UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 

LOS  ANGELES 


SCHOOL  OF  LAW 
LIBRARY 


THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 


o 


O  w 

W  C 

•>  <u 

M  -o 

W  -3 

—  s 


- 
w    «r 

>3          CO 

<  § 

H     K 

M     C 


THE 
PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

A  PERSONAL  NARRATIVE 

BY 
ROBERT  LANSING 

WITH   ILLUSTRATIONS 


BOSTON  AND  NEW  YORK 

HOUGHTON  MIFFLIN  COMPANY 

Cttliersifcf  pres?  Cambribge 
1921 


T 


COPYRIGHT,    1921,    B\    HOUGHTON  MIFFLIN    COMPANY 

Copyright  is  reserved  in  the  following  countries  under  the  copy- 
right convention  proclaimed  July  ij,  1014:  Argentine  Republic, 
Brazil,  Chile,  Colombia,  Costa  Rica,  Cuba,  Dominican  Republic, 
Ecuador,  Guatemala,  Haiti,  Honduras,  Mexico,  Nicaragua,  Pan- 
ama, Paraguay,  Peru,  Salvador,  Uruguay,  and  Venezuela. 

All  rights  reserved,  including  that  of  translation  into  foreign 
languages,  including  the  Scandinavian 


£/ 


Cht  JRitrrsi&t 

CAMBRIDGE      MASSACHUSETTS 
U  .  S  .  A 


I.  REASONS  FOR  WRITING  A  PERSONAL  NARRATIVE  3 

II.  MR.  WILSON'S  PRESENCE  AT  THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE  14 

III.  GENERAL  PLAN  FOR  A  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS  28 

IV.  SUBSTITUTE  ARTICLES  PROPOSED  48 
V.  THE  AFFIRMATIVE  GUARANTY  AND   BALANCE   OF 

POWER  77 

VI.  THE  PRESIDENT'S  PLAN  AND  THE  CECIL  PLAN  81 

VII.  SELF-DETERMINATION  93 

VIII.  THE  CONFERENCE  OF  JANUARY  10,  1919  106 

IX.  A  RESOLUTION  INSTEAD  OF  THE  COVENANT  109 

X.  THE  GUARANTY  IN  THE  REVISED  COVENANT  122 

XI.  INTERNATIONAL  ARBITRATION  126 

XII.  REPORT  OF  COMMISSION  ON  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS  134 

XIII.  THE  SYSTEM  OF  MANDATES  149 

XIV.  DIFFERENCES  AS  TO  THE  LEAGUE  RECAPITULATED  162 
XV.  THE  PROPOSED  TREATY  WITH  FRANCE  178 

XVI.  LACK  OF  AN  AMERICAN  PROGRAMME  190 

XVII.  SECRET  DIPLOMACY  213 

XVIII.  THE  SHANTUNG  SETTLEMENT  243 

XIX.  THE  BULLITT  AFFAIR  268 

CONCLUSION  278 

APPENDICES 

I.  THE  PRESIDENT'S  ORIGINAL  DRAFT  OF  THE  COVENANT 
OF  THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS,  LAID  BEFORE  THE  AMERICAN 

COMMISSION  ON  JANUARY  10,  1919  281 


vi  CONTENTS 

II.  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS  PLAN  OF  LORD  ROBERT  CECIL  295 

III.  THE  COVENANT  OF  THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS  IN  THE 
TREATY  OF  VERSAILLES  299 

IV.  THE  FOURTEEN  POINTS  314 
V.  PRINCIPLES   DECLARED   BY  PRESIDENT  WILSON    IN   HIS 

ADDRESS  OF  FEBRUARY  n,  1918  317 

VI.  THE  ARTICLES  OF  THE  TREATY  OF  VERSAILLES  RELATING 

TO  SHANTUNG  318 

INDEX  321 


ILLUSTRATIONS 

THE  AMERICAN  PEACE  DELEGATION  AT  PARIS  Frontispiece 

Photograph  by  Signal  Corps,  U.S.A. 

FACSIMILE  OF  MR.  LANSING'S  COMMISSION  AS  A  COMMISSIONER 
PLENIPOTENTIARY  TO  NEGOTIATE  PEACE  28 

THE  RUE  ROYALE  ON  THE  ARRIVAL  OF  PRESIDENT  WILSON 
ON  DECEMBER  14,  1918  48 

Photograph  by  Signal  Corps,  U.S.A. 

THE  AMERICAN  PEACE  DELEGATION  AND  STAFF  94 

Photograph  by  Signal  Corps,  U.S.A. 

A  MEETING  AT  THE  QUAI  D'ORSAY  AFTER  PRESIDENT  WILSON'S 
DEPARTURE  FROM  PARIS  134 

FACSIMILE  OF  MR.  LANSING'S   "  FULL  POWERS  "    TO  NEGO- 
TIATE A  TREATY  OF  ASSISTANCE  TO  FRANCE  182 

THE  DAILY  CONFERENCE  OF  THE  AMERICAN  PEACE  COMMIS- 
SION 256 
Photograph  by  Isabey,  Paris 


THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 


CHRONOLOGY 


The  Declaration  of  the  Fourteen  Points 

Declaration  of  Four  Additional  Bases  of  Peace 

Departure  of  Colonel  House  for  Paris  to  represent  the 
President  on  Supreme  War  Council 

Signature  of  Armistice,  5  A.M.;  effective,  II  A.M. 

Departure  of  President  and  American  Commission 
for  France 

Arrival  of  President  and  American  Commission  in 
Paris 

Meeting  of  Supreme  War  Council 

First  Plenary  Session  of  Peace  Conference 

Plenary  Session  at  which  Report  on  the  League  of  Na- 
tions was  Submitted 

Departure  of  President  from  Paris  for  United  States 

President  lands  at  Boston 

Departure  of  President  from  New  York  for  France 

President  arrives  in  Paris 

Organization  of  Council  of  Four 

President's  public  statement  in  regard  to  Fiume 

Adoption  of  Commission's  Report  on  League  of  Na- 
tions by  the  Conference 

The  Shantung  Settlement 

Delivery  of  the  Peace  Treaty  to  the  German  Plenipo- 
tentiaries 

Signing  of  Treaty  of  Versailles 

Signing  of  Treaty  of  Assistance  with  France 

Departure  of  President  for  the  United  States 

Departure  of  Mr.  Lansing  from  Paris  for  United 
States 

Hearing  of  Mr.  Lansing  before  Senate  Committee  on 
Foreign  Relations 

Conference  of  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations 
with  the  President  at  the  White  House 

Hearing  of  Mr.  Bullitt  before  Senate  Committee  on 
Foreign  Relations 

Return  of  President  to  Washington  from  tour  of  West 

Resignation  of  Mr.  Lansing  as  Secretary  of  State 


January  18,  1918 
February  n,  1918 

October  17,  1918 
November  u,  1918 

December  4,  1918 

December  14,  1918 
January  12,  1919 
January  25,  1919 


February  14,  1919 
February  14,  1919 
February  24,  1919 
March  5,  1919 
March  14,  1919 
About  March  24,  1919 
April  23,  1919 


April  28,  1919 
April  30,  1919 

May  7,  1919 
June  28,  1919 
June  28,  1919 
June  28,  1919 

July  12,  1919 

August  6,  1919 

August  19,  1919 

September  12,  1919 
September  28,  1919 
February  13,  1920 


THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

•        • 
• 

CHAPTER  I 
REASONS  FOR  WRITING  A  PERSONAL  NARRATIVE 

"WHILE  we  were  still  in  Paris,  I  felt,  and  have  felt  in- 
creasingly ever  since,  that  you  accepted  my  guidance 
and  direction  on  questions  with  regard  to  which  I  had  to 
instruct  you  only  with  increasing  reluctance.  .  .  . 

"...  I  must  say  that  it  would  relieve  me  of  embarrass- 
ment, Mr.  Secretary,  the  embarrassment  of  feeling  your 
reluctance  and  divergence  of  judgment,  if  you  would  give 
your  present  office  up  and  afford  me  an  opportunity  to 
select  some  one  whose  mind  would  more  willingly  go  along 
with  mine." 

These  words  are  taken  from  the  letter  which  President 
Wilson  wrote  to  me  on  February  n,  1920.  On  the  follow- 
ing day  I  tendered  my  resignation  as  Secretary  of  State 
by  a  letter,  in  which  I  said : 

"Ever  since  January,  1919, 1  have  been  conscious  of  the 
fact  that  you  no  longer  were  disposed  to  welcome  my 
advice  in  matters  pertaining  to  the  negotiations  in  Paris, 
to  our  foreign  service,  or  to  international  affairs  in  gen- 
eral. Holding  these  views  I  would,  if  I  had  consulted 
my  personal  inclination  alone,  have  resigned  as  Secretary 
of  State  and  as  a  Commissioner  to  Negotiate  Peace.  I 
felt,  however,  that  such  a  step  might  have  been  misin- 
terpreted both  at  home  and  abroad,  and  that  it  was  my 
duty  to  cause  you  no  embarrassment  in  carrying  forward 
the  great  task  in  which  you  were  then  engaged." 


4  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

The  President  was  right  in  his  impression  that,  "while 
we  were  still  in  Paris,"  I  had  accepted  his  guidance  and 
direction  with  reluctance.  It  was  as  correct  as  my  state- 
ment that,  as  early  as  January,  1919, 1  was  conscious  that 
he  was  no  longer  disposed  to  welcome  my  advice  in  matters 
pertaining  to  the  peace  negotiations  at  Paris. 

There  have  been  obvious  reasons  of  propriety  for  my 
silence  until  now  as  to  the  divergence  of  judgment,  the 
differences  of  opinion  and  the  consequent  breach  in  the 
relations  between  President  Wilson  and  myself.  They 
have  been  the  subject  of  speculation  and  inference  which 
have  left  uncertain  the  true  record.  The  time  has  come 
when  a  frank  account  of  our  differences  can  be  given  pub- 
licity without  a  charge  being  made  of  disloyalty  to  the 
Administration  in  power. 

The  President,  in  his  letter  of  February  u,  1920,  from 
which  the  quotation  is  made,  indicated  my  unwillingness 
to  follow  him  in  the  course  which  he  adopted  at  Paris,  but 
he  does  not  specifically  point  out  the  particular  subjects 
as  to  which  we  were  not  in  accord.  It  is  unsatisfactory,  if 
not  criticizable,  to  leave  the  American  people  in  doubt  as 
to  a  disagreement  between  two  of  their  official  representa- 
tives upon  a  matter  of  so  grave  importance  to  the  country 
as  the  negotiation  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles.  They  are 
entitled  to  know  the  truth  in  order  that  they  may  pass 
judgment  upon  the  merits  of  the  differences  which  ex- 
isted. I  am  not  willing  that  the  present  uncertainty  as  to 
the  facts  should  continue.  Possibly  some  may  think  that 


REASONS  FOR  PERSONAL  NARRATIVE       5 

I  have  remained  silent  too  long.  If  I  have,  it  has  been  only 
from  a  sense  of  obligation  to  an  Administration  of  which 
I  was  so  long  a  member.  It  has  not  been  through  lack  of 
desire  to  lay  the  record  before  the  public. 

The  statements  which  will  be  made  in  the  succeeding 
pages  will  not  be  entirely  approved  by  some  of  my  readers. 
In  the  circumstances  it  is  far  too  much  to  expect  to  escape 
criticism.  The  review  of  facts  and  the  comments  upon 
them  may  be  characterized  in  certain  quarters  as  disloyal 
to  a  superior  and  as  violative  of  the  seal  of  silence  which  is 
considered  generally  to  apply  to  the  intercourse  and  com- 
munications between  the  President  and  his  official  ad- 
visers. Under  normal  conditions  such  a  characterization 
would  not  be  unjustified.  But  the  present  case  is  different 
from  the  usual  one  in  which  a  disagreement  arises  between 
a  President  and  a  high  official  of  his  Administration. 

Mr.  Wilson  made  our  differences  at  Paris  one  of  the 
chief  grounds  for  stating  that  he  would  be  pleased  to 
take  advantage  of  my  expressed  willingness  to  resign. 
The  manifest  imputation  was  that  I  had  advised  him 
wrongly  and  that,  after  he  had  decided  to  adopt  a  course 
contrary  to  my  advice,  I  had  continued  to  oppose  his 
views  and  had  with  reluctance  obeyed  his  instructions. 
Certainly  no  American  official  is  in  honor  bound  to  remain 
silent  under  such  an  imputation  which  approaches  a  charge 
of  faithlessness  and  of  a  secret,  if  not  open,  avoidance  of 
duty.  He  has,  in  my  judgment,  the  right  to  present  the 
case  to  the  American  people  in  order  that  they  may  decide 


6  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

whether  the  imputation  was  justified  by  the  facts,  and 
whether  his  conduct  was  or  was  not  in  the  circumstances 
in  accord  with  the  best  traditions  of  the  public  service  of 
the  United  States. 

A  review  of  this  sort  becomes  necessarily  a  personal 
narrative,  which,  because  of  its  intimate  nature,  is  embar- 
rassing to  the  writer,  since  he  must  record  his  own  acts, 
words,  desires,  and  purposes,  his  own  views  as  to  a  course 
of  action,  and  his  own  doubts,  fears,  and  speculations  as  to 
the  future.  If  there  were  another  method  of  treatment 
which  would  retain  the  authoritative  character  of  a  per- 
sonal statement,  it  would  be  a  satisfaction  to  adopt  it. 
But  I  know  of  none.  The  true  story  can  only  be  told  from 
the  intimate  and  personal  point  of  view.  As  I  intend  to 
tell  the  true  story  I  offer  no  further  apology  for  its  per- 
sonal character. 

Before  beginning  a  recital  of  the  relations  existing  be- 
tween President  Wilson  and  myself  during  the  Paris  Con- 
ference, I  wish  to  state,  and  to  emphasize  the  statement, 
that  I  was  never  for  a  moment  unmindful  that  the  Con- 
stitution of  the  United  States  confides  to  the  President  the 
absolute  right  of  conducting  the  foreign  relations  of  the 
Republic,  and  that  it  is  the  duty  of  a  Commissioner  to  fol- 
low the  President's  instructions  in  the  negotiation  of  a 
treaty.  Many  Americans,  some  of  whom  are  national 
legislators  and  solicitous  about  the  Constitution,  seem  to 
have  ignored  or  to  have  forgotten  this  delegation  of  exclu- 
sive authority,  with  the  result  that  they  have  condemned 


REASONS  FOR  PERSONAL  NARRATIVE       7 

the  President  in  intemperate  language  for  exercising  this 
executive  right.  As  to  the  wisdom  of  the  way  in  which  Mr. 
Wilson  exercised  it  in  directing  the  negotiations  at  Paris 
individual  opinions  may  differ,  but  as  to  the  legality  of  his 
conduct  there  ought  to  be  but  one  mind.  From  first  to 
last  he  acted  entirely  within  his  constitutional  powers  as 
President  of  the  United  States. 

The  duties  of  a  diplomatic  representative  commissioned 
by  the  President  and  given  full  powers  to  negotiate  a 
treaty  are,  in  addition  to  the  formal  carrying  out  of  his 
instructions,  twofold,  namely,  to  advise  the  President  dur- 
ing the  negotiation  of  his  views  as  to  the  wise  course  to  be 
adopted,  and  to  prevent  the  President,  in  so  far  as  possible, 
from  taking  any  step  in  the  proceedings  which  may  impair 
the  rights  of  his  country  or  may  be  injurious  to  its  inter- 
ests. These  duties,  in  my  opinion,  are  equally  imperative 
whether  the  President  directs  the  negotiations  through 
written  instructions  issuing  from  the  White  House  or  con- 
ducts them  in  person.  For  an  American  plenipotentiary  to 
remain  silent,  and  by  his  silence  to  give  the  impression  that 
he  approves  a  course  of  action  which  he  in  fact  believes  to 
be  wrong  in  principle  or  contrary  to  good  policy,  consti- 
tutes a  failure  to  perform  his  full  duty  to  the  President  and 
to  the  country.  It  is  his  duty  to  speak  and  to  speak  frankly 
and  plainly. 

With  this  conception  of  the  obligations  of  a  Commis- 
sioner to  Negotiate  Peace,  obligations  which  were  the 
more  compelling  in  my  case  because  of  my  official  position 


8  TOE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

as  Secretary  of  State,  I  felt  it  incumbent  upon  me  to  offer 
advice  to  the  President  whenever  it  seemed  necessary  to 
me  to  consider  the  adoption  of  a  line  of  action  in  regard  to 
the  negotiations,  and  particularly  so  when  the  indications 
were  that  the  President  purposed  to  reach  a  decision  which 
seemed  to  me  unwise  or  impolitic.  Though  from  the  first  I 
felt  that  my  suggestions  were  received  with  coldness  and 
my  criticisms  with  disfavor,  because  they  did  not  conform 
to  the  President's  wishes  and  intentions,  I  persevered  in 
my  efforts  to  induce  him  to  abandon  in  some  cases  or  to 
modify  in  others  a  course  which  would  in  my  judgment  be 
a  violation  of  principle  or  a  mistake  in  policy.  It  seemed 
to  me  that  duty  demanded  this,  and  that,  whatever  the 
consequences  might  be,  I  ought  not  to  give  tacit  assent  to 
that  which  I  believed  wrong  or  even  injudicious. 

The  principal  subjects,  concerning  which  President  Wil- 
son and  I  were  in  marked  disagreement,  were  the  follow- 
ing: His  presence  in  Paris  during  the  peace  negotiations 
and  especially  his  presence  there  as  a  delegate  to  the  Peace 
Conference;  the  fundamental  principles  of  the  constitu- 
tion and  functions  of  a  League  of  Nations  as  proposed  or 
advocated  by  him;  the  form  of  the  organic  act,  known  as 
the  "Covenant,"  its  elaborate  character  and  its  inclusion 
in  the  treaty  restoring  a  state  of  peace;  the  treaty  of  de- 
fensive alliance  with  France;  the  necessity  for  a  definite 
programme  which  the  American  Commissioners  could  fol- 
low in  carrying  on  the  negotiations;  the  employment  of 
private  interviews  and  confidential  agreements  in  reaching 


REASONS  FOR  PERSONAL  NARRATIVE       9 

settlements,  a  practice  which  gave  color  to  the  charge  of 
"secret  diplomacy";  and,  lastly,  the  admission  of  the 
Japanese  claims  to  possession  of  German  treaty  rights  at 
Kiao-Chau  and  in  the  Province  of  Shantung. 

Of  these  seven  subjects  of  difference  the  most  impor- 
tant were  those  relating  to  the  League  of  Nations  and  the 
Covenant,  though  our  opposite  views  as  to  Shantung  were 
more  generally  known  and  more  frequently  the  subject 
of  public  comment.  While  chief  consideration  will  be 
given  to  the  differences  regarding  the  League  and  the  Cov- 
enant, the  record  would  be  incomplete  if  the  other  sub- 
jects were  omitted.  In  fact  nearly  all  of  these  matters  of 
difference  are  more  or  less  interwoven  and  have  a  col- 
lateral, if  not  a  direct,  bearing  upon  one  another.  They 
all  contributed  in  affecting  the  attitude  of  President 
Wilson  toward  the  advice  that  I  felt  it  my  duty  to  volun- 
teer, an  attitude  which  was  increasingly  impatient  of 
unsolicited  criticism  and  suggestion  and  which  resulted 
at  last  in  the  correspondence  of  February,  1920,  that 
ended  with  the  acceptance  of  my  resignation  as  Secretary 
of  State. 

The  review  of  these  subjects  will  be,  so  far  as  it  is  possi- 
ble, treated  in  chronological  order,  because,  as  the  matters 
of  difference  increased  in  number,  they  gave  emphasis  to 
the  divergence  of  judgment  which  existed  between  the 
President  and  myself.  The  effect  was  cumulative,  and 
tended  not  only  to  widen  the  breach,  but  to  make  less 
and  less  possible  a  restoration  of  our  former  relations.  It 


io  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

was  my  personal  desire  to  support  the  President's  views 
concerning  the  negotiations  at  Paris,  but,  when  in  order 
to  do  so  it  became  necessary  to  deny  a  settled  conviction 
and  to  suppress  a  conception  of  the  true  principle  or  the 
wise  policy  to  be  followed,  I  could  not  do  it  and  feel  that 
to  give  support  under  such  conditions  accorded  with  true 
loyalty  to  the  President  of  the  United  States. 

It  was  in  this  spirit  that  my  advice  was  given  and  my 
suggestions  were  made,  though  in  doing  so  I  believed  it 
justifiable  to  conform  as  far  as  it  was  possible  to  the  ex- 
pressed views  of  Mr.  Wilson,  or  to  what  seemed  to  be  his 
views,  concerning  less  important  matters  and  to  concen- 
trate on  those  which  seemed  vital.  I  went  in  fact  as  far 
as  I  could  in  adopting  his  views  in  the  hope  that  my  advice 
would  be  less  unpalatable  and  would,  as  a  consequence, 
receive  more  sympathetic  consideration.  Believing  that 
I  understood  the  President's  temperament,  success  in  an 
attempt  to  change  his  views  seemed  to  lie  in  moderation 
and  in  partial  approval  of  his  purpose  rather  than  in 
bluntly  arguing  that  it  was  wholly  wrong  and  should  be 
abandoned.  This  method  of  approach,  which  seemed  the 
expedient  one  at  the  time,  weakened,  in  some  instances 
at  least,  the  criticisms  and  objections  which  I  made.  It  is 
very  possible  that  even  in  this  diluted  form  my  views  were 
credited  with  wrong  motives  by  the  President  so  that  he 
suspected  my  purpose.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that  this  was  the 
true  explanation  of  Mr.  Wilson's  attitude  of  mind,  for  the 
alternative  forces  a  conclusion  as  to  the  cause  for  his  re- 


REASONS  FOR  PERSONAL  NARRATIVE     11 

sentful  reception  of  honest  differences  of  opinion,  which 
no  one,  who  admires  his  many  sterling  qualities  and  great 
attainments,  will  willingly  accept. 

Whatever  the  cause  of  the  President's  attitude  toward 
the  opinions  which  I  expressed  on  the  subjects  concerning 
which  our  views  were  at  variance  —  and  I  prefer  to  as- 
sume that  the  cause  was  a  misapprehension  of  my  reasons 
for  giving  them  —  the  result  was  that  he  was  disposed  to 
give  them  little  weight.  The  impression  made  was  that 
he  was  irritated  by  opposition  to  his  views,  however  mod- 
erately urged,  and  that  he  did  not  like  to  have  his  judg- 
ment questioned  even  in  a  friendly  way.  It  is,  of  course, 
possible  that  this  is  not  a  true  estimate  of  the  President's 
feelings.  It  may  do  him  an  injustice.  But  his  manner 
of  meeting  criticism  and  his  disposition  to  ignore  opposi- 
tion can  hardly  be  interpreted  in  any  other  way. 

There  is  the  alternative  possibility  that  Mr.  Wilson  was 
convinced  that,  after  he  had  given  a  subject  mature  con- 
sideration and  reached  a  decision,  his  judgment  was  right 
or  at  least  better  than  that  of  any  adviser.  A  conviction 
of  this  nature,  if  it  existed,  would  naturally  have  caused 
him  to  feel  impatient  with  any  one  who  attempted  to 
controvert  his  decisions  and  would  tend  to  make  him  be- 
lieve that  improper  motives  induced  the  opposition  or 
criticism.,  This  alternative,  which  is  based  of  necessity 
on  a  presumption  as  to  the  temperament  of  Mr.  Wilson 
that  an  unprejudiced  and  cautious  student  of  personality 
would  hesitate  to  adopt,  I  mention  only  because  there 


12  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

were  many  who  believed  it  to  be  the  correct  explanation 
of  his  attitude.  In  view  of  my  intimate  relations  with  the 
President  prior  to  the  Paris  Conference  I  feel  that  in 
justice  to  him  I  should  say  that  he  did  not,  except  on  rare 
occasions,  resent  criticism  of  a  proposed  course  of  action, 
and,  while  he  seemed  in  a  measure  changed  after  departing 
from  the  United  States  in  December,  1918,  I  do  not  think 
that  the  change  was  sufficient  to  justify  the  presumption 
of  self-assurance  which  it  would  be  necessary  to  adopt  if 
the  alternative  possibility  is  considered  to  furnish  the 
better  explanation. 

It  is,  however,  natural,  considering  what  occurred  at 
Paris,  to  search  out  the  reason  or  reasons  for  the  Presi- 
dent's evident  unwillingness  to  listen  to  advice  when  he  did 
not  solicit  it,  and  for  his  failure  to  take  all  the  American 
Commissioners  into  his  confidence.  But  to  attempt  to 
dissect  the  mentality  and  to  analyze  the  intellectual  proc- 
esses of  Woodrow  Wilson  is  not  my  purpose.  It  would 
only  invite  discussion  and  controversy  as  to  the  truth  of 
the  premises  and  the  accuracy  of  the  deductions  reached. 
The  facts  will  be  presented  and  to  an  extent  the  im- 
pressions made  upon  me  at  the  time  will  be  reviewed,  but 
impressions  of  that  character  which  are  not  the  result 
of  comparison  with  subsequent  events  and  of  mature 
deliberation  are  not  always  justified.  They  may  later 
prove  to  be  partially  or  wholly  wrong.  They  have  the 
value,  nevertheless,  of  explaining  in  many  cases  why  I 
did  or  did  not  do  certain  things,  and  of  disclosing  the 


REASONS  FOR  PERSONAL  NARRATIVE     13 

state  of  mind  that  in  a  measure  determined  my  conduct 
which  without  this  recital  of  contemporaneous  impres- 
sions might  mystify  one  familiar  with  what  afterwards 
took  place.  The  notes,  letters,  and  memoranda  which  are 
quoted  in  the  succeeding  pages,  as  well  as  the  opinions 
and  beliefs  held  at  the  time  (of  which,  in  accordance  with 
a  practice  of  years,  I  kept  a  record  supplementing  my  daily 
journal  of  events),  should  be  weighed  and  measured  by  the 
situation  which  existed  when  they  were  written  and  not 
alone  in  the  light  of  the  complete  review  of  the  proceedings. 
In  forming  an  opinion  as  to  my  differences  with  the  Presi- 
dent it  should  be  the  reader's  endeavor  to  place  himself  in 
my  position  at  the  time  and  not  judge  them  solely  by  the 
results  of  the  negotiations  at  Paris.  It  comes  to  this: 
Was  I  justified  then?  Am  I  justified  now?  If  those  ques- 
tions are  answered  impartially  and  without  prejudice, 
there  is  nothing  further  that  I  would  ask  of  the  reader. 


CHAPTER  II 

MR.  WILSON'S  PRESENCE  AT  THE  PEACE 
CONFERENCE 

EARLY  in  October,  1918,  it  required  no  prophetic  vision 
to  perceive  that  the  World  War  would  come  to  an  end  in 
the  near  future.  Austria-Hungary,  acting  with  the  full 
approval  of  the  German  Government,  had  made  overtures 
for  peace,  and  Bulgaria,  recognizing  the  futility  of  further 
struggle,  had  signed  an  armistice  which  amounted  to  an 
unconditional  surrender.  These  events  were  soon  followed 
by  the  collapse  of  Turkish  resistance  and  by  the  German 
proposals  which  resulted  in  the  armistice  which  went  into 
effect  on  November  n,  1918. 

In  view  of  the  importance  of  the  conditions  of  the  armi- 
stice with  Germany  and  their  relation  to  the  terms  of  peace 
to  be  later  negotiated,  the  President  considered  it  essen- 
tial to  have  an  American  member  added  to  the  Supreme 
War  Council,  which  then  consisted  of  M.  Clemenceau, 
Mr.  Lloyd  George,  and  Signor  Orlando,  the  premiers  of 
the  three  Allied  Powers.  He  selected  Colonel  Edward 
M.  House  for  this  important  post  and  named  him  a 
Special  Commissioner  to  represent  him  personally.  Colo- 
nel House  with  a  corps  of  secretaries  and  assistants  sailed 
from  New  York  on  October  17,  en  route  for  Paris  where 
the  Supreme  War  Council  was  in  session. 


MR.  WILSON'S  PRESENCE  15 

Three  days  before  his  departure  the  Colonel  was  in 
Washington  and  we  had  two  long  conferences  with  the 
President  regarding  the  correspondence  with  Germany 
and  with  the  Allies  relating  to  a  cessation  of  hostilities, 
during  which  we  discussed  the  position  which  the  United 
States  should  take  as  to  the  terms  of  the  armistice  and 
the  bases  of  peace  which  should  be  incorporated  in  the 
document. 

It  was  after  one  of  these  conferences  that  Colonel  House 
informed  me  that  the  President  had  decided  to  name  him 
(the  Colonel)  and  me  as  two  of  the  American  plenipo- 
tentiaries to  the  Peace  Conference,  and  that  the  President 
was  considering  attending  the  Conference  and  in  person 
directing  the  negotiations.  This  latter  intention  of  Mr. 
Wilson  surprised  and  disturbed  me,  and  I  expressed  the 
hope  that  the  President's  mind  was  not  made  up,  as  I 
believed  that  if  he  gave  more  consideration  to  the  project 
he  would  abandon  it,  since  it  was  manifest  that  his  influ- 
ence over  the  negotiations  would  be  much  greater  if  he 
remained  in  Washington  and  issued  instructions  to  his 
representatives  in  the  Conference.  Colonel  House  did  not 
say  that  he  agreed  with  my  judgment  in  this  matter, 
though  he  did  not  openly  disagree  with  it.  However,  I 
drew  the  conclusion,  though  without  actual  knowledge, 
that  he  approved  of  the  President's  purpose,  and,  possibly, 
had  encouraged  him  to  become  an  actual  participant  in 
the  preliminary  conferences. 

The  President's  idea  of  attending  the  Peace  Conference 


16  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

was  not  a  new  one.  Though  I  cannot  recollect  the  source 
of  my  information,  I  know  that  in  December,  1916,  when  it 
will  be  remembered  Mr.  Wilson  was  endeavoring  to  induce 
the  belligerents  to  state  their  objects  in  the  war  and  to 
enter  into  a  conference  looking  toward  peace,  he  had  an 
idea  that  he  might,  as  a  friend  of  both  parties,  preside  over 
such  a  conference  and  exert  his  personal  influence  to  bring 
the  belligerents  into  agreement.  A  service  of  this  sort  un- 
doubtedly appealed  to  the  President's  humanitarian  in- 
stinct and  to  his  earnest  desire  to  end  the  devastating  war, 
while  the  novelty  of  the  position  in  which  he  would  be 
placed  would  not  have  been  displeasing  to  one  who  in  his 
public  career  seemed  to  find  satisfaction  in  departing  from 
the  established  paths  marked  out  by  custom  and  usage. 

When,  however,  the  attempt  at  mediation  failed  and 
when  six  weeks  later,  on  February  I,  1917,  the  German 
Government  renewed  indiscriminate  submarine  warfare 
resulting  in  the  severance  of  diplomatic  relations  between 
the  United  States  and  Germany,  President  Wilson  con- 
tinued to  cherish  the  hope  that  he  might  yet  assume  the 
role  of  mediator.  He  even  went  so  far  as  to  prepare  a  draft 
of  the  bases  of  peace,  which  he  purposed  to  submit  to  the 
belligerents  if  they  could  be  induced  to  meet  in  conference. 
I  cannot  conceive  how  he  could  have  expected  to  bring 
this  about  in  view  of  the  elation  of  the  Allies  at  the  dis- 
missal of  Count  von  Bernstorff  and  the  seeming  certainty 
that  the  United  States  would  declare  war  against  Germany 
if  the  latter  persisted  in  her  ruthless  sinking  of  American 


MR.  WILSON'S  PRESENCE  17 

merchant  vessels.  But  I  know,  in  spite  of  the  logic  of  the 
situation,  that  he  expected  or  at  least  hoped  to  succeed 
in  his  mediatory  programme  and  made  ready  to  play  his 
part  in  the  negotiation  of  a  peace. 

From  the  time  that  Congress  declared  that  a  state  of 
war  existed  between  the  United  States  and  the  Imperial 
German  Government  up  to  the  autumn  of  1918,  when  the 
Central  Alliance  made  overtures  to  end  the  war,  the  Presi- 
dent made  no  attempt  so  far  as  I  am  aware  to  enter  upon 
peace  negotiations  with  the  enemy  nations.  In  fact  he 
showed  a  disposition  to  reject  all  peace  proposals.  He 
appears  to  have  reached  the  conclusion  that  the  defeat  of 
Germany  and  her  allies  was  essential  before  permanent 
peace  could  be  restored.  At  all  events,  he  took  no  steps 
to  bring  the  belligerents  together  until  a  military  decision 
had  been  practically  reached.  He  did,  however,  on  Janu- 
ary 8, 1918,  lay  down  his  famous  "Fourteen  Points,"  which 
he  supplemented  with  certain  declarations  in  "subsequent 
addresses,"  thus  proclaiming  his  ideas  as  to  the  proper 
bases  of  peace  when  the  time  should  come  to  negotiate. 

Meanwhile,  in  anticipation  of  the  final  triumph  of  the 
armies  of  the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers,  the  President, 
in  the  spring  of  1917,  directed  the  organization,  under  the 
Department  of  State,  of  a  body  of  experts  to  collect  data 
and  prepare  monographs,  charts,  and  maps,  covering  all 
historical,  territorial,  economic,  and  legal  subjects  which 
would  probably  arise  in  the  negotiation  of  a  treaty  of  peace. 
This  Commission  of  Inquiry,  as  it  was  called,  had  its 


1 8  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

offices  in  New  York  and  was  under  Colonel  House  so  far 
as  the  selection  of  its  members  was  concerned.  The  nom- 
inal head  of  the  Commission  was  Dr.  Mezes,  President  of 
the  College  of  the  City  of  New  York  and  a  brother-in-law 
of  Colonel  House,  though  the  actual  and  efficient  executive 
head  was  Dr.  Isaiah  Bowman,  Director  of  the  Ameri- 
can Geographical  Society.  The  plans  of  organization,  the 
outline  of  work,  and  the  proposed  expenditures  for  the 
maintenance  of  the  Commission  were  submitted  to  me  as 
Secretary  of  State.  I  examined  them  and,  after  several 
comferences  with  Dr.  Mezes,  approved  them  and  recom- 
mended to  the  President  that  he  allot  the  funds  necessary 
to  carry  out  the  programme. 

In  addition  to  the  subjects  which  were  dealt  with  by 
this  excellent  corps  of  students  and  experts,  whose  work 
was  of  the  highest  order,  the  creation  of  some  sort  of  an 
international  association  to  prevent  wars  in  the  future  re- 
ceived special  attention  from  the  President  as  it  did  from 
Americans  of  prominence  not  connected  with  the  Govern- 
ment. It  caused  considerable  discussion  in  the  press  and 
many  schemes  were  proposed  and  pamphlets  written  on 
the  subject.  To  organize  such  an  association  became  a 
generally  recognized  object  to  be  attained  in  the  negotia- 
tion of  the  peace  which  would  end  the  World  War;  and 
there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  President  believed  more 
and  more  in  the  vital  necessity  of  forming  an  effective 
organization  of  the  nations  to  preserve  peace  in  the  future 
and  make  another  great  war  impossible. 


MR.  WILSON'S  PRESENCE  19 

The  idea  of  being  present  and  taking  an  active  part  in 
formulating  the  terms  of  peace  had,  in  my  opinion,  never 
been  abandoned  by  President  Wilson,  although  it  had  re- 
mained dormant  while  the  result  of  the  conflict  was  un- 
certain. When,  however,  in  early  October,  1918,  there 
could  no  longer  be  any  doubt  that  the  end  of  the  war  was 
approaching,  the  President  appears  to  have  revived  the 
idea  and  to  have  decided,  if  possible,  to  carry  out  the  pur- 
pose which  he  had  so  long  cherished.  He  seemed  to  have 
failed  to  appreciate,  or,  if  he  did  appreciate,  to  have  ig- 
nored the  fact  that  the  conditions  were  wholly  different 
in  October,  1918,  from  what  they  were  in  December,  1916. 

In  December,  1916,  the  United  States  was  a  neutral  na- 
tion, and  the  President,  in  a  spirit  of  mutual  friendliness, 
which  was  real  and  not  assumed,  was  seeking  to  bring  the 
warring  powers  together  in  conference  looking  toward  the 
negotiation  of  "a  peace  without  victory."  In  the  event 
that  he  was  able  to  persuade  them  to  meet,  his  presence  at 
the  conference  as  a  pacificator  and  probably  as  the  presid- 
ing officer  would  not  improbably  have  been  in  the  interests 
of  peace,  because,  as  the  executive  head  of  the  greatest  of 
the  neutral  nations  of  the  world  and  as  the  impartial  friend 
of  both  parties,  his  personal  influence  would  presumably 
have  been  very  great  in  preventing  a  rupture  in  the  nego- 
tiations and  in  inducing  the  parties  to  act  in  a  spirit  of  con- 
ciliation and  compromise. 

In  October,  1918,  however,  the  United  States  was  a 
belligerent.  Its  national  interests  were  involved;  its  armies 


20  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

were  in  conflict  with  the  Germans  on  the  soil  of  France;  its 
naval  vessels  were  patrolling  the  Atlantic;  and  the  Ameri- 
can people,  bitterly  hostile,  were  demanding  vengeance  on 
the  Governments  and  peoples  of  the  Central  Powers,  par- 
ticularly those  of  Germany.  President  Wilson,  it  is  true, 
had  endeavored  with  a  measure  of  success  to  maintain  the 
position  of  an  unbiased  arbiter  in  the  discussions  leading 
up  to  the  armistice  of  November  n,  and  Germany  un- 
doubtedly looked  to  him  as  the  one  hope  of  checking  the 
spirit  of  revenge  which  animated  the  Allied  Powers  in  view 
of  all  that  they  had  suffered  at  the  hands  of  the  Germans. 
It  is  probable  too  that  the  Allies  recognized  that  Mr.  Wil- 
son was  entitled  to  be  satisfied  as  to  the  terms  of  peace  since 
American  man  power  and  American  resources  had  turned 
the  scale  against  Germany  and  made  victory  a  certainty. 
The  President,  in  fact,  dominated  the  situation.  If  he 
remained  in  Washington  and  carried  on  the  negotiations 
through  his  Commissioners,  he  would  in  all  probability 
retain  his  superior  place  and  be  able  to  dictate  such  terms 
of  peace  as  he  considered  just.  But,  if  he  did  as  he  pur- 
posed doing  and  attended  the  Peace  Conference,  he  would 
lose  the  unique  position  which  he  held  and  would  have  to 
submit  to  the  combined  will  of  his  foreign  colleagues  be- 
coming a  prey  to  intrigue  and  to  the  impulses  arising  from 
their  hatred  for  the  vanquished  nations. 

A  practical  view  of  the  situation  so  clearly  pointed  to 
the  unwisdom  of  the  President's  personal  participation  in 
the  peace  negotiations  that  a  very  probable  explanation 


MR.  WILSON'S  PRESENCE  21 

for  his  determination  to  be  present  at  the  Conference  is  the 
assumption  that  the  idea  had  become  so  firmly  embedded 
in  his  mind  that  nothing  could  dislodge  it  or  divert  him 
from  his  purpose.  How  far  the  spectacular  feature  of  a 
President  crossing  the  ocean  to  control  in  person  the  mak- 
ing of  peace  appealed  to  him  I  do  not  know.  It  may  have 
been  the  deciding  factor.  It  may  have  had  no  effect  at  all. 
How  far  the  belief  that  a  just  peace  could  only  be  secured 
by  the  exercise  of  his  personal  influence  over  the  delegates 
I  cannot  say.  How  far  he  doubted  the  ability  of  the  men 
whom  he  proposed  to  name  as  plenipotentiaries  is  wholly 
speculative.  Whatever  plausible  reason  may  be  given,  the 
true  reason  will  probably  never  be  known. 

Not  appreciating,  at  the  time  that  Colonel  House  in- 
formed me  of  the  President's  plan  to  be  present  at  the  Con- 
ference, that  the  matter  had  gone  as  far  as  it  had,  and  feel- 
ing very  strongly  that  it  would  be  a  grave  mistake  for  the 
President  to  take  part  in  person  in  the  negotiations,  I  felt 
it  to  be  my  duty,  as  his  official  adviser  in  foreign  affairs  and 
as  one  desirous  to  have  him  adopt  a  wise  course,  to  state 
plainly  to  him  my  views.  It  was  with  hesitation  that  I  did 
this  because  the  consequence  of  the  non-attendance  of  the 
President  would  be  to  make  me  the  head  of  the  American 
Peace  Commission  at  Paris.  There  was  the  danger  that 
my  motive  in  opposing  the  President's  attending  the  Con- 
ference would  be  misconstrued  and  that  I  might  be  sus- 
pected of  acting  from  self-interest  rather  than  from  a  sense 
of  loyalty  to  my  chief.  When,  however,  the  armistice  went 


22  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

into  effect  and  the  time  arrived  for  completing  the  per- 
sonnel of  the  American  Commission,  I  determined  that 
I  ought  not  to  remain  silent. 

The  day  after  the  cessation  of  hostilities,  that  is,  on 
November  12,  I  made  the  following  note: 

"I  had  a  conference  this  noon  with  the  President  at  the 
White  House  in  relation  to  the  Peace  Conference.  I  told 
him  frankly  that  I  thought  the  plan  for  him  to  attend  was 
unwise  and  would  be  a  mistake.  I  said  that  I  felt  embar- 
rassed in  speaking  to  him  about  it  because  it  would  leave 
me  at  the  head  of  the  delegation,  and  I  hoped  that  he 
understood  that  I  spoke  only  out  of  a  sense  of  duty.  I 
pointed  out  that  he  held  at  present  a  dominant  position  in 
the  world,  which  I  was  afraid  he  would  lose  if  he  went  into 
conference  with  the  foreign  statesmen;  that  he  could  prac- 
tically dictate  the  terms  of  peace  if  he  held  aloof;  that  he 
would  be  criticized  severely  in  this  country  for  leaving  at  a 
time  when  Congress  particularly  needed  his  guidance;  and 
that  he  would  be  greatly  embarrassed  in  directing  domes- 
tic affairs  from  overseas." 

I  also  recorded  as  significant  that  the  President  listened 
to  my  remarks  without  comment  and  turned  the  conver- 
sation into  other  channels. 

For  a  week  after  this  interview  I  heard  nothing  from  the 
President  on  the  subject,  though  the  fact  that  no  steps 
were  taken  to  prepare  written  instructions  for  the  Ameri- 
can Commissioners  convinced  me  that  he  intended  to  fol- 
low his  original  intention.  My  fears  were  confirmed.  On 
the  evening  of  Monday,  November  18,  the  President  came 
to  my  residence  and  told  me  that  he  had  finally  decided  to 


MR.  WILSON'S  PRESENCE  23 

go  to  the  Peace  Conference  and  that  he  had  given  out  to 
the  press  an  announcement  to  that  effect.  In  view  of  the 
publicity  given  to  his  decision  it  would  have  been  futile  to 
have  attempted  to  dissuade  him  from  his  purpose.  He 
knew  my  opinion  and  that  it  was  contrary  to  his. 

After  the  President  departed  I  made  a  note  of  the  inter- 
view, in  which  among  other  things  I  wrote : 

"I  am  convinced  that  he  is  making  one  of  the  greatest 
mistakes  of  his  career  and  will  imperil  his  reputation.  I 
may  be  in  error  and  hope  that  I  am,  but  I  prophesy  trou- 
ble in  Paris  and  worse  than  trouble  here.  I  believe  the 
President's  place  is  here  in  America." 

Whether  the  decision  of  Mr.  Wilson  was  wise  and 
whether  my  prophecy  was  unfulfilled,  I  leave  to  the  judg- 
ment of  others.  His  visit  to  Europe  and  its  consequences 
are  facts  of  history.  It  should  be  understood  that  the  in- 
cident is  not  referred  to  here  to  justify  my  views  or  to 
prove  that  the  President  was  wrong  in  what  he  did.  The 
reference  is  made  solely  because  it  shows  that  at  the  very 
outset  there  was  a  decided  divergence  of  judgment  be- 
tween us  in  regard  to  the  peace  negotiations. 

While  this  difference  of  opinion  apparently  in  no  way 
affected  our  cordial  relations,  I  cannot  but  feel,  in  review- 
ing this  period  of  our  intercourse,  that  my  open  opposition 
to  his  attending  the  Conference  was  considered  by  the 
President  to  be  an  unwarranted  meddling  with  his  per- 
sonal affairs  and  was  none  of  my  business.  It  was,  I  be- 
lieve, the  beginning  of  his  loss  of  confidence  in  my  judg- 


24  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

ment  and  advice,  which  became  increasingly  marked  dur- 
ing the  Paris  negotiations.  At  the  time,  however,  I  did 
not  realize  that  my  honest  opinion  affected  the  President 
in  the  way  which  I  now  believe  that  it  did.  It  had  always 
been  my  practice  as  Secretary  of  State  to  speak  to  him 
with  candor  and  to  disagree  with  him  whenever  I  thought 
he  was  reaching  a  wrong  decision  in  regard  to  any  matter 
pertaining  to  foreign  affairs.  There  was  a  general  belief 
that  Mr.  Wilson  was  not  open-minded  and  that  he  was 
quick  to  resent  any  opposition  however  well  founded.  I 
had  not  found  him  so  during  the  years  we  had  been  associ- 
ated. Except  in  a  few  instances  he  listened  with  considera- 
tion to  arguments  and  apparently  endeavored  to  value 
them  correctly.  If,  however,  the  matter  related  even  re- 
motely to  his  personal  conduct  he  seemed  unwilling  to  de- 
bate the  question.  My  conclusion  is  that  he  considered  his 
going  to  the  Peace  Conference  was  his  affair  solely  and 
that  he  viewed  my  objections  as  a  direct  criticism  of  him 
personally  for  thinking  of  going.  He  may,  too,  have  felt 
that  my  opposition  arose  from  a  selfish  desire  to  become 
the  head  of  the  American  Commission.  From  that  time 
forward  any  suggestion  or  advice  volunteered  by  me  was 
seemingly  viewed  with  suspicion.  It  was,  however,  long 
after  this  incident  that  I  began  to  feel  that  the  President 
was  imputing  to  me  improper  motives  and  crediting  me 
with  disloyalty  to  him  personally,  an  attitude  which  was 
as  unwarranted  as  it  was  unjust. 
The  President  having  determined  to  go  to  Paris,  it 


MR.  WILSON'S  PRESENCE  25 

seemed  almost  useless  to  urge  him  not  to  become  a  dele- 
gate in  view  of  the  fact  that  he  had  named  but  four  Com- 
missioners, although  it  had  been  arranged  that  the  Great 
Powers  should  each  have  five  delegates  in  the  Conference. 
This  clearly  indicated  that  the  President  was  at  least  con- 
sidering sitting  as  the  fifth  member  of  the  American  group. 
At  the  same  time  it  seemed  that,  if  he  did  not  take  his 
place  in  the  Conference  as  a  delegate,  he  might  retain  in  a 
measure  his  superior  place  of  influence  even  though  he  was 
in  Paris.  Four  days  after  the  Commission  landed  at  Brest 
I  had  a  long  conference  with  Colonel  House  on  matters 
pertaining  to  the  approaching  negotiations,  during  which 
he  informed  me  that  there  was  a  determined  effort  being 
made  by  the  European  statesmen  to  induce  the  President 
to  sit  at  the  peace  table  and  that  he  was  afraid  that  the 
President  was  disposed  to  accede  to  their  wishes.  This 
information  indicated  that,  while  the  President  had  come 
to  Paris  prepared  to  act  as  a  delegate,  he  had,  after  dis- 
cussing the  subject  with  the  Colonel  and  possibly  with 
others,  become  doubtful  as  to  the  wisdom  of  doing  so,  but 
that  through  the  pressure  of  his  foreign  colleagues  he  was 
turning  again  to  the  favorable  view  of  personal  participa- 
tion which  he  had  held  before  he  left  the  United  States. 

In  my  conversation  with  Colonel  House  I  told  him  my 
reasons  for  opposing  the  President's  taking  an  active  part 
in  the  Conference  and  explained  to  him  the  embarrass- 
ment that  I  felt  in  advising  the  President  to  adopt  a  course 
which  would  make  me  the  head  of  the  American  Commis- 


26  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

sion.  I  am  sure  that  the  Colonel  fully  agreed  with  me  that 
it  was  impolitic  for  Mr.  Wilson  to  become  a  delegate,  but 
whether  he  actively  opposed  the  plan  I  do  not  know,  al- 
though I  believe  that  he  did.  It  was  some  days  before  the 
President  announced  that  he  would  become  the  head  of 
the  American  Commission.  I  believe  that  he  did  this  with 
grave  doubts  in  his  own  mind  as  to  the  wisdom  of  his  de- 
cision, and  I  do  not  think  that  any  new  arguments  were 
advanced  during  those  days  which  materially  affected  his 
judgment. 

This  delay  in  reaching  a  final  determination  as  to  a 
course  of  action  was  characteristic  of  Mr.  Wilson.  There 
is  in  his  mentality  a  strange  mixture  of  positiveness  and 
indecision  which  is  almost  paradoxical.  It  is  a  peculiarity 
which  it  is  hard  to  analyze  and  which  has  often  been  an 
embarrassment  in  the  conduct  of  public  affairs.  Sudden- 
ness rather  than  promptness  has  always  marked  his  de- 
cisions. Procrastination  in  announcing  a  policy  or  a  pro- 
gramme makes  cooperation  difficult  and  not  infrequently 
defeats  the  desired  purpose.  To  put  off  a  decision  to  the 
last  moment  is  a  trait  of  Mr.  Wilson's  character  which  has 
caused  much  anxiety  to  those  who,  dealing  with  matters 
of  vital  importance,  realized  that  delay  was  perilous  if 
not  disastrous. 

Of  the  consequences  of  the  President's  acting  as  one  of 
his  own  representatives  to  negotiate  peace  it  is  not  my 
purpose  to  speak.  The  events  of  the  six  months  succeeding 
his  decision  to  exercise  in  person  his  constitutional  right  to 


MR.  WILSON'S  PRESENCE  27 

conduct  the  foreign  relations  of  the  United  States  are  in  a 
general  way  matters  of  common  knowledge  and  furnish 
sufficient  data  for  the  formulation  of  individual  opinions 
without  the  aid  of  argument  or  discussion.  The  important 
fact  in  connection  with  the  general  topic  being  considered 
is  the  difference  of  opinion  between  the  President  and  my- 
self as  to  the  wisdom  of  his  assuming  the  role  of  a  delegate. 
While  I  did  not  discuss  the  matter  with  him  except  at  the 
first  when  I  opposed  his  attending  the  Peace  Conference, 
I  have  little  doubt  that  Colonel  House,  if  he  urged  the 
President  to  decline  to  sit  as  a  delegate,  which  I  think  may 
be  presumed,  or  if  he  discussed  it  at  all,  mentioned  to  him 
my  opinion  that  such  a  step  would  be  unwise.  In  any 
event  Mr.  Wilson  knew  my  views  and  that  they  were  at 
variance  with  the  decision  which  he  reached. 


CHAPTER  III 
GENERAL  PLAN  FOR  A  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

IT  appears,  from  a  general  review  of  the  situation  prior 
and  subsequent  to  the  assembling  of  the  delegates  to  the 
Peace  Conference,  that  President  Wilson's  decision  to  go 
to  Paris  and  to  engage  in  person  in  the  negotiations  was 
strongly  influenced  by  his  belief  that  it  was  the  only  sure 
way  of  providing  in  the  treaty  of  peace  for  the  organiza- 
tion of  a  League  of  Nations.  While  his  presence  in  Paris 
was  probably  affected  to  an  extent  by  other  considera- 
tions, as  I  have  pointed  out,  it  is  to  be  presumed  that  he 
was  anxious  to  participate  directly  in  the  drafting  of  the 
plan  of  organization  of  the  League  and  to  exert  his  per- 
sonal influence  on  the  delegates  in  favor  of  its  acceptance 
by  publicly  addressing  the  Conference.  This  he  could 
hardly  have  done  without  becoming  a  delegate.  It  would 
seem,  therefore,  that  the  purpose  of  creating  a  League  of 
Nations  and  obtaining  the  incorporation  of  a  plan  of  or- 
ganization in  the  treaty  to  be  negotiated  had  much  to  do 
with  the  President's  presence  at  the  peace  table. 

From  the  time  that  the  United  States  entered  the  war  in 
April,  1917,  Mr.  Wilson  held  firmly  to  the  idea  that  the 
salvation  of  the  world  from  imperialism  would  not  be 
lasting  unless  provision  was  made  in  the  peace  treaty  for 
an  international  agency  strong  enough  to  prevent  a  future 


GENERAL  PLAN  FOR  A  LEAGUE  29 

attack  upon  the  rights  and  liberties  of  the  nations  which 
were  at  so  great  a  cost  holding  in  check  the  German  armies 
and  preventing  them  from  carrying  out  their  evil  designs 
of  conquest.  The  object  sought  by  the  United  States  in 
the  war  would  not,  in  the  views  of  many,  be  achieved  un- 
less the  world  was  organized  to  resist  future  aggression. 
The  essential  thing,  as  the  President  saw  it,  in  order  to 
"make  the  world  safe  for  democracy"  was  to  give  perma- 
nency to  the  peace  which  would  be  negotiated  at  the  con- 
clusion of  the  war.  A  union  of  the  nations  for  the  purpose 
of  preventing  wars  of  aggression  and  conquest  seemed  to 
him  the  most  practical,  if  not  the  only,  way  of  accomplish- 
ing this  supreme  object,  and  he  urged  it  with  earnestness 
and  eloquence  in  his  public  addresses  relating  to  the  bases 
of  peace. 

There  was  much  to  be  said  in  favor  of  the  President's 
point  of  view.  Unquestionably  the  American  people  as 
a  whole  supported  him  in  the  belief  that  there  ought  to 
be  some  international  agreement,  association,  or  concord 
which  would  lessen  the  possibility  of  future  wars.  An 
international  organization  to  remove  in  a  measure  the 
immediate  causes  of  war,  to  provide  means  for  the  peace- 
able settlement  of  disputes  between  nations,  and  to  draw 
the  governments  into  closer  friendship  appealed  to  the 
general  desire  of  the  peoples  of  America  and  Europe.  The 
four  years  and  more  of  horror  and  agony  through  which 
mankind  had  passed  must  be  made  impossible  of  repeti- 
tion, and  there  seemed  no  other  way  than  to  form  an  inter- 


30  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

national  union  devoted  to  the  maintenance  of  peace  by 
composing,  as  far  as  possible,  controversies  which  might 
ripen  into  war. 

For  many  years  prior  to  1914  an  organization  devoted 
to  the  prevention  of  international  wars  had  been  discussed 
by  those  who  gave  thought  to  warfare  of  the  nations  and 
who  realized  in  a  measure  the  precarious  state  of  inter- 
national peace.  The  Hague  Conventions  of  1899  and  of 
1907  had  been  negotiated  with  that  object,  and  it  was  only 
because  of  the  improper  aspirations  and  hidden  designs 
of  certain  powers,  which  were  represented  at  those  great 
historic  conferences,  that  the  measures  adopted  were  not 
more  expressive  of  the  common  desire  of  mankind  and 
more  effective  in  securing  the  object  sought.  The  Carnegie 
Endowment  for  International  Peace,  the  Ginn,  now  the 
World,  Peace  Foundation,  and  the  American  Peace  So- 
ciety, and  later  the  Society  for  the  Judicial  Settlement  of 
International  Disputes,  the  League  to  Enforce  Peace,  and 
many  other  organizations  in  America  and  in  Europe  were 
actively  engaged  in  considering  ways  and  means  to  prevent 
war,  to  strengthen  the  bonds  of  international  good-will, 
and  to  insure  the  more  general  application  of  the  principles 
of  justice  to  disputes  between  nations. 

The  outbreak  of  the  war  and  the  dreadful  waste  and 
suffering  which  followed  impelled  the  societies  and  associa- 
tions then  organized  to  redoubled  effort  and  induced  the 
formation  of  new  organizations.  People  everywhere  began 
to  realize  that  their  objects  were  real  and  not  merely 


GENERAL  PLAN  FOR  A  LEAGUE    31 

sentimental  or  academic,  that  they  were  seeking  practical 
means  to  remove  the  conditions  which  had  made  the  Great 
War  possible.  Public  opinion  became  more  and  more 
pronounced  as  the  subject  was  more  widely  discussed  in 
the  journals  and  periodicals  of  the  day  and  at  public  meet- 
ings, the  divergence  of  views  being  chiefly  in  regard  to 
the  means  to  be  employed  by  the  proposed  organization 
and  not  as  to  the  creation  of  the  organization,  the  necessity 
for  which  appeared  to  be  generally  conceded. 

With  popular  sentiment  overwhelmingly  in  favor  of 
some  sort  of  world  union  which  would  to  an  extent  insure 
the  nations  against  another  tragedy  like  the  one  which  in 
November,  1918,  had  left  the  belligerents  wasted  and  ex- 
hausted and  the  whole  world  a  prey  to  social  and  indus- 
trial unrest,  there  was  beyond  question  a  demand  that  out 
of  the  great  international  assembly  at  Paris  there  should 
come  some  common  agency  devoted  to  the  prevention 
of  war.  To  ignore  this  all-prevalent  sentiment  would  have 
been  to  misrepresent  the  peoples  of  the  civilized  world  and 
would  have  aroused  almost  universal  condemnation  and 
protest.  The  President  was,  therefore,  entirely  right  in 
giving  prominence  to  the  idea  of  an  international  union 
against  war  and  in  insisting  that  the  Peace  Conference 
should  make  provision  for  the  establishment  of  an  organi- 
zation of  the  world  with  the  prevention  of  future  wars  as 
its  central  thought  and  purpose. 

The  great  bulk  of  the  American  people,  at  the  time  that 
the  President  left  the  United  States  to  attend  the  Peace 


32  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

Conference,  undoubtedly  believed  that  some  sort  of  or- 
ganization of  this  nature  was  necessary,  and  I  am  con- 
vinced that  the  same  popular  belief  prevailed  in  all  other 
civilized  countries.  It  is  possible  that  this  assertion  may 
seem  too  emphatic  to  some  who  have  opposed  the  plan  for 
a  League  of  Nations,  which  appears  in  the  first  articles  of 
the  Treaty  of  Versailles,  but,  if  these  opponents  of  the 
plan  will  go  back  to  the  time  of  which  I  am  writing,  and 
avoid  the  impressions  made  upon  them  by  subsequent 
events,  they  will  find,  I  believe,  that  even  their  own  views 
have  materially  changed  since  December,  1918.  It  is  true 
that  concrete  plans  had  then  been  suggested,  but  so  far 
as  the  public  knew  the  President  had  not  adopted  any  of 
them  or  formulated  one  of  his  own.  He  had  not  then  dis- 
closed the  provisions  of  his  "Covenant." 

The  mass  of  the  people  were  only  concerned  with  the 
general  idea.  There  was  no  well-defined  opposition  to  that 
idea.  At  least  it  was  not  vocal.  Even  the  defeat  of  the 
Democratic  Party  in  the  Congressional  elections  of  Novem- 
ber, 1918,  could  not  be  interpreted  to  be  a  repudiation  of 
the  formation  of  a  world  organization.  That  election,  by 
which  both  Houses  of  Congress  became  Republican,  was 
a  popular  rebuke  to  Mr.  Wilson  for  the  partisanship  shown 
in  his  letter  of  October  addressed  to  the  American  people, 
in  which  he  practically  asserted  that  it  was  unpatriotic 
to  support  the  Republican  candidates.  The  indignation 
and  resentment  aroused  by  that  injudicious  and  unwar- 
ranted attack  upon  the  loyalty  of  his  political  opponents 


GENERAL  PLAN  FOR  A  LEAGUE    33 

lost  to  the  Democratic  Party  the  Senate  and  largely  re- 
duced its  membership  in  the  House  of  Representatives  if 
it  did  not  in  fact  deprive  the  party  of  control  of  that  body. 
The  result,  however,  did  not  mean  that  the  President's 
ideas  as  to  the  terms  of  peace  were  repudiated,  but 
that  his  practical  assertion,  that  refusal  to  accept  his 
policies  was  unpatriotic,  was  repudiated  by  the  American 
people. 

It  is  very  apparent  to  one,  who  without  prejudice  re- 
views the  state  of  public  sentiment  in  December,  1918, 
that  the  trouble,  which  later  developed  as  to  a  League  of 
Nations,  did  not  lie  in  the  necessity  of  convincing  the 
peoples  of  the  world,  their  governments,  and  their  dele- 
gates to  the  Paris  Conference  that  it  was  desirable  to  or- 
ganize the  world  to  prevent  future  wars,  but  in  deciding 
upon  the  form  and  functions  of  the  organization  to  be  cre- 
ated. As  to  these  details,  which  of  course  affected  the  char- 
acter, the  powers,  and  the  duties  of  the  organization,  there 
had  been  for  years  a  wide  divergence  of  opinion.  Some 
advocated  the  use  of  international  force  to  prevent  a  na- 
tion from  warring  against  another.  Some  favored  coercion 
by  means  of  general  ostracism  and  non-intercourse.  Some 
believed  that  the  application  of  legal  justice  through  the 
medium  of  international  tribunals  and  commissions  was 
the  only  practical  method  of  settling  disputes  which  might 
become  causes  of  war.  And  some  emphasized  the  impor- 
tance of  a  mutual  agreement  to  postpone  actual  hostili- 
ties until  there  could  be  an  investigation  as  to  the  merits  of 


34  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

a  controversy.  There  were  thus  two  general  classes  of 
powers  proposed  which  were  in  the  one  case  political  and 
in  the  other  juridical.  The  cleavage  of  opinion  was  along 
these  lines,  although  it  possibly  was  not  recognized  by  the 
general  public.  It  was  not  only  shown  in  the  proposed 
powers,  but  also  in  the  proposed  form  of  the  organization, 
the  one  centering  on  a  politico-diplomatic  body,  and  the 
other  on  an  international  judiciary.  Naturally  the  details 
of  any  plan  proposed  would  become  the  subject  of  discus- 
sion and  the  advisability  of  adopting  the  provisions  would 
arouse  controversy  and  dispute.  Thus  unanimity  in  ap- 
proving a  world  organization  did  not  mean  that  opinions 
might  not  diifer  radically  in  working  out  the  fundamental 
principles  of  its  form  and  functions,  to  say  nothing  of  the 
detailed  plan  based  on  these  principles. 

In  May,  1916,  President  Wilson  accepted  an  invitation 
to  address  the  first  annual  meeting  of  the  League  to  En- 
force Peace,  which  was  to  be  held  in  Washington.  After 
preparing  his  address  he  went  over  it  and  erased  all  refer- 
ence to  the  use  of  physical  force  in  preventing  wars.  I 
mention  this  as  indicative  of  the  state  of  uncertainty  in 
which  he  was  in  the  spring  of  1916  as  to  the  functions  and 
powers  of  the  international  organization  to  maintain 
peace  which  he  then  advocated.  By  January,  1917,  he 
had  become  convinced  that  the  use  of  force  was  the 
practical  method  of  checking  aggressions.  This  conversion 
was  probably  due  to  the  fact  that  he  had  in  his  own  mind 
worked  out,  as  one  of  the  essential  bases  of  peace,  to  which 


GENERAL  PLAN  FOR  A  LEAGUE    35 

he  was  then  giving  much  thought,  a  mutual  guaranty  of 
territorial  integrity  and  political  independence,  which  had 
been  the  chief  article  of  a  proposed  Pan-American  Treaty 
prepared  early  in  1915  and  to  which  he  referred  in  his  ad- 
dress before  the  League  to  Enforce  Peace.  He  appears  to 
have  reached  the  conclusion  that  a  guaranty  of  this  sort 
would  be  of  little  value  unless  supported  by  the  threat- 
ened, and,  if  necessary,  the  actual,  employment  of  force. 
The  President  was  entirely  logical  in  this  attitude.  A 
guaranty  against  physical  aggression  would  be  practically 
worthless  if  it  did  not  rest  on  an  agreement  to  protect  with 
physical  force.  An  undertaking  to  protect  carried  with  it 
the  idea  of  using  effectual  measures  to  insure  protection. 
They  were  inseparable;  and  the  President,  having  adopted 
an  affirmative  guaranty  against  aggression  as  a  cardinal 
provision  —  perhaps  I  should  say  the  cardinal  provision  — 
of  the  anticipated  peace  treaty,  could  not  avoid  becoming 
the  advocate  of  the  use  of  force  in  making  good  the  guar- 
anty. 

During  the  year  1918  the  general  idea  of  the  formation 
of  an  international  organization  to  prevent  war  was  in- 
creasingly discussed  in  the  press  of  the  United  States  and 
Europe  and  engaged  the  thought  of  the  Governments  of 
the  Powers  at  war  with  the  German  Empire.  On  January 
8  of  that  year  President  Wilson  in  an  address  to  Congress 
proclaimed  his  "Fourteen  Points,"  the  adoption  of  which 
he  considered  necessary  to  a  just  and  stable  peace.  The 
last  of  these  "Points"  explicitly  states  the  basis  of  the 


36  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

proposed  international  organization  and  the  fundamental 
reason  for  its  formation.    It  is  as  follows: 

"XIV.  A  general  association  of  nations  must  be  formed 
under  specific  covenants  for  the  purpose  of  affording 
mutual  guarantees  of  political  independence  and  territo- 
rial integrity  to  great  and  small  states  alike." 

This  declaration  may  be  considered  in  view  of  subse- 
quent developments  to  be  a  sufficiently  clear  announce- 
ment of  the  President's  theory  as  to  the  plan  of  organiza- 
tion which  ought  to  be  adopted,  but  at  the  time  the 
exact  character  of  the  "mutual  guarantees"  was  not  dis- 
closed and  aroused  little  comment.  I  do  not  believe  that 
Congress,  much  less  the  public  at  large,  understood  the 
purpose  that  the  President  had  in  mind.  Undoubtedly, 
too,  a  sense  of  loyalty  to  the  Chief  Executive,  while  the 
war  was  in  progress,  and  the  desire  to  avoid  giving  com- 
fort of  any  sort  to  the  enemy,  prevented  a  critical  dis- 
cussion of  the  announced  bases  of  peace,  some  of  which 
were  at  the  time  academic,  premature,  and  liable  to  modi- 
fication if  conditions  changed. 

In  March  Lord  Phillimore  and  his  colleagues  made  their 
preliminary  report  to  the  British  Government  on  "a 
League  of  Nations  "  and  this  was  followed  in  July  by  their 
final  report,  copies  of  which  reached  the  President  soon 
after  they  were  made.  The  time  had  arrived  for  putting 
into  concrete  form  the  general  ideas  that  the  President 
held,  and  Colonel  House,  whom  some  believed  to  be  the 
real  author  of  Mr.  Wilson's  conception  of  a  world  union, 


GENERAL  PLAN  FOR  A  LEAGUE    37 

prepared,  I  am  informed,  the  draft  of  a  scheme  of  organi- 
zation. This  draft  was  either  sent  or  handed  to  the  Presi- 
dent and  discussed  with  him.  To  what  extent  it  was 
amended  or  revised  by  Mr.  Wilson  I  do  not  know,  but  in 
a  modified  form  it  became  the  typewritten  draft  of  the 
Covenant  which  he  took  with  him  to  Paris,  where  it  under- 
went several  changes.  In  it  was  the  guaranty  of  1915, 
1916,  1917,  and  1918,  which,  from  the  form  in  which  it 
appeared,  logically  required  the  use  of  force  to  give  it 
effect. 

Previous  to  the  departure  of  the  American  Commission 
for  Paris,  on  December  4,  1918,  the  President  did  not 
consult  me  as  to  his  plan  for  a  League  of  Nations.  He  did 
not  show  me  a  copy  of  the  plan  or  even  mention  that 
one  had  been  put  into  writing.  I  think  that  there  were 
two  reasons  for  his  not  doing  so,  although  I  was  the  offi- 
cial adviser  whom  he  should  naturally  consult  on  such 
matters. 

The  first  reason,  I  believe,  was  due  to  the  following  facts. 
In  our  conversations  prior  to  1918 1  had  uniformly  opposed 
the  idea  of  the  employment  of  international  force  to  com- 
pel a  nation  to  respect  the  rights  of  other  nations  and  had 
repeatedly  urged  judicial  settlement  as  the  practical  way 
of  composing  international  controversies,  though  I  did  not 
favor  the  use  of  force  to  compel  such  settlement. 

To  show  my  opposition  to  an  international  agreement 
providing  for  the  use  of  force  and  to  show  that  President 
Wilson  knew  of  this  opposition  and  the  reasons  for  it, 


38  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

I  quote  a  letter  which  I  wrote  to  him  in  May,  1916,  that  is, 
two  years  and  a  half  before  the  end  of  the  war : 

"May  25,  1916 
"Mr  DEAR  MR.  PRESIDENT: 

"I  had  hoped  to  see  you  to-morrow  at  Cabinet  meeting, 
but  to-day  the  Doctor  refused  to  allow  me  to  leave  the 
house  this  week.  I  intended  when  I  saw  you  to  say  some- 
thing about  the  purposes  of  the  League  to  Enforce  Peace, 
which  is  to  meet  here,  and  at  the  banquet  of  which  I  under- 
stand you  are  to  speak  on  Saturday  night.  I  would  have 
preferred  to' talk  the  matter  over  with  you,  but  as  that  is 
impossible  I  have  taken  the  liberty  to  write  you  this  letter, 
although  in  doing  so  I  am  violating  the  directions  of  the 
Doctor. 

"While  I  have  not  had  time  or  opportunity  to  study 
carefully  the  objects  of  the  proposed  League  to  Enforce 
Peace,  I  understand  the  fundamental  ideas  are  these,  which 
are  to  be  embodied  in  a  general  treaty  of  the  nations: 
First,  an  agreement  to  submit  all  differences  which  fail  of 
diplomatic  adjustment  to  arbitration  or  a  board  of  concili- 
ation; and,  second,  in  case  a  government  fails  to  comply 
with  this  provision,  an  agreement  that  the  other  parties 
will  unite  in  compelling  it  to  do  so  by  an  exercise  of  force. 

"With  the  first  agreement  I  am  in  accord  to  an  extent, 
but  I  cannot  see  how  it  is  practicable  to  apply  it  in  case  of 
a  continuing  invasion  of  fundamental  national  or  individ- 
ual rights  unless  some  authoritative  international  body  has 
the  power  to  impose  and  enforce  an  order  in  the  nature  of 
an  injunction,  which  will  prevent  the  aggressor  from  further 
action  until  arbitration  has  settled  the  rights  of  the  parties. 
How  this  can  be  done  in  a  practical  way  I  have  not  at- 
tempted to  work  out,  but  the  problem  is  not  easy,  espe- 
cially the  part  which  relates  to  the  enforcement  of  the  order. 


GENERAL  PLAN  FOR  A  LEAGUE          39 

"It  is,  however,  the  second  agreement  in  regard  to  the 
imposition  of  international  arbitration  by  force,  which 
seems  to  me  the  most  difficult,  especially  when  viewed  from 
the  standpoint  of  its  effects  on  our  national  sovereignty 
and  national  interests.  It  is  needless  to  go  into  the  mani- 
fest questions  arising  when  the  modus  operandi  of  the 
agreement  is  considered.  Such  questions  as:  Who  may 
demand  international  intervention?  What  body  will  de- 
cide whether  the  demand  should  be  complied  with  ?  How 
will  the  international  forces  be  constituted?  Who  will 
take  charge  of  the  military  and  naval  operations?  Who 
will  pay  the  expenses  of  the  war  (for  war  it  will  be)  ? 

"Perplexing  as  these  questions  appear  to  me,  I  am  more 
concerned  with  the  direct  effect  on  this  country.  I  do  not 
believe  that  it  is  wise  to  limit  our  independence  of  action, 
a  sovereign  right,  to  the  will  of  other  powers  beyond  this 
hemisphere.  In  any  representative  international  body 
clothed  with  authority  to  require  of  the  nations  to  employ 
their  armies  and  navies  to  coerce  one  of  their  number,  we 
would  be  in  the  minority.  I  do  not  believe  that  we  should 
put  ourselves  in  the  position  of  being  compelled  to  send  our 
armed  forces  to  Europe  or  Asia  or,  in  the  alternative,  of 
repudiating  our  treaty  obligation.  Neither  our  sovereignty 
nor  our  interests  would  accord  with  such  a  proposition, 
and  I  am  convinced  that  popular  opinion  as  well  as  the 
Senate  would  reject  a  treaty  framed  along  such  lines. 

"It  is  possible  that  the  difficulty  might  be  obviated  by 
the  establishment  of  geographical  zones,  and  leaving  to 
the  groups  of  nations  thus  formed  the  enforcement  of  the 
peaceful  settlement  of  disputes.  But  if  that  is  done  why 
should  all  the  world  participate?  We  have  adopted  a 
much  modified  form  of  this  idea  in  the  proposed  Pan- 
American  Treaty  by  the  'guaranty'  article.  But  I  would 
not  like  to  see  its  stipulations  extended  to  the  European 


40  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

powers  so  that  they,  with  our  full  agreement,  would  have 
the  right  to  cross  the  ocean  and  stop  quarrels  between  two 
American  Republics.  Such  authority  would  be  a  serious 
menace  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and  a  greater  menace  to 
the  Pan-American  Doctrine. 

"It  appears  to  me  that,  if  the  first  idea  of  the  League  can 
be  worked  out  in  a  practical  way  and  an  international  body 
constituted  to  determine  when  steps  should  be  taken  to 
enforce  compliance,  the  use  of  force  might  be  avoided  by 
outlawing  the  offending  nation.  No  nation  to-day  can  live 
unto  itself.  The  industrial  and  commercial  activities  of 
the  world  are  too  closely  interwoven  for  a  nation  isolated 
from  the  other  nations  to  thrive  and  prosper.  A  tremen- 
dous economic  pressure  could  be  imposed  on  the  outlawed 
nation  by  all  other  nations  denying  it  intercourse  of  every 
nature,  even  communication,  in  a  word  make  that  nation 
a  pariah,  and  so  to  remain  until  it  was  willing  to  perform 
its  obligations. 

"I  am  not  at  all  sure  that  this  means  is  entirely  feasible. 
I  see  many  difficulties  which  would  have  to  be  met  under 
certain  conditions.  But  I  do  think  that  it  is  more  practical 
in  operation  and  less  objectionable  from  the  standpoint  of 
national  rights  and  interests  than  the  one  proposed  by  the 
League.  It  does  not  appear  to  me  that  the  use  of  physical 
force  is  in  any  way  practical  or  advisable. 

"I  presume  that  you  are  far  more  familiar  than  I  am 
with  the  details  of  the  plans  of  the  League  and  that  it  may 
be  presumptuous  on  my  part  to  write  you  as  I  have.  I  nev- 
ertheless felt  it  my  duty  to  frankly  give  you  my  views  on 
the  subject  and  I  have  done  so. 

"Faithfully  yours 

"ROBERT  LANSING 

"THE  PRESIDENT 

"The  White  House" 


GENERAL  PLAN  FOR  A  LEAGUE          41 

The  President,  thus  early  advised  of  my  unqualified 
opposition  to  any  plan  which  was  similar  in  principle  to 
the  one  advocated  by  the  League  to  Enforce  Peace,  natu- 
rally concluded  that  I  would  look  with  disfavor  on  an  in- 
ternational guaranty  which  by  implication,  if  not  by 
declaration,  compelled  the  use  of  force  to  give  it  effect. 
Doubtless  he  felt  that  I  would  not  be  disposed  to  aid  in 
perfecting  a  plan  which  had  as  its  central  idea  a  guaranty 
of  that  nature.  Disliking  opposition  to  a  plan  or  policy 
which  he  had  originated  or  made  his  own  by  adoption,  he 
preferred  to  consult  those  who  without  debate  accepted 
his  judgment  and  were  in  sympathy  with  his  ideas.  Un- 
doubtedly the  President  by  refraining  from  asking  my 
advice  spared  himself  from  listening  to  arguments  against 
the  guaranty  and  the  use  of  force  which  struck  at  the  very 
root  of  his  plan,  for  I  should,  if  I  had  been  asked,  have 
stated  my  views  with  entire  frankness. 

The  other  reason  for  not  consulting  me,  as  I  now  realize, 
but  did  not  at  the  time,  was  that  I  belonged  to  the  legal 
profession.  It  is  a  fact,  which  Mr.  Wilson  has  taken  no 
trouble  to  conceal,  that  he  does  not  value  the  advice  of 
lawyers  except  on  strictly  legal  questions,  and  that  he  con- 
siders their  objections  and  criticisms  on  other  subjects  to 
be  too  often  based  on  mere  technicalities  and  their  judg- 
ments to  be  warped  by  an  undue  regard  for  precedent. 
This  prejudice  against  the  legal  profession  in  general  was 
exhibited  on  more  than  one  occasion  during  our  sojourn  at 
Paris.  Looking  back  over  my  years  of  intercourse  with  the 


42  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

President  I  can  now  see  that  he  chafed  under  the  restraints 
imposed  by  usage  and  even  by  enacted  laws  if  they  inter- 
fered with  his  acting  in  a  way  which  seemed  to  him  right 
or  justified  by  conditions.  I  do  not  say  that  he  was  law- 
less. He  was  not  that,  but  he  conformed  grudgingly  and 
with  manifest  displeasure  to  legal  limitations.  It  was  a 
thankless  task  to  question  a  proposed  course  of  action  on 
the  ground  of  illegality,  because  he  appeared  to  be  irri- 
tated by  such  an  obstacle  to  his  will  and  to  transfer  his 
irritation  against  the  law  to  the  one  who  raised  it  as  an 
objection.  I  think  that  he  was  especially  resentful  toward 
any  one  who  volunteered  criticism  based  on  a  legal  provi- 
sion, precept,  or  precedent,  apparently  assuming  that  the 
critic  opposed  his  purpose  on  the  merits  and  in  order  to 
defeat  it  interposed  needless  legal  objections.  It  is  unnec- 
essary to  comment  on  the  prejudice  which  such  an  attitude 
of  mind  made  evident. 

After  the  President's  exceptionally  strong  address  at  the 
Metropolitan  Opera  House  in  New  York  on  September  27, 
1918, 1  realized  the  great  importance  which  he  gave  to  the 
creation  of  a  League  of  Nations  and  in  view  of  this  I  de- 
voted time  and  study  to  the  subject,  giving  particular  at- 
tention to  the  British  and  French  suggestions,  both  of 
which  emphasized  judicial  settlement.  Knowing  that  the 
President  had  been  in  consultation  with  Colonel  House  on 
the  various  phases  of  the  peace  to  be  negotiated  as  well  as 
on  the  terms  of  the  armistice,  I  asked  the  latter  what  he 
knew  about  the  former's  scheme  for  a  League  of  Nations. 


GENERAL  PLAN  FOR  A  LEAGUE     43 

The  Colonel  discreetly  avoided  disclosing  the  details  of 
the  plan,  but  from  our  conversation  I  gained  an  idea  of 
the  general  principles  of  the  proposed  organization  and  the 
way  in  which  the  President  intended  to  apply  them. 

After  the  Colonel  and  his  party  had  sailed  for  France 
and  in  expectation  of  being  consulted  on  the  subject  by 
President  Wilson,  I  put  my  thoughts  on  the  League  of 
Nations  into  writing.  In  a  note,  which  is  dated  October 
27,  1918,  appears  the  following: 

"From  the  little  I  know  of  the  President's  plan  I  am 
sure  that  it  is  impracticable.  There  is  in  it  too  much  al- 
truistic cooperation.  No  account  is  taken  of  national  self- 
ishness and  the  mutual  suspicions  which  control  inter- 
national relations.  It  may  be  noble  thinking,  but  it  is  not 
true  thinking. 

"What  I  fear  is  that  a  lot  of  dreamers  and  theorists  will 
be  selected  to  work  out  an  organization  instead  of  men 
whose  experience  and  common  sense  will  tell  them  not  to 
attempt  anything  which  will  not  work.  The  scheme  ought 
to  be  simple  and  practical.  If  the  federation,  or  whatever 
it  may  be  called,  is  given  too  much  power  or  if  its  ma- 
chinery is  complex,  my  belief  is  that  it  will  be  unable  to 
function  or  else  will  be  defied.  I  can  see  lots  of  trouble 
ahead  unless  impractical  enthusiasts  and  fanatics  are  sup- 
pressed. This  is  a  time  when  sober  thought,  caution,  and 
common  sense  should  control." 

On  November  22,  1918,  after  I  had  been  formally  desig- 
nated as  a  Peace  Commissioner,  I  made  another  note  for 
the  purpose  of  crystallizing  my  own  thought  on  the  subject 
of  a  League  of  Nations.  Although  President  Wilson  had 


44  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

not  then  consulted  me  in  any  way  regarding  his  plan  of 
organization,  I  felt  sure  that  he  would,  and  I  wished  to  be 
prepared  to  give  him  my  opinion  concerning  the  funda- 
mentals of  the  plan  which  might  be  proposed  on  behalf 
of  the  United  States.  I  saw,  or  thought  that  I  saw,  a  dis- 
position to  adopt  physical  might  as  the  basis  of  the  or- 
ganization, because  the  guaranty,  which  the  President 
had  announced  in  Point  XIV  and  evidently  purposed  to 
advocate,  seemed  to  require  the  use  of  force  in  the  event 
that  it  became  necessary  to  make  it  good. 

From  the  note  of  November  22  I  quote  the  following: 

"The  legal  principk  [of  the  equality  of  nations],  what- 
ever its  basis  in  fact,  must  be  preserved,  otherwise  force 
rather  than  law,  the  power  to  act  rather  than  the  right  to 
act,  becomes  the  fundamental  principle  of  organization, 
just  as  it  has  been  in  all  previous  Congresses  and  Concerts 
of  the  European  Powers. 

"It  appears  to  me  that  a  positive  guaranty  of  territo- 
rial integrity  and  political  independence  by  the  nations 
would  have  to  rest  upon  an  open  recognition  of  dominant 
coercive  power  in  the  articles  of  agreement,  the  power 
being  commercial  and  economic  as  well  as  physical.  The 
wisdom  of  entering  into  such  a  guaranty  is  questionable 
and  should  be  carefully  considered  before  being  adopted. 

"In  order  to  avoid  the  recognition  of  force  as  a  basis 
and  the  question  of  dominant  force  with  the  unavoidable 
classification  of  nations  into  'big'  and  'little,'  'strong'  and 
'weak,'  the  desired  result  of  a  guaranty  might  be  attained 
by  entering  into  a  mutual  undertaking  not  to  impair  the 
territorial  integrity  or  to  violate  the  political  sovereignty 
of  any  state.  The  breach  of  this  undertaking  would  be  a 


GENERAL  PLAN  FOR  A  LEAGUE    45 

breach  of  the  treaty  and  would  sever  the  relations  of  the 
offending  nation  with  all  other  signatories." 

I  have  given  these  two  extracts  from  my  notes  in  order 
to  show  the  views  that  I  held,  at  the  time  the  American 
Commission  was  about  to  depart  from  the  United  States, 
in  regard  to  the  character  of  the  guaranty  which  the  Presi- 
dent intended  to  make  the  central  feature  of  the  League  of 
Nations.  In  the  carrying  out  of  his  scheme  and  in  creating 
an  organization  to  give  effect  to  the  guaranty  I  believed 
that  I  saw  as  an  unavoidable  consequence  an  exaltation 
of  force  and  an  overlordship  of  the  strong  nations.  Under 
such  conditions  it  would  be  impossible  to  preserve  within 
the  organization  the  equality  of  nations,  a  precept  of  in- 
ternational law  which  was  the  universally  recognized  basis 
of  intercourse  between  nations  in  time  of  peace.  This  I 
considered  most  unwise  and  a  return  to  the  old  order, 
from  which  every  one  hoped  that  the  victory  over  the 
Central  Empires  had  freed  the  world. 

The  views  expressed  in  the  notes  quoted  formed  the 
basis  for  my  subsequent  course  of  action  as  an  American 
Commissioner  at  Paris  in  relation  to  the  League  of  Na- 
tions. Convinced  from  previous  experience  that  to  oppose 
every  form  of  guaranty  by  the  nations  assembled  at  Paris 
would  be  futile  in  view  of  the  President's  apparent  de- 
termination to  compel  the  adoption  of  that  principle,  I 
endeavored  to  find  a  form  of  guaranty  that  would  be  less 
objectionable  than  the  one  which  the  President  had  in 
mind.  The  commitment  of  the  United  States  to  any  guar- 


46  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

anty  seemed  to  me  at  least  questionable,  though  to  prevent 
it  seemed  impossible  in  the  circumstances.  It  did  not 
seem  politic  to  try  to  persuade  the  President  to  abandon 
the  idea  altogether.  I  was  certain  that  that  could  not  be 
done.  If  he  could  be  induced  to  modify  his  plan  so  as  to 
avoid  a  direct  undertaking  to  protect  other  nations  from 
aggression,  the  result  would  be  all  that  could  be  expected. 
I  was  guided,  therefore,  chiefly  by  expediency  rather  than 
by  principle  in  presenting  my  views  to  the  President  and 
in  openly  approving  the  idea  of  a  guaranty. 

The  only  opportunity  that  I  had  to  learn  more  of  the 
President's  plan  for  a  League  before  arriving  in  Paris  was 
an  hour's  interview  with  him  on  the  U.S.S.  George  Wash- 
ington some  days  after  we  sailed  from  New  York.  He 
showed  me  nothing  in  writing,  but  explained  in  a  general 
way  his  views  as  to  the  form,  purpose,  and  powers  of  a 
League.  From  this  conversation  I  gathered  that  my  fears 
as  to  the  proposed  organization  were  justified  and  that  it 
was  to  be  based  on  the  principle  of  diplomatic  adjustment 
rather  than  that  of  judicial  settlement  and  that  political 
expediency  tinctured  with  morality  was  to  be  the  standard 
of  determination  of  an  international  controversy  rather 
than  strict  legal  justice. 

In  view  of  the  President's  apparent  fixity  of  purpose  it 
seemed  unwise  to  criticize  the  plan  until  I  could  deliver 
to  him  a  substitute  in  writing  for  the  mutual  guaranty 
which  he  evidently  considered  to  be  the  chief  feature  of  the 
plan.  I  did  not  attempt  to  debate  the  subject  with  him 


47 

believing  it  better  to  submit  my  ideas  in  concrete  form,  as 
I  had  learned  from  experience  that  Mr.  Wilson  preferred 
to  have  matters  for  his  decision  presented  in  writing  rather 
than  by  word  of  mouth. 


CHAPTER  IV 
SUBSTITUTE  ARTICLES  PROPOSED 

THE  President,  Mr.  Henry  White,  and  I  arrived  in  Paris 
on  Saturday,  December  14, 1918,  where  Colonel  House  and 
General  Bliss  awaited  us.  The  days  following  our  arrival 
were  given  over  to  public  functions  in  honor  of  the  Presi- 
dent and  to  official  exchanges  of  calls  and  interviews  with 
the  delegates  of  other  countries  who  were  gathering  for  the 
Peace  Conference.  On  the  23d,  when  the  pressure  of  for- 
mal and  social  engagements  had  in  a  measure  lessened, 
I  decided  to  present  to  the  President  my  views  as  to  the 
mutual  guaranty  which  he  intended  to  propose,  fearing 
that,  if  there  were  further  delay,  he  would  become  abso- 
lutely committed  to  the  affirmative  form.  I,  therefore,  on 
that  day  sent  him  the  following  letter,  which  was  marked 
"Secret  and  Urgent": 

" Hotel  de  Crillon 
December  23,  1918 

"Mv  DEAR  MR.  PRESIDENT: 

"The  plan  of  guaranty  proposed  for  the  League  of  Na- 
tions, which  has  been  the  subject  of  discussion,  will  find 
considerable  objection  from  other  Governments  because, 
even  when  the  principle  is  agreed  to,  there  will  be  a  wide 
divergence  of  views  as  to  the  terms  of  the  obligation.  This 
difference  of  opinion  will  be  seized  upon  by  those,  who  are 
openly  or  secretly  opposed  to  the  League,  to  create  con- 
troversy and  discord. 


THE   RUE   ROYALE   ON  THE  ARRIVAL  OF  PRESIDENT  WILSON 
DECEMBER   14, 


SUBSTITUTE  ARTICLES  PROPOSED        49 

"In  addition  to  this  there  will  be  opposition  in  Con- 
gress to  assuming  obligations  to  take  affirmative  action 
along  either  military  or  economic  lines.  On  constitutional 
grounds,  on  its  effect  on  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  on  jealousy 
as  to  Congressional  powers,  etc.,  there  will  be  severe  criti- 
cism which  will  materially  weaken  our  position  with  other 
nations,  and  may,  in  view  of  senatorial  hostility,  defeat 
a  treaty  as  to  the  League  of  Nations  or  at  least  render  it 
impotent. 

"With  these  thoughts  in  mind  and  with  an  opposition 
known  to  exist  among  certain  European  statesmen  and 
already  manifest  in  Washington,  I  take  the  liberty  of  lay- 
ing before  you  a  tentative  draft  of  articles  of  guaranty 
which  I  do  not  believe  can  be  successfully  opposed  either 
at  home  or  abroad." 

I  would  interrupt  the  reader  at  this  point  to  suggest  that 
it  might  be  well  to  peruse  the  enclosures,  which  will  be 
found  in  the  succeeding  pages,  in  order  to  have  a  better 
understanding  of  the  comments  which  follow.  To  con- 
tinue : 

"I  do  not  see  how  any  nation  can  refuse  to  subscribe  to 
them.  I  do  not  see  how  any  question  of  constitutionality 
can  be  raised,  as  they  are  based  essentially  on  powers 
which  are  confided  to  the  Executive.  They  in  no  way 
raise  a  question  as  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  At  the  same 
time  I  believe  that  the  result  would  be  as  efficacious  as  if 
there  was  an  undertaking  to  take  positive  action  against 
an  offending  nation,  which  is  the  present  cause  of  con- 
troversy. 

"  I  am  so  earnestly  in  favor  of  the  guaranty,  which  is  the 
heart  of  the  League  of  Nations,  that  I  have  endeavored  to 
find  a  way  to  accomplish  this  and  to  remove  the  objections 


50  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

raised  which  seem  to  me  to-day  to  jeopardize  the  whole 
plan. 

"I  shall  be  glad,  if  you  desire  it,  to  confer  with  you  in 
regard  to  the  enclosed  paper  or  to  receive  your  opinion  as 
to  the  suggestions  made.  In  any  event  it  is  my  hope  that 
you  will  give  the  paper  consideration. 

"Faithfully  yours 

"ROBERT  LANSING 
"THE  PRESIDENT 

"28  Rue  de  Monceau" 

It  should  be  borne  in  mind  in  reading  this  letter  that  I 
had  reached  the  conclusion  that  modification  rather  than 
abandonment  of  the  guaranty  was  all  that  I  could  hope  to 
accomplish,  and  that,  as  a  matter  of  expediency,  it  seemed 
wise  to  indicate  a  sympathetic  attitude  toward  the  idea. 
For  that  reason  I  expressed  myself  as  favorable  to  the 
guaranty  and  termed  it  "the  heart  of  the  League  of  Na- 
tions," a  phrase  which  the  President  by  his  subsequent  use 
of  it  considered  to  be  a  proper  characterization. 

The  memoranda  contained  in  the  paper  enclosed  in  the 
letter  were  as  follows : 

The  Constitutional  Power  to  provide  Coercion  in  a  Treaty 

"  December  20,  1918 

"In  the  institution  of  a  League  of  Nations  we  must 
bear  in  mind  the  limitations  imposed  by  the  Constitution 
of  the  United  States  upon  the  Executive  and  Legislative 
Branches  of  the  Government  in  defining  their  respective 
powers. 

"The  Constitution  confers  upon  Congress  the  right  to 
declare  war.  This  right,  I  do  not  believe,  can  be  delegated 


SUBSTITUTE  ARTICLES  PROPOSED        51 

and  it  certainly  cannot  be  taken  away  by  treaty.  The 
question  arises,  therefore,  as  to  how  far  a  provision  in  an 
agreement  as  to  a  League  of  Nations,  which  imposes  on 
the  United  States  the  obligation  to  employ  its  military  or 
naval  forces  in  enforcing  the  terms  of  the  agreement,  would 
be  constitutional. 

"It  would  seem  that  the  utilization  of  forces,  whether 
independently  or  in  conjunction  with  other  nations,  would 
in  fact  by  being  an  act  of  war  create  a  state  of  war,  which 
constitutionally  can  only  be  done  by  a  declaration  of  Con- 
gress. To  contract  by  treaty  to  create  a  state  of  war  upon 
certain  contingencies  arising  would  be  equally  tainted 
with  unconstitutionality  and  would  be  null  and  inopera- 
tive. 

"I  do  not  think,  therefore,  that,  even  if  it  were  advis- 
able, any  treaty  can  provide  for  the  independent  or  joint 
use  of  the  military  or  naval  forces  of  the  United  States  to 
compel  compliance  with  a  treaty  or  to  make  good  a  guar- 
anty made  in  a  treaty. 

"The  other  method  of  international  coercion  is  non- 
intercourse,  especially  commercial  non-intercourse.  Would 
a  treaty  provision  to  employ  this  method  be  constitu- 
tional ? 

"As  to  this  my  mind  is  less  clear.  The  Constitution  in 
delegating  powers  to  Congress  includes  the  regulation  of 
commerce.  Does  non-intercourse  fall  within  the  idea  of 
regulation  ?  Could  an  embargo  be  imposed  without  an  act 
of  Congress  ?  My  impression  is  that  it  could  not  be  done 
without  legislation  and  that  a  treaty  provision  agreeing 
in  a  certain  event  to  impose  an  embargo  against  another 
nation  would  be  void. 

"Even  if  Congress  was  willing  to  delegate  to  the  Execu- 
tive for  a  certain  purpose  its  powers  as  to  making  war  and 
regulating  commerce,  I  do  not  think  that  it  could  constitu- 


52  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

tionally  do  so.  It  is  only  in  the  event  of  war  that  powers 
conferred  by  the  Constitution  on  Congress  can  be  dele- 
gated and  then  only  for  war  purposes.  As  a  state  of  war 
would  not  exist  at  the  time  action  was  required,  I  do  not 
believe  that  it  could  be  done,  and  any  provision  contract- 
ing to  take  measures  of  this  nature  would  be  contrary  to 
the  Constitution  and  as  a  consequence  void. 

"But,  assuming  that  Congress  possessed  the  power  of 
delegation,  I  am  convinced  that  it  would  not  only  refuse 
to  do  so,  but  would  resent  such  a  suggestion  because  of  the 
fact  that  both  Houses  have  been  and  are  extremely  jealous 
of  their  rights  and  authority. 

"Viewed  from  the  standpoints  of  legality  and  expediency 
it  would  seem  necessary  to  find  some  other  method  than 
coercion  in  enforcing  an  international  guaranty,  or  else  to 
find  some  substitute  for  a  guaranty  which  would  be  value- 
less without  affirmative  action  to  support  it. 

"I  believe  that  such  a  substitute  can  be  found." 

The  foregoing  memorandum  was  intended  as  an  intro- 
duction to  the  negative  guaranty  or  "self-denying  cove- 
nant" which  I  desired  to  lay  before  the  President  as  a  sub- 
stitute for  the  one  upon  which  he  intended  to  build  the 
League  of  Nations.  The  memorandum  was  suggestive 
merely,  but  in  view  of  the  necessity  for  a  speedy  decision 
there  was  no  time  to  prepare  an  exhaustive  legal  opinion. 
Furthermore,  I  felt  that  the  President,  whose  hours  were 
at  that  time  crowded  with  numerous  personal  confer- 
ences and  public  functions,  would  find  little  opportunity 
to  peruse  a  long  and  closely  reasoned  argument  on  the 
subject. 

The  most  important  portion  of  the  document  was  that 


SUBSTITUTE  ARTICLES  PROPOSED         53 

entitled  "  Suggested  Draft  of  Articles  for  Discussion.    De- 
cember 20,  1918."   It  reads  as  follows: 

"The  parties  to  this  convention,  for  the  purpose  of 
maintaining  international  peace  and  preventing  future 
wars  between  one  another,  hereby  constitute  themselves 
into  a  League  of  Nations  and  solemnly  undertake  jointly 
and  severally  to  fulfill  the  obligations  imposed  upon  them 
in  the  following  articles : 

"A 

"Each  power  signatory  or  adherent  hereto  severally 
covenants  and  guarantees  that  it  will  not  violate  the  ter- 
ritorial integrity  or  impair  the  political  independence  of 
any  other  power  signatory  or  adherent  to  this  convention 
except  when  authorized  so  to  do  by  a  decree  of  the  ar- 
bitral tribunal  hereinafter  referred  to  or  by  a  three-fourths 
vote  of  the  International  Council  of  the  League  of  Nations 
created  by  this  convention. 

"B 

"In  the  event  that  any  power  signatory  or  adherent 
hereto  shall  fail  to  observe  the  covenant  and  guaranty 
set  forth  in  the  preceding  article,  such  breach  of  covenant 
and  guaranty  shall  ipso  facto  operate  as  an  abrogation  of 
this  convention  in  so  far  as  it  applies  to  the  offending  power 
and  furthermore  as  an  abrogation  of  all  treaties,  con- 
ventions, and  agreements  heretofore  or  hereafter  entered 
into  between  the  offending  power  and  all  other  powers 
signatory  and  adherent  to  this  convention. 

"C 

"A  breach  of  the  covenant  and  guaranty  declared  in 
Article  A  shall  constitute  an  act  unfriendly  to  all  other 


54  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

powers  signatory  and  adherent  hereto,  and  they  shall 
forthwith  sever  all  diplomatic,  consular,  and  official  re- 
lations with  the  offending  power,  and  shall,  through  the 
International  Council,  hereinafter  provided  for,  exchange 
views  as  to  the  measures  necessary  to  restore  the  power, 
whose  sovereignty  has  been  invaded,  to  the  rights  and  lib- 
erties which  it  possessed  prior  to  such  invasion  and  to 
prevent  further  violation  thereof. 

"D 

"Any  interference  with  a  vessel  on  the  high  seas  or  with 
aircraft  proceeding  over  the  high  seas,  which  interference 
is  not  affirmatively  sanctioned  by  the  law  of  nations  shall 
be,  for  the  purposes  of  this  convention,  considered  an 
impairment  of  political  independence." 

In  considering  the  foregoing  series  of  articles  constitut- 
ing a  guaranty  against  one's  own  acts,  instead  of  a  guar- 
anty against  the  acts  of  another,  it  must  be  remembered 
that,  at  the  time  of  their  preparation,  I  had  not  seen  a 
draft  of  the  President's  proposed  guaranty,  though  from 
conversations  with  Colonel  House  and  from  my  study  of 
Point  XIV  of  "The  Fourteen  Points,"  I  knew  that  it  was 
affirmative  rather  than  negative  in  form  and  would  re- 
quire positive  action  to  be  effective  in  the  event  that  the 
menace  of  superior  force  was  insufficient  to  prevent  ag- 
gressive acts. 

As  far  as  I  am  able  to  judge  from  subsequently  acquired 
knowledge,  President  Wilson  at  the  time  he  received  my 
letter  of  December  23  had  a  typewritten  draft  of  the  docu- 
ment which  after  certain  amendments  he  later  laid  before 


SUBSTITUTE  ARTICLES  PROPOSED  55 

the  American  Commissioners  and  which  he  had  printed 
with  a  few  verbal  changes  under  the  title  of  "The  Cove- 
nant." In  order  to  understand  the  two  forms  of  guaranty 
which  he  had  for  consideration  after  he  received  my 
letter,  I  quote  the  article  relating  to  it,  which  appears  in 
the  first  printed  draft  of  the  Covenant. 

"Ill 

"The  Contracting  Powers  unite  in  guaranteeing  to 
each  other  political  independence  and  territorial  integ- 
rity; but  it  is  understood  between  them  that  such  terri- 
torial readjustments,  if  any,  as  may  in  the  future  become 
necessary  by  reasons  of  changes  in  present  racial  condi- 
tions and  aspirations  or  present  social  and  political  rela- 
tionships, pursuant  to  the  principle  of  self-determination, 
and  also  such  territorial  readjustments  as  may  in  the 
judgment  of  three  fourths  of  the  Delegates  be  demanded 
by  the  welfare  and  manifest  interest  of  the  people  con- 
cerned, may  be  effected  if  agreeable  to  those  peoples ;  and 
that  territorial  changes  may  involve  material  compensa- 
tion. The  Contracting  Powers  accept  without  reserva- 
tion the  principle  that  the  peace  of  the  world  is  superior 
in  importance  to  every  question  of  political  jurisdiction 
or  boundary." 

It  seems  needless  to  comment  upon  the  involved  lan- 
guage and  the  uncertainty  of  meaning  of  this  article 
wherein  it  provided  for  "territorial  readjustments"  of 
which  there  appeared  to  be  two  classes,  one  dependent 
on  "self-determination,"  the  other  on  the  judgment  of 
the  Body  of  Delegates  of  the  League.  In  view  of  the  possi- 
ble reasons  which  might  be  advanced  for  changes  in  terri- 


56  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

tory  and  allegiance,  justification  for  an  appeal  to  the  guar- 
antors was  by  no  means  certain.  If  this  article  had  been 
before  me  when  the  letter  of  December  23  was  written,  I 
might  have  gone  much  further  in  opposition  to  the  Presi- 
dent's plan  for  stabilizing  peace  in  the  world  on  the 
ground  that  a  guaranty  so  conditioned  would  cause  rather 
than  prevent  international  discord. 

Though  without  knowledge  of  the  exact  terms  of  the 
President's  proposed  guaranty,  I  did  not  feel  for  the 
reason  stated  that  I  could  delay  longer  in  submitting  my 
views  to  the  President.  There  was  not  time  to  work  out  a 
complete  and  well-digested  plan  for  a  League,  but  I  had 
prepared  in  the  rough  several  articles  for  discussion  which 
related  to  the  organization,  and  which  might  be  incor- 
porated in  the  organic  agreement  which  I  then  assumed 
would  be  a  separate  document  from  the  treaty  restoring 
peace.  While  unwilling  to  lay  these  articles  before  the 
President  until  they  were  more  carefully  drafted,  I  en- 
closed in  my  letter  the  following  as  indicative  of  the  char- 
acter of  the  organization  which  it  seemed  to  me  would 
form  a  simple  and  practical  agency  common  to  all  nations : 

"  Suggestions  as  to  an  International  Council 
"For  Discussion 

"December  21,  1918 

"An  International  Council  of  the  League  of  Nations  is 
hereby  constituted,  which  shall  be  the  channel  for  com- 
munication between  the  members  of  the  League,  and  the 
agent  for  common  action. 


SUBSTITUTE  ARTICLES  PROPOSED        57 

"The  International  Council  shall  consist  of  the  diplo- 
matic representative  of  each  party  signatory  or  adherent 
to  this  convention  at . 

"Meetings  of  the  International  Council  shall  be  held  at 
-,  or  in  the  event  that  the  subject  to  be  considered  in- 


volves the  interests  of or  its  nationals,  then  at  such 

other  place  outside  the  territory  of  a  power  whose  inter- 
ests are  involved  as  the  Supervisory  Committee  of  the 
Council  shall  designate. 

"The  officer  charged  with  the  conduct  of  the  foreign 
affairs  of  the  power  where  a  meeting  is  held  shall  be  the 
presiding  officer  thereof. 

"At  the  first  meeting  of  the  International  Council  a 
Supervisory  Committee  shall  be  chosen  by  a  majority  vote 
of  the  members  present,  which  shall  consist  of  five  mem- 
bers and  shall  remain  in  office  for  two  years  or  until  their 
successors  are  elected. 

"The  Supervisory  Committee  shall  name  a  Secretariat 
which  shall  have  charge  of  the  archives  of  the  Council  and 
receive  all  communications  addressed  to  the  Council  or 
Committee  and  send  all  communications  issued  by  the 
Council  or  Committee. 

"The  Supervisory  Committee  may  draft  such  rules  of 
procedure  as  it  deems  necessary  for  conducting  business 
coming  before  the  Council  or  before  the  Committee. 

"The  Supervisory  Committee  may  call  a  meeting  of  the 
Council  at  its  discretion  and  must  call  a  meeting  at  the 
request  of  any  member  of  the  Council  provided  the  re- 
quest contains  a  written  statement  of  the  subject  to  be 
discussed. 

"The  archives  of  the  Council  shall  be  open  at  any  time 
to  any  member  of  the  Council,  who  may  make  and  retain 
copies  thereof. 

"All  expenses  of  the  Supervisory  Committee  and  Secre- 


58  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

tariat  shall  be  borne  equally  by  all  powers  signatory  or 
adherent  to  this  convention." 

As  indicated  by  the  caption,  this  document  was  in- 
tended merely  "for  discussion"  of  the  principal  features 
of  the  organization.  It  should  be  noted  that  the  basic 
principle  is  the  equality  of  nations.  No  special  privileges 
are  granted  to  the  major  powers  in  the  conduct  of  the 
organization.  The  rights  and  obligations  of  one  member 
of  the  League  are  no  more  and  no  less  than  those  of  every 
other  member.  It  is  based  on  international  democracy 
and  denies  international  aristocracy. 

Equality  in  the  exercise  of  sovereign  rights  in  times  of 
peace,  an  equality  which  is  imposed  by  the  very  nature  of 
sovereignty,  seemed  to  me  fundamental  to  a  world  organi- 
zation affecting  in  any  way  a  nation's  independence  of 
action  or  its  exercise  of  supreme  authority  over  its  ex- 
ternal or  domestic  affairs.  In  my  judgment  any  departure 
from  that  principle  would  be  a  serious  error  fraught  with 
danger  to  the  general  peace  of  the  world  and  to  the  recog- 
nized law  of  nations,  since  it  could  mean  nothing  less  than 
the  primacy  of  the  Great  Powers  and  the  acknowledgment 
that  because  they  possessed  the  physical  might  they  had  a 
right  to  control  the  affairs  of  the  world  in  times  of  peace  as 
well  as  in  times  of  war.  For  the  United  States  to  admit 
that  such  a  primacy  ought  to  be  formed  would  be  bad 
enough,  but  to  suggest  it  indirectly  by  proposing  an  inter- 
national organization  based  on  that  idea  would  be  far 
worse. 


SUBSTITUTE  ARTICLES  PROPOSED        59 

On  January  22,  1917,  the  President  in  an  address  to  the 
Senate  had  made  the  following  declaration : 

"The  equality  of  nations  upon  which  peace  must  be 
founded  if  it  is  to  last  must  be  an  equality  of  rights;  the 
guarantees  exchanged  must  neither  recognize  nor  imply  a 
difference  between  big  nations  or  small,  between  those 
that  are  powerful  and  those  that  are  weak.  Right  must  be 
based  upon  the  common  strength,  not  the  individual 
strength,  of  the  nations  upon  whose  concert  peace  will  de- 
pend. Equality  of  territory  or  of  resources  there  of  course 
cannot  be;  nor  any  other  sort  of  equality  not  gained  in  the 
ordinary  peaceful  and  legitimate  development  of  the  peo- 
ples themselves.  But  no  one  asks  or  expects  anything 
more  than  an  equality  of  rights." 

In  view  of  this  sound  declaration  of  principle  it  seemed 
hardly  possible  that  the  President,  after  careful  considera- 
tion of  the  consequences  of  his  plan  of  a  guaranty  requir- 
ing force  to  make  it  practical,  would  not  perceive  the 
fundamental  error  of  creating  a  primacy  of  the  Great 
Powers. 

It  was  in  order  to  prevent,  if  possible,  the  United 
States  from  becoming  sponsor  for  an  undemocratic  princi- 
ple that  I  determined  to  lay  my  partial  plan  of  organiza- 
tion before  the  President  at  the  earliest  moment  that  I 
believed  it  would  receive  consideration. 

To  my  letter  of  December  23  with  its  enclosed  memo- 
randa I  never  received  a  reply  or  even  an  acknowledg- 
ment. It  is  true  that  the  day  following  its  delivery  the 
President  went  to  Chaumont  to  spend  Christmas  at  the 


60  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

headquarters  of  General  Pershing  and  that  almost  immedi- 
ately thereafter  he  visited  London  and  two  or  three  days 
after  his  return  to  Paris  he  set  out  for  Rome.  It  is  possible 
that  Mr.  Wilson  in  the  midst  of  these  crowded  days  had 
no  time  to  digest  or  even  to  read  my  letter  and  its  enclosed 
memoranda.  It  is  possible  that  he  was  unable  or  unwilling 
to  form  an  opinion  as  to  their  merits  without  time  for 
meditation.  I  do  not  wish  to  be  unjustly  critical  or  to 
blame  the  President  for  a  neglect  which  was  the  result  of 
circumstance  rather  than  of  intention. 

At  the  time  I  assumed  that  his  failure  to  mention  my 
letter  in  any  way  was  because  his  visits  to  royalty  exacted 
from  him  so  much  of  his  time  that  there  was  no  opportu- 
nity to  give  the  matter  consideration.  While  some  doubt 
was  thrown  on  this  assumption  by  the  fact  that  the  Presi- 
dent held  an  hour's  conference  with  the  American  Com- 
missioners on  January  I,  just  before  departing  for  Italy, 
during  which  he  discussed  the  favorable  attitude  of  Mr. 
Lloyd  George  toward  his  (the  President's)  ideas  as  to  a 
League  of  Nations,  but  never  made  any  reference  to  my 
proposed  substitute  for  the  guaranty,  I  was  still  disposed 
to  believe  that  there  was  a  reasonable  explanation  for  his 
silence  and  that  upon  his  return  from  Rome  he  would 
discuss  it. 

Having  this  expectation  I  continued  the  preparation  of 
tentative  provisions  to  be  included  in  the  charter  of  a 
League  of  Nations  in  the  event  one  was  negotiated,  and 
which  would  in  any  event  constitute  a  guide  for  the  prepa° 


SUBSTITUTE  ARTICLES  PROPOSED        61 

ration  of  declarations  to  be  included  in  the  Treaty  of 
Peace  in  case  the  negotiation  as  to  a  League  was  post- 
poned until  after  peace  had  been  restored.  As  has  been 
said,  it  was  my  hope  that  there  would  be  a  separate  con- 
vention organizing  the  League,  but  I  was  not  as  sanguine  of 
this  as  many  who  believed  this  course  would  be  followed. 
It  later  developed  that  the  President  never  had  any 
other  purpose  than  to  include  the  detailed  plan  of  organi- 
zation in  the  peace  treaty,  whether  the  treaty  was  pre- 
liminary or  definitive.  When  he  departed  for  Italy  he  had 
not  declared  this  purpose  to  the  Commissioners,  but  from 
some  source,  which  I  failed  to  note  at  the  time  and  cannot 
now  recollect,  I  gained  the  impression  that  he  intended  to 
pursue  this  policy,  for  on  December  29  I  wrote  in  my  book 
of  notes : 

"It  is  evident  that  the  President  is  determined  to  in- 
corporate in  the  peace  treaty  an  elaborate  scheme  for  the 
League  of  Nations  which  will  excite  all  sorts  of  opposition 
at  home  and  abroad  and  invite  much  discussion. 

"The  articles  relating  to  the  League  ought  to  be  few  and 
brief.  They  will  not  be.  They  will  be  many  and  long.  If 
we  wait  till  they  are  accepted,  it  will  be  four  or  five  months 
before  peace  is  signed,  and  I  fear  to  say  how  much  longer 
it  will  take  to  have  it  ratified. 

"It  is  perhaps  foolish  to  prophesy,  but  I  will  take  the 
chance.  Two  months  from  now  we  will  still  be  haggling 
over  the  League  of  Nations  and  an  exasperated  world  will 
be  cursing  us  for  not  having  made  peace.  I  hope  that  I  am 
a  false  prophet,  but  I  fear  my  prophecy  will  come  true. 
We  are  riding  a  hobby,  and  riding  to  a  fall." 


62 

By  the  time  the  President  returned  from  his  triumphal 
journey  to  Rome  I  had  completed  the  articles  upon  which 
I  had  been  working;  at  least  they  were  in  form  for  discus- 
sion. At  a  conference  at  the  Hotel  Crillon  between  Presi- 
dent Wilson  and  the  American  Commissioners  on  Janu- 
ary 7,  I  handed  to  him  the  draft  articles  saying  that  they 
were  supplemental  to  my  letter  of  December  23.  He  took 
them  without  comment  and  without  making  any  reference 
to  my  unanswered  letter. 

The  first  two  articles  of  the  "International  Agreement," 
as  I  termed  the  document,  were  identical  in  language  with 
the  memoranda  dealing  with  a  mutual  covenant  and  with 
an  international  council  which  I  had  enclosed  in  my  letter 
of  December  23.  It  is  needless,  therefore,  to  repeat  them 
here. 

Article  III  of  the  so-called  "Agreement"  was  entitled 
"Peaceful  Settlements  of  International  Disputes,"  and 
read  as  follows : 

"Clause  i 

"In  the  event  that  there  is  a  controversy  between  two  or 
more  members  of  the  League  of  Nations  which  fails  of  set- 
tlement through  diplomatic  channels,  one  of  the  following 
means  of  settlement  shall  be  employed: 

"i.  The  parties  to  the  controversy  shall  constitute  a 
joint  commission  to  investigate  and  report  jointly  or  sev- 
erally to  their  Governments  the  facts  and  make  recom- 
mendations as  to  settlement.  After  such  report  a  further 
effort  shall  be  made  to  reach  a  diplomatic  settlement  of 
the  controversy. 

"2.  The  parties  shall  by  agreement  arrange  for  the  sub- 


SUBSTITUTE  ARTICLES  PROPOSED        63 

mission  of  the  controversy  to  arbitration  mutually  agreed 
upon,  or  to  the  Arbitral  Tribunal  hereinafter  referred  to. 
"3.  Any  party  may,  unless  the  second  means  of  settle- 
ment is  mutually  adopted,  submit  the  controversy  to  the 
Supervisory  Committee  of  the  International  Council;  and 
the  Committee  shall  forthwith  (a)  name  and  direct  a  spe- 
cial commission  to  investigate  and  report  upon  the  subject; 
(b)  name  and  direct  a  commission  to  mediate  between  the 
parties  to  the  controversy;  or  (c)  direct  the  parties  to  sub- 
mit the  controversy  to  the  Arbitral  Tribunal  for  judicial 
settlement,  it  being  understood  that  the  direction  to  arbi- 
trate may  be  made  at  any  time  in  the  event  that  investiga- 
tion and  mediation  fail  to  result  in  a  settlement  of  the 
controversy. 

"Clause  2 

"No  party  to  a  controversy  shall  assume  any  authority 
or  perform  any  acts  based  upon  disputed  rights  without 
authorization  of  the  Supervisory  Committee,  such  authori- 
zation being  limited  in  all  cases  to  the  pendency  of  the 
controversy  and  its  final  settlement  and  being  in  no  way 
prejudicial  to  the  rights  of  the  parties.  An  authorization 
thus  granted  by  the  Supervisory  Committee  may  be  modi- 
fied or  superseded  by  mutual  agreement  of  the  parties,  by 
order  of  an  arbitrator  or  arbitrators  selected  by  the  parties, 
or  by  order  of  the  Arbitral  Tribunal  if  the  controversy  is 
submitted  to  it. 

"Clause  3 

"The  foregoing  clause  shall  not  apply  to  cases  in  which 
the  constituted  authorities  of  a  power  are  unable  or  fail  to 
give  protection  to  the  lives  and  property  of  nationals  of 
another  power.  In  the  event  that  it  becomes  necessary  for 
a  power  to  use  its  military  or  naval  forces  to  safeguard  the 
lives  or  property  of  its  nationals  within  the  territorial 


64  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

jurisdiction  of  another  power,  the  facts  and  reasons  for 
such  action  shall  be  forthwith  reported  to  the  Supervisory 
Committee,  which  shall  determine  the  course  of  action  to 
be  adopted  in  order  to  protect  the  rights  of  all  parties,  and 
shall  notify  the  same  to  the  governments  involved  which 
shall  comply  with  such  notification.  In  the  event  that 
a  government  fails  to  comply  therewith  it  shall  be  deemed 
to  have  violated  the  covenant  and  guaranty  hereinbefore 
set  forth." 

The  other  articles  follow: 

"ARTICLE  IV 

"Revision  of  Arbitral  Tribunal  and  Codification  of 
International  Law 

"Clause  I 

"The  International  Council,  within  one  year  after  its 
organization,  shall  notify  to  the  powers  signatory  and  ad- 
herent to  this  convention  and  shall  invite  all  other  powers  to 
send  delegates  to  an  international  conference  at  such  place 
and  time  as  the  Council  may  determine  and  not  later  than 
six  months  after  issuance  of  such  notification  and  invitation. 

"Clause  2 

"The  International  Conference  shall  consider  the  revi- 
sion of  the  constitution  and  procedure  of  the  Arbitral 
Tribunal  and  provisions  for  the  amicable  settlement  of 
international  disputes  established  by  the  I  Treaty  signed 
at  The  Hague  in  1907,  and  shall  formulate  codes  embody- 
ing the  principles  of  international  law  applicable  in  time  of 
peace  and  the  rules  of  warfare  on  land  and  sea  and  in  the 
air.  The  revision  and  codification  when  completed  shall  be 
embodied  in  a  treaty  or  treaties. 


SUBSTITUTE  ARTICLES  PROPOSED        65 

11  Clause  3 

"The  International  Council  shall  prepare  and  submit 
with  the  notification  and  invitation  above  provided  a  pre- 
liminary programme  of  the  International  Conference, 
which  shall  be  subject  to  modification  or  amendment  by 
the  Conference. 

"Clause  4 

"Until  the  treaty  of  revision  of  the  constitution  and  pro- 
cedure of  the  Arbitral  Tribunal  becomes  operative,  the 
provisions  of  the  I  Treaty  signed  at  The  Hague  in  1907 
shall  continue  in  force,  and  all  references  herein  to  the 
*  Arbitral  Tribunal'  shall  be  understood  to  be  the  Tribunal 
constituted  under  the  I  Treaty,  but  upon  the  treaty  of  re- 
vision coming  into  force  the  references  shall  be  construed 
as  applying  to  the  Arbitral  Tribunal  therein  constituted. 

"ARTICLE  V 
"Publication  of  Treaties  and  Agreements 

"Clause  i 

"Each  power,  signatory  or  adherent  to  this  convention, 
severally  agrees  with  all  other  parties  hereto  that  it  will  not 
exchange  the  ratification  of  any  treaty  or  convention  here- 
inafter entered  into  by  it  with  any  other  power  until  thirty 
days  after  the  full  text  of  such  treaty  or  convention  has 
been  published  in  the  public  press  of  the  parties  thereto 
and  a  copy  has  been  filed  with  the  Secretariat  of  the  League 
of  Nations. 

"Clause  2 

"No  international  agreement,  to  which  a  power  signa- 
tory or  adherent  to  this  convention,  is  a  party,  shall  be- 


66  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

come  operative  or  be  put  in  force  until  published  and  filed 
as  aforesaid. 

"Clause  3 

"All  treaties,  conventions  and  agreements,  to  which  a 
power,  signatory  or  adherent  to  this  convention,  is  a  party, 
and  which  are  in  force  or  to  come  into  force  and  which  have 
not  been  heretofore  published,  shall  within  six  months 
after  the  signature  of  this  convention  be  published  and 
filed  as  aforesaid  or  abrogated  or  denounced. 

"ARTICLE  VI 
"Equality  of  Commercial  Privileges 

"The  powers,  signatory  and  adherent  to  this  convention 
agree  jointly  and  severally  not  to  discriminate  against  or 
in  favor  of  any  power  in  the  matter  of  commerce  or  trade 
or  of  industrial  privileges ;  and  they  further  agree  that  all 
treaties,  conventions  and  agreements  now  in  force  or  to 
come  into  force  or  hereinafter  negotiated  shall  be  con- 
sidered as  subject  to  the  'most  favored  nation'  doctrine, 
whether  they  contain  or  do  not  contain  a  clause  to  that 
effect.  It  is  specifically  declared  that  it  is  the  purpose  of 
this  article  not  to  limit  any  power  in  imposing  upon  com- 
merce and  trade  such  restrictions  and  burdens  as  it  may 
deem  proper  but  to  make  such  impositions  apply  equally 
and  impartially  to  all  other  powers,  their  nationals  and 
ships. 

"This  article  shall  not  apply,  however,  to  any  case,  in 
which  a  power  has  committed  an  unfriendly  act  against 
the  members  of  the  League  of  Nations  as  defined  in  Arti- 
cle I  and  in  which  commercial  and  trade  relations  are  de- 
nied or  restricted  by  agreements  between  the  members  as 
a  measure  of  restoration  or  protection  of  the  rights  of  a 
power  injured  by  such  unfriendly  act." 


SUBSTITUTE  ARTICLES  PROPOSED        67 

These  proposed  articles,  which  were  intended  for  discus- 
sion before  drafting  the  provisions  constituting  a  League 
of  Nations  and  which  did  not  purport  to  be  a  completed 
document,  are  given  in  full  because  there  seems  no  simpler 
method  of  showing  the  differences  between  the  President 
and  me  as  to  the  form,  functions,  and  authority  of  an  inter- 
national organization.  They  should  be  compared  with  the 
draft  of  the  "Covenant"  which  the  President  had  when 
these  proposed  articles  were  handed  to  him;  the  text  of  the 
President's  draft  appears  in  the  Appendix  (page  281). 
Comparison  will  disclose  the  irreconcilable  differences  be- 
tween the  two  projects. 

Of  these  differences  the  most  vital  was  in  the  character 
of  the  international  guaranty  of  territorial  and  political 
sovereignty.  That  difference  has  already  been  discussed. 
The  second  in  importance  was  the  practical  repudiation 
by  the  President  of  the  doctrine  of  the  equality  of  nations, 
which,  as  has  been  shown,  was  an  unavoidable  consequence 
of  an  affirmative  guaranty  which  he  had  declared  to  be  abso- 
lutely essential  to  an  effective  world  union.  The  repudia- 
tion, though  by  indirection,  was  none  the  less  evident  in 
the  recognition  in  the  President's  plan  of  the  primacy  of 
the  Great  Powers  through  giving  to  them  a  permanent 
majority  on  the  "Executive  Council"  which  body  sub- 
stantially controlled  the  activities  of  the  League.  A  third 
marked  difference  was  in  Mr.  Wilson's  exaltation  of  the 
executive  power  of  the  League  and  the  subordination  of 
the  administration  of  legal  justice  to  that  power,  and  in 


68  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

my  advocacy  of  an  independent  international  judiciary, 
whose  decisions  would  be  final  and  whose  place  in  the  or- 
ganization of  the  nations  would  be  superior,  since  I  con- 
sidered a  judicial  tribunal  the  most  practical  agency  for 
removing  causes  of  war. 

The  difference  as  to  international  courts  and  the  impor- 
tance of  applied  legal  justice  requires  further  consideration 
in  order  to  understand  the  divergence  of  views  which  existed 
as  to  the  fundamental  idea  of  organization  of  the  League. 

President  Wilson  in  his  Covenant,  as  at  first  submitted 
to  the  American  Commissioners,  made  no  provision  for 
the  establishment  of  a  World  Court  of  Justice,  and  nc 
reference  of  any  sort  was  made  to  The  Hague  Tribunal 
of  Arbitration.  It  is  not,  in  my  opinion,  a  misstatement 
to  say  that  the  President  intentionally  omitted  judicial 
means  of  composing  international  disputes  preferring  to 
leave  settlements  of  that  sort  to  arrangement  between  the 
parties  or  else  to  the  Body  of  Delegates  or  the  Executive 
Council,  both  of  which  bodies  being  essentially  diplomatic 
or  political  in  their  composition  would  lack  the  judicial 
point  of  view,  since  their  members  would  presumably  be 
influenced  by  their  respective  national  interests  and  by 
political  considerations  rather  than  by  a  desire  and  pur- 
pose to  do  impartial  justice  by  applying  legal  principles. 

It  is  true  that  in  Article  V  of  the  first  draft  of  the  Cove- 
nant (Appendix,  page  285)  there  is  an  agreement  to  sub- 
mit to  arbitration  certain  classes  of  controversies  and  a 
method  of  selecting  arbitrators  is  provided  —  a  method, 


SUBSTITUTE  ARTICLES  PROPOSED        69 

by  the  way,  which  the  actual  experience  of  a  century  has 
shown  to  be  the  least  satisfactory  in  administering  legal 
justice,  since  it  almost  inevitably  leads  to  a  compromise 
which  impairs  the  just  rights  of  one  of  the  parties.  But,  to 
my  mind,  a  provision,  far  more  objectionable  than  the 
antiquated  and  unsatisfactory  method  of  arbitration  pro- 
vided, was  that  which  made  an  arbitral  award  review- 
able  on  appeal  to  the  Body  of  Delegates  of  the  League, 
which  could  set  aside  the  award  even  if  the  arbitrators  had 
rendered  a  unanimous  decision  and  compel  a  rehearing 
before  other  arbitrators.  International  arbitration  as  a 
method  of  applying  the  principles  of  justice  to  disputes 
between  nations  would,  in  the  first  instance  at  least,  have 
become  a  farce  if  this  provision  had  been  adopted.  As  an 
award  based  on  compromise  is  seldom,  if  ever,  satisfactory 
to  both  parties,  the  right  of  appeal  would  in  substantially 
every  case  have  been  invoked  and  the  award  would  have 
been  reviewed  by  the  Body  of  Delegates,  who  would 
practically  render  a  final  decision  since  the  new  arbitrators 
would  presumably  adopt  it.  The  effect  of  this  provision 
as  to  appeals  was,  therefore,  to  supplant  judicial  settle- 
ments by  political  compromises  and  diplomatic  adjust- 
ments, in  which  the  national  interests  of  the  judges,  many 
of  whom  would  be  untrained  in  juridical  procedure,  would 
be  decided,  if  not  deciding,  factors.  Manifestly  the  ex- 
pediency of  the  moment  would  be  far  more  potent  in 
the  decisions  reached  than  the  principles  and  precepts  of 
international  law. 


yo  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

I  shall  not  express  here  my  opinion  as  to  the  reasons 
which  I  believe  impelled  the  President  to  insert  in  the 
Covenant  these  extraordinary  provisions  which  deprived 
arbitral  courts  of  that  independence  of  the  executive  au- 
thority which  has  been  in  modern  times  considered  essen- 
tial to  the  impartial  administration  of  justice.  But,  when 
one  considers  how  jealously  and  effectively  the  Constitu- 
tion of  the  United  States  and  the  constitutions  of  the  vari- 
ous States  of  the  Union  guard  the  judiciary  from  executive 
and  legislative  interference,  the  proposal  in  the  President's 
plan  for  a  League  of  Nations  to  abandon  that  great  prin- 
ciple in  the  settlement  of  international  disputes  of  a  justici- 
able nature  causes  speculation  as  to  Mr.  Wilson's  real 
opinion  of  the  American  political  system  which  empha- 
sizes the  separation  and  independence  of  the  three  coordi- 
nate branches  of  government. 

That  a  provision  found  its  way  into  the  draft  of  the 
Covenant,  which  the  President,  on  February  3,  1919,  laid 
before  the  Commission  on  the  League  of  Nations,  declar- 
ing for  the  creation  by  the  League  of  a  permanent  court  of 
international  justice,  was  not  due,  I  feel  sure,  to  any  spon- 
taneous thought  on  the  part  of  President  Wilson. 

My  own  views  as  to  the  relative  value  of  the  settlement 
of  an  international  controversy,  which  is  by  its  nature 
justiciable,  by  a  body  of  diplomats  and  of  the  settlement 
by  a  body  of  trained  jurists  were  fully  set  forth  in  an  ad- 
dress which  I  delivered  before  the  American  Bar  Associa- 
tion at  its  annual  meeting  at  Boston  on  September  5, 1919. 


SUBSTITUTE  ARTICLES  PROPOSED        71 

An  extract  from  that  address  will  show  the  radical  differ- 
ence between  the  President's  views  and  mine. 

"While  abstract  justice  cannot  [under  present  condi- 
tions] be  depended  upon  as  a  firm  basis  on  which  to  consti- 
tute an  international  concord  for  the  preservation  of  peace 
and  good  relations  between  nations,  legal  justice  offers  a 
common  ground  where  the  nations  can  meet  to  settle 
their  controversies.  No  nation  can  refuse  in  the  face  of 
the  opinion  of  the  world  to  declare  its  unwillingness  to 
recognize  the  legal  rights  of  other  nations  or  to  submit  to 
the  judgment  of  an  impartial  tribunal  a  dispute  involving 
the  determination  of  such  rights.  The  moment,  however, 
that  we  go  beyond  the  clearly  defined  field  of  legal  justice 
we  enter  the  field  of  diplomacy  where  national  interests 
and  ambitions  are  to-day  the  controlling  factors  of  na- 
tional action.  Concession  and  compromise  are  the  chief 
agents  of  diplomatic  settlement  instead  of  the  impartial 
application  of  legal  justice  which  is  essential  to  a  judicial 
settlement.  Furthermore,  the  two  modes  of  settlement 
differ  in  that  a  judicial  settlement  rests  upon  the  pre- 
cept that  all  nations,  whether  great  or  small,  are  equal, 
but  in  the  sphere  of  diplomacy  the  inequality  of  nations 
is  not  only  recognized,  but  unquestionably  influences  the 
adjustment  of  international  differences.  Any  change  in 
the  relative  power  of  nations,  a  change  which  is  continu- 
ally taking  place,  makes  more  or  less  temporary  diplo- 
matic settlements,  but  in  no  way  affects  a  judicial  settle- 
ment. 

"However,  then,  international  society  may  be  organ- 
ized for  the  future  and  whatever  machinery  may  be  set 
up  to  minimize  the  possibilities  of  war,  I  believe  that 
the  agency  which  may  be  counted  upon  to  function  with 
certainty  is  that  which  develops  and  applies  legal  justice. 


72  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

Every  other  agency,  regardless  of  its  form,  will  be  found, 
when  analyzed,  to  be  diplomatic  in  character  and  subject 
to  those  impulses  and  purposes  which  generally  affect 
diplomatic  negotiations.  With  a  full  appreciation  of  the 
advantage  to  be  gained  for  the  world  at  large  through  the 
common  consideration  of  a  vexatious  international  ques- 
tion by  a  body  representing  all  nations,  we  ought  not  to 
lose  sight  of  the  fact  that  such  consideration  and  the  action 
resulting  from  it  are  essentially  diplomatic  in  nature.  It  is, 
in  brief,  the  transference  of  a  dispute  in  a  particular  case 
from  the  capitals  of  the  disputants  to  the  place  where  the 
delegates  of  the  nations  assemble  to  deliberate  together  on 
matters  which  affect  their  common  interests.  It  does  not 
—  and  this  we  should  understand  —  remove  the  question 
from  the  processes  of  diplomacy  or  prevent  the  influences 
which  enter  into  diplomacy  from  affecting  its  considera- 
tion. Nor  does  it  to  an  appreciable  extent  change  the  ac- 
tual inequality  which  exists  among  nations  in  the  matter 
of  power  and  influence. 

"On  the  other  hand,  justice  applied  through  the  agency 
of  an  impartial  tribunal  clothed  with  an  international 
jurisdiction  eliminates  the  diplomatic  methods  of  com- 
promise and  concession  and  recognizes  that  before  the  law 
all  nations  are  equal  and  equally  entitled  to  the  exercise 
of  their  rights  as  sovereign  and  independent  states.  In  a 
word,  international  democracy  exists  in  the  sphere  of 
legal  justice  and,  up  to  the  present  time,  in  no  other  rela- 
tion between  nations. 

"Let  us,  then,  with  as  little  delay  as  possible  establish 
an  international  tribunal  or  tribunals  of  justice  with  The 
Hague  Court  as  a  foundation;  let  us  provide  an  easier,  a 
cheaper,  and  better  procedure  than  now  exists;  and  let  us 
draft  a  simple  and  concise  body  of  legal  principles  to  be 
applied  to  the  questions  to  be  adjudicated.  When  that  has 


SUBSTITUTE  ARTICLES  PROPOSED        73 

been  accomplished  —  and  it  ought  not  to  be  a  difficult 
task  if  the  delegates  of  the  Governments  charged  with  it 
are  chosen  for  their  experience  and  learning  in  the  field 
of  jurisprudence  —  we  shall,  in  my  judgment,  have  done 
more  to  prevent  international  wars  through  removing 
their  causes  than  can  be  done  by  any  other  means  that  has 
been  devised  or  suggested." 

The  views,  which  I  thus  publicly  expressed  at  Boston  in 
September,  1919,  while  the  President  was  upon  his  tour 
of  the  country  in  favor  of  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of 
Nations,  were  the  same  as  those  that  I  held  at  Paris  in 
December,  1918,  before  I  had  seen  the  President's  first 
draft  of  a  Covenant,  as  the  following  will  indicate. 

On  December  17,  1918,  three  days  after  arriving  in 
Paris,  I  had,  as  has  been  stated,  a  long  conference  with 
Colonel  House  on  the  Peace  Conference  and  the  subjects 
to  come  before  it.  I  urged  him  in  the  course  of  our  con- 
versation "  to  persuade  the  President  to  make  the  nucleus 
of  his  proposed  League  of  Nations  an  international  court 
pointing  out  that  it  was  the  simplest  and  best  way  of  or- 
ganizing the  world  for  peace,  and  that,  if  in  addition  the 
general  principles  of  international  law  were  codified  and 
the  right  of  inquiry  confided  to  the  court,  everything  prac- 
tical would  have  been  done  to  prevent  wars  in  the  future  " 
(quoted  from  a  memorandum  of  the  conversation  made 
at  the  time).  I  also  urged  upon  the  Colonel  that  The 
Hague  Tribunal  be  made  the  basis  of  the  judicial  organi- 
zation, but  that  it  be  expanded  and  improved  to  meet 


74  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

the  new  conditions.  I  shall  have  something  further  to  say 
on  this  subject. 

Reverting  now  to  the  draft  of  articles  which  I  had  in 
form  on  January  5,  1919,  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  I 
then  had  no  reason  to  think  that  the  President  would  omit 
from  his  plan  an  independent  judicial  agency  for  the  ad- 
ministration of  legal  justice,  although  I  did  realize  that  he 
gave  first  place  to  the  mutual  guaranty  and  intended  to 
build  a  League  on  that  as  a  nucleus.  It  did  not  seem 
probable  that  an  American,  a  student  of  the  political  in- 
stitutions of  the  United  States  and  familiar  with  their 
operation,  would  fail  to  incorporate  in  any  scheme  for 
world  organization  a  judicial  system  which  would  be  free 
from  the  control  and  even  from  the  influence  of  the  political 
and  diplomatic  branch  of  the  organization.  The  benefit,  if 
not  the  necessity,  of  such  a  division  of  authority  seemed  so 
patent  that  the  omission  of  a  provision  to  that  effect  in  the 
original  draft  of  the  Covenant  condemned  it  to  one  who 
believed  in  the  principles  of  government  which  found  ex- 
pression in  American  institutions.  Fortunately  the  defect 
was  in  a  measure  cured  before  the  Commission  on  the 
League  of  Nations  formally  met  to  discuss  the  subject, 
though  not  before  the  Covenant  had  been  laid  before  the 
American  Commissioners. 

The  articles  of  a  proposed  convention  for  the  creation  of 
an  international  organization  were  not  intended,  as  I  have 
said,  to  form  a  complete  convention.  They  were  sugges- 
tive only  of  the  principal  features  of  a  plan  which  could,  if 


SUBSTITUTE  ARTICLES  PROPOSED        75 

the  President  desired,  arouse  discussion  as  to  the  right 
theory  and  the  fundamental  principles  of  the  interna- 
tional organization  which  there  seemed  little  doubt  would 
be  declared  by  the  Paris  Conference. 

Among  the  suggested  articles  there  was  none  covering 
the  subject  of  disarmament,  because  the  problem  was 
highly  technical  requiring  the  consideration  of  military 
and  naval  experts.  Nor  was  there  any  reference  to  the 
mandatory  system  because  there  had  not  been,  to  my 
knowledge,  any  mention  of  it  at  that  time  in  connection 
with  the  President's  plan,  though  General  Smuts  had 
given  it  prominence  in  his  proposed  scheme. 

During  the  preparation  of  these  suggestive  articles  I 
made  a  brief  memorandum  on  the  features,  which  seemed 
to  me  salient,  of  any  international  agreement  to  prevent 
wars  in  the  future,  and  which  in  my  opinion  ought  to  be  in 
mind  when  drafting  such  an  agreement.  The  first  three 
paragraphs  of  the  memorandum  follow : 

"There  are  three  doctrines  which  should  be  incorpo- 
rated in  the  Treaty  of  Peace  if  wars  are  to  be  avoided  and 
equal  justice  is  to  prevail  in  international  aifairs. 

"These  three  doctrines  may  be  popularly  termed 
'Hands  Off,'  the  'Open  Door,'  and  'Publicity.' 

"The  first  pertains  to  national  possessions  and  national 
rights;  the  second  to  international  commerce  and  eco- 
nomic conditions;  and  the  third,  to  international  agree- 
ments." 

An  examination  of  the  articles  which  I  prepared  shows 
that  these  doctrines  are  developed  in  them,  although  at; 


76  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

the  time  I  was  uncertain  whether  they  ought  to  appear  in 
the  convention  creating  the  League  or  in  the  Preliminary 
Treaty  of  Peace,  which  I  believed,  in  common  with  the 
prevailing  belief,  would  be  negotiated.  My  impression 
was  that  they  should  appear  in  the  Peace  Treaty  and  pos- 
sibly be  repeated  in  the  League  Treaty,  if  the  two  were 
kept  distinct. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE  AFFIRMATIVE  GUARANTY  AND  BALANCE 
OF  POWER 

WHILE  I  was  engaged  in  the  preparation  of  these  articles 
for  discussion,  which  were  based  primarily  on  the  equality 
of  nations  and  avoided  a  mutual  guaranty  or  other  under- 
taking necessitating  a  departure  from  that  principle,  M. 
Clemenceau  delivered  an  important  address  in  the  Cham- 
ber of  Deputies  at  its  session  on  December  30,  1918.  In 
this  address  the  French  Premier  declared  himself  in  favor 
of  maintaining  the  doctrine  of  "the  balance  of  power"  and 
of  supporting  it  by  a  concert  of  the  Great  Powers.  During 
his  remarks  he  made  the  following  significant  assertion, 
"This  system  of  alliances,  which  I  do  not  renounce,  will 
be  my  guiding  thought  at  the  Conference,  if  your  confi- 
dence sends  me  to  it,  so  that  there  will  be  no  separation 
in  peace  of  the  four  powers  which  have  battled  side  by 
side." 

M.  Clemenceau's  words  caused  a  decided  sensation 
among  the  delegates  already  in  Paris  and  excited  much 
comment  in  the  press.  The  public  interest  was  intensified 
by  the  fact  that  President  Wilson  had  but  a  day  or  two 
before,  in  an  address  at  Manchester,  England,  denounced 
the  doctrine  of  "the  balance  of  power"  as  belonging  to  the 
old  international  order  which  had  been  repudiated  be- 


78  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

cause  it  had  produced  the  conditions  that  resulted  in  the 
Great  War. 

A  week  after  the  delivery  of  M.  Clemenceau's  address 
I  discussed  his  declarations  at  some  length  with  Colonel 
House,  and  he  agreed  with  me  that  the  doctrine  was  en- 
tirely contrary  to  the  public  opinion  of  the  world  and  that 
every  effort  should  be  made  to  prevent  its  revival  and  to 
end  the  "system  of  alliances"  which  M.  Clemenceau  de- 
sired to  continue. 

During  this  conversation  I  pointed  out  that  the  form 
of  affirmative  guaranty,  which  the  President  then  had  in 
mind,  would  unavoidably  impose  the  burden  of  enforcing 
it  upon  the  Great  Powers,  and  that  they,  having  that  re- 
sponsibility, would  demand  the  right  to  decide  at  what 
time  and  in  what  manner  the  guaranty  should  be  enforced. 
This  seemed  to  me  to  be  only  a  different  application  of 
the  principle  expressed  in  the  doctrine  of  "the  balance  of 
power"  and  to  amount  to  a  practical  continuance  of  the 
alliances  formed  for  prosecution  of  the  war.  I  said  that,  in 
my  judgment,  if  the  President's  guaranty  was  made  the 
central  idea  of  the  League  of  Nations,  it  would  play  di- 
rectly into  the  hands  of  M.  Clemenceau  because  it  could 
mean  nothing  other  than  the  primacy  of  the  great  military 
and  naval  powers;  that  I  could  not  understand  how  the 
President  was  able  to  harmonize  his  plan  of  a  positive 
guaranty  with  his  utterances  at  Manchester;  and  that,  if 
he  clung  to  his  plan,  he  would  have  to  accept  the  Clemen- 
ceau doctrine,  which  would  to  all  intents  transform  the 


GUARANTY  AND  BALANCE  OF  POWER    79 

Conference  into  a  second  Congress  of  Vienna  and  result  in 
a  reversion  to  the  old  undesirable  order,  and  its  continu- 
ance in  the  League  of  Nations. 

It  was  my  hope  that  Colonel  House,  to  whom  I  had 
shown  the  letter  and  memoranda  which  I  had  sent  to  the 
President,  would  be  so  impressed  with  the  inconsistency 
of  favoring  the  affirmative  guaranty  and  of  opposing  the 
doctrine  of  "the  balance  of  power,"  that  he  would  exert 
his  influence  with  the  President  to  persuade  him  to  find  a 
substitute  for  the  guaranty  which  Mr.  Wilson  then  favored. 
It  seemed  politic  to  approach  the  President  in  this  way 
in  view  of  the  fact  that  he  had  never  acknowledged  my 
letter  or  manifested  any  inclination  to  discuss  the  subject 
with  me. 

This  hope  was  increased  when  the  Colonel  came  to  me 
on  the  evening  of  the  same  day  that  we  had  the  conversa- 
tion related  above  and  told  me  that  he  was  "entirely  con- 
verted" to  my  plan  for  a  negative  guaranty  and  for  the 
organization  of  a  League. 

At  this  second  interview  Colonel  House  gave  me  a  type- 
written copy  of  the  President's  plan  and  asked  me  to  ex- 
amine it  and  to  suggest  a  way  to  amend  it  so  that  it  would 
harmonize  with  my  views.  This  was  the  first  time  that  I 
had  seen  the  President's  complete  plan  for  a  League.  My 
previous  knowledge  had  been  gained  orally  and  was  gen- 
eral and  more  or  less  vague  in  character  except  as  to  the 
guaranty  of  which  I  had  an  accurate  idea  through  the 
President's  "Bases  of  Peace"  of  1917,  and  Point  XIV  of 


8o  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

his  address  of  January  8,  1918.  At  the  time  that  the  type- 
written plan  was  handed  to  me  another  copy  had  already 
been  given  to  the  printer  of  the  Commission.  It  was  evi- 
dent, therefore,  that  the  President  was  satisfied  with  the 
document.  It  contained  the  theory  and  fundamental 
principles  which  he  advocated  for  world  organization. 


CHAPTER  VI 
THE  PRESIDENT'S  PLAN  AND  THE  CECIL  PLAN 

I  IMMEDIATELY  began  an  examination  and  analysis  of  the 
President's  plan  for  a  League,  having  in  mind  Colonel 
House's  suggestion  that  I  consider  a  way  to  modify  it  so 
that  it  would  harmonize  with  my  views.  The  more  I  stud- 
ied the  document,  the  less  I  liked  it.  A  cursory  reading  of 
the  plan,  which  is  printed  in  the  Appendix  (page  283),  will 
disclose  the  looseness  of  the  language  and  the  doubtful 
interpretation  of  many  of  the  provisions.  It  showed  an 
inexpertness  in  drafting  and  a  fault  in  expression  which 
were  chargeable  to  lack  of  appreciation  of  the  need  of 
exactness  or  else  to  haste  in  preparation.  This  fault  in  the 
paper,  which  was  very  apparent,  could,  however,  be  cured 
and  was  by  no  means  a  fatal  defect.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
the  faults  of  expression  were  to  a  certain  extent  removed 
by  subsequent  revisions,  though  some  of  the  vagueness 
and  ambiguity  of  the  first  draft  persisted  and  appeared  in 
the  final  text  of  the  Covenant. 

The  more  serious  defects  of  the  plan  were  in  the  princi- 
ples on  which  it  was  based  and  in  their  application  under 
the  provisions  of  the  articles  proposed.  The  contemplated 
use  of  force  in  making  good  the  guaranty  of  sovereign 
rights  and  the  establishment  of  a  primacy  of  the  Great 
Powers  were  provided  for  in  language  which  was  suffi- 


82  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

ciently  explicit  to  admit  of  no  denial.  In  my  opinion  these 
provisions  were  entirely  out  of  harmony  with  American 
ideals,  policies,  and  traditions.  Furthermore,  the  clauses 
in  regard  to  arbitration  and  appeals  from  arbitral  awards, 
to  which  reference  has  been  made,  the  lack  of  any  provi- 
sion for  the  establishment  of  a  permanent  international 
judiciary,  and  the  introduction  of  the  mandatory  system 
were  strong  reasons  to  reject  the  President's  plan. 

It  should  be  borne  in  mind  that,  at  the  time  that  this 
document  was  placed  in  my  hands,  the  plan  of  General 
Smuts  for  a  League  of  Nations  had,  as  I  have  said,  been 
printed  in  the  press  and  in  pamphlet  form  and  had  been 
given  wide  publicity.  In  the  Smuts  plan,  which  gave  first 
place  to  the  system  of  mandates,  appeared  the  declaration 
that  the  League  of  Nations  was  to  acquire  the  mandated 
territories  as  "the  heir  of  the  Empires."  This  clever  and 
attractive  phrase  caught  the  fancy  of  the  President,  as  was 
evident  from  his  frequent  repetition  and  approval  of  it  in 
discussing  mandates  under  the  League.  Just  as  General 
Smuts  had  adopted  the  President's  "self-determination," 
Mr.  Wilson  seized  upon  the  Smuts  idea  with  avidity  and 
incorporated  it  in  his  plan.  It  unquestionably  had  a  de- 
cided influence  upon  his  conception  of  the  right  way  to 
dispose  of  the  colonial  possessions  of  Germany  and  of  the 
proper  relation  of  the  newly  created  European  states  to 
the  League  of  Nations.  As  an  example  of  the  way  in  which 
President  Wilson  understood  and  applied  General  Smuts's 
phrase  to  the  new  states,  I  quote  the  following  from  the 


WILSON'S  PLAN  AND  CECIL'S  PLAN       83 

"Supplementary  Agreements"  forming  part  of  the  first 
printed  draft  of  the  President's  Covenant,  but  which  I  be- 
lieve were  added  to  the  typewritten  draft  after  the  Presi- 
dent had  examined  the  plan  of  the  South  African  states- 
man: 

"As  successor  to  the  Empires,  the  League  of  Nations  is 
empowered,  directly  and  without  right  of  delegation,  to 
watch  over  the  relations  inter  se  of  all  new  independent 
states  arising  or  created  out  of  the  Empires,  and  shall 
assume  and  fulfill  the  duty  of  conciliating  and  composing 
differences  between  them  with  a  view  to  the  maintenance 
of  settled  order  and  the  general  peace." 

There  is  a  natural  temptation  to  a  student  of  interna- 
tional agreements  to  analyze  critically  the  composition  and 
language  of  this  provision,  but  to  do  so  would  in  no  way 
advance  the  consideration  of  the  subject  under  discussion 
and  would  probably  be  interpreted  as  a  criticism  of  the 
President's  skill  in  accurately  expressing  his  thoughts,  a 
criticism  which  it  is  not  my  purpose  to  make. 

Mr.  Wilson's  draft  also  contained  a  system  of  mandates 
over  territories  in  a  form  which  was,  to  say  the  least,  rudi- 
mentary if  not  inadequate.  By  the  proposed  system  the 
League  of  Nations,  as  "the  residuary  trustee,"  was  to  take 
sovereignty  over  "the  peoples  and  territories"  of  the  de- 
feated Empires  and  to  issue  a  mandate  to  some  power  or 
powers  to  exercise  such  sovereignty.  A  "  residuary  trustee  " 
was  a  novelty  in  international  relations  sufficient  to  arouse 
conjecture  as  to  its  meaning,  but  giving  to  the  League  the 


84  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

character  of  an  independent  state  with  the  capacity  of 
possessing  sovereignty  and  the  power  to  exercise  sovereign 
rights  through  a  designated  agent  was  even  more  extraor- 
dinary. This  departure  from  the  long  accepted  idea  of  the 
essentials  of  statehood  seemed  to  me  an  inexpedient  and  to 
a  degree  a  dangerous  adventure.  The  only  plausible  excuse 
for  the  proposal  seemed  to  be  a  lack  of  knowledge  as  to  the 
nature  of  sovereignty  and  as  to  the  attributes  inherent  in 
the  very  conception  of  a  state.  The  character  of  a  man- 
date, a  mandatory,  and  the  authority  issuing  the  mandate 
presented  many  legal  perplexities  which  certainly  required 
very  careful  study  before  the  experiment  was  tried.  Until 
the  system  was  fully  worked  out  and  the  problems  of 
practical  operation  were  solved,  it  seemed  to  me  unwise  to 
suggest  it  and  still  more  unwise  to  adopt  it.  While  the 
general  idea  of  mandates  issuing  from  the  proposed  inter- 
national organization  was  presumably  acceptable  to  the 
President  from  the  first,  his  support  was  doubtless  con- 
firmed by  the  fact  that  it  followed  the  groove  which  had 
been  made  in  his  mind  by  the  Smuts  phrase  "the  heir  of 
the  Empires." 

In  any  event  it  seemed  to  me  the  course  of  wise  states- 
manship to  postpone  the  advocacy  of  mandates,  based  on 
the  assumption  that  the  League  of  Nations  could  become 
the  possessor  of  sovereignty,  until  the  practical  application 
of  the  theory  could  be  thoroughly  considered  from  the 
standpoint  of  international  law  as  well  as  from  the  stand- 
point of  policy.  The  experiment  was  too  revolutionary  to 


WILSON'S  PLAN  AND  CECIL'S  PLAN       85 

be  tried  without  hesitation  and  without  consideration  of 
the  effect  on  established  principles  and  usage.  At  an  ap- 
propriate place  this  subject  will  be  more  fully  discussed. 

As  to  the  organization  and  functions  of  the  League  of 
Nations  planned  by  Mr.  Wilson  there  was  little  that  ap- 
pealed to  one  who  was  opposed  to  the  employment  of  force 
in  compelling  the  observance  of  international  obligations 
and  to  the  establishment  of  an  international  oligarchy 
of  the  Great  Powers  to  direct  and  control  world  affairs. 
The  basic  principle  of  the  plan  was  that  the  strong  should, 
as  a  matter  of  right  recognized  by  treaty,  possess  a  domi- 
nant voice  in  international  councils.  Obviously  the  prin- 
ciple of  the  equality  of  nations  was  ignored  or  abandoned. 
In  the  face  of  the  repeated  declarations  of  the  Government 
of  the  United  States  in  favor  of  the  equality  of  independ- 
ent states  as  to  their  rights  in  times  of  peace,  this  appeared 
to  be  a  reversal  of  policy  which  it  would  be  difficult,  if  not 
impossible,  to  explain  in  a  satisfactory  way.  Personally  I 
could  not  subscribe  to  this  principle  which  was  so  destruc- 
tive of  the  American  theory  of  the  proper  relations  be- 
tween nations. 

It  was  manifest,  when  I  read  the  President's  plan,  that 
there  was  no  possible  way  to  harmonize  my  ideas  with  it. 
They  were  fundamentally  different.  There  was  no  com- 
mon basis  on  which  to  build.  To  attempt  to  bring  the  two 
theories  into  accord  would  have  been  futile.  I,  therefore, 
told  Colonel  House  that  it  was  useless  to  try  to  bring  into 
accord  the  two  plans,  since  they  were  founded  on  contra- 


86  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

dictory  principles  and  that  the  only  course  of  procedure 
open  to  me  was  to  present  my  views  to  the  President  in 
written  form,  hoping  that  he  would  give  them  considera- 
tion, although  fearing  that  his  mind  was  made  up,  since 
he  had  ordered  his  plan  to  be  printed. 

In  the  afternoon  of  the  same  day  (January  7),  on  which 
I  informed  the  Colonel  of  the  impossibility  of  harmonizing 
and  uniting  the  two  plans,  President  Wilson  held  a  con- 
ference with  the  American  Commissioners  during  which  he 
declared  that  he  considered  the  affirmative  guaranty  ab- 
solutely necessary  to  the  preservation  of  future  peace  and 
the  only  effective  means  of  preventing  war.  Before  this 
declaration  could  be  discussed  M.  Clemenceau  was  an- 
nounced and  the  conference  came  to  an  end.  While  the 
President  did  not  refer  in  any  way  to  the  "self-denying 
covenant"  which  I  had  proposed  as  a  substitute,  it  seemed 
to  me  that  he  intended  it  to  be  understood  that  the  sub- 
stitute was  rejected,  and  that  he  had  made  the  declaration 
with  that  end  in  view.  This  was  the  nearest  approach  to 
an  answer  to  my  letter  of  December  23  that  I  ever  re- 
ceived. Indirect  as  it  was  the  implication  was  obvious. 

Although  the  settled  purpose  of  the  President  to  insist 
on  his  form  of  mutual  guaranty  was  discouraging  and  his 
declaration  seemed  to  be  intended  to  close  debate  on  the 
subject,  I  felt  that  no  effort  should  be  spared  to  persuade 
him  to  change  his  views  or  at  least  to  leave  open  an  avenue 
for  further  consideration.  Impelled  by  this  motive  I  gave 
to  the  President  the  articles  which  I  had  drafted  and  asked 


WILSON'S  PLAN  AND  CECIL'S  PLAN       87 

him  if  he  would  be  good  enough  to  read  them  and  consider 
the  principles  on  which  they  were  based.  The  President 
with  his  usual  courtesy  of  manner  smilingly  received  them. 
Whether  or  not  he  ever  read  them  I  cannot  state  posi- 
tively because  he  never  mentioned  them  to  me  or,  to  my 
knowledge,  to  any  one  else.  I  believe,  however,  that  he  did 
read  them  and  realized  that  they  were  wholly  opposed  to 
the  theory  which  he  had  evolved,  because  from  that  time 
forward  he  seemed  to  assume  that  I  was  hostile  to  his  plan 
for  a  League  of  Nations.  I  drew  this  conclusion  from  the 
fact  that  he  neither  asked  my  advice  as  to  any  provision 
of  the  Covenant  nor  discussed  the  subject  with  me  per- 
sonally. In  many  little  ways  he  showed  that  he  preferred 
to  have  me  direct  my  activities  as  a  Commissioner  into 
other  channels  and  to  keep  away  from  the  subject  of  a 
League.  The  conviction  that  my  counsel  was  unwelcome 
to  Mr.  Wilson  was,  of  course,  not  formed  at  the  time  that 
he  received  the  articles  drafted  by  me.  It  only  developed 
after  some  time  had  elapsed,  during  which  incidents  took 
place  that  aroused  a  suspicion  which  finally  became  a  con- 
viction. Possibly  I  was  over-sensitive  as  to  the  Presi- 
dent's treatment  of  my  communications  to  him.  Possibly 
he  considered  my  advice  of  no  value,  and,  therefore,  un- 
worthy of  discussion.  But,  in  view  of  his  letter  of  Febru- 
ary n,  1920,  it  must  be  admitted  that  he  recognized  that 
I  was  reluctant  in  accepting  certain  of  his  views  at  Paris, 
a  recognition  which  arose  from  my  declared  opposition  to 
them.  Except  in  the  case  of  the  Shantung  settlement,  there 


8&  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

was  none  concerning  which  our  judgments  were  so  at 
variance  as  they  were  concerning  the  League  of  Nations. 
I  cannot  believe,  therefore,  that  I  was  wrong  in  my  con- 
clusion as  to  his  attitude. 

On  the  two  days  succeeding  the  one  when  I  handed 
the  President  my  draft  of  articles  I  had  long  conferences 
with  Lord  Robert  Cecil  and  Colonel  House.  Previous  to 
these  conferences,  or  at  least  previous  to  the  second  one, 
I  examined  Lord  Robert's  plan  for  a  League.  His  plan 
was  based  on  the  proposition  that  the  Supreme  War 
Council,  consisting  of  the  Heads  of  States  and  the  Secre- 
taries and  Ministers  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  the  Five  Great 
Powers,  should  be  perpetuated  as  a  permanent  interna- 
tional body  which  should  meet  once  a  year  and  discuss 
subjects  of  common  interest.  That  is,  he  proposed  the 
formation  of  a  Quintuple  Alliance  which  would  constitute 
itself  primate  over  all  nations  and  the  arbiter  in  world 
affairs,  a  scheme  of  organization  very  similar  to  the  one 
proposed  by  General  Smuts. 

Lord  Robert  made  no  attempt  to  disguise  the  purpose 
of  his  plan.  It  was  intended  to  place  in  the  hands  of  the 
Five  Powers  the  control  of  international  relations  and  the 
direction  in  large  measure  of  the  foreign  policies  of  all 
nations.  It  was  based  on  the  power  to  compel  obedience, 
on  the  right  of  the  powerful  to  rule.  Its  chief  merit  was  its 
honest  declaration  of  purpose,  however  wrong  that  pur- 
pose might  appear  to  those  who  denied  that  the  possession 
of  superior  might  conferred  special  rights  upon  the  posses- 


WILSON'S  PLAN  AND  CECIL'S  PLAN       89 

sor.  It  seemed  to  provide  for  a  rebirth  of  the  Congress 
of  Vienna  which  should  be  clothed  in  the  modern  garb  of 
democracy.  It  could  only  be  interpreted  as  a  rejection  of 
the  principle  of  the  equality  of  nations.  Its  adoption  would 
mean  that  the  destiny  of  the  world  would  be  in  the  hands 
of  a  powerful  international  oligarchy  possessed  of  dicta- 
torial powers. 

There  was  nothing  idealistic  in  the  plan  of  Lord  Robert 
Cecil,  although  he  was  reputed  to  be  an  idealist  favoring 
a  new  international  order.  An  examination  of  his  plan 
(Appendix,  page  295)  shows  it  to  be  a  substantial  revival 
of  the  old  and  discredited  ideas  of  a  century  ago.  There 
could  be  no  doubt  that  a  plan  of  this  sort,  materialistic 
and  selfish  as  it  was,  would  win  the  approval  and  cor- 
dial support  of  M.  Clemenceau,  since  it  fitted  in  with  his 
public  advocacy  of  the  doctrine  of  "the  balance  of  power." 
Presumably  the  Italian  delegates  would  not  be  opposed  to 
a  scheme  which  gave  Italy  so  influential  a  voice  in  inter- 
national affairs,  while  the  Japanese,  not  averse  to  this 
recognition  of  their  national  power  and  importance,  would 
unquestionably  favor  an  alliance  of  this  nature.  I  think 
that  it  is  fair  to  assume  that  all  of  the  Five  Great  Powers 
would  have  readily  accepted  the  Cecil  plan  —  all  except 
the  United  States. 

This  plan,  however,  did  not  meet  with  the  approval  of 
President  Wilson,  and  his  open  opposition  to  it  became  an 
obstacle  which  prevented  its  consideration  in  the  form  in 
which  it  was  proposed.  It  is  a  matter  of  speculation  what 


90 

reasons  appealed  to  the  President  and  caused  him  to  op- 
pose the  plan,  although  the  principle  of  primacy  found 
application  in  a  different  and  less  radical  form  in  his  own 
plan  of  organization.  Possibly  he  felt  that  the  British 
statesman's  proposal  too  frankly  declared  the  coalition 
and  oligarchy  of  the  Five  Powers,  and  that  there  should 
be  at  least  the  appearance  of  cooperation  on  the  part  of 
the  lesser  nations.  Of  course,  in  view  of  the  perpetual 
majority  of  the  Five  Powers  on  the  Executive  Council,  as 
provided  in  the  President's  plan,  the  primacy  of  the  Five 
was  weakened  little  if  at  all  by  the  minority  membership 
of  the  small  nations.  The  rule  of  unanimity  gave  to  each 
nation  a  veto  power,  but  no  one  believed  that  one  of  the 
lesser  states  represented  on  the  Council  would  dare  to 
exercise  it  if  the  Great  Powers  were  unanimous  in  support 
of  a  proposition.  In  theory  unanimity  was  a  just  and  satis- 
factory rule;  in  practice  it  would  amount  to  nothing.  The 
President  may  also  have  considered  the  council  proposed 
by  Lord  Robert  to  be  inexpedient  in  view  of  the  political 
organization  of  the  United  States.  The  American  Govern- 
ment had  no  actual  premier  except  the  President,  and  it 
seemed  out  of  the  question  for  him  to  attend  an  annual 
meeting  of  the  proposed  council.  It  would  result  in  the 
President  sending  a  personal  representative  who  would  un- 
avoidably be  in  a  subordinate  position  when  sitting  with 
the  European  premiers.  I  think  this  latter  reason  was  a 
very  valid  one,  but  that  the  first  one,  which  seemed  to 
appeal  especially  to  the  President,  had  little  real  merit. 


91 

In  addition  to  his  objection  to  the  Cecil  plan  of  admin- 
istration, another  was  doubtless  of  even  greater  weight  to 
Mr.  Wilson  and  that  was  the  entire  omission  in  the  Cecil 
proposal  of  the  mutual  guaranty  of  political  independence 
and  territorial  integrity.  The  method  of  preventing  wars 
which  was  proposed  by  Lord  Robert  was  for  the  nations 
to  enter  into  a  covenant  to  submit  disputes  to  interna- 
tional investigation  and  to  obtain  a  report  before  engaging 
in  hostilities  and  also  a  covenant  not  to  make  war  on  a 
disputant  nation  which  accepted  a  report  which  had  been 
unanimously  adopted.  He  further  proposed  that  the  mem- 
bers of  the  League  should  undertake  to  regard  themselves 
as  ipso  facto  at  war  with  a  member  violating  these  cove- 
nants and  "to  take,  jointly  and  severally,  appropriate  mil- 
itary, economic,  and  other  measures  against  the  recalci- 
trant State,"  thus  following  closely  the  idea  of  the  League 
to  Enforce  Peace. 

Manifestly  this  last  provision  in  the  Cecil  plan  was 
open  to  the  same  constitutional  objections  as  those  which 
could  be  raised  against  the  President's  mutual  guaranty. 
My  impression  is  that  Mr.  Wilson's  opposition  to  the  pro- 
vision was  not  based  on  the  ground  that  it  was  in  contra- 
vention of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  but 
rather  on  the  ground  that  it  did  not  go  far  enough  in  sta- 
bilizing the  terms  of  peace  which  were  to  be  negotiated. 
The  President  was  seeking  permanency  by  insuring, 
through  the  threat  or  pressure  of  international  force,  a 
condition  of  changelessness  in  boundaries  and  sovereign 


92  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

rights,  subject,  nevertheless,  to  territorial  changes  based 
either  on  the  principle  of  "self-determination"  or  on  a 
three-fourths  vote  of  the  Body  of  Delegates.  He,  never- 
theless, discussed  the  subject  with  Lord  Robert  Cecil  prior 
to  laying  his  draft  of  a  Covenant  before  the  American 
Commissioners,  as  is  evident  by  comparing  it  with  the 
Cecil  plan,  for  certain  phrases  are  almost  identical  in 
language  in  the  two  documents. 


CHAPTER  VII 
SELF-DETERMINATION 

THE  mutual  guaranty  which  was  advocated  by  President 
Wilson  appears  as  Article  III  of  his  original  draft  of  a 
Covenant.  It  reads  as  follows: 

"ARTICLE  III 

"The  Contracting  Powers  unite  in  guaranteeing  to  each 
other  political  independence  and  territorial  integrity;  but 
it  is  understood  between  them  that  such  territorial  read- 
justments, if  any,  as  may  in  the  future  become  necessary 
by  reason  of  changes  in  present  racial  conditions  and  aspi- 
rations or  present  social  and  political  relationships,  pursu- 
ant to  the  principle  of  self-determination,  and  also  such 
territorial  readjustments  as  may  in  the  judgment  of  three 
fourths  of  the  Delegates  be  demanded  by  the  welfare  and 
manifest  interest  of  the  peoples  concerned,  may  be  effected 
if  agreeable  to  those  peoples;  and  that  territorial  changes 
may  in  equity  involve  material  compensation.  The  Con- 
tracting Powers  accept  without  reservation  the  principle 
that  the  peace  of  the  world  is  superior  in  importance  to 
every  question  of  political  jurisdiction  or  boundary." 

In  the  revised  draft,  which  he  laid  before  the  Commis- 
sion on  the  League  of  Nations  at  its  first  session  Article  III 
became  Article  7.  It  is  as  follows : 

"ARTICLE  7 

"The  High  Contracting  Parties  undertake  to  respect 
and  preserve  as  against  external  aggression  the  territorial 


94  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

integrity  and  existing  political  independence  of  all  States 
members  of  the  League." 

The  guaranty  was  finally  incorporated  in  the  Treaty  of 
Peace  as  Article  10.  It  reads: 

"ARTICLE  10 

"The  members  of  the  League  undertake  to  respect  and 
preserve  as  against  external  aggression  the  territorial  in- 
tegrity and  existing  political  independence  of  all  Members 
of  the  League.  In  case  of  any  such  aggression  or  in  case  of 
any  threat  or  danger  of  such  aggression  the  Council  shall 
advise  upon  the  means  by  which  this  obligation  shall  be 
fulfilled." 

In  the  revision  of  the  original  draft  the  modifying  clause 
providing  for  future  territorial  readjustments  was  omitted. 
It  does  not  appear  in  Article  7  of  the  draft  which  was  pre- 
sented to  the  Commission  on  the  League  of  Nations  and 
which  formed  the  basis  of  its  deliberations.  In  addition 
to  this  modification  the  words  "unite  in  guaranteeing"  in 
Article  III  became  "undertake  to  respect  and  preserve" 
in  Article  7.  These  changes  are  only  important  in  that 
they  indicate  a  disposition  to  revise  the  article  to  meet  the 
wishes,  and  to  remove  to  an  extent  the  objections,  of  some 
of  the  foreign  delegates  who  had  prepared  plans  for  a 
League  or  at  least  had  definite  ideas  as  to  the  purposes  and 
functions  of  an  international  organization. 

It  was  generally  believed  that  the  elimination  of  the 
modifying  clause  from  the  President's  original  form  of 
guaranty  was  chiefly  due  to  the  opposition  of  the  states- 


SELF-DETERMINATION  95 

men  who  represented  the  British  Empire  in  contradis- 
tinction to  those  who  represented  the  self-governing 
British  Dominions.  It  was  also  believed  that  this  opposi- 
tion was  caused  by  an  unwillingness  on  their  part  to  rec- 
ognize or  to  apply  as  a  right  the  principle  of  "self-deter- 
mination" in  arranging  possible  future  changes  of  sov- 
ereignty over  territories. 

I  do  not  know  the  arguments  which  were  used  to  induce 
the  President  to  abandon  this  phrase  and  to  strike  it  from 
his  article  of  guaranty.  I  personally  doubt  whether  the 
objection  to  the  words  "self-determination"  was  urged 
upon  him.  Whatever  reasons  were  advanced  by  his  for- 
eign colleagues,  they  were  successful  in  freeing  the  Cove- 
nant from  the  phrase.  It  is  to  be  regretted  that  the  influ- 
ence, which  was  sufficient  to  induce  the  President  to  elim- 
inate from  his  proposed  guaranty  the  clause  containing 
a  formal  acceptance  of  the  principle  of  "self-determina- 
tion," was  not  exerted  or  else  was  not  potent  enough  to 
obtain  from  him  an  open  disavowal  of  the  principle  as  a 
right  standard  for  the  determination  of  sovereign  author- 
ity. Without  such  a  disavowal  the  phrase  remained  as 
one  of  the  general  bases  upon  which  a  just  peace  should 
be  negotiated.  It  remained  a  precept  of  the  international 
creed  which  Mr.  Wilson  proclaimed  while  the  war  was 
still  in  progress,  for  he  had  declared,  in  an  address  deliv- 
ered on  February  n,  1918,  before  a  joint  session  of  the 
Senate  and  House  of  Representatives,  that  "self-deter- 
mination is  not  a  mere  phrase.  It  is  an  imperative  prin- 


96  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

ciple  of  action  which  statesmen  will  henceforth  ignore  at 
their  peril." 

"  Self-determination "  is  as  right  in  theory  as  the  more 
famous  phrase  "the  consent  of  the  governed,"  which  has 
for  three  centuries  been  repeatedly  declared  to  be  sound  by 
political  philosophers  and  has  been  generally  accepted  as 
just  by  civilized  peoples,  but  which  has  been  for  three  cen- 
turies commonly  ignored  by  statesmen  because  the  right 
could  not  be  practically  applied  without  imperiling  na- 
tional safety,  always  the  paramount  consideration  in  in- 
ternational and  national  affairs.  The  two  phrases  mean 
substantially  the  same  thing  and  have  to  an  extent  been 
used  interchangeably  by  those  who  advocate  the  prin- 
ciple as  a  standard  of  right.  "  Self-determination  "  was  not 
a  new  thought.  It  was  a  restatement  of  the  old  one. 

Under  the  present  political  organization  of  the  world, 
based  as  it  is  on  the  idea  of  nationality,  the  new  phrase  is  as 
unsusceptible  of  universal  application  as  the  old  one  was 
found  to  be.  Fixity  of  national  boundaries  and  of  national 
allegiance,  and  political  stability  would  disappear  if  this 
principle  was  uniformly  applied.  Impelled  by  new  social 
conditions,  by  economic  interests,  by  racial  prejudices,  and 
by  the  various  forces  which  affect  society,  change  and 
uncertainty  would  result  from  an  attempt  to  follow  the 
principle  in  every  case  to  which  it  is  possible  to  apply  it. 

Among  my  notes  I  find  one  of  December  20,  1918  — 
that  is,  one  week  after  the  American  Commission  landed 
in  France  —  in  which  I  recorded  my  thoughts  concerning 


SELF-DETERMINATION  97 

certain  phrases  or  epigrams  of  the  President,  which  he  had 
declared  to  be  bases  of  peace,  and  which  I  considered  to 
contain  the  seeds  of  future  trouble.  In  regard  to  the  as- 
serted right  of  "self-determination"  I  wrote: 

"When  the  President  talks  of  'self-determination' 
what  unit  has  he  in  mind?  Does  he  mean  a  race,  a  terri- 
torial area,  or  a  community?  Without  a  definite  unit  which 
is  practical,  application  of  this  principle  is  dangerous  to 
peace  and  stability." 

Ten  days  later  (December  30)  the  frequent  repetition 
of  the  phrase  in  the  press  and  by  members  of  certain 
groups  and  unofficial  delegations,  who  were  in  Paris  seek- 
ing to  obtain  hearings  before  the  Conference,  caused  me  to 
write  the  following: 

"The  more  I  think  about  the  President's  declaration  as 
to  the  right  of  'self-determination,'  the  more  convinced 
I  am  of  the  danger  of  putting  such  ideas  into  the  minds  of 
certain  races.  It  is  bound  to  be  the  basis  of  impossible 
demands  on  the  Peace  Congress  and  create  trouble  in 
many  lands. 

"What  effect  will  it  have  on  the  Irish,  the  Indians,  the 
Egyptians,  and  the  nationalists  among  the  Boers?  Will 
it  not  breed  discontent,  disorder,  and  rebellion  ?  Will  not 
the  Mohammedans  of  Syria  and  Palestine  and  possibly 
of  Morocco  and  Tripoli  rely  on  it?  How  can  it  be  harmo- 
nized with  Zionism,  to  which  the  President  is  practically 
committed  ? 

"The  phrase  is  simply  loaded  with  dynamite.  It  will 
raise  hopes  which  can  never  be  realized.  It  will,  I  fear, 
cost  thousands  of  lives.  In  the  end  it  is  bound  to  be  dis- 
credited, to  be  called  the  dream  of  an  idealist  who  failed 


98  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

to  realize  the  danger  until  too  late  to  check  those  who  at- 
tempt to  put  the  principle  in  force.  What  a  calamity  that 
the  phrase  was  ever  uttered!  What  misery  it  will  cause!" 

Since  the  foregoing  notes  were  written  the  impracti- 
cability of  the  universal  or  even  of  the  general  application 
of  the  principle  has  been  fully  demonstrated.  Mr.  Wilson 
resurrected  "the  consent  of  the  governed"  regardless  of 
the  fact  that  history  denied  its  value  as  a  practical  guide 
in  modern  political  relations.  He  proclaimed  it  in  the 
phrase  "self-determination,"  declaring  it  to  be  an  "im- 
perative principle  of  action."  He  made  it  one  of  the  bases 
of  peace.  And  yet,  in  the  negotiations  at  Paris  and  in  the 
formulation  of  the  foreign  policy  of  the  United  States,  he 
has  by  his  acts  denied  the  existence  of  the  right  other  than 
as  the  expression  of  a  moral  precept,  as  something  to  be 
desired,  but  generally  unattainable  in  the  lives  of  nations. 
In  the  actual  conduct  of  affairs,  in  the  practical  and  con- 
crete relations  between  individuals  and  governments,  it 
doubtless  exercises  and  should  exercise  a  measure  of  in- 
fluence, but  it  is  not  a  controlling  influence. 

In  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  with  Germany  the  readjust- 
ment of  the  German  boundaries,  by  which  the  sovereignty 
over  millions  of  persons  of  German  blood  was  transferred 
to  the  new  states  of  Poland  and  Czecho-Slovakia,  and  the 
practical  cession  to  the  Empire  of  Japan  of  the  port  of 
Kiao-Chau  and  control  over  the  economic  life  of  the  Prov- 
ince of  Shantung  are  striking  examples  of  the  abandonment 
of  the  principle. 


SELF-DETERMINATION  99 

In  the  Treaty  of  Saint-Germain  the  Austrian  Tyrol  was 
ceded  to  the  Kingdom  of  Italy  against  the  known  will  of 
substantially  the  entire  population  of  that  region. 

In  both  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  and  the  Treaty  of  Saint- 
Germain  Austria  was  denied  the  right  to  form  a  political 
union  with  Germany,  and  when  an  article  of  the  German 
Constitution  of  August,  1919,  contemplating  a  "reunion" 
of  "German  Austria"  with  the  German  Empire  was  ob- 
jected to  by  the  Supreme  Council,  then  in  session  at  Paris, 
as  in  contradiction  of  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  with  Ger- 
many, a  protocol  was  signed  on  September  22,  1919,  by 
plenipotentiaries  of  Germany  and  the  five  Principal  Allied 
and  Associated  Powers,  declaring  the  article  in  the  Con- 
stitution null  and  void.  There  could  hardly  be  a  more  open 
repudiation  of  the  alleged  right  of  "self-determination" 
than  this  refusal  to  permit  Austria  to  unite  with  Germany 
however  unanimous  the  wish  of  the  Austrian  people  for 
such  union. 

But  Mr.  Wilson  even  further  discredited  the  phrase 
by  adopting  a  policy  toward  Russia  which  ignored  the 
principle.  The  peoples  of  Esthonia,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  the 
Ukraine,  Georgia,  and  Azerbaidjan  have  by  blood,  lan- 
guage, and  racial  traits  elements  of  difference  which  give 
to  each  of  them  in  more  or  less  degree  the  character  of  a 
distinct  nationality.  These  peoples  all  possess  aspirations 
to  become  independent  states,  and  yet,  throughout  the 
negotiations  at  Paris  and  since  that  time,  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  has  repeatedly  refused  to  rec- 


ioo  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

ognize  the  right  of  the  inhabitants  of  these  territories  to 
determine  for  themselves  the  sovereignty  under  which 
they  shall  live.  It  has,  on  the  contrary,  declared  in  favor 
of  a  "Great  Russia"  comprising  the  vast  territory  of 
the  old  Empire  except  the  province  which  belonged  to 
the  dismembered  Kingdom  of  Poland  and  the  lands  in- 
cluded within  the  present  boundaries  of  the  Republic 
of  Finland. 

I  do  not  mention  the  policy  of  President  Wilson  as  to 
an  undivided  Russia  by  way  of  criticism  because  I  believe 
the  policy  was  and  has  continued  to  be  the  right  one.  The 
reference  to  it  is  made  for  the  sole  purpose  of  pointing 
out  another  example  of  Mr.  Wilson's  frequent  departure 
without  explanation  from  his  declared  standard  for  the 
determination  of  political  authority  and  allegiance.  I 
think  that  it  must  be  conceded  that  he  has  by  his  acts 
proved  that  "self-determination"  is  "a  mere  phrase" 
which  ought  to  be  discarded  as  misleading  because  it 
cannot  be  practically  applied. 

It  may  be  pointed  out  as  a  matter  of  special  interest  to 
the  student  of  American  history  that,  if  the  right  of  "  self- 
determination  "  were  sound  in  principle  and  uniformly 
applicable  in  establishing  political  allegiance  and  terri- 
torial sovereignty,  the  endeavor  of  the  Southern  States 
to  secede  from  the  American  Union  in  1861  would  have 
been  wholly  justifiable;  and,  conversely,  the  Northern 
States,  in  forcibly  preventing  secession  and  compelling 
the  inhabitants  of  the  States  composing  the  Confederacy 


SELF-DETERMINATION  101 

to  remain  under  the  authority  of  the  Federal  Govern- 
ment, would  have  perpetrated  a  great  and  indefensible 
wrong  against  the  people  of  the  South  by  depriving 
them  of  a  right  to  which  they  were  by  nature  entitled. 
This  is  the  logic  of  the  application  of  the  principle  of 
"self-determination"  to  the  political  rights  at  issue  in  the 
American  Civil  War. 

I  do  not  believe  that  there  are  many  Americans  of  the 
present  generation  who  would  support  the  proposition 
that  the  South  was  inherently  right  and  the  North  was  in- 
herently wrong  in  that  great  conflict.  There  were,  at  the 
time  when  the  sections  were  arrayed  in  arms  against  each 
other,  and  there  may  still  be,  differences  of  opinion  as  to 
the  legal  right  of  secession  under  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States,  but  the  inherent  right  of  a  people  of  a 
State  to  throw  off  at  will  their  allegiance  to  the  Federal 
Union  and  resume  complete  sovereignty  over  the  territory 
of  the  State  was  never  urged  as  a  conclusive  argument.  It 
was  the  legal  right  and  not  the  natural  right  which  was 
emphasized  as  justifying  those  who  took  up  arms  in  order 
to  disrupt  the  Union.  But  if  an  American  citizen  denies 
that  the  principle  of  "self-determination"  can  be  right- 
fully applied  to  the  affairs  of  his  own  country,  how  can  he 
consistently  maintain  that  it  is  a  right  inseparable  from  a 
true  conception  of  political  liberty  and  therefore  univer- 
sally applicable,  just  in  principle,  and  wise  from  the  prac- 
tical point  of  view  ? 

Of  course,  those  who  subscribe  to  "self-determination" 


102 

and  advocate  it  as  a  great  truth  fundamental  to  every 
political  society  organized  to  protect  and  promote  civil 
liberty,  do  not  claim  it  for  races,  peoples,  or  communities 
whose  state  of  barbarism  or  ignorance  deprive  them  of  the 
capacity  to  choose  intelligently  their  political  affiliations. 
As  to  peoples  or  communities,  however,  who  do  possess  the 
intelligence  to  make  a  rational  choice  of  political  allegiance, 
no  exception  is  made,  so  far  as  words  go,  to  the  undeviat- 
ing  application  of  the  principle.  It  is  the  affirmation  of  an 
unqualified  right.  It  is  one  of  those  declarations  of  prin- 
ciple which  sounds  true,  which  in  the  abstract  may  be 
true,  and  which  appeals  strongly  to  man's  innate  sense  of 
moral  right  and  to  his  conception  of  natural  justice,  but 
which,  when  the  attempt  is  made  to  apply  it  in  every  case, 
becomes  a  source  of  political  instability  and  domestic  dis- 
order and  not  infrequently  a  cause  of  rebellion. 

In  the  settlement  of  territorial  rights  and  of  the  sov- 
ereignty to  be  exercised  over  particular  regions  there  are 
several  factors  which  require  consideration.  International 
boundaries  may  be  drawn  along  ethnic,  economic,  geo- 
graphic, historic,  or  strategic  lines.  One  or  all  of  these  ele- 
ments may  influence  the  decision,  but  whatever  argument 
may  be  urged  in  favor  of  any  one  of  these  factors,  the  chief 
object  in  the  determination  of  the  sovereignty  to  be  exer- 
cised within  a  certain  territory  is  national  safety.  Na- 
tional safety  is  as  dominant  in  the  life  of  a  nation  as  self- 
preservation  is  in  the  life  of  an  individual.  It  is  even  more 
so,  as  nations  do  not  respond  to  the  impulse  of  self-sacri- 


SELF-DETERMINATION  103 

fice.  With  national  safety  as  the  primary  object  to  be  at- 
tained in  territorial  settlements,  the  factors  of  the  problem 
assume  generally,  though  not  always,  the  following  order 
of  importance :  the  strategic,  to  which  is  closely  allied  the 
geographic  and  historic;  the  economic,  affecting  the  com- 
mercial and  industrial  life  of  a  nation;  and  lastly  the  ethnic, 
including  in  the  terms  such  conditions  as  consanguinity, 
common  language,  and  similar  social  and  religious  insti- 
tutions. 

The  national  safety  and  the  economic  welfare  of  the 
United  States  were  at  stake  in  the  War  of  Secession,  al- 
though the  attempt  to  secede  resulted  from  institutional 
rather  than  ethnic  causes.  The  same  was  true  when  in  the 
Papineau  Rebellion  of  1837  the  French  inhabitants  of  the 
Province  of  Lower  Canada  attempted  for  ethnic  reasons 
to  free  themselves  from  British  sovereignty.  Had  the 
right  of  "self-determination"  in  the  latter  case  been 
recognized  as  "imperative"  by  Great  Britain,  the  na- 
tional life  and  economic  growth  of  Canada  would  have 
been  strangled  because  the  lines  of  communication  and 
the  commercial  routes  to  the  Atlantic  seaboard  would  have 
been  across  an  alien  state.  The  future  of  Canada,  with  its 
vast  undeveloped  resources,  its  very  life  as  a  British  col- 
ony, depended  upon  denying  the  right  of  "  self-determina- 
tion." It  was  denied  and  the  French  inhabitants  of  Quebec 
were  forced  against  their  will  to  accept  British  sovereignty. 

Experience  has  already  demonstrated  the  unwisdom  of 
having  given  currency  to  the  phrase  "self-determina- 


104  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

tion."  As  the  expression  of  an  actual  right,  the  applica- 
tion of  which  is  universal  and  invariable,  the  phrase  has 
been  repudiated  or  at  least  violated  by  many  of  the  terms 
of  the  treaties  which  brought  to  an  end  the  World  War. 
Since  the  time  that  the  principle  was  proclaimed,  it  has 
been  the  excuse  for  turbulent  political  elements  in  various 
lands  to  resist  established  governmental  authority;  it  has 
induced  the  use  of  force  in  an  endeavor  to  wrest  the  sover- 
eignty over  a  territory  or  over  a  community  from  those 
who  have  long  possessed  and  justly  exercised  it.  It  has 
formed  the  basis  for  territorial  claims  by  avaricious  na- 
tions. And  it  has  introduced  into  domestic  as  well  as  in- 
ternational affairs  a  new  spirit  of  disorder.  It  is  an  evil 
thing  to  permit  the  principle  of  "self-determination"  to 
continue  to  have  the  apparent  sanction  of  the  nations 
when  it  has  been  in  fact  thoroughly  discredited  and  will 
always  be  cast  aside  whenever  it  comes  in  conflict  with 
national  safety,  with  historic  political  rights,  or  with 
national  economic  interests  affecting  the  prosperity  of  a 
nation. 

This  discussion  of  the  right  of  "  self-determination,'' 
which  was  one  of  the  bases  of  peace  which  President  Wil- 
son declared  in  the  winter  of  1918,  and  which  was  included 
in  the  modifying  clause  of  his  guaranty  as  originally 
drafted,  is  introduced  for  the  purpose  of  showing  the  re- 
luctance which  I  felt  in  accepting  his  guidance  in  the 
adoption  of  a  principle  so  menacing  to  peace  and  so  im- 
possible of  practical  application.  As  a  matter  of  fact  I 


SELF-DETERMINATION  105 

never  discussed  the  subject  with  Mr.  Wilson  as  I  purposed 
doing,  because  a  situation  arose  on  January  10,  1919, 
which  discouraged  me  from  volunteering  to  him  advice  on 
matters  which  did  not  directly  pertain  to  legal  questions 
and  to  the  international  administration  of  legal  justice. 


CHAPTER  VIII 
THE  CONFERENCE  OF  JANUARY  10,  1919 

IT  is  with  extreme  reluctance,  as  the  reader  will  under- 
stand, that  I  make  any  reference  to  the  conference  which 
the  President  held  with  the  American  Commissioners  at 
the  Hotel  Crillon  on  January  10,  because  of  the  personal 
nature  of  what  occurred.  It  would  be  far  more  agreeable 
to  omit  an  account  of  this  unpleasant  episode.  But  with- 
out referring  to  it  I  cannot  satisfactorily  explain  the 
sudden  decision  I  then  reached  to  take  no  further  part  in 
the  preparation  or  revision  of  the  text  of  the  Covenant  of 
the  League  of  Nations.  Without  explanation  my  subse- 
quent conduct  would  be,  and  not  without  reason,  open  to 
the  charge  of  neglect  of  duty  and  possibly  of  disloyalty.  I 
do  not  feel  called  upon  to  rest  under  that  suspicion,  or  to, 
remain  silent  when  a  brief  statement  of  what  occurred  at 
that  conference  will  disclose  the  reason  for  the  cessation  of 
my  efforts  to  effect  changes  in  the  plan  of  world  organiza- 
tion which  the  President  had  prepared.  In  the  circum- 
stances there  can  be  no  impropriety  in  disclosing  the  truth 
as  to  the  cause  for  a  course  of  action  when  the  course  of 
action  itself  must  be  set  forth  to  complete  the  record  and 
to  explain  an  ignorance  of  the  subsequent  negotiations 
regarding  the  League  of  Nations,  an  ignorance  which  has 
been  the  subject  of  public  comment.  Certainly  no  one 


TOE  CONFERENCE  OF  JANUARY  10,  1919    107 

who  participated  in  the  conference  can  object  to  the  truth 
being  known  unless  for  personal  reasons  he  prefers  that  a 
false  impression  should  go  forth.  After  careful  considera- 
tion I  can  see  no  public  reason  for  withholding  the  facts. 
At  this  meeting,  to  which  I  refer,  the  President  took  up 
the  provisions  of  his  original  draft  of  a  Covenant,  which 
was  at  the  time  in  typewritten  form,  and  indicated  the 
features  which  he  considered  fundamental  to  the  proper 
organization  of  a  League  of  Nations.  I  pointed  out  certain 
provisions  which  appeared  to  me  objectionable  in  princi- 
ple or  at  least  of  doubtful  policy.  Mr.  Wilson,  however, 
clearly  indicated  —  at  least  so  I  interpreted  his  words  and 
manner  —  that  he  was  not  disposed  to  receive  these  criti- 
cisms in  good  part  and  was  unwilling  to  discuss  them.  He 
also  said  with  great  candor  and  emphasis  that  he  did  not 
intend  to  have  lawyers  drafting  the  treaty  of  peace.  Al- 
though this  declaration  was  called  forth  by  the  statement 
that  the  legal  advisers  of  the  American  Commission  had 
been,  at  my  request,  preparing  an  outline  of  a  treaty,  a 
"skeleton  treaty"  in  fact,  the  President's  sweeping  disap- 
proval of  members  of  the  legal  profession  participating  in 
the  treaty-making  seemed  to  be,  and  I  believe  was,  in- 
tended to  be  notice  to  me  that  my  counsel  was  unwelcome. 
Being  the  only  lawyer  on  the  delegation  I  naturally  took 
this  remark  to  myself,  and  I  know  that  other  American 
Commissioners  held  the  same  view  of  its  purpose.  If  my 
belief  was  unjustified,  I  can  only  regret  that  I  did  not 
persevere  in  my  criticisms  and  suggestions,  but  I  could 


io8  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

not  do  so  believing  as  I  then  did  that  a  lawyer's  advice  on 
any  question  not  wholly  legal  in  nature  was  unacceptable 
to  the  President,  a  belief  which,  up  to  the  present  time,  I 
have  had  no  reason  to  change. 

It  should  be  understood  that  this  account  of  the  confer- 
ence of  January  10  is  given  by  way  of  explanation  of  my 
conduct  subsequent  to  it  and  not  in  any  spirit  of  com- 
plaint or  condemnation  of  Mr.  Wilson's  attitude.  He  had 
a  right  to  his  own  opinion  of  the  worth  of  a  lawyer's  advice 
and  a  right  to  act  in  accordance  with  that  opinion.  If 
there  was  any  injustice  done,  it  was  in  his  asking  a  lawyer 
to  become  a  Peace  Commissioner,  thereby  giving  the  im- 
pression that  he  desired  his  counsel  and  advice  as  to  the 
negotiations  in  general,  when  in  fact  he  did  not.  But,  dis- 
regarding the  personal  element,  I  consider  that  he  was 
justified  in  his  course,  as  the  entire  constitutional  responsi- 
bility for  the  negotiation  of  a  treaty  was  on  his  shoulders  and 
he  was,  in  the  performance  of  his  duty,  entitled  to  seek  ad- 
vice from  those  only  in  whose  judgment  he  had  confidence. 

In  spite  of  this  frank  avowal  of  prejudice  by  the  Presi- 
dent there  was  no  outward  change  in  the  personal  and 
official  relations  between  him  and  myself.  The  breach, 
however,  regardless  of  appearances,  was  too  wide  and  too 
deep  to  be  healed.  While  subsequent  events  bridged  it 
temporarily,  it  remained  until  my  association  with  Presi- 
dent Wilson  came  to  an  end  in  February,  1920.  I  never 
forgot  his  words  and  always  felt  that  in  his  mind  my  opin- 
ions, even  when  he  sought  them,  were  tainted  with  legalism. 


CHAPTER  IX 
A  RESOLUTION  INSTEAD  OF  THE  COVENANT 

As  it  seemed  advisable,  in  view  of  the  incident  of  January 
10,  to  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  drafting  of  the  Cove- 
nant unless  the  entire  theory  was  changed,  the  fact  that 
there  prevailed  at  that  time  a  general  belief  that  a  pre- 
liminary treaty  of  peace  would  be  negotiated  in  the  near 
future  invited  an  effort  to  delay  the  consideration  of  a 
complete  and  detailed  charter  of  the  League  of  Nations 
until  the  definitive  treaty  or  a  separate  treaty  dealing 
with  the  League  alone  was  considered.  As  delay  would 
furnish  time  to  study  and  discuss  the  subject  and  prevent 
hasty  acceptance  of  an  undesirable  or  defective  plan,  it 
seemed  to  me  that  the  advisable  course  to  take  was  to 
limit  reference  to  the  organization  in  the  preliminary 
treaty  to  general  principles. 

The  method  that  I  had  in  mind  in  carrying  out  this 
policy  was  to  secure  the  adoption,  by  the  Conference  on 
the  Preliminaries  of  Peace,  of  a  resolution  embodying  a 
series  of  declarations  as  to  the  creation,  the  nature,  and 
the  purposes  of  a  League  of  Nations,  which  declarations 
could  be  included  in  the  preliminary  treaty  of  peace  ac- 
companied by  an  article  providing  for  the  negotiation  of  a 
detailed  plan  based  on  these  declarations  at  the  time  of  the 
negotiation  of  the  definitive  treaty  or  else  by  an  article 


no  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

providing  for  the  summoning  of  a  world  congress,  in  which 
all  nations,  neutrals  as  well  as  belligerents,  would  be  repre- 
sented and  have  a  voice  in  the  drafting  of  a  convention 
establishing  a  League  of  Nations  in  accordance  with  the 
general  principles  declared  in  the  preliminary  treaty. 
Personally  I  preferred  a  separate  treaty,  but  doubted  the 
possibility  of  obtaining  the  assent  of  the  Conference  to 
that  plan  because  some  of  the  delegates  showed  a  feeling 
of  resentment  toward  certain  neutral  nations  on  account 
of  their  attitude  during  the  war,  while  the  inclusion  of  the 
four  powers  which  had  formed  the  Central  Alliance  seemed 
almost  out  of  the  question. 

In  addition  to  the  advantage  to  be  gained  by  postponing 
the  determination  of  the  details  of  the  organization  until 
the  theory,  the  form,  the  purposes  and  the  powers  of  the 
proposed  League  could  be  thoroughly  considered,  it  would 
make  possible  the  speedy  restoration  of  a  state  of  peace. 
There  can  be  no  doubt  that  peace  at  the  earliest  possible 
moment  was  the  supreme  need  of  the  world.  The  political 
and  social  chaos  in  the  Central  Empires,  due  to  the  over- 
throw of  their  strong  autocratic  governments  and  the  pre- 
vailing want,  suffering,  and  despair,  in  which  the  war  had 
left  their  peoples,  offered  a  fertile  field  for  the  pernicious 
doctrines  of  Bolshevism  to  take  root  and  thrive.  A  pro- 
letarian revolution  seemed  imminent.  The  Spartacists  in 
Germany,  the  Radical  Socialists  in  Austria,  and  the  Com- 
munists in  Hungary  were  the  best  organized  and  most 
vigorous  of  the  political  groups  in  those  countries  and 


RESOLUTION  INSTEAD  OF  COVENANT    in 

were  conducting  an  active  and  seemingly  successful  propa- 
ganda among  the  starving  and  hopeless  masses,  while  the 
Russian  duumvirs,  Lenine  and  Trotsky,  were  with  funds 
and  emissaries  aiding  these  movements  against  established 
authority  and  social  order.  Eastern  Europe  seemed  to  be  a 
volcano  on  the  very  point  of  eruption.  Unless  something 
was  speedily  done  to  check  the  peril,  it  threatened  to 
spread  to  other  countries  and  even  to  engulf  the  very 
foundations  of  modern  civilization. 

A  restoration  of  commercial  relations  and  of  normal 
industrial  conditions  through  the  medium  of  a  treaty  of 
peace  appeared  to  offer  the  only  practical  means  of  resist- 
ing these  movements  and  of  saving  Europe  from  the  hor- 
rors of  a  proletarian  despotism  which  had  brought  the 
Russian  people  to  so  low  a  state.  This  was  the  common 
judgment  of  those  who  at  that  time  watched  with  increas- 
ing impatience  the  slow  progress  of  the  negotiations  at 
Paris  and  with  apprehension  the  political  turmoil  in  the 
defeated  and  distracted  empires  of  Central  Europe. 

An  immediate  restoration  of  peace  was,  as  I  then  saw  it, 
of  vital  importance  to  the  world  as  it  was  the  universal  de- 
mand of  all  mankind.  To  delay  it  for  the  purpose  of  com- 
pleting the  organization  of  a  League  of  Nations  or  for 
any  other  purpose  than  the  formulation  of  terms  essential 
to  peace  seemed  to  me  to  be  taking  a  risk  as  to  the  future 
wholly  unwarranted  by  the  relative  importance  of  the 
subjects.  There  is  no  question,  in  the  light  of  subsequent 
events,  that  the  peoples  of  the  Central  Empires  possessed 


ii2  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

a  greater  power  of  resistance  to  the  temptations  of  lawless- 
ness and  disorder  than  was  presumed  in  the  winter  of 
1918-19.  And  yet  it  was  a  critical  time.  Anything  might 
have  happened.  It  would  have  taken  very  little  to  turn 
the  scale.  What  occurred  later  cannot  excuse  the  delay  in 
making  peace.  It  was  not  wise  statesmanship  and  fore- 
sight that  saved  the  world  from  a  great  catastrophe  but 
the  fortunate  circumstance  that  a  people  habituated  to 
obedience  were  not  led  astray  by  the  enemies  of  the 
existing  order. 

Of  the  importance  of  negotiating  a  peace  without  wait- 
ing to  complete  a  detailed  plan  for  a  League  of  Nations 
I  was  firmly  convinced  in  those  early  days  at  Paris,  and  I 
know  that  the  President's  judgment  as  to  this  was  con- 
trary to  mine.  He  considered  —  at  least  his  course  can 
only  be  so  interpreted  —  that  the  organization  of  a  League 
in  all  its  details  was  the  principal  task  to  be  accomplished 
by  the  Conference,  a  task  that  he  felt  must  be  completed 
before  other  matters  were  settled.  The  conclusion  is  that 
the  necessity  of  an  immediate  peace  seemed  to  him  sub- 
ordinate to  the  necessity  of  erecting  an  international 
agency  to  preserve  the  peace  when  it  was  restored.  In  fact 
one  may  infer  that  the  President  was  disposed  to  employ 
the  general  longing  for  peace  as  a  means  of  exerting  pres- 
sure on  the  delegates  in  Paris  and  on  their  Governments  to 
accept  his  plan  for  a  League.  It  is  generally  believed  that 
objections  to  certain  provisions  of  the  Covenant  were  not 
advanced  or,  if  advanced,  were  not  urged  because  the  dis- 


RESOLUTION  INSTEAD  OF  COVENANT    113 

cussion  of  objections  would  mean  delay  in  negotiating  the 
peace. 

Mr.  Wilson  gave  most  of  his  time  and  thought  prior  to 
his  departure  for  the  United  States  in  February,  1919,  to 
the  revision  of  the  plan  of  organization  which  he  had  pre- 
pared and  to  the  conversion  of  the  more  influential  mem- 
bers of  the  Conference  to  its  support.  While  other  ques- 
tions vital  to  a  preliminary  peace  treaty  were  brought  up 
in  the  Council  of  Ten,  he  showed  a  disposition  to  keep 
them  open  and  to  avoid  their  settlement  until  the  Cove- 
nant had  been  reported  to  the  Conference.  In  this  I  could 
not  conscientiously  follow  him.  I  felt  that  the  policy  was 
wholly  wrong  since  it  delayed  the  peace. 

Though  recognizing  the  President's  views  as  to  the  rela- 
tive importance  of  organizing  a  League  and  of  restoring 
peace  without  delay,  and  suspecting  that  he  purposed  to 
use  the  impatience  and  fear  of  the  delegates  to  break  down 
objections  to  his  plan  of  organization,  I  still  hoped  that  the 
critical  state  of  affairs  in  Europe  might  induce  him  to 
adopt  another  course.  With  that  hope  I  began  the  prepa- 
ration of  a  resolution  to  be  laid  before  the  Conference, 
which,  if  adopted,  would  appear  in  the  preliminary  treaty 
in  the  form  of  declarations  which  would  constitute  the 
bases  of  a  future  negotiation  regarding  a  League  of  Na- 
tions. 

At  a  conference  on  January  20  between  the  President 
and  the  American  Commissioners,  all  being  present  except 
Colonel  House,  I  asked  the  President  if  he  did  not  think 


1 14  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

that,  in  view  of  the  shortness  of  time  before  he  would  be 
compelled  to  return  to  Washington  on  account  of  the  ap- 
proaching adjournment  of  Congress,  it  would  be  well  to 
prepare  a  resolution  of  this  sort  and  to  have  it  adopted  in 
order  that  it  might  clear  the  way  for  the  determination  of 
other  matters  which  should  be  included  in  a  preliminary 
treaty.  From  the  point  of  view  of  policy  I  advanced  the 
argument  that  a  series  of  declarations  would  draw  the  fire 
of  the  opponents  and  critics  of  the  League  and  would  give 
opportunity  for  an  expression  of  American  public  opinion 
which  would  make  possible  the  final  drafting  of  the  charter 
of  a  League  in  a  way  to  win  the  approval  of  the  great  mass 
of  the  American  people  and  in  all  probability  insure  ap- 
proval of  the  Covenant  by  the  Senate  of  the  United  States. 
In  reviewing  what  took  place  at  this  conference  I  realize 
now,  as  I  did  not  then,  that  it  was  impolitic  for  me  to  have 
presented  an  argument  based  on  the  assumption  that 
changes  in  the  President's  plan  might  be  necessary,  as  he 
might  interpret  my  words  to  be  another  effort  to  revise  the 
theory  of  his  plan.  At  the  time,  however,  I  was  so  entirely 
convinced  of  the  expediency  of  this  course,  from  the  Presi- 
dent's own  point  of  view  as  well  as  from  the  point  of  view  of 
those  who  gave  first  place  to  restoring  peace,  that  I  be- 
lieved he  would  see  the  advantage  to  be  gained  and  would 
adopt  the  course  suggested.  I  found  that  I  was  mistaken. 
Mr.  Wilson  without  discussing  the  subject  said  that  he  did 
not  think  that  a  resolution  of  that  sort  was  either  neces- 
sary or  advisable. 


RESOLUTION  INSTEAD  OF  COVENANT    115 

While  this  definite  rejection  of  the  proposal  seemed  to 
close  the  door  to  further  effort  in  that  direction,  I  decided 
to  make  another  attempt  before  abandoning  the  plan. 
The  next  afternoon  (January  21)  at  a  meeting  of  the 
Council  of  Ten,  the  discussion  developed  in  a  way  that 
gave  me  an  excuse  to  present  the  proposal  informally  to 
the  Council.  The  advantages  to  be  gained  by  adopting  the 
suggested  action  apparently  appealed  to  the  members,  and 
their  general  approval  of  it  impressed  the  President,  for  he 
asked  me  in  an  undertone  if  I  had  prepared  the  resolution. 
I  replied  that  I  had  been  working  upon  it,  but  had  ceased 
when  he  said  to  me  the  day  before  that  he  did  not  think  it 
necessary  or  advisable,  adding  that  I  would  complete  the 
draft  if  he  wished  me  to  do  so.  He  said  that  he  would  be 
obliged  to  me  if  I  would  prepare  one. 

Encouraged  by  the  support  received  in  the  Council  and 
by  the  seeming  willingness  of  the  President  to  give  the 
proposal  consideration,  I  proceeded  at  once  to  draft  a  reso- 
lution. 

The  task  was  not  an  easy  one  because  it  would  have  been 
useless  to  insert  in  the  document  any  declaration  which 
seemed  to  be  contradictory  of  the  President's  theory  of  an 
affirmative  guaranty  or  which  was  not  sufficiently  broad  to 
be  interpreted  in  other  terms  in  the  event  that  American 
public  opinion  was  decidedly  opposed  to  his  theory,  as  I 
felt  that  it  would  be.  It  was  also  desirable,  from  my  point 
of  view,  that  the  resolution  should  contain  a  declaration  in 
favor  of  the  equality  of  nations  or  one  which  would  pre- 


ii6  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

vent  the  establishment  of  an  oligarchy  of  the  Great  Pow- 
ers, and  another  declaration  which  would  give  proper  place 
to  the  administration  of  legal  justice  in  international  dis- 
putes. 

The  handicaps  and  difficulties  under  which  I  labored  are 
manifest,  and  the  resolution  as  drafted  indicates  them  in 
that  it  does  not  express  as  clearly  and  unequivocally  as  it 
would  otherwise  do  the  principles  which  formed  the  bases 
of  the  articles  which  I  handed  to  the  President  on  Janu- 
ary 7  and  which  have  already  been  quoted  in  extenso. 

The  text  of  the  resolution,  which  was  completed  on  the 
22d,  reads  as  follows: 

"Resolved  that  the  Conference  makes  the  following 
declaration : 

"That  the  preservation  of  international  peace  is  the 
standing  policy  of  civilization  and  to  that  end  a  league  of 
nations  should  be  organized  to  prevent  international  wars ; 

"That  it  is  a  fundamental  principle  of  peace  that  all 
nations  are  equally  entitled  to  the  undisturbed  possession 
of  their  respective  territories,  to  the  full  exercise  of  their 
respective  sovereignties,  and  to  the  use  of  the  high  seas 
as  the  common  property  of  all  peoples;  and 

"That  it  is  the  duty  of  all  nations  to  engage  by  mutual 
covenants  — 

"(i)  To  safeguard  from  invasion  the  sovereign  rights 
of  one  another; 

"(2)  To  submit  to  arbitration  all  justiciable  disputes 
which  fail  of  settlement  by  diplomatic  arrangement; 

"(3)  To  submit  to  investigation  by  the  league  of  na- 
tions all  non-justiciable  disputes  which  fail  of  settlement 
by  diplomatic  arrangement;  and 


RESOLUTION  INSTEAD  OF  COVENANT    117 

"  (4)  To  abide  by  the  award  of  an  arbitral  tribunal  and 
to  respect  a  report  of  the  league  of  nations  after  investiga- 
tion; 

"That  the  nations  should  agree  upon  — 

"  (i)  A  plan  for  general  reduction  of  armaments  on  land 
and  sea; 

"  (2)  A  plan  for  the  restriction  of  enforced  military  serv- 
ice and  the  governmental  regulation  and  control  of  the 
manufacture  and  sale  of  munitions  of  war; 

"(3)  Full  publicity  of  all  treaties  and  international 
agreements ; 

"  (4)  The  equal  application  to  all  other  nations  of  com- 
mercial and  trade  regulations  and  restrictions  imposed  by 
any  nation;  and 

"(5)  The  proper  regulation  and  control  of  new  states 
pending  complete  independence  and  sovereignty." 

This  draft  of  a  resolution  was  discussed  with  the  other 
American  Commissioners,  and  after  some  changes  of  a 
more  or  less  minor  character  which  it  seemed  advisable  to 
make  because  of  the  appointment  of  a  Commission  on  the 
League  of  Nations  at  a  plenary  session  of  the  Conference 
on  January  25,  of  which  Commission  President  Wilson  and 
Colonel  House  were  the  American  members,  I  sent  the 
draft  to  the  President  on  the  3ist,  four  days  before  the 
Commission  held  its  first  meeting  in  Colonel  House's  office 
at  the  Hotel  Crillon. 

As  the  Sixty-Fifth  Congress  would  come  to  an  end  on 
March  4,  and  as  the  interpretation  which  had  been  placed 
on  certain  provisions  of  the  Federal  Constitution  required 
the  presence  of  the  Chief  Executive  in  Washington  during 


ii8  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

the  last  days  of  a  session  in  order  that  he  might  pass  upon 
legislation  enacted  in  the  days  immediately  preceding 
adjournment,  Mr.  Wilson  had  determined  that  he  could 
not  remain  in  Paris  after  February  14.  At  the  time  that 
I  sent  him  the  proposed  resolution  there  remained,  there- 
fore, but  two  weeks  for  the  Commission  on  the  League  of 
Nations  to  organize,  to  deliberate,  and  to  submit  its  report 
to  the  Conference,  provided  its  report  was  made  prior  to 
the  President's  departure  for  the  United  States.  It  did  not 
seem  to  me  conceivable  that  the  work  of  the  Commission 
could  be  properly  completed  in  so  short  a  time  if  the  Presi- 
dent's Covenant  became  the  basis  of  its  deliberations. 
This  opinion  was  shared  by  many  others  who  appreciated 
the  difficulties  and  intricacies  of  the  subject  and  who  felt 
that  a  hasty  and  undigested  report  would  be  unwise  and 
endanger  the  whole  plan  of  a  world  organization. 

In  view  of  this  situation,  which  seemed  to  be  a  strong 
argument  for  delay  in  drafting  the  plan  of  international 
organization,  I  wrote  a  letter  to  the  President,  at  the  time 
I  sent  him  the  proposed  resolution,  saying  that  in  my  opin- 
ion no  plan  could  be  prepared  with  sufficient  care  to  war- 
rant its  submission  to  the  Conference  on  the  Preliminaries 
of  Peace  before  he  left  Paris  and  that  unless  a  plan  was 
reported  he  would  be  in  the^position  of  returning  empty- 
handed  to  the  United  States.  I  urged  him  in  the  circum- 
stances to  secure  the  adoption  of  a  resolution  by  the  dele- 
gates similar  in  nature,  if  not  in  language,  to  the  draft 
which  was  enclosed,  thereby  avoiding  a  state  of  affairs 


RESOLUTION  INSTEAD  OF  COVENANT    119 

which  would  be  very  disheartening  to  the  advocates  of 
a  League  of  Nations  and  cause  general  discontent  among 
all  peoples  who  impatiently  expected  evidence  that  the 
restoration  of  peace  was  not  far  distant. 

It  would  be  presumptuous  on  my  part  to  speculate  on 
the  President's  feelings  when  he  received  and  read  my 
letter  and  the  proposed  resolution.  It  was  never  answered 
or  acknowledged,  and  he  did  not  act  upon  the  suggestion 
or  discuss  acting  upon  it,  to  my  knowledge,  with  any  of 
his  colleagues.  On  the  contrary,  he  summoned  the  Com- 
mission on  the  League  of  Nations  to  meet  on  February  3, 
eleven  days  before  the  date  fixed  for  his  departure  for 
the  United  States,  and  laid  before  that  body  his  revised 
draft  of  a  Covenant  which  formed  the  groundwork  for 
the  Commission's  report  presented  to  the  Conference  on 
February  14. 

The  question  naturally  arises  —  Why  did  the  President 
ask  me  to  complete  and  send  to  him  the  resolution  em- 
bodying a  series  of  declarations  if  he  did  not  intend  to 
make  it  a  subject  of  consideration  and  discussion?  It  is 
a  pertinent  question,  but  the  true  answer  remains  with 
Mr.  Wilson  himself.  Possibly  he  concluded  that  the  only 
way  to  obtain  his  plan  for  a  League  was  to  insist  upon  its 
practical  acceptance  before  peace  was  negotiated,  and 
that,  unless  he  took  advantage  of  the  universal  demand 
for  peace  by  making  the  acceptance  of  the  Covenant  a 
condition  precedent,  he  would  be  unable  to  obtain  its 
adoption.  While  I  believe  this  is  a  correct  supposition,  it 


120  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

is  not  responsive  to  the  question  as  to  the  reason  why  he 
wished  me  to  deliver  to  him  a  draft  resolution.  In  fact  it 
suggests  another  question  —  What,  from  the  President's 
point  of  view,  was  to  be  gained  by  having  the  resolution 
in  his  hands? 

I  think  the  answer  is  not  difficult  to  find  when  one  re- 
members that  Mr.  Wilson  had  disapproved  a  resolution  of 
that  sort  and  that  the  Council  of  Ten  had  seemed  dis- 
posed to  approve  it.  There  was  no  surer  way  to  prevent 
me  from  bringing  the  subject  again  before  the  Council  than 
by  having  the  proposed  resolution  before  him  for  action. 
Having  submitted  it  to  him  I  was  bound,  on  account  of 
our  official  relationship,  to  await  his  decision  before  taking 
any  further  steps.  In  a  word,  his  request  for  a  draft  prac- 
tically closed  my  mouth  and  tied  my  hands.  If  he  sought 
to  check  my  activities  with  the  members  of  the  Council  in 
favor  of  the  proposed  course  of  action,  he  could  have  taken 
no  more  effectual  way  than  the  one  which  he  did  take.  It 
was  undoubtedly  an  effective  means  of  "pigeonholing" 
a  resolution,  the  further  discussion  of  which  might  interfere 
with  his  plan  to  force  through  a  report  upon  the  Covenant 
before  the  middle  of  February. 

This  opinion  as  to  the  motive  which  impelled  the  Presi- 
dent to  pursue  the  course  that  he  did  in  regard  to  a  resolu- 
tion was  not  the  one  held  by  me  at  the  time.  It  was  formed 
only  after  subsequent  events  threw  new  light  on  the  sub- 
ject. The  delay  perplexed  me  at  the  time,  but  the  reason 
for  it  was  not  evident.  I  continued  to  hope,  even  after 


RESOLUTION  INSTEAD  OF  COVENANT    121 

the  Commission  on  the  League  of  Nations  had  assembled 
and  had  begun  its  deliberations,  that  the  policy  of  a  reso- 
lution would  be  adopted.  But,  as  the  days  went  by  and 
the  President  made  no  mention  of  the  proposal,  I  realized 
that  he  did  not  intend  to  discuss  it,  and  the  conviction  was 
forced  upon  me  that  he  had  never  intended  to  have  it 
discussed.  It  was  a  disappointing  result  and  one  which 
impressed  me  with  the  belief  that  Mr.  Wilson  was  preju- 
diced against  any  suggestion  that  I  might  make,  if  it  in 
any  way  differed  with  his  own  ideas  even  though  it  found 
favor  with  others. 


CHAPTER  X 
THE  GUARANTY  IN  THE  REVISED  COVENANT 

DURING  the  three  weeks  preceding  the  meeting  of  the 
Commission  on  the  League  the  work  of  revising  the  Presi- 
dent's original  draft  of  the  Covenant  had  been  in  progress, 
the  President  and  Colonel  House  holding  frequent  inter- 
views with  the  more  influential  delegates,  particularly  the 
British  and  French  statesmen  who  had  been  charged  with 
the  duty  of  studying  the  subject.  While  I  cannot  speak 
from  personal  knowledge,  I  learned  that  the  suggested 
changes  in  terms  and  language  were  put  into  form  by  mem- 
bers of  the  Colonel's  office  staff.  In  addition  to  modifica- 
tions which  were  made  to  meet  the  wishes  of  the  foreign 
statesmen,  especially  the  British,  Mr.  Gordon  Auchin- 
closs,  the  son-in-law  and  secretary  of  Colonel  House,  and 
Mr.  David  Hunter  Miller,  Auchincloss's  law  partner  and 
one  of  the  accredited  legal  advisers  of  the  American  Com- 
mission, prepared  an  elaborate  memorandum  on  the  Presi- 
dent's draft  of  a  Covenant  which  contained  comments  and 
also  suggested  changes  in  the  text.  On  account  of  the  in- 
timate relations  existing  between  Messrs.  Miller  and  Au- 
chincloss  and  Colonel  House  it  seems  reasonable  to  assume 
that  their  comments  and  suggestions  were  approved  by, 
if  they  did  not  to  an  extent  originate  with,  the  Colonel. 
The  memorandum  was  first  made  public  by  Mr.  William 


GUARANTY  IN  REVISED  COVENANT     123 

C.  Bullitt  during  his  hearing  before  the  Senate  Committee 
on  Foreign  Relations  in  September,  1919  (Senate  Doc.  106, 
66th  Congress,  ist  Session,  pages  1177  et  seq.). 

The  most  important  amendment  to  the  Covenant  sug- 
gested by  these  advisers  was,  in  my  judgment,  the  one 
relating  to  Article  III  of  the  draft,  which  became  Article 
10  in  the  Treaty.  After  a  long  criticism  of  the  President's 
proposed  guaranty,  in  which  it  is  declared  that  "such  an 
agreement  would  destroy  the  Monroe  Doctrine,"  and  that 
"any  guaranty  of  independence  and  integrity  means  war 
by  the  guarantor  if  a  breach  of  the  independence  or  in- 
tegrity of  the  guaranteed  State  is  attempted  and  persisted 
in,"  the  memorandum  proposed  that  the  following  be 
substituted : 

"Each  Contracting  Power  severally  covenants  and 
guarantees  that  it  will  not  violate  the  territorial  integrity 
or  impair  the  political  independence  of  any  other  Con- 
tracting Power." 

This  proposed  substitute  should  be  compared  with  the 
language  of  the  "self-denying  covenant"  that  I  sent  to  the 
President  on  December  23,  1918,  the  pertinent  portion  of 
which  is  repeated  here  for  the  purpose  of  such  comparison : 

"Each  power  signatory  or  adherent  hereto  severally 
covenants  and  guarantees  that  it  will  not  violate  the  terri- 
torial integrity  or  impair  the  political  sovereignty  of  any 
other  power  signatory  or  adherent  to  this  convention, .  . ." 

The  practical  adoption  of  the  language  of  my  proposed 
substitute  in  the  memorandum  furnishes  conclusive  proof 


124  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

that  Colonel  House  was  "entirely  converted"  to  my  form 
of  a  guaranty  as  he  had  frankly  assured  me  that  he  was 
on  the  evening  of  January  6.  I  am  convinced  also  that  Mr. 
Henry  White  and  General  Bliss  held  the  same  views  on 
the  subject.  It  is  obvious  that  President  Wilson  was  the 
only  one  of  the  American  representatives  at  Paris  who 
favored  the  affirmative  guaranty,  but,  as  he  possessed  the 
constitutional  authority  to  determine  independently  the 
policy  of  the  United  States,  his  form  of  a  guaranty  was 
written  into  the  revised  draft  of  a  Covenant  submitted 
to  the  Commission  on  the  League  of  Nations  and  with 
comparatively  little  change  was  finally  adopted  in  the 
Treaty  of  Peace  with  Germany. 

The  memorandum  prepared  by  Messrs.  Miller  and  Au- 
chincloss  was  apparently  in  the  President's  hands  before 
the  revised  draft  was  completed,  for  certain  changes  in  the 
original  draft  were  in  accord  with  the  suggestions  made  in 
their  memorandum.  His  failure  to  modify  the  guaranty 
may  be  considered  another  rejection  of  the  "self-denying 
covenant "  and  a  final  decision  to  insist  on  the  affirmative 
form  of  guaranty  in  spite  of  the  unanimous  opposition  of 
his  American  colleagues. 

In  view  of  what  later  occurred  a  very  definite  conclusion 
may  be  reached  concerning  the  President's  rejection  of  the 
proposed  substitute  for  his  guaranty.  Article  10  was  from 
the  first  the  storm  center  of  opposition  to  the  report  of  the 
Commission  on  the  League  of  Nations  and  the  chief  cause 
for  refusal  of  consent  to  the  ratification  of  the  Treaty  of 


GUARANTY  IN  REVISED  COVENANT     125 

Versailles  by  the  Senate  of  the  United  States.  The  vul- 
nerable nature  of  the  provision,  which  had  been  so  plainly 
pointed  out  to  the  President  before  the  Covenant  was  sub- 
mitted to  the  Commission,  invited  attack.  If  he  had 
listened  to  the  advice  of  his  colleagues,  in  fact  if  he  had 
listened  to  any  American  who  expressed  an  opinion  on  the 
subject,  the  Treaty  would  probably  have  obtained  the 
speedy  approval  of  the  Senate.  There  would  have  been 
opposition  from  those  inimical  to  the  United  States  enter- 
ing any  international  organization,  but  it  would  have  been 
insufficient  to  prevent  ratification  of  the  Treaty. 

As  it  was,  the  President's  unalterable  determination  to 
have  his  form  of  guaranty  in  the  Covenant,  in  which  he 
was  successful,  and  his  firm  refusal  to  modify  it  in  any  sub- 
stantial way  resulted  in  strengthening  the  opponents  to 
the  League  to  such  an  extent  that  they  were  able  to  pre- 
vent the  Treaty  from  obtaining  the  necessary  consent  of 
two  thirds  of  the  Senators. 

The  sincerity  of  Mr.  Wilson's  belief  in  the  absolute  neces- 
sity of  the  guaranty,  which  he  proposed,  to  the  preserva- 
tion of  international  peace  cannot  be  doubted.  While  his 
advisers  were  practically  unanimous  in  the  opinion  that 
policy,  as  well  as  principle,  demanded  a  change  in  the 
guaranty,  he  clung  tenaciously  to  the  affirmative  form. 
The  result  was  that  which  was  feared  and  predicted  by  his 
colleagues.  The  President,  and  the  President  alone,  must 
bear  the  responsibility  for  the  result. 


CHAPTER  XI 
INTERNATIONAL  ARBITRATION 

ON  the  day  that  the  Commission  on  the  League  of  Nations 
held  its  first  meeting  and  before  I  had  reason  to  suspect 
that  Mr.  Wilson  intended  to  ignore  the  letter  which  I  had 
sent  him  with  the  suggested  resolution  enclosed,  I  deter- 
mined to  appeal  to  him  in  behalf  of  international  arbitra- 
tion. I  decided  to  do  this  on  the  assumption  that,  even  if 
the  plan  for  a  resolution  was  approved,  the  Commission 
would  continue  its  sessions  in  preparation  for  the  subse- 
quent negotiation  of  an  agreement  of  some  sort  providing 
for  world  organization.  The  provision  as  to  arbitration  in 
the  President's  original  draft  of  a  Covenant  was  so  wrong 
from  my  point  of  view  and  showed  such  a  lack  of  knowl- 
edge of  the  practical  side  of  the  subject  that  I  was  impelled 
to  make  an  effort  to  induce  him  to  change  the  pro- 
vision. Except  for  the  fact  that  the  matter  was  wholly 
legal  in  character  and  invited  an  opinion  based  on  techni- 
cal knowledge,  I  would  have  remained  silent  in  accordance 
with  my  feeling  that  it  would  be  inadvisable  for  me  to 
have  anything  to  do  with  drafting  the  Covenant.  I  felt, 
however,  that  the  constitution  and  procedure  of  inter- 
national courts  were  subjects  which  did  not  affect  the 
general  theory  of  organization  and  concerning  which 
my  views  might  influence  the  President  and  be  of  aid  to 


INTERNATIONAL  ARBITRATION         127 

him  in  the  formulation  of  the  judicial  feature  of  any  plan 
adopted. 

With  this  object  in  view  I  wrote  to  him  the  following 
letter: 

"  Hotel  Crillon,  Paris 
"February  3,  1919 

"MY  DEAR  MR.  PRESIDENT: 

"I  am  deeply  interested,  as  you  know,  in  the  constitu- 
tion and  procedure  of  international  courts  of  arbitration, 
and  having  participated  in  five  proceedings  of  this  sort  I 
feel  that  I  can  speak  with  a  measure  of  authority. 

"In  the  first  place  let  me  say  that  a  tribunal,  on  which 
representatives  of  the  litigants  sit  as  judges,  has  not  proved 
satisfactory  even  though  the  majority  of  the  tribunal  are 
nationals  of  other  countries.  However  well  prepared  from 
experience  on  the  bench  to  render  strict  justice,  the  liti- 
gants' arbitrators  act  in  fact  as  advocates.  As  a  conse- 
quence the  neutral  arbitrators  are  decidedly  hampered  in 
giving  full  and  free  expression  to  their  views,  and  there  is 
not  that  frank  exchange  of  opinion  which  should  char- 
acterize the  conference  of  judges.  It  has  generally  re- 
sulted in  a  compromise,  in  which  the  nation  in  the  wrong 
gains  a  measure  of  benefit  and  the  nation  in  the  right  is 
deprived  of  a  part  of  the  remedy  to  which  it  is  entitled.  In 
fact  an  arbitration  award  is  more  of  a  political  and  diplo- 
matic arrangement  than  it  is  a  judicial  determination.  I 
believe  that  this  undesirable  result  can  be  in  large  measure 
avoided  by  eliminating  arbitrators  of  the  litigant  nations. 
It  is  only  in  the  case  of  monetary  claims  that  these  ob- 
servations do  not  apply. 

"Another  difficulty  has  been  the  method  of  procedure 
before  international  tribunals.  This  does  not  apply  to 
monetary  claims,  but  to  disputes  arising  out  of  boundaries, 


128  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

interpretation  of  treaties,  national  rights,  etc.  The  pres- 
ent method  of  an  exchange  of  cases  and  of  counter-cases  is 
more  diplomatic  than  judicial,  since  it  does  not  put  the 
parties  in  the  relation  of  complainant  and  defendant.  This 
relation  can  in  every  case  be  established,  if  not  by  mutual 
agreement,  then  by  some  agency  of  the  League  of  Nations 
charged  with  that  duty.  Until  this  reform  of  procedure 
takes  place  there  will  be  no  definition  of  issues,  and  arbi- 
tration will  continue  to  be  the  long  and  elaborate  proceed- 
ing it  has  been  in  the  past. 

"There  is  another  practical  obstacle  to  international 
arbitration  as  now  conducted  which  ought  to  be  consid- 
ered, and  that  is  the  cost.  This  obstacle  does  not  affect 
wealthy  nations,  but  it  does  prevent  small  and  poor  na- 
tions from  resorting  to  it  as  a  means  of  settling  disputes. 
Just  how  this  can  be  remedied  I  am  not  prepared  to  say, 
although  possibly  the  international  support  of  all  arbitral 
tribunals  might  be  provided.  At  any  rate,  I  feel  that  some- 
thing should  be  done  to  relieve  the  great  expense  which 
now  prevents  many  of  the  smaller  nations  from  resorting 
to  arbitration. 

"  I  would  suggest,  therefore,  that  the  Peace  Treaty  con- 
tain a  provision  directing  the  League  of  Nations  to  hold  a 
conference  or  to  summon  a  conference  to  take  up  this 
whole  matter  and  draft  an  international  treaty  dealing 
with  the  constitution  of  arbitral  tribunals  and  radically 
revising  the  procedure. 

"On  account  of  the  difficulties  of  the  subject,  which  do 
not  appear  on  the  surface,  but  which  experience  has  shown 
to  be  very  real,  I  feel  that  it  would  be  impracticable  to 
provide  in  the  Peace  Treaty  too  definitely  the  method  of 
constituting  arbitral  tribunals.  It  will  require  considerable 
thought  and  discussion  to  make  arbitration  available  to 
the  poor  as  well  as  the  rich,  to  make  an  award  a  judicial 


INTERNATIONAL  ARBITRATION         129 

settlement  rather  than  a  diplomatic  compromise,  and  to 
supersede  the  cumbersome  and  prolonged  procedure  with 
its  duplication  of  documents  and  maps  by  a  simple  method 
which  will  settle  the  issues  and  materially  shorten  the  pro- 
ceedings which  now  unavoidably  drag  along  for  months, 
if  not  for  years. 

"Faithfully  yours 

"ROBERT  LANSING 
"THE  PRESIDENT 

"28  Rue  de  Monceau" 


At  the  time  that  I  sent  this  letter  to  Mr.  Wilson  I  had 
not  seen  the  revised  draft  of  the  Covenant  which  he  laid 
before  the  Commission  on  the  League  of  Nations.  The 
probability  is  that,  if  I  had  seen  it,  the  letter  would  not 
have  been  written,  for  in  the  revision  of  the  original  draft 
the  objectionable  Article  V,  relating  to  arbitration  and 
appeals  from  arbitral  awards,  was  omitted.  In  place  of 
it  there  were  substituted  two  articles,  n  and  12,  the  first 
being  an  agreement  to  arbitrate  under  certain  conditions 
and  the  other  providing  that  "  the  Executive  Council  will 
formulate  plans  for  the  establishment  of  a  Permanent 
Court  of  International  Justice,  and  this  Court  will  be  com- 
petent to  hear  and  determine  any  matter  which  the  parties 
recognize  as  suitable  for  submission  to  it  for  arbitration." 

Unadvised  as  to  this  change,  which  promised  a  careful 
consideration  of  the  method  of  applying  legal  principles 
of  justice  to  international  disputes,  I  did  not  feel  that  I 
could  let  pass  without  challenge  the  unsatisfactory  pro- 
visions of  the  President's  original  draft.  Knowing  the 


130  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

contempt  which  Mr.  Wilson  felt  for  The  Hague  Tribunal 
and  his  general  suspicion  of  the  justice  of  decisions  which 
it  might  render,  it  seemed  to  me  inexpedient  to  suggest 
that  it  should  form  the  basis  of  a  newly  constituted  judi- 
ciary, a  suggestion  which  I  should  have  made  had  I  been 
dealing  with  any  one  other  than  President  Wilson.  In  view 
of  the  intensity  of  the  President's  prejudices  and  of  the 
uselessness  of  attempting  to  remove  them,  my  letter  was 
intended  to  induce  him  to  postpone  a  determination  of 
the  subject  until  the  problems  which  it  presented  could 
be  thoroughly  studied  and  a  judicial  system  developed  by 
an  international  body  of  representatives  more  expert  in 
juridical  matters  than  the  Commission  on  the  League  of 
Nations,  the  American  members  of  which  were  incom- 
petent by  training,  knowledge,  and  practical  experience 
to  consider  the  subject. 

No  acknowledgment,  either  written  or  oral,  was  ever 
made  of  my  letter  of  February  3.  Possibly  President  Wil- 
son considered  it  unnecessary  to  do  so  in  view  of  the  pro- 
vision in  his  revised  Covenant  postponing  discussion  of  the 
subject.  At  the  time,  however,  I  naturally  assumed  that 
my  voluntary  advice  was  unwelcome  to  him.  His  silence 
as  to  my  communications,  which  seemed  to  be  intended 
to  discourage  a  continuance  of  them,  gave  the  impression 
that  he  considered  an  uninvited  opinion  on  any  subject 
connected  with  the  League  of  Nations  an  unwarranted  in- 
terference with  a  phase  of  the  negotiations  which  he  looked 
upon  as  his  own  special  province,  and  that  comment  or 


INTERNATIONAL  ARBITRATION          131 

suggestion,  which  did  not  conform  wholly  to  his  views,  was 
interpreted  into  opposition  and  possibly  into  criticism  of 
him  personally. 

This  judgment  of  the  President's  mental  attitude,  which 
was  formed  at  the  time,  may  have  been  too  harsh.  It  is 
possible  that  the  shortness  of  time  in  which  to  complete 
the  drafting  of  the  report  of  the  Commission  on  the  League 
of  Nations,  upon  which  he  had  set  his  heart,  caused  him 
to  be  impatient  of  any  criticism  or  suggestion  which  tended 
to  interrupt  his  work  or  that  of  the  Commission.  It  may 
have  been  that  pressure  for  time  prevented  him  from 
answering  letters  of  the  character  of  the  one  of  February  3 . 
Whatever  the  real  reason  was,  the  fact  remains  that  the 
letter  went  unnoticed  and  the  impression  was  made  that  it 
was  futile  to  attempt  to  divert  the  President  from  the 
single  purpose  which  he  had  in  mind.  His  fidelity  to  his 
own  convictions  and  his  unswerving  determination  to  attain 
what  he  sought  are  characteristics  of  Mr.  Wilson  which 
are  sources  of  weakness  as  well  as  of  strength.  Through 
them  success  has  generally  crowned  his  efforts,  success 
which  in  some  instances  has  been  more  disastrous  than 
failure  would  have  been. 

By  what  means  the  change  of  Article  V  of  the  original 
draft  of  the  Covenant  took  place,  I  cannot  say.  In  the 
memorandum  of  Messrs.  Miller  and  Auchincloss  no  sug- 
gestion of  a  Court  of  International  Justice  appears,  which 
seems  to  indicate  that  the  provision  in  the  revised  draft 
did  not  originate  with  them  or  with  Colonel  House.  In 


132  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

fact  on  more  than  one  occasion  I  had  mentioned  arbitra- 
tion to  the  Colonel  and  found  his  views  on  the  subject  ex- 
tremely vague,  though  I  concluded  that  he  had  almost  as 
poor  an  opinion  of  The  Hague  Tribunal  as  did  the  Presi- 
dent. The  probability  is  that  the  change  was  suggested  to 
Mr.  Wilson  by  one  of  the  foreign  statesmen  in  a  personal 
interview  during  January  and  that  upon  sounding  others 
he  found  that  they  were  practically  unanimous  in  favor  of 
a  Permanent  Court  of  Justice.  As  a  matter  of  policy  it 
seemed  wise  to  forestall  amendment  by  providing  for  its 
future  establishment.  If  this  is  the  true  explanation, 
Article  12  was  not  of  American  origin,  though  it  appears 
in  the  President's  revised  draft. 

To  be  entirely  frank  in  stating  my  views  in  regard  to 
Mr.  Wilson's  attitude  toward  international  arbitration 
and  its  importance  in  a  plan  of  world  organization,  I  have 
always  been  and  still  am  skeptical  of  the  sincerity  of  the 
apparent  willingness  of  the  President  to  accept  the  change 
which  was  inserted  in  his  revised  draft.  It  is  difficult  to 
avoid  the  belief  that  Article  V  of  the  original  draft  indi- 
cated his  true  opinion  of  the  application  of  legal  principles 
to  controversies  between  nations.  That  article,  by  de- 
priving an  arbitral  award  of  finality  and  conferring  the 
power  of  review  on  a  political  body  with  authority  to 
order  a  rehearing,  shows  that  the  President  believed  that 
more  complete  justice  would  be  rendered  if  the  precepts 
and  rules  of  international  law  were  in  a  measure  subordi- 
nated to  political  expediency  and  if  the  judges  were  not 


INTERNATIONAL  ARBITRATION         133 

permitted  to  view  the  questions  solely  from  the  stand- 
point of  legal  justice.  There  is  nothing  that  occurred,  to 
my  knowledge,  between  the  printing  of  the  original  draft 
of  the  Covenant  and  the  printing  of  the  revised  draft, 
which  indicated  a  change  of  opinion  by  the  President.  It 
may  be  that  this  is  a  misinterpretation  of  Mr.  Wilson's 
attitude,  and  that  the  change  toward  international  arbi- 
tration was  due  to  conviction  rather  than  to  expediency; 
but  my  belief  is  that  expediency  was  the  sole  cause. 


CHAPTER  XII 

REPORT  OF  COMMISSION  ON  LEAGUE  OF 
NATIONS 

THE  Commission  on  the  League  of  Nations,  over  which 
President  Wilson  presided,  held  ten  meetings  between 
February  3  and  February  14,  on  which  latter  day  it  sub- 
mitted a  report  at  a  plenary  session  of  the  Conference  on 
the  Preliminaries  of  Peace.  The  report  was  presented  by 
the  President  in  an  address  of  exceptional  excellence  which 
made  a  deep  impression  on  his  hearers.  His  dignity  of 
manner,  his  earnestness,  and  his  logical  presentation  of 
the  subject,  clothed  as  it  was  in  well-chosen  phrases,  un- 
questionably won  the  admiration  of  all,  even  of  those  who 
could  not  reconcile  their  personal  views  with  the  Covenant 
as  reported  by  the  Commission.  It  was  a  masterly  effort, 
an  example  of  literary  rather  than  emotional  oratory, 
peculiarly  fitting  to  the  occasion  and  to  the  temper  and 
intellectual  character  of  the  audience. 

Considering  the  brief  time  given  to  its  discussion  in  the 
Commission  and  the  necessary  haste  required  to  complete 
the  document  before  the  President's  departure,  the  Cove- 
nant as  reported  to  the  Conference  was  a  creditable  piece 
of  work.  Many  of  the  more  glaring  errors  of  expression 
and  some  of  the  especially  objectionable  features  of  the 
President's  revised  draft  were  eliminated.  There  were 


A  MEETING  AT  THE  QUAI   D  ORSAY  AFTER  PRESIDENT  WILSON  S 
DEPARTURE  FROM  PARIS 


REPORT  OF  COMMISSION  ON  LEAGUE    135 

others  which  persisted,  but  the  improvement  was  so 
marked  that  the  gross  defects  in  word  and  phrase  largely 
disappeared.  If  one  accepted  the  President's  theory  of 
organization,  there  was  little  to  criticize  in  the  report,  ex- 
cept a  certain  inexactness  of  expression  which  indicated  a 
lack  of  technical  knowledge  on  the  part  of  those  who  put 
the  Covenant  into  final  form.  But  these  crudities  and  am- 
biguities of  language  would,  it  was  fair  to  presume,  disap- 
pear if  the  articles  passed  through  the  hands  of  drafting 
experts. 

Fundamentally,  however,  the  Covenant  as  reported 
was  as  wrong  as  the  President's  original  draft,  since  it  con- 
tained the  affirmative  guaranty  of  political  independence 
and  territorial  integrity,  the  primacy  of  the  Five  Great 
Powers  on  the  Executive  Council,  and  the  perplexing  and 
seemingly  unsound  system  of  mandates.  In  this  I  could 
not  willingly  follow  President  Wilson,  but  I  felt  that  I  had 
done  all  that  I  could  properly  do  in  opposition  to  his  the- 
ory. The  responsibility  of  decision  rested  with  him  and  he 
had  made  his  decision.  There  was  nothing  more  to  be  said. 

On  the  evening  of  the  day  of  the  plenary  session,  at 
which  the  report  of  the  League  of  Nations  was  submitted, 
the  President  left  Paris  for  Brest  where  the  George  Wash- 
ington was  waiting  to  convey  him  to  the  United  States. 
He  carried  with  him  the  report  of  the  Commission,  whose 
deliberations  and  decisions  he  had  so  manifestly  domi- 
nated. He  went  prepared  to  meet  his  political  antagonists 
and  the  enemies  of  the  League,  confidently  believing  that 


136  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

he  could  win  a  popular  support  that  would  silence  the  op- 
position which  had  been  increasingly  manifest  in  the  Halls 
of  Congress  and  in  some  of  the  Republican  newspapers 
which  declined  to  follow  Mr.  Taft,  Mr.  Wickersham,  Mr. 
Straus,  and  other  influential  Republican  members  of  the 
League  to  Enforce  Peace. 

During  the  ten  days  preceding  February  14,  when  the 
Commission  on  the  League  of  Nations  held  daily  sessions, 
the  President  had  no  conferences  with  the  American  Com- 
missioners except,  of  course,  with  Colonel  House,  his 
American  colleague  on  the  Commission  on  the  League. 
On  the  morning  of  the  I4th,  however,  he  called  a  meeting 
of  the  Commissioners  and  delivered  to  them  the  printed 
report  which  was  to  be  presented  that  afternoon  to  the 
plenary  session.  As  the  meetings  of  the  Commission  on 
the  League  of  Nations  had  been  secret,  the  American 
Commissioners,  other  than  Colonel  House,  were  almost 
entirely  ignorant  of  the  proceedings  and  of  the  progress 
being  made.  Colonel  House's  office  staff  knew  far  more 
about  it  than  did  Mr.  White,  General  Bliss,  or  I.  When 
the  President  delivered  the  report  to  the  Commissioners 
they  were,  therefore,  in  no  position  to  express  an  opinion 
concerning  it.  The  only  remarks  were  expressions  of  con- 
gratulation that  he  had  been  able  to  complete  the  work 
before  his  departure.  They  were  merely  complimentary. 
As  to  the  merits  of  the  document  nothing  was  or  could  be 
said  by  the  three  Commissioners,  since  no  opportunity  had 
been  given  them  to  study  it,  and  without  a  critical  ex- 


REPORT  OF  COMMISSION  ON  LEAGUE    137 

amination  any  comment  concerning  its  provisions  would 
have  been  worthless.  I  felt  and  I  presume  that  my  two 
colleagues,  who  had  not  been  consulted  as  to  the  work  of 
the  Commission  on  the  League,  felt,  that  it  was,  in  any 
event,  too  late  to  offer  suggestions  or  make  criticisms. 
The  report  was  in  print;  it  was  that  afternoon  to  be  laid 
before  the  Conference;  in  twelve  hours  the  President 
would  be  on  his  way  to  the  United  States.  Clearly  it 
would  have  been  useless  to  find  fault  with  the  report,  es- 
pecially if  the  objections  related  to  the  fundamental  ideas 
of  the  organization  which  it  was  intended  to  create.  The 
President  having  in  the  report  declared  the  American  pol- 
icy, his  commissioned  representatives  were  bound  to  acqui- 
esce in  his  decision  whatever  their  personal  views  were. 
Acquiescence  or  resignation  was  the  choice,  and  resigna- 
tion would  have  undoubtedly  caused  an  unfortunate,  if 
not  a  critical,  situation.  In  the  circumstances  acquiescence 
seemed  the  only  practical  and  proper  course. 

The  fact  that  in  ten  meetings  and  in  a  week  and  a  half 
a  Commission  composed  of  fifteen  members,  ten  of  whom 
represented  the  Five  Great  Powers  and  five  of  whom  repre- 
sented the  lesser  powers  (to  which  were  later  added  four 
others),  completed  the  drafting  of  a  detailed  plan  of  a 
League  of  Nations,  is  sufficient  in  itself  to  raise  doubts  as 
to  the  thoroughness  with  which  the  work  was  done  and  as 
to  the  care  with  which  the  various  plans  and  numerous 
provisions  proposed  were  studied,  compared,  and  dis- 
cussed. It  gives  the  impression  that  many  clauses  were 


i38  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

accepted  under  the  pressing  necessity  of  ending  the  Com- 
mission's labors  within  a  fixed  time.  The  document  itself 
bears  evidence  of  the  haste  with  which  it  was  prepared, 
and  is  almost  conclusive  proof  in  itself  that  it  was  adopted 
through  personal  influence  rather  than  because  of  belief 
in  the  wisdom  of  all  its  provisions. 

The  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations  was  intended  to 
be  the  greatest  international  compact  that  had  ever  been 
written.  It  was  to  be  the  Maxima  Charta  of  mankind  se- 
curing to  the  nations  their  rights  and  liberties  and  uniting 
them  for  the  preservation  of  universal  peace.  To  harmon- 
ize the  conflicting  views  of  the  members  of  the  Commis- 
sion —  and  it  was  well  known  that  they  were  conflicting  — 
and  to  produce  in  eleven  days  a  world  charter,  which 
would  contain  the  elements  of  greatness  or  even  of  per- 
petuity, was  on  the  face  of  it  an  undertaking  impossible 
of  accomplishment.  The  document  which  was  produced 
sufficiently  establishes  the  truth  of  this  assertion. 

It  required  a  dominant  personality  on  the  Commission 
to  force  through  a  detailed  plan  of  a  League  in  so  short  a 
time.  President  Wilson  was  such  a  personality.  By  adopt- 
ing the  scheme  of  an  oligarchy  of  the  Great  Powers  he 
silenced  the  dangerous  opposition  of  the  French  and 
British  members  of  the  Commission  who  willingly  passed 
over  minor  defects  in  the  plan  provided  this  Concert  of 
Powers,  this  Quintuple  Alliance,  was  incorporated  in  the 
Covenant.  And  for  the  same  reason  it  may  be  assumed 
the  Japanese  and  Italians  found  the  President's  plan  ac- 


REPORT  OF  COMMISSION  ON  LEAGUE    139 

ceptable.  Mr.  Wilson  won  a  great  personal  triumph,  but 
he  did  so  by  surrendering  the  fundamental  principle  of  the 
equality  of  nations.  In  his  eagerness  to  "make  the  world 
safe  for  democracy"  he  abandoned  international  democ- 
racy and  became  the  advocate  of  international  autocracy. 

It  is  not  my  purpose  to  analyze  the  provisions  of  the 
Covenant  which  was  submitted  to  the  Conference  on  the 
Preliminaries  of  Peace  on  February  14,  1919.  My  objec- 
tions to  it  have  been  sufficiently  discussed  in  the  preceding 
pages.  It  would  be  superfluous  to  repeat  them.  The  in- 
numerable published  articles  and  the  endless  debates  on 
the  Covenant  have  brought  out  its  good  features  as  well  as 
its  defects.  Unfortunately  for  the  opponents  and  defenders 
of  the  document  alike  some  of  the  objections  urged  have 
been  flagrantly  unjustifiable  and  based  on  false  premises 
and  misstatements  of  fact  and  of  law,  which  seem  to  show 
political  motives  and  not  infrequently  personal  animosity 
toward  Mr.  Wilson.  The  exaggerated  statements  and  un- 
fair arguments  of  some  of  the  Senators,  larded,  as  they 
often  were,  with  caustic  sarcasm  and  vindictive  personali- 
ties, did  much  to  prevent  an  honest  and  useful  discussion 
of  the  merits  and  demerits  of  the  Covenant. 

The  effect  upon  President  Wilson  of  this  campaign 
against  him  personally  —  and  it  seems  to  me  that  it  would 
have  had  the  same  effect  upon  any  man  of  spirit  —  was  to 
arouse  his  indignation.  Possibly  a  less  stubborn  man 
would  not  have  assumed  so  uncompromising  an  attitude 
as  he  did  or  have  permitted  his  ire  to  find  expression  in 


140  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

threats,  but  it  cannot  be  denied  that  there  was  provoca- 
tion for  the  resentment  which  he  exhibited.  The  President 
has  been  blamed  for  not  having  sought  more  constantly  to 
placate  the  opponents  of  the  Covenant  and  to  meet  them 
on  a  common  ground  of  compromise,  especially  during  his 
visit  to  the  United  States  in  February,  1919.  From  the 
point  of  view  of  policy  there  is  justice  in  blaming  him,  but, 
when  one  considers  the  personal  animus  shown  and  the 
insolent  tone  assumed  by  some  of  his  critics,  his  conduct 
was  very  human;  not  wise,  but  human.  Mr.  Wilson  had 
never  shown  a  spirit  of  conciliation  in  dealing  with  those 
who  opposed  him.  Even  in  the  case  of  a  purely  political 
question  he  appeared  to  consider  opposition  to  be  a  per- 
sonal affront  and  he  was  disposed  to  retaliate  in  a  personal 
way.  In  a  measure  this  explains  the  personal  enmity  of 
many  of  his  political  foes.  I  think  that  it  is  not  unjust 
to  say  that  President  Wilson  was  stronger  in  his  hatreds 
than  in  his  friendships.  He  seemed  to  lack  the  ability  to 
forgive  one  who  had  in  any  way  offended  him  or  opposed 
him. 

Believing  that  much  of  the  criticism  of  the  Covenant  was 
in  reality  criticism  of  him  as  its  author,  a  belief  that  was 
in  a  measure  justified,  the  President  made  it  a  personal 
matter.  He  threatened,  in  a  public  address  delivered  in 
the  New  York  Opera  House  on  the  eve  of  his  departure 
for  France,  to  force  the  Republican  majority  to  accept  the 
Covenant  by  interweaving  the  League  of  Nations  into  the 
terms  of  peace  to  such  an  extent  that  they  could  not  be 


REPORT  OF  COMMISSION  ON  LEAGUE    141 

separated,  so  that,  if  they  rejected  the  League,  they  would 
be  responsible  for  defeating  the  Treaty  and  preventing  a 
restoration  of  peace.  With  the  general  demand  for  peace 
this  seemed  no  empty  threat,  although  the  propriety  of 
making  it  may  be  questioned.  It  had,  however,  exactly  the 
opposite  effect  from  that  which  the  President  intended. 
Its  utterance  proved  to  be  as  unwise  as  it  was  ineffective. 
The  opposition  Senators  resented  the  idea  of  being  coerced. 
They  became  more  than  ever  determined  to  defeat  a  Pres- 
ident whom  they  charged  with  attempting  to  disregard  and 
nullify  the  right  of  the  Senate  to  exercise  independently  its 
constitutional  share  in  the  treaty-making  power.  Thus  at 
the  very  outset  of  the  struggle  between  the  President  and 
the  Senate  a  feeling  of  hostility  was  engendered  which 
continued  with  increasing  bitterness  on  both  sides  and 
prevented  any  compromise  or  concession  in  regard  to 
the  Covenant  as  it  finally  appeared  in  the  Treaty  of 
Versailles. 

When  President  Wilson  returned  to  Paris  after  the  ad- 
journment of  the  Sixty-Fifth  Congress  on  March  4,  1919, 
he  left  behind  him  opponents  who  were  stronger  and  more 
confident  than  they  were  when  he  landed  ten  days  before. 
While  his  appeal  to  public  opinion  in  favor  of  the  League 
of  Nations  had  been  to  an  extent  successful,  there  was  a 
general  feeling  that  the  Covenant  as  then  drafted  required 
amendment  so  that  the  sovereign  rights  and  the  tradi- 
tional policies  of  the  United  States  should  be  safeguarded. 
Until  the  document  was  amended  it  seemed  that  the  op- 


142  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

position  had  the  better  of  the  argument  with  the  people. 
Furthermore,  when  the  new  Congress  met,  the  Republi- 
cans would  have  a  majority  in  the  Senate  which  was  of 
special  importance  in  the  matter  of  the  Treaty  which 
would  contain  the  Covenant,  because  it  would,  when  sent 
to  the  Senate,  be  referred  to  the  Committee  on  Foreign 
Relations  to  report  on  its  ratification  and  a  majority  of 
that  Committee,  under  a  Republican  organization,  would 
presumably  be  hostile  to  the  plan  for  a  League  advocated 
by  the  President.  The  Committee  could  hinder  and  possi- 
bly prevent  the  acceptance  of  the  Covenant,  while  it 
would  have  the  opportunity  to  place  the  opposition's  case 
in  a  favorable  light  before  the  American  people  and  to  at- 
tack the  President's  conduct  of  the  negotiations  at  Paris. 
I  believe  that  the  President  realized  the  loss  of  strategic 
position  which  he  had  sustained  by  the  Democratic  defeat 
at  the  polls  in  November,  1918,  but  was  persuaded  that, 
by  making  certain  alterations  in  the  Covenant  suggested  by 
Republicans  favorable  to  the  formation  of  a  League,  and 
especially  those  advocating  a  League  to  Enforce  Peace,  he 
would  be  able  to  win  sufficient  support  in  the  Senate  and 
from  the  people  to  deprive  his  antagonists  of  the  advan- 
tage which  they  had  gained  by  the  elections.  This  he 
sought  to  do  on  his  return  to  Paris  about  the  middle  of 
March.  If  the  same  spirit  of  compromise  had  been  shown 
while  he  was  in  America  it  would  doubtless  have  gone  far 
to  weaken  hostility  to  the  Covenant.  Unfortunately  for 
his  purpose  he  assumed  a  contrary  attitude,  and  in  conse- 


REPORT  OF  COMMISSION  ON  LEAGUE    143 

quence  the  sentiment  against  the  League  was  crystallized 
and  less  responsive  to  the  concessions  which  the  President 
appeared  willing  to  make  when  the  Commission  on  the 
League  of  Nations  resumed  its  sittings,  especially  as  the 
obnoxious  Article  10  remained  intact. 

In  the  formulation  of  the  amendments  to  the  Covenant, 
which  were  incorporated  in  it  after  the  President's  return 
from  the  United  States  and  before  its  final  adoption  by  the 
Conference,  I  had  no  part  and  I  have  no  reason  to  think 
that  Mr.  White  or  General  Bliss  shared  in  the  work.  As 
these  amendments  or  modifications  did  not  affect  the 
theory  of  organization  or  the  fundamental  principles  of  the 
League,  they  in  no  way  changed  my  views  or  lessened  the 
differences  between  the  President's  judgment  and  mine. 
Our  differences  were  as  to  the  bases  and  not  as  to  the  de- 
tails of  the  Covenant.  Since  there  was  no  disposition  to 
change  the  former  we  were  no  nearer  an  agreement  than 
we  were  in  January. 

The  President's  visit  to  the  United  States  had  been  dis- 
appointing to  the  friends  of  a  League  in  that  he  had  failed 
to  rally  to  the  support  of  the  Covenant  an  overwhelming 
popular  sentiment  in  its  favor  which  the  opposition  in  the 
Senate  could  not  resist.  The  natural  reaction  was  that 
the  peoples  of  Europe  and  their  statesmen  lost  a  measure 
of  their  enthusiasm  and  faith  in  the  project.  Except  in  the 
case  of  a  few  idealists,  there  was  a  growing  disposition  to 
view  it  from  the  purely  practical  point  of  view  and  to  spec- 
ulate on  its  efficacy  as  an  instrument  to  interpret  and  carry 


144 

out  the  international  will.  Among  the  leaders  of  political 
thought  in  the  principal  Allied  countries,  the  reports  of 
the  President's  reception  in  the  United  States  were  suffi- 
ciently conflicting  to  arouse  doubt  as  to  whether  the  Amer- 
ican people  were  actually  behind  him  in  his  plan  for  a 
League,  and  this  doubt  was  not  diminished  by  his  pro- 
posed changes  in  the  Covenant,  which  indicated  that  he 
was  not  in  full  control  of  the  situation  at  home. 

Two  weeks  after  the  President  had  resumed  his  duties 
as  a  negotiator  and  had  begun  the  work  of  revising  the 
Covenant,  I  made  a  memorandum  of  my  views  as  to  the 
situation  that  then  existed.  The  memorandum  is  as  fol- 
lows: 

" March  25,  1919 

"With  the  increasing  military  preparations  and  opera- 
tions throughout  Eastern  Europe  and  the  evident  purpose 
of  all  these  quarreling  nations  to  ignore  any  idea  of  dis- 
armament and  to  rely  upon  force  to  obtain  and  retain 
territory  and  rights,  the  League  of  Nations  is  being  dis- 
cussed with  something  like  contempt  by  the  cynical,  hard- 
headed  statesmen  of  those  countries  which  are  being  put 
on  a  war-footing.  They  are  cautious  and  courteous  out  of 
regard  for  the  President.  I  doubt  if  the  truth  reaches  him, 
but  it  comes  to  me  from  various  sources. 

"These  men  say  that  in  theory  the  idea  is  all  right  and 
is  an  ideal  to  work  toward,  but  that  under  present  condi- 
tions it  is  not  practical  in  preventing  war.  They  ask,  what 
nation  is  going  to  rely  on  the  guaranty  in  the  Covenant  if 
a  jealous  or  hostile  neighbor  maintains  a  large  army.  They 
want  to  know  whether  it  would  be  wise  or  not  to  disarm 
under  such  conditions.  Of  course  the  answers  are  obvious. 


REPORT  OF  COMMISSION  ON  LEAGUE    145 

But,  if  the  guaranty  is  not  sufficient,  or  accepted  as  suffi- 
cient, protection,  what  becomes  of  the  central  purpose  of 
the  League  and  the  chief  reason  for  creating  it? 

"  I  believe  that  the  President  and  Colonel  House  see  this, 
though  they  do  not  admit  it,  and  that  to  save  the  League 
from  being  cast  into  the  discard  they  will  attempt  to 
make  of  it  a  sort  of  international  agency  to  do  certain 
things  which  would  normally  be  done  by  independent  in- 
ternational commissions.  Such  a  course  would  save  the 
League  from  being  still-born  and  would  so  interweave  it 
with  the  terms  of  peace  that  to  eliminate  it  would  be  to 
open  up  some  difficult  questions. 

"Of  course  the  League  of  Nations  as  originally  planned 
had  one  supreme  object  and  that  was  to  prevent  future 
wars.  That  was  substantially  all  that  it  purposed  to  do. 
Since  then  new  functions  have  been  gradually  added  until 
the  chief  argument  for  the  League's  existence  has  been 
almost  lost  to  sight.  The  League  has  been  made  a  conven- 
ient c catch-all'  for  all  sorts  of  international  actions.  At 
first  this  was  undoubtedly  done  to  give  the  League  some- 
thing to  do,  and  now  it  is  being  done  to  save  it  from  extinc- 
tion or  from  being  ignored. 

"I  am  not  denying  that  a  common  international  agent 
may  be  a  good  thing.  In  fact  the  plan  has  decided  merit. 
But  the  organization  of  the  League  does  not  seem  to  me 
suitable  to  perform  efficiently  and  properly  these  new 
functions. 

"However,  giving  this  character  to  the  League  may 
save  it  from  being  merely  an  agreeable  dream.  As  the 
repository  of  international  controversies  requiring  long 
and  careful  consideration  it  may  live  and  be  useful. 

"My  impression  is  that  the  principal  sponsors  for  the 
League  are  searching  through  the  numerous  disputes 
which  are  clogging  the  wheels  of  the  Conference,  seizing 


146  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

upon  every  one  which  can  possibly  be  referred,  and  heap- 
ing them  on  the  League  of  Nations  to  give  it  standing  as 
a  useful  and  necessary  adjunct  to  the  Treaty. 

"At  least  that  is  an  interesting  view  of  what  is  taking 
place  and  opens  a  wide  field  for  speculation  as  to  the  fu- 
ture of  the  League  and  the  verdict  which  history  will  ren- 
der as  to  its  origin,  its  nature,  and  its  real  value." 

I  quote  this  memorandum  because  it  gives  my  thoughts 
at  the  time  concerning  the  process  of  weaving  the  League 
into  the  terms  of  peace  as  the  President  had  threatened  to 
do.  I  thought  then  that  it  had  a  double  purpose,  to  give 
a  practical  reason  for  the  existence  of  the  League  and  to 
make  certain  the  ratification  of  the  Covenant  by  the  Sen- 
ate. No  fact  has  since  developed  which  has  induced  me 
to  change  my  opinion. 

In  consequence  of  the  functions  which  were  added  to 
the  League,  the  character  of  the  League  itself  underwent 
a  change.  Instead  of  an  agency  created  solely  for  the  pre- 
vention of  international  wars,  it  was  converted  into  an 
agency  to  carry  out  the  terms  of  peace.  Its  idealistic  con- 
ception was  subordinated  to  the  materialistic  purpose  of 
confirming  to  the  victorious  nations  the  rewards  of  vic- 
tory. It  is  true  that  during  the  long  struggle  between  the 
President  and  the  Senate  on  the  question  of  ratification 
there  was  in  the  debates  a  general  return  to  the  original 
purpose  of  the  League  by  both  the  proponents  and  oppo- 
nents of  the  Covenant,  but  that  fact  in  no  way  affects  the 
truth  of  the  assertion  that,  in  order  to  save  the  League 
of  Nations,  its  character  was  changed  by  extending  its 


REPORT  OF  COMMISSION  ON  LEAGUE    147 

powers  and  duties  as  a  common  agent  of  the  nations  which 
had  triumphed  over  the  Central  Alliance. 

The  day  before  the  Treaty  of  Peace  was  delivered  to  the 
German  plenipotentiaries  (May  6)  its  terms  induced  me 
to  write  a  note  entitled  "The  Greatest  Loss  Caused  by  the 
War,"  referring  to  the  loss  of  idealism  to  the  world.  In 
that  note  I  wrote  of  the  League  of  Nations  as  follows : 

"Even  the  measure  of  idealism,  with  which  the  League 
of  Nations  was  at  the  first  impregnated,  has,  under  the 
influence  and  intrigue  of  ambitious  statesmen  of  the  Old 
World,  been  supplanted  by  an  open  recognition  that  force 
and  selfishness  are  primary  elements  in  international  co- 
operation. The  League  has  succumbed  to  this  reversion 
to  a  cynical  materialism.  It  is  no  longer  a  creature  of 
idealism.  Its  very  source  and  reason  have  been  dried  up 
and  have  almost  disappeared.  The  danger  is  that  it  will 
become  a  bulwark  of  the  old  order,  a  check  upon  all  efforts 
to  bring  man  again  under  the  influence  which  he  has  lost." 

The  President,  in  the  addresses  which  he  afterward 
made  in  advocacy  of  the  Covenant  and  of  ratification  of 
the  Treaty,  indicated  clearly  the  wide  divergence  of  opin- 
ion between  us  as  to  the  character  of  the  League  provided 
for  in  the  Treaty.  I  do  not  remember  that  the  subject  was 
directly  discussed  by  us,  but  I  certainly  took  no  pains  to 
hide  my  misgivings  as  to  the  place  it  would  have  in  the 
international  relations  of  the  future.  However,  as  Mr. 
Wilson  knew  that  I  disapproved  of  the  theory  and  basic 
principles  of  the  organization,  especially  the  recognition 
of  the  oligarchy  of  the  Five  Powers,  he  could  not  but 


148  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

realize  that  I  considered  that  idealism  had  given  place  to 
political  expediency  in  order  to  secure  for  the  Covenant 
the  support  of  the  powerful  nations  represented  at  the 
Conference.  This  was  my  belief  as  to  our  relations  when 
the  Treaty  of  Peace  containing  the  Covenant  was  laid 
before  the  Germans  at  the  Hotel  des  Reservoirs  in  Ver- 
sailles. 


CHAPTER  XIII 
THE  SYSTEM  OF  MANDATES 

IN  the  foregoing  review  of  the  opposite  views  held  by  the 
President  and  by  me  in  regard  to  the  plan  for  a  League 
of  Nations  and  specifically  in  regard  to  the  Covenant  as 
originally  drawn  and  as  revised,  mention  was  made  of  the 
proposed  mandatory  system  as  one  of  the  subjects  con- 
cerning which  we  were  not  in  agreement.  My  objections  to 
the  system  were  advanced  chiefly  on  the  ground  of  the 
legal  difficulties  which  it  presented  because  it  seemed  prob- 
able that  the  President  would  give  more  weight  to  my 
opinion  on  that  ground  than  on  one  which  concerned  the 
policy  of  adopting  the  system.  Viewed  from  the  latter 
standpoint  it  appeared  to  me  most  unwise  for  the  President 
to  propose  a  plan,  in  which  the  United  States  would  be 
expected  to  participate  and  which,  if  it  did  participate, 
would  involve  it  in  the  political  quarrels  of  the  Old  World. 
To  do  so  would  manifestly  require  a  departure  from  the 
traditional  American  policy  of  keeping  aloof  from  the  polit- 
ical jealousies  and  broils  of  Europe.  Without  denying  that 
present  conditions  have,  of  necessity,  modified  the  old 
policy  of  isolation  and  without  minimizing  the  influence 
of  that  fact  on  the  conduct  of  American  foreign  affairs,  it 
did  not  seem  essential  for  the  United  States  to  become  the 
guardian  of  any  of  the  peoples  of  the  Near  East,  who  were 


150  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

aspiring  to  become  independent  nationalities,  a  guardian- 
ship which  the  President  held  to  be  a  duty  that  the  United 
States  was  bound  to  perform  as  its  share  of  the  burden 
imposed  by  the  international  cooperation  which  he  con- 
sidered vital  to  the  new  world  order. 

The  question  of  mandates  issuing  from  the  League  of 
Nations  was  discussed  at  length  by  the  Council  of  Ten  in 
connection  with  the  disposition  and  future  control  of  the 
German  colonies  and  incidentally  as  to  the  dismember- 
ment of  the  Ottoman  Empire.  The  discussions  were  chiefly 
along  the  lines  of  practicability,  of  policy,  and  of  moral 
obligation.  The  President's  strong  support  of  the  manda- 
tory system  and  his  equally  strong  objection  to  the  idea  of 
condominium  showed  that  his  mind  was  made  up  in  favor 
of  the  issuance  of  mandates  by  the  League.  Since  it  would 
have  been  highly  improper  for  me  to  oppose  openly  a 
policy  which  the  President  had  declared  under  his  consti- 
tutional authority,  there  was  no  proper  opportunity  to 
present  the  legal  difficulties  of  the  system  to  the  Council. 

However,  the  seriousness  of  these  difficulties  and  the 
possible  troubles  and  controversies  which  might  be  antici- 
pated from  attempting  to  put  the  system  into  operation 
induced  me,  after  one  of  the  sessions  of  the  Council  of 
Ten,  to  state  briefly  to  the  President  some  of  the  serious 
objections  to  League  mandates  from  the  standpoint  of  in- 
ternational law  and  the  philosophy  of  government.  Presi- 
dent Wilson  listened  with  his  usual  attentiveness  to  what 
I  had  to  say,  though  the  objections  evidently  did  not  appeal 


THE  SYSTEM  OF  MANDATES  151 

to  him,  as  he  characterized  them  as  "  mere  technicalities  " 
which  could  be  cured  or  disregarded.  Impressed  myself 
with  the  importance  of  these  "technicalities"  and  their 
direct  bearing  on  the  policy  of  adopting  the  mandatory 
system,  I  later,  on  February  2,  1919,  embodied  them  in  a 
memorandum.  At  the  time  I  hoped  and  believed  that  the 
negotiation  of  the  completed  Covenant  might  be  post- 
poned and  that  there  would  be  another  opportunity  to 
raise  the  question.  The  memorandum,  prepared  with  this 
end  in  view,  is  as  follows: 

"The  system  of  'mandatories  under  the  League  of  Na- 
tions,' when  applied  to  territories  which  were  formerly  col- 
onies of  Germany,  the  system  which  has  been  practically 
adopted  and  will  be  written  into  the  plan  for  the  League, 
raises  some  interesting  and  difficult  questions : 

"The  one,  which  is  the  most  prominent  since  it  enters 
into  nearly  all  of  the  international  problems  presented,  is 
— Where  does  the  sovereignty  over  these  territories  reside? 

"  Sovereignty  is  inherent  in  the  very  conception  of  gov- 
ernment. It  cannot  be  destroyed,  though  it  may  be  ab- 
sorbed by  another  sovereignty  either  by  compulsion  or 
cession.  When  the  Germans  were  ousted  from  their  col- 
onies, the  sovereignty  passed  to  the  power  or  powers 
which  took  possession.  The  location  of  the  sovereignty  up 
to  the  present  is  clear,  but  with  the  introduction  of  the 
League  of  Nations  as  an  international  primate  superior  to 
the  conquerors  some  rather  perplexing  questions  will  have 
to  be  answered. 

"Do  those  who  have  seized  the  sovereignty  transfer  it 
or  does  Germany  transfer  it  to  the  League  of  Nations? 
If  so,  how? 


152  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

"Does  the  League  assume  possession  of  the  sovereignty 
on  its  renunciation  by  Germany?  If  so,  how? 

"Does  the  League  merely  direct  the  disposition  of  the 
sovereignty  without  taking  possession  of  it? 

"Assuming  that  the  latter  question  is  answered  in  the 
affirmative,  then  after  such  disposition  of  the  right  to 
exercise  sovereignty,  which  will  presumably  be  a  limited 
right,  where  does  the  actual  sovereignty  reside? 

"The  appointment  of  a  mandatory  to  exercise  sovereign 
rights  over  territory  is  to  create  an  agent  for  the  real  sov- 
ereign. But  who  is  the  real  sovereign  ? 

"  Is  the  League  of  Nations  the  sovereign,  or  is  it  a  com- 
mon agent  of  the  nations  composing  the  League,  to  whom 
is  confided  solely  the  duty  of  naming  the  mandatory  and 
issuing  the  mandate? 

"If  the  League  is  the  sovereign,  can  it  avoid  responsibil- 
ity for  the  misconduct  of  the  mandatory,  its  agent? 

"If  it  is  not  the  League,  who  is  responsible  for  the  man- 
datory's conduct? 

"Assuming  that  the  mandatory  in  faithfully  performing 
the  provisions  of  the  mandate  unavoidably  works  an  in- 
justice upon  another  party,  can  or  ought  the  mandatory  to 
be  held  responsible?  If  not,  how  can  the  injured  party 
obtain  redress?  Manifestly  the  answer  is,  'From  the 
sovereign,'  but  who  is  the  sovereign? 

"In  the  Treaty  of  Peace  Germany  will  be  called  upon 
to  renounce  sovereignty  over  her  colonial  possessions.  To 
whom  will  the  sovereignty  pass? 

"If  the  reply  is,  'The  League  of  Nations,'  the  question 
is :  Does  the  League  possess  the  attributes  of  an  independ- 
ent state  so  that  it  can  function  as  an  owner  of  territory? 
If  so,  what  is  it?  A  world  state? 

"  If  the  League  does  not  constitute  a  world  state,  then 
the  sovereignty  would  have  to  pass  to  some  national  state. 


THE  SYSTEM  OF  MANDATES  153 

What  national  state?  What  would  be  the  relation  of  the 
national  state  to  the  League? 

"If  the  League  is  to  receive  title  to  the  sovereignty, 
what  officers  of  the  League  are  empowered  to  receive  it  and 
to  transfer  its  exercise  to  a  mandatory? 

"What  form  of  acceptance  should  be  adopted? 

"Would  every  nation  which  is  a  member  of  the  League 
have  to  give  its  representatives  full  powers  to  accept  the 
title? 

"Assuming  that  certain  members  decline  to  issue  such 
powers  or  to  accept  title  as  to  one  or  more  of  the  territories, 
what  relation  would  those  members  have  to  the  manda- 
tory named?" 

There  is  no  attempt  in  the  memorandum  to  analyze  or 
classify  the  queries  raised,  and,  as  I  review  them  in  the 
light  of  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles,  I  do  not  think 
that  some  of  them  can  be  asked  with  any  helpful  purpose. 
On  the  other  hand,  many  of  the  questions,  I  believe  the 
large  majority,  were  as  pertinent  after  the  Treaty  was  com- 
pleted as  they  were  when  the  memorandum  was  made. 

As  Colonel  House  was  the  other  member  of  the  Com- 
mission on  the  League  of  Nations  and  would  have  to  con- 
sider the  practicability  and  expediency  of  including  the 
mandatory  system  in  the  Covenant,  I  read  the  memoran- 
dum to  him  stating  that  I  had  orally  presented  most  of 
the  questions  to  the  President  who  characterized  them 
as  "legal  technicalities"  and  for  that  reason  unimportant. 
I  said  to  the  Colonel  that  I  differed  with  the  President,  as 
I  hoped  he  did,  not  only  as  to  the  importance  of  consider- 
ing the  difficulties  raised  by  the  questions  before  the  sys- 


154  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

tern  of  mandates  was  adopted,  but  also  as  to  the  impor- 
tance of  viewing  from  every  standpoint  the  wisdom  of  the 
system  and  the  difficulties  that  might  arise  in  its  practical 
operation.  I  stated  that,  in  my  opinion,  a  simpler  and 
better  plan  was  to  transfer  the  sovereignty  over  territory 
to  a  particular  nation  by  a  treaty  of  cession  under  such 
terms  as  seemed  wise  and,  in  the  case  of  some  of  the  newly 
erected  states,  to  have  them  execute  treaties  accepting 
protectorates  by  Powers  mutually  acceptable  to  those 
states  and  to  the  League  of  Nations. 

Colonel  House,  though  he  listened  attentively  to  the 
memorandum  and  to  my  suggestions,  did  not  seem  con- 
vinced of  the  importance  of  the  questions  or  of  the  advan- 
tages of  adopting  any  other  plan  than  that  of  the  proposed 
mandatory  system.  To  abandon  the  system  meant  to 
abandon  one  of  the  ideas  of  international  supervision, 
which  the  President  especially  cherished  and  strongly 
advocated.  It  meant  also  to  surrender  one  of  the  proposed 
functions  of  the  League  as  an  agent  in  carrying  out  the 
peace  settlements  under  the  Treaty,  functions  which 
would  form  the  basis  of  an  argument  in  favor  of  the  organ- 
ization of  the  League  and  furnish  a  practical  reason  for  its 
existence.  Of  course  the  presumed  arguments  against  the 
abandonment  of  mandates  may  not  have  been  considered, 
but  at  the  time  I  believed  that  they  were  potent  with 
Colonel  House  and  with  the  President.  The  subsequent 
advocacy  of  the  system  by  these  two  influential  mem- 
bers of  the  Commission  on  the  League  of  Nations,  which 


THE  SYSTEM  OF  iVIANDATES  155 

resulted  in  its  adoption,  in  no  way  lessened  my  belief  as 
to  the  reasons  for  their  support. 

The  mandatory  system,  a  product  of  the  creative  mind 
of  General  Smuts,  was  a  novelty  in  international  relations 
which  appealed  strongly  to  those  who  preferred  to  adopt 
unusual  and  untried  methods  rather  than  to  accept  those 
which  had  been  tested  by  experience  and  found  practical 
of  operation.  The  self-satisfaction  of  inventing  something 
new  or  of  evolving  a  new  theory  is  inherent  with  not  a  few 
men.  They  are  determined  to  try  out  their  ideas  and  are 
impatient  of  opposition  which  seeks  to  prevent  the  experi- 
ment. In  fact  opposition  seems  sometimes  to  enhance  the 
virtue  of  a  novelty  in  the  minds  of  those  who  propose  or 
advocate  its  adoption.  Many  reformers  suffer  from  this 
form  of  vanity. 

In  the  case  of  the  system  of  mandates  its  adoption  by 
the  Conference  and  the  conferring  on  the  League  of  Na- 
tions the  power  to  issue  mandates  seemed  at  least  to  the 
more  conservative  thinkers  at  Paris  a  very  doubtful  ven- 
ture. It  appeared  to  possess  no  peculiar  advantages  over 
the  old  method  of  transferring  and  exercising  sovereign 
control  either  in  providing  added  protection  to  the  in- 
habitants of  territory  subject  to  a  mandate  or  greater 
certainty  of  international  equality  in  the  matter  of  com- 
merce and  trade,  the  two  principal  arguments  urged  in 
favor  of  the  proposed  system. 

If  the  advocates  of  the  system  intended  to  avoid 
through  its  operation  the  appearance  of  taking  enemy 


156  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

territory  as  the  spoils  of  war,  it  was  a  subterfuge  which  de- 
ceived no  one.  It  seemed  obvious  from  the  very  first  that 
the  Powers,  which  under  the  old  practice  would  have  ob- 
.tained  sovereignty  over  certain  conquered  territories, 
would  not  be  denied  mandates  over  those  territories.  The 
League  of  Nations  might  reserve  in  the  mandate  a  right 
of  supervision  of  administration  and  even  of  revocation 
of  authority,  but  that  right  would  be  nominal  and  of  little, 
if  any,  real  value  provided  the  mandatory  was  one  of  the 
Great  Powers  as  it  undoubtedly  would  be.  The  almost 
irresistible  conclusion  is  that  the  protagonists  of  the  theory 
saw  in  it  a  means  of  clothing  the  League  of  Nations  with 
an  apparent  usefulness  which  justified  the  League  by  mak- 
ing it  the  guardian  of  uncivilized  and  semi-civilized  peoples 
and  the  international  agent  to  watch  over  and  prevent 
any  deviation  from  the  principle  of  equality  in  the  com- 
mercial and  industrial  development  of  the  mandated 
territories. 

It  may  appear  surprising  that  the  Great  Powers  so 
readily  gave  their  support  to  the  new  method  of  obtaining 
an  apparently  limited  control  over  the  conquered  terri- 
tories, and  did  not  seek  to  obtain  complete  sovereignty 
over  them.  It  is  not  necessary  to  look  far  for  a  sufficient 
and  very  practical  reason.  If  the  colonial  possessions  of 
Germany  had,  under  the  old  practice,  been  divided  among 
the  victorious  Powers  and  been  ceded  to  them  directly  in 
full  sovereignty,  Germany  might  justly  have  asked  that 
the  value  of  such  territorial  cessions  be  applied  on  any  war 


THE  SYSTEM  OF  MANDATES  157 

indemnities  to  which  the  Powers  were  entitled.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  League  of  Nations  in  the  distribution  of 
mandates  would  presumably  do  so  in  the  interests  of  the 
inhabitants  of  the  colonies  and  the  mandates  would  be 
accepted  by  the  Powers  as  a  duty  and  not  to  obtain  new 
possessions.  Thus  under  the  mandatory  system  Germany 
lost  her  territorial  assets,  which  might  have  greatly  re- 
duced her  financial  debt  to  the  Allies,  while  the  latter  ob- 
tained the  German  colonial  possessions  without  the  loss  of 
any  of  their  claims  for  indemnity.  In  actual  operation  the 
apparent  altruism  of  the  mandatory  system  worked  in 
favor  of  the  selfish  and  material  interests  of  the  Powers 
which  accepted  the  mandates.  And  the  same  may  be 
said  of  the  dismemberment  of  Turkey.  It  should  not  be  a 
matter  of  surprise,  therefore,  that  the  President  found 
little  opposition  to  the  adoption  of  his  theory,  or,  to  be 
more  accurate,  of  the  Smuts  theory,  on  the  part  of  the 
European  statesmen. 

There  was  one  case,  however,  in  which  the  issuance  of 
a  mandate  appeared  to  have  a  definite  and  practical  value 
and  to  be  superior  to  a  direct  transfer  of  complete  sov- 
ereignty or  of  the  conditional  sovereignty  resulting  from 
the  establishment  of  a  protectorate.  The  case  was  that  of 
a  territory  with  or  without  a  national  government,  which, 
not  being  self-supporting  and  not  sufficiently  strong  to 
protect  its  borders  from  aggressive  neighbors,  or  its  peo- 
ple sufficiently  enlightened  to  govern  themselves  properly, 
would  be  a  constant  source  of  expense  instead  of  profit 


158  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

to  the  Power,  which  as  its  protector  and  tutor  became  its 
overlord.  Under  such  conditions  there  was  more  proba- 
bility of  persuading  a  nation  inspired  by  humanitarian 
and  altruistic  motives  to  assume  the  burden  for  the  com- 
mon good  under  the  mandatory  system  than  under  the 
old  method  of  cession  or  of  protectorate.  As  to  nations, 
however,  which  placed  national  interests  first  and  made 
selfishness  the  standard  of  international  policy  it  was  to 
be  assumed  that  an  appeal  under  either  system  would  be 
ineffective. 

The  truth  of  this  was  very  apparent  at  Paris.  In  the 
tentative  distribution  of  mandates  among  the  Powers, 
which  took  place  on  the  strong  presumption  that  the  man- 
datory system  would  be  adopted,  the  principal  European 
Powers  appeared  to  be  willing  and  even  eager  to  become 
mandatories  over  territories  possessing  natural  resources 
which  could  be  profitably  developed  and  showed  an  un- 
willingness to  accept  mandates  for  territories  which,  bar- 
ren of  mineral  or  agricultural  wealth,  would  be  continu- 
ing liabilities  rather  than  assets.  This  is  not  stated  by 
way  of  criticism,  but  only  in  explanation  of  what  took 
place. 

From  the  beginning  to  the  end  of  the  discussions  on 
mandates  and  their  distribution  among  the  Powers  it  was 
repeatedly  declared  that  the  United  States  ought  to  par- 
ticipate in  the  general  plan  for  the  upbuilding  of  the  new 
states  which  under  mandatories  would  finally  become  in- 
dependent nationalities,  but  it  was  never,  to  my  knowl- 


THE  SYSTEM  OF  MANDATES  159 

edge,  proposed,  except  by  the  inhabitants  of  the  region 
in  question,  that  the  United  States  should  accept  a  man- 
date for  Syria  or  the  Asiatic  coast  of  the^Egean  Sea.  Those 
regions  were  rich  in  natural  resources  and  their  economic 
future  under  a  stable  government  was  bright.  Expendi- 
tures in  their  behalf  and  the  direction  of  their  public 
affairs  would  bring  ample  returns  to  the  mandatory  na- 
tions. On  the  other  hand,  there  was  a  sustained  propa- 
ganda-— for  it  amounted  to  that  —  in  favor  of  the  United 
States  assuming  mandates  over  Armenia  and  the  muni- 
cipal district  of  Constantinople,  both  of  which,  if  limited 
by  the  boundaries  which  it  was  then  purposed  to  draw, 
would  be  a  constant  financial  burden  to  the  Power  ac- 
cepting the  mandate,  and,  in  the  case  of  Armenia,  would 
require  that  Power  to  furnish  a  military  force  estimated 
at  not  less  than  50,0x30  men  to  prevent  the  aggression  of 
warlike  neighbors  and  to  preserve  domestic  order  and 
peace. 

It  is  not  too  severe  to  say  of  those  who  engaged  in  this 
propaganda  that  the  purpose  was  to  take  advantage  of 
the  unselfishness  of  the  American  people  and  of  the  altru- 
ism and  idealism  of  President  Wilson  in  order  to  impose 
on  the  United  States  the  burdensome  mandates  and  to 
divide  those  which  covered  desirable  territories  among 
the  European  Powers.  I  do  not  think  that  the  President 
realized  at  the  time  that  an  actual  propaganda  was  going 
on,  and  I  doubt  very  much  whether  he  would  have  be- 
lieved it  if  he  had  been  told.  Deeply  impressed  with  the 


160  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

idea  that  it  was  the  moral  duty  of  the  great  and  enlight- 
ened nations  to  aid  the  less  fortunate  and  especially  to 
guard  the  nationalities  freed  from  autocratic  rule  until 
they  were  capable  of  self-government  and  self-protection, 
the  President  apparently  looked  upon  the  appeals  made 
to  him  as  genuine  expressions  of  humanitarianism  and 
as  manifestations  of  the  opinion  of  mankind  concerning 
the  part  that  the  United  States  ought  to  take  in  the 
reconstruction  of  the  world.  His  high-mindedness  and 
loftiness  of  thought  blinded  him  to  the  sordidness  of  pur- 
pose which  appears  to  have  induced  the  general  acquies- 
cence in  his  desired  system  of  mandates,  and  the  same 
qualities  of  mind  caused  him  to  listen  sympathetically  to 
proposals,  the  acceptance  of  which  would  give  actual  proof 
of  the  unselfishness  of  the  United  States. 

Reading  the  situation  thus  and  convinced  of  the  ob- 
jections against  the  mandatory  system  from  the  point  of 
view  of  international  law,  of  policy  and  of  American  in- 
terests, I  opposed  the  inclusion  of  the  system  in  the  plan 
for  a  League  of  Nations.  In  view  of  the  attitude  which 
Mr.  Wilson  had  taken  toward  my  advice  regarding  poli- 
cies I  confined  the  objections  which  I  presented  to  him,  as 
I  have  stated,  to  those  based  on  legal  difficulties.  The  ob- 
jections on  the  ground  of  policy  were  made  to  Colonel 
House  in  the  hope  that  through  him  they  might  reach  the 
President  and  open  his  eyes  to  the  true  state  of  affairs. 
Whether  they  ever  did  reach  him  I  do  not  know.  Nothing 
in  his  subsequent  course  of  action  indicated  that  they  did. 


THE  SYSTEM  OF  MANDATES  161 

But,  if  they  did,  he  evidently  considered  them  as  invalid 
as  he  did  the  objections  arising  from  legal  difficulties.  The 
system  of  mandates  was  written  into  the  Treaty  and  a 
year  after  the  Treaty  was  signed  President  Wilson  asked 
the  Congress  for  authority  to  accept  for  the  United  States 
a  mandate  over  Armenia.  This  the  Congress  refused.  It  is 
needless  to  make  further  comment. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

DIFFERENCES  AS  TO  THE  LEAGUE  RECAPITULATED 

THE  differences  between  the  President's  views  and  mine 
in  regard  to  the  character  of  the  League  of  Nations  and  to 
the  provisions  of  the  Covenant  relating  to  the  organiza- 
tion and  functions  of  the  League  were  irreconcilable,  and 
we  were  equally  in  disagreement  as  to  the  duties  of  the 
League  in  carrying  out  certain  provisions  of  the  Treaty 
of  Peace  as  the  common  agent  of  the  signatory  Powers.  As 
a  commissioned  representative  of  the  President  of  the 
United  States  acting  under  his  instructions  I  had  no  al- 
ternative but  to  accept  his  decisions  and  to  follow  his  di- 
rections, since  surrender  of  my  commission  as  Peace  Com- 
missioner seemed  to  me  at  the  time  to  be  practically  out 
of  the  question.  I  followed  his  directions,  however,  with 
extreme  reluctance  because  I  felt  that  Mr.  Wilson's  poli- 
cies were  fundamentally  wrong  and  would  unavoidably 
result  in  loss  of  prestige  to  the  United  States  and  to  him  as 
its  Chief  Magistrate.  It  seemed  to  me  that  he  had  en- 
dangered, if  he  had  not  destroyed,  his  preeminent  position 
in  world  affairs  in  order  to  obtain  the  acceptance  of  his 
plan  for  a  League  of  Nations,  a  plan  which  in  theory  and 
in  detail  was  so  defective  that  it  would  be  difficult  to  de- 
fend it  successfully  from  critical  attack. 

The  objections  to  the  terms  of  the  Covenant,  which  I 


DIFFERENCES  RECAPITULATED         163 

had  raised  at  the  outset,  were  based  on  principle  and  also 
on  policy,  as  has  been  shown  in  the  preceding  pages;  and 
on  the  same  grounds  I  had  opposed  their  hasty  adoption 
and  their  inclusion  in  the  Peace  Treaty  to  be  negotiated 
at  Paris  by  the  Conference.  These  objections  and  the 
arguments  advanced  in  their  support  did  not  apparently 
have  any  effect  on  President  Wilson,  for  they  failed  to 
change  his  views  or  to  modify  the  plan  which  he,  with 
General  Smuts  and  Lord  Robert  Cecil,  had  worked  out 
for  an  international  organization.  They  did  not  swerve 
him  one  jot  from  his  avowed  purpose  to  make  the  creation 
of  the  League  of  Nations  the  principal  feature  of  the  nego- 
tiations and  the  provisions  of  the  Covenant  the  most 
prominent  articles  in  the  Treaties  of  Peace  with  the  Cen- 
tral Powers. 

Instead  of  accomplishing  their  designed  purpose,  my 
efforts  to  induce  the  President  to  change  his  policy  re- 
sulted only  in  my  losing  his  confidence  in  my  judgment 
and  in  arousing  in  his  mind,  if  I  do  not  misinterpret  his 
conduct,  doubts  of  my  loyalty  to  him  personally.  It  was 
characteristic  of  Mr.  Wilson  that  his  firm  conviction  as  to 
the  soundness  of  his  conclusions  regarding  the  character 
of  the  League  of  Nations  and  his  fixity  of  purpose  in  seek- 
ing to  compel  its  adoption  by  the  Peace  Conference  were 
so  intense  as  to  brook  no  opposition,  especially  from  one 
whom  he  expected  to  accept  his  judgment  without  ques- 
tion and  to  give  support  in  thought  and  word  to  any  plan 
or  policy  which  he  advocated.  In  view  of  this  mental  at- 


164  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

titude  of  the  President  it  is  not  difficult  to  understand  his 
opinion  of  my  course  of  action  at  Paris.  The  breach  in  our 
confidential  relations  was  unavoidable  in  view  of  my  con- 
viction of  the  duty  of  an  official  adviser  and  his  belief  that 
objections  ought  not  to  be  urged  as  to  a  matter  concern- 
ing which  he  had  expressed  his  opinion.  To  give  implied 
assent  to  policies  and  intentions  which  seemed  to  me 
wrong  or  unwise  would  have  been  violative  of  a  public 
trust,  though  doubtless  by  remaining  silent  I  might  have 
won  favor  and  approval  from  the  President  and  retained 
his  confidence. 

In  summarizing  briefly  the  subjects  of  disagreement 
between  the  President  and  myself  concerning  the  League 
of  Nations  I  will  follow  the  order  of  importance  rather  than 
the  order  in  which  they  arose.  While  they  also  divide  into 
two  classes,  those  based  on  principle  and  those  based  on 
policy,  it  does  not  seem  advisable  to  treat  them  by  classes 
in  the  summary. 

The  most  serious  defect  in  the  President's  Covenant  was, 
in  my  opinion,  one  of  principle.  It  was  the  practical  denial 
of  the  equality  of  nations  in  the  regulation  of  international 
affairs  in  times  of  peace  through  the  recognition  in  the 
Executive  Council  of  the  League  of  the  right  of  primacy 
of  the  Five  Great  Powers.  This  was  an  abandonment  of 
a  fundamental  principle  of  international  law  and  comity 
and  was  destructive  of  the  very  conception  of  national 
sovereignty  both  as  a  term  of  political  philosophy  and  as 
a  term  of  constitutional  law.  The  denial  of  the  equal  in- 


DIFFERENCES  RECAPITULATED         165 

dependence  and  the  free  exercise  of  sovereign  rights  of  all 
states  in  the  conduct  of  their  foreign  affairs,  and  the  es- 
tablishment of  this  group  of  primates,  amounted  to  a  rec- 
ognition of  the  doctrine  that  the  powerful  are,  in  law  as 
well  as  in  fact,  entitled  to  be  the  overlords  of  the  weak.  If 
adopted,  it  legalized  the  mastery  of  might,  which  in  inter- 
national relations,  when  peace  prevailed,  had  been  univer- 
sally condemned  as  illegal  and  its  assertion  as  reprehensible. 
It  was  this  doctrine,  that  the  possessors  of  superior 
physical  power  were  as  a  matter  of  right  the  supervisors, 
if  not  the  dictators,  of  those  lacking  the  physical  power 
to  resist  their  commands,  which  was  the  vital  element  of 
ancient  imperialism  and  of  modern  Prussianism.  Belief 
in  it  as  a  true  theory  of  world  polity  justified  the  Great 
War  in  the  eyes  of  the  German  people  even  when  they 
doubted  the  plea  of  their  Government  that  their  national 
safety  was  in  peril.  The  victors,  although  they  had  fought 
the  war  with  the  announced  purpose  of  proving  the  falsity 
of  this  pernicious  doctrine  and  of  emancipating  the  op- 
pressed nationalities  subject  to  the  Central  Powers,  re- 
vived the  doctrine  with  little  hesitation  during  the  negotia- 
tions at  Paris  and  wrote  it  into  the  Covenant  of  the  League 
of  Nations  by  contriving  an  organization  which  would 
give  practical  control  over  the  destinies  of  the  world  to 
an  oligarchy  of  the  Five  Great  Powers.  It  was  an  assump- 
tion of  the  right  of  supremacy  based  on  the  fact  that  the 
united  strength  of  these  Powers  could  compel  obedience. 
It  was  a  full  endorsement  of  the  theory  of  "  the  balance  of 


166  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

power"  in  spite  of  the  recognized  evils  of  that  doctrine  in 
its  practical  application.  Beneath  the  banner  of  the  democ- 
racies of  the  world  was  the  same  sinister  idea  which  had 
found  expression  in  the  Congress  of  Vienna  with  its  pur- 
pose of  protecting  the  monarchical  institutions  of  a  century 
ago.  It  proclaimed  in  fact  that  mankind  must  look  to 
might  rather  than  right,  to  force  rather  than  law,  in  the 
regulation  of  international  affairs  for  the  future. 

This  defect  in  the  theory,  on  which  the  League  of 
Nations  was  to  be  organized,  was  emphasized  and  given 
permanency  by  the  adoption  of  a  mutual  guaranty  of  ter- 
ritorial integrity  and  political  independence  against  exter- 
nal aggression.  Since  the  burden  of  enforcing  the  guaranty 
would  unavoidably  fall  upon  the  more  powerful  nations, 
they  could  reasonably  demand  the  control  over  affairs 
which  might  develop  into  a  situation  requiring  a  resort  to 
the  guaranty.  In  fact  during  a  plenary  session  of  the 
Peace  Conference  held  on  May  31,  1919,  President  Wil- 
son stated  as  a  broad  principle  that  responsibility  for  pro- 
tecting and  maintaining  a  settlement  under  one  of  the 
Peace  Treaties  carried  with  it  the  right  to  determine 
what  that  settlement  should  be.  The  application  to  the 
case  of  responsible  guarantors  is  obvious  and  was  appar- 
ently in  mind  when  the  Covenant  was  being  evolved.  The 
same  principle  was  applied  throughout  the  negotiations 
at  Paris. 

The  mutual  guaranty  from  its  affirmative  nature  com- 
pelled in  fact,  though  not  in  form,  the  establishment  of  a 


DIFFERENCES  RECAPITULATED         167 

ruling  group,  a  coalition  of  the  Great  Powers,  and  denied, 
though  not  in  terms,  the  equality  of  nations.  The  oli- 
garchy was  the  logical  result  of  entering  into  the  guaranty 
or  the  guaranty  was  the  logical  result  of  the  creation  of  the 
oligarchy  through  the  perpetuation  of  the  basic  idea  of 
the  Supreme  War  Council.  No  distinction  was  made  as 
to  a  state  of  war  and  a  state  of  peace.  Strongly  opposed 
to  the  abandonment  of  the  principle  of  the  equality  of 
nations  in  times  of  peace  I  naturally  opposed  the  affirma- 
tive guaranty  and  endeavored  to  persuade  the  President 
to  accept  as  a  substitute  for  it  a  self-denying  or  negative 
covenant  which  amounted  to  a  promise  of  "hands-off" 
and  in  no  way  required  the  formation  of  an  international 
oligarchy  to  make  it  effective. 

In  addition  to  the  foregoing  objection  I  opposed  the 
guaranty  on  the  ground  that  it  was  politically  inexpedient 
to  attempt  to  bind  the  United  States  by  a  treaty  provision 
which  by  its  terms  would  certainly  invite  attack  as  to  its 
constitutionality.  Without  entering  into  the  strength  of 
the  legal  argument,  and  without  denying  that  there  are 
two  sides  to  the  question,  the  fact  that  it  was  open  to  de- 
bate whether  the  treaty-making  power  under  the  Consti- 
tution could  or  could  not  obligate  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  to  make  war  under  certain  conditions  was 
in  my  judgment  a  practical  reason  for  avoiding  the  issue. 
If  the  power  existed  to  so  bind  the  United  States  by  treaty 
on  the  theory  that  the  Federal  Government  could  not  be 
restricted  in  its  right  to  make  international  agreements, 


168  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

then  the  guaranty  would  be  attacked  as  an  unwise  and 
needless  departure  from  the  traditional  policies  of  the 
Republic.  If  the  power  did  not  exist,  then  the  violation  of 
the  Constitution  would  be  an  effective  argument  against 
such  an  undertaking.  Whatever  the  conclusion  might  be, 
therefore,  as  to  the  legality  of  the  guaranty  or  as  to 
whether  the  obligation  was  legal  or  moral  in  nature,  it  did 
not  seem  possible  for  it  to  escape  criticism  and  vigorous 
attack  in  America. 

It  seemed  to  me  that  the  President's  guaranty  was  so 
vulnerable  from  every  angle  that  to  insist  upon  it  would 
endanger  the  acceptance  of  any  treaty  negotiated  if  the 
Covenant  was,  in  accordance  with  the  President's  plan, 
made  an  integral  part  of  it.  Then,  too,  opposition  would, 
in  my  opinion,  develop  on  the  ground  that  the  guaranty 
would  permit  European  Powers  to  participate,  if  they 
could  not  act  independently,  in  the  forcible  settlement  of 
international  quarrels  in  the  Western  Hemisphere  when- 
ever there  was  an  actual  invasion  of  territory  or  violation 
of  sovereignty,  while  conversely  the  United  States  would 
be  morally,  if  not  legally,  bound  to  take  part  in  coercive 
measures  in  composing  European  differences  under  similar 
conditions.  It  could  be  urged  with  much  force  that  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  in  the  one  case  and  the  Washington  pol- 
icy of  avoiding  "entangling  alliances"  in  the  other  would 
be  so  affected  that  they  would  both  have  to  be  substan- 
tially abandoned  or  else  rewritten.  If  the  American  peo- 
ple were  convinced  that  this  would  be  the  consequence  of 


DIFFERENCES  RECAPITULATED         169 

accepting  the  affirmative  guaranty,  it  meant  its  rejection. 
In  any  event  it  was  bound  to  produce  an  acrimonious  con- 
troversy. From  the  point  of  view  of  policy  alone  it  seemed 
unwise  to  include  the  guaranty  in  the  Covenant,  and  be- 
lieving that  an  objection  on  that  ground  would  appeal  to 
the  President  more  strongly  than  one  based  on  principle,  I 
emphasized  that  objection,  though  in  my  own  mind  the 
other  was  the  more  vital  and  more  compelling. 

The  points  of  difference  relating  to  the  League  of  Na- 
tions between  the  President's  views  and  mine,  other  than 
the  recognition  of  the  primacy  of  the  Great  Powers,  the 
affirmative  guaranty  and  the  resulting  denial  in  fact  of  the 
equality  of  nations  in  times  of  peace,  were  the  provisions 
in  the  President's  original  draft  of  the  Covenant  relating 
to  international  arbitrations,  the  subordination  of  the  ju- 
dicial power  to  the  political  power,  and  the  proposed  sys- 
tem of  mandates.  Having  discussed  with  sufficient  detail 
the  reasons  which  caused  me  to  oppose  these  provisions, 
and  having  stated  the  efforts  made  to  induce  President 
Wilson  to  abandon  or  modify  them,  repetition  would  be 
superfluous.  It  is  also  needless,  in  view  of  the  full  narra- 
tive of  events  contained  in  these  pages,  to  state  that  I 
failed  entirely  in  my  endeavor  to  divert  the  President 
from  his  determination  to  have  these  provisions  inserted 
in  the  Covenant,  except  in  the  case  of  international  arbi- 
trations, and  even  in  that  case  I  do  not  believe  that  my 
advice  had  anything  to  do  with  his  abandonment  of  his 
ideas  as  to  the  method  of  selecting  arbitrators  and  the 


170  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

right  of  appeal  from  arbitral  awards.  Those  changes  and 
the  substitution  of  an  article  providing  for  the  future  crea- 
tion of  a  Permanent  Court  of  International  Justice,  were, 
in  my  opinion,  as  I  have  said,  a  concession  to  the  Euro- 
pean statesmen  and  due  to  their  insistence. 

President  Wilson  knew  that  I  disagreed  with  him  as  to 
the  relative  importance  of  restoring  a  state  of  peace  at  the 
earliest  date  possible  and  of  securing  the  adoption  of  a 
plan  for  the  creation  of  a  League  of  Nations.  He  was 
clearly  convinced  that  the  drafting  and  acceptance  of  the 
Covenant  was  superior  to  every  other  task  imposed  on  the 
Conference,  that  it  must  be  done  before  any  other  settle- 
ment was  reached  and  that  it  ought  to  have  precedence  in 
the  negotiations.  His  course  of  action  was  conclusive  evi- 
dence of  this  conviction. 

On  the  other  hand,  I  favored  the  speedy  negotiation  of  a 
short  and  simple  preliminary  treaty,  in  which,  so  far  as  the 
League  of  Nations  was  concerned,  there  would  be  a  series 
of  declarations  and  an  agreement  for  a  future  interna- 
tional conference  called  for  the  purpose  of  drafting  a  con- 
vention in  harmony  with  the  declarations  in  the  prelimi- 
nary treaty.  By  adopting  this  course  a  state  of  peace  would 
have  been  restored  in  the  early  months  of  1919,  official 
intercourse  and  commercial  relations  would  have  been  re- 
sumed, the  more  complex  and  difficult  problems  of  settle- 
ment would  have  been  postponed  to  the  negotiation  of  the 
definitive  Treaty  of  Peace,  and  there  would  have  been 
time  to  study  exhaustively  the  purposes,  powers,  and 


DIFFERENCES  RECAPITULATED         171 

practical  operations  of  a  League  before  the  organic  agree- 
ment was  put  into  final  form.  Postponement  would  also 
have  given  opportunity  to  the  nations,  which  had  contin- 
ued neutral  throughout  the  war,  to  participate  in  the 
formation  of  the  plan  for  a  League  on  an  equal  footing 
with  the  nations  which  had  been  belligerents.  In  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  world  organization  universality  of  interna- 
tional representation  in  reaching  an  agreement  seemed  to 
me  advisable,  if  not  essential,  provided  the  nations  repre- 
sented were  democracies  and  not  autocracies. 

It  was  to  be  presumed  also  that  at  a  conference  entirely 
independent  of  the  peace  negotiations  and  free  from  the 
influences  affecting  the  terms  of  peace,  there  would  be 
more  general  and  more  frank  discussions  regarding  the 
various  phases  of  the  subject  than  was  possible  at  a  con- 
ference ruled  by  the  Five  Great  Powers  and  dominated  in 
its  decisions,  if  not  in  its  opinions,  by  the  statesmen  of 
those  Powers. 

To  perfect  such  a  document,  as  the  Covenant  of  the 
League  of  Nations  was  intended  to  be,  required  expert 
knowledge,  practical  experience  in  international  relations, 
and  an  exchange  of  ideas  untrammeled  by  immediate 
questions  of  policy  or  by  the  prejudices  resulting  from  the 
war  and  from  national  hatreds  and  jealousies.  It  was  not  a 
work  for  politicians,  novices,  or  inexperienced  theorists, 
but  for  trained  statesmen  and  jurists,  who  were  conver- 
sant with  the  fundamental  principles  of  international  law, 
with  the  usages  of  nations  in  their  intercourse  with  one  an- 


172  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

other,  and  with  the  successes  and  failures  of  previous  ex- 
periments in  international  association.  The  President  was 
right  in  his  conception  as  to  the  greatness  of  the  task  to  be 
accomplished,  but  he  was  wrong,  radically  wrong,  in  be- 
lieving that  it  could  be  properly  done  at  the  Paris  Confer- 
ence under  the  conditions  which  there  prevailed  and  in  the 
time  given  for  consideration  of  the  subject. 

To  believe  for  a  moment  that  a  world  constitution  — 
for  so  its  advocates  looked  upon  the  Covenant  —  could  be 
drafted  perfectly  or  even  wisely  in  eleven  days,  however 
much  thought  individuals  may  have  previously  given  to 
the  subject,  seems  on  the  face  of  it  to  show  an  utter  lack 
of  appreciation  of  the  problems  to  be  solved  or  else  an 
abnormal  confidence  in  the  talents  and  wisdom  of  those 
charged  with  the  duty.  If  one  compares  the  learned  and 
comprehensive  debates  that  took  place  in  the  convention 
which  drafted  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  and 
the  months  that  were  spent  in  the  critical  examination 
word  by  word  of  the  proposed  articles,  with  the  ten  meet- 
ings of  the  Commission  on  the  League  of  Nations  prior  to 
its  report  of  February  14  and  with  the  few  hours  given  to 
debating  the  substance  and  language  of  the  Covenant,  the 
inferior  character  of  the  document  produced  by  the  Com- 
mission ought  not  to  be  a  matter  of  wonder.  It  was  a  fore- 
gone conclusion  that  it  would  be  found  defective.  Some  of 
these  defects  were  subsequently  corrected,  but  the  theory 
and  basic  principles,  which  were  the  chief  defects  in  the 
plan,  were  preserved  with  no  substantial  change. 


DIFFERENCES  RECAPITULATED         173 

But  the  fact,  which  has  been  repeatedly  asserted  in  the 
preceding  pages  and  which  cannot  be  too  strongly  empha- 
sized by  repetition,  is  that  the  most  potent  and  most  com- 
pelling reason  for  postponing  the  consideration  of  a  de- 
tailed plan  for  an  international  organization  was  that  such 
a  consideration  at  the  outset  of  the  negotiations  at  Paris 
obstructed  and  delayed  the  discussion  and  settlement  of 
the  general  terms  necessary  to  the  immediate  restoration 
of  a  state  of  peace.  Those  who  recall  the  political  and  so- 
cial conditions  in  Europe  during  the  winter  of  1918-19,  to 
which  reference  has  already  been  made,  will  comprehend 
the  apprehension  caused  by  anything  which  interrupted 
the  negotiation  of  the  peace.  No  one  dared  to  prophesy 
what  might  happen  if  the  state  of  political  uncertainty  and 
industrial  stagnation,  which  existed  under  the  armistices, 
continued. 

The  time  given  to  the  formulation  of  the  Covenant  of 
the  League  of  Nations  and  the  determination  that  it 
should  have  first  place  in  the  negotiations  caused  such  a 
delay  in  the  proceedings  and  prevented  a  speedy  restora- 
tion of  peace.  Denial  of  this  is  useless.  It  is  too  manifest 
to  require  proof  or  argument  to  support  it.  It  is  equally 
true,  I  regret  to  say,  that  President  Wilson  was  chiefly 
responsible  for  this.  If  he  had  not  insisted  that  a  complete 
and  detailed  plan  for  the  League  should  be  part  of  the 
treaty  negotiated  at  Paris,  and  if  he  had  not  also  insisted 
that  the  Covenant  be  taken  up  and  settled  in  terms  be- 
fore other  matters  were  considered,  a  preliminary  treaty 


174  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

of  peace  would  in  all  probability  have  been  signed,  ratified, 
and  in  effect  during  April,  1919. 

Whatever  evils  resulted  from  the  failure  of  the  Paris 
Conference  to  negotiate  promptly  a  preliminary  treaty  — 
and  it  must  be  admitted  they  were  not  a  few  —  must  be 
credited  to  those  who  caused  the  delay.  The  personal  in- 
terviews and  secret  conclaves  before  the  Commission  on 
the  League  of  Nations  met  occupied  a  month  and  a  half. 
Practically  another  half  month  was  consumed  in  sessions 
of  the  Commission.  The  month  following  was  spent  by 
President  Wilson  on  his  visit  to  the  United  States  explain- 
ing the  reported  Covenant  and  listening  to  criticisms. 
While  much  was  done  during  his  absence  toward  the  settle- 
ment of  numerous  questions,  final  decision  in  every  case 
awaited  his  return  to  Paris.  After  his  arrival  the  Commis- 
sion on  the  League  renewed  its  sittings  to  consider  amend- 
ments to  its  report,  and  it  required  over  a  month  to  put  it 
in  final  form  for  adoption;  but  during  this  latter  period 
much  time  was  given  to  the  actual  terms  of  peace,  which 
on  account  of  the  delay  caused  in  attempting  to  perfect 
the  Covenant  had  taken  the  form  of  a  definitive  rather 
than  a  preliminary  treaty. 

It  is  conservative  to  say  that  between  two  and  three 
months  were  spent  in  the  drafting  of  a  document  which 
in  the  end  was  rejected  by  the  Senate  of  the  United  States 
and  was  responsible  for  the  non-ratification  of  the  Treaty 
of  Versailles.  In  view  of  the  warnings  that  President  Wil- 
son had  received  as  to  the  probable  result  of  insisting  on 


DIFFERENCES  RECAPITULATED         175 

the  plan  of  a  League  which  he  had  prepared  and  his  failure 
to  heed  the  warnings,  his  persistency  in  pressing  for  ac- 
ceptance of  the  Covenant  before  anything  else  was  done 
makes  the  resulting  delay  in  the  peace  less  excusable. 

Two  weeks  after  the  President  returned  from  the  United 
States  in  March  the  common  opinion  was  that  the  drafting 
of  the  Covenant  had  delayed  the  restoration  of  peace,  an 
opinion  which  was  endorsed  in  the  press  of  many  countries. 
The  belief  became  so  general  and  aroused  so  much  popular 
condemnation  that  Mr.  Wilson  considered  it  necessary  to 
make  a  public  denial,  in  which  he  expressed  surprise  at  the 
published  views  and  declared  that  the  negotiations  in  re- 
gard to  the  League  of  Nations  had  in  no  way  delayed  the 
peace.  Concerning  the  denial  and  the  subject  with  which 
it  dealt,  I  made  on  March  28  the  following  memorandum : 

"The  President  has  issued  a  public  statement,  which 
appears  in  this  morning's  papers,  in  which  he  refers  to  the 
'surprising  impression'  that  the  discussions  concerning  the 
League  of  Nations  have  delayed  the  making  of  peace  and 
he  flatly  denies  that  the  impression  is  justified. 

"I  doubt  if  this  statement  will  remove  the  general  im- 
pression which  amounts  almost  to  a  conviction.  Every 
one  knows  that  the  President's  thoughts  and  a  great  deal 
of  his  time  prior  to  his  departure  for  the  United  States 
were  given  to  the  formulation  of  the  plan  for  a  League  and 
that  he  insisted  that  the  'Covenant'  should  be  drafted  and 
reported  before  the  other  features  of  the  peace  were  con- 
sidered. The  real  difficulties  of  the  present  situation,  which 
had  to  be  settled  before  the  treaty  could  be  drafted,  were 
postponed  until  his  return  here  on  March  I3th. 


176  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

"In  fact  the  real  bases  of  peace  have  only  just  begun  to 
receive  the  attention  which  they  deserve. 

"If  such  questions  as  the  Rhine  Provinces,  Poland, 
reparations,  and  economic  arrangements  had  been  taken 
up  by  the  President  and  Premiers  in  January,  and  if  they 
had  sat  day  and  night,  as  they  are  now  sitting  in  camera, 
until  each  was  settled,  the  peace  treaty  would,  I  believe, 
be  to-day  on  the  Conference's  table,  if  not  actually  signed. 

"Of  course  the  insistence  that  the  plan  of  the  League  be 
first  pushed  to  a  draft  before  all  else  prevented  the  settle- 
ment of  the  other  questions.  Why  attempt  to  refute  what 
is  manifestly  true?  I  regret  that  the  President  made  the 
statement  because  I  do  not  think  that  it  carries  convic- 
tion. I  fear  that  it  will  invite  controversy  and  denial,  and 
that  it  puts  the  President  on  the  defensive." 

The  views  expressed  in  this  memorandum  were  those 
held,  I  believe,  by  the  great  majority  of  persons  who  par- 
ticipated in  the  Peace  Conference  or  were  in  intimate 
touch  with  its  proceedings.  Mr.  Wilson's  published  denial 
may  have  converted  some  to  the  belief  that  the  drafting  of 
the  Covenant  was  in  no  way  responsible  for  the  delay  of 
the  peace,  but  the  number  of  converts  must  have  been 
very  few,  as  it  meant  utter  ignorance  of  or  indifference  to 
the  circumstances  which  conclusively  proved  the  incor- 
rectness of  the  statement. 

The  effect  of  this  attempt  of  President  Wilson  to  check 
the  growing  popular  antipathy  to  the  League  as  an  obsta- 
cle to  the  speedy  restoration  of  peace  was  to  cause  specu- 
lation as  to  whether  he  really  appreciated  the  situation. 
If  he  did  not,  it  was  affirmed  that  he  was  ignorant  of  pub- 


DIFFERENCES  RECAPITULATED         177 

lie  opinion  or  else  was  lacking  in  mental  acuteness.  If  he 
did  appreciate  the  state  of  affairs,  it  was  said  that  his 
statement  was  uttered  with  the  sole  purpose  of  deceiving 
the  people.  In  either  case  he  fell  in  public  estimation.  It 
shows  the  unwisdom  of  having  issued  the  denial. 


CHAPTER  XV 
THE  PROPOSED  TREATY  WITH  FRANCE 

THERE  is  one  subject,  connected  with  the  consideration  of 
the  mutual  guaranty  which,  as  finally  reported  by  the 
Commission  on  the  League  of  Nations,  appears  as  Article 
10  of  the  Covenant,  that  should  be  briefly  reviewed,  as  it 
directly  bears  upon  the  value  placed  upon  the  guaranty  by 
the  French  statesmen  who  accepted  it.  I  refer  to  the  treat- 
ies negotiated  by  France  with  the  United  States  and  Great 
Britain  respectively.  These  treaties  provided  that,  in  the 
event  of  France  being  again  attacked  by  Germany  without 
provocation,  the  two  Powers  severally  agreed  to  come  to 
the  aid  of  the  French  Republic  in  repelling  the  invasion. 
The  joint  nature  of  the  undertaking  was  in  a  provision  in 
each  treaty  that  a  similar  treaty  would  be  signed  by  the 
other  Power,  otherwise  the  agreement  failed.  The  under- 
takings stated  in  practically  identical  terms  in  the  two 
treaties  constituted,  in  fact,  a  triple  defensive  alliance  for 
the  preservation  of  the  integrity  of  French  territory  and 
French  independence.  It  had  the  same  object  as  the  guar- 
anty in  the  Covenant,  though  it  went  even  further  in  the 
assurance  of  affirmative  action,  and  was,  therefore,  open 
to  the  same  objections  on  the  grounds  of  constitutionality 
and  policy  as  Article  10. 

In  a  note,  dated  March  20,  stating  my  "  Impressions  as 


THE  PROPOSED  TREATY  WITH  FRANCE  179 

to  the  Present  Situation,"  I  discussed  the  endeavors  being 
made  by  the  President  to  overcome  opposition  and  to  re- 
move obstacles  to  the  acceptance  of  his  plan  for  a  League 
of  Nations  by  means  of  compromises  and  concessions.  In 
the  note  appears  the  following: 

"  An  instance  of  the  lengths  to  which  these  compromises 
and  makeshifts  are  going,  occurred  this  morning  when 
Colonel  House  sent  to  Mr.  White,  General  Bliss,  and  me 
for  our  opinion  the  following  proposal:  That  the  United 
States,  Great  Britain,  and  France  enter  into  a  formal  alli- 
ance to  resist  any  aggressive  action  by  Germany  against 
France  or  Belgium,  and  to  employ  their  military,  financial, 
and  economic  resources  for  this  purpose  in  addition  to 
exerting  their  moral  influence  to  prevent  such  aggression. 

"We  three  agreed  that,  if  that  agreement  was  made,  the 
chief  reason  for  a  League  of  Nations,  as  now  planned,  dis- 
appeared. So  far  as  France  and  Belgium  were  concerned 
the  alliance  was  all  they  needed  for  their  future  safety. 
They  might  or  might  not  accept  the  League.  Of  course 
they  would  if  the  alliance  depended  upon  their  acceptance. 
They  would  do  most  anything  to  get  such  an  alliance. 

"The  proposal  was  doubtless  made  to  remove  two  pro- 
visions on  which  the  French  are  most  insistent:  First,  an 
international  military  staff  to  be  prepared  to  use  force 
against  Germany  if  there  were  signs  of  military  activity; 
second,  the  creation  of  an  independent  Rhenish  Republic 
to  act  as  a  *  buffer'  state.  Of  course  the  triple  alliance 
would  make  these  measures  needless. 

"What  impressed  me  most  was  that  to  gain  French  sup- 
port for  the  League  the  proposer  of  the  alliance  was  willing 
to  destroy  the  chief  feature  of  the  League.  It  seemed  to 
me  that  here  was  utter  blindness  as  to  the  consequences  of 
such  action.  There  appears  to  have  been  no  thought  given 


i8o  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

as  to  the  way  other  nations,  like  Poland,  Bohemia,  and  the 
Southern  Slavs,  would  view  the  formation  of  an  alliance 
to  protect  France  and  Belgium  alone.  Manifestly  it  would 
increase  rather  than  decrease  their  danger  from  Germany 
since  she  would  have  to  look  eastward  and  southward  for 
expansion.  Of  course  they  would  not  accept  as  sufficient 
the  guaranty  in  the  Covenant  when  France  and  Belgium 
declined  to  do  it. 

"How  would  such  a  proposal  be  received  in  the  United 
States  with  its  traditional  policy  of  avoiding  'entangling 
alliances '  ?  Of  course,  when  one  considers  it,  the  proposal 
is  preposterous  and  would  be  laughed  at  and  rejected. " 

This  was  the  impression  made  upon  me  at  the  time  that 
this  triple  alliance  against  Germany  was  first  proposed. 
I  later  came  to  look  upon  it  more  seriously  and  to  recognize 
the  fact  that  there  were  some  valid  reasons  in  favor  of  the 
proposal.  The  subject  was  not  further  discussed  by  the 
Commissioners  for  several  weeks,  but  it  is  clear  from  what 
followed  that  M.  Clemenceau,  who  naturally  favored  the 
idea,  continued  to  press  the  President  to  agree  to  the  plan. 
What  arguments  were  employed  to  persuade  him  I  cannot 
say,  but,  knowing  the  shrewdness  of  the  French  Premier 
in  taking  advantage  of  a  situation,  my  belief  is  that  he 
threatened  to  withdraw  or  at  least  gave  the  impression 
that  he  would  withdraw  his  support  of  the  League  of  Na- 
tions or  else  would  insist  on  a  provision  in  the  Covenant 
creating  a  general  staff  and  an  international  military  force 
and  on  a  provision  in  the  treaty  establishing  a  Rhenish 
Republic  or  else  ceding  to  France  all  territory  west  of  the 
Rhine.  To  avoid  the  adoption  of  either  of  these  provi- 


THE  PROPOSED  TREATY  WITH  FRANCE    181 

sions,  which  would  have  endangered  the  approval  of  his 
plan  for  world  organization,  the  President  submitted  to 
the  French  demand.  At  least  I  assume  that  was  the  reason, 
for  he  promised  to  enter  into  the  treaty  of  assistance 
which  M.  Clemenceau  insisted  should  be  signed. 

It  is  of  course  possible  that  he  was  influenced  in  his  de- 
cision by  the  belief  that  the  knowledge  that  such  an  agree- 
ment existed  would  be  sufficient  to  deter  Germany  from 
even  planning  another  invasion  of  France,  but  my  opinion 
is  that  the  desire  to  win  French  support  for  the  Covenant 
was  the  chief  reason  for  the  promise  that  he  gave.  It  should 
be  remembered  that  at  the  time  both  the  Italians  and  Jap- 
anese were  threatening  to  make  trouble  unless  their  terri- 
torial ambitions  were  satisfied.    With  these  two  Powers 
disaffected  and  showing  a  disposition  to  refuse  to  accept 
membership  in  the  proposed  League  of  Nations  the  oppo- 
sition of  France  to  the  Covenant  would  have  been  fatal. 
It  would  have  been  the  end  of  the  President's  dream  of 
a  world  organized  to  maintain  peace  by  an  interna- 
tional guaranty  of  national  boundaries  and  sovereignties. 
Whether  France  would  in  the  end  have  insisted  on  the 
additional  guaranty  of  protection  I  doubt,  but  it  is  evident 
that  Mr.  Wilson  believed  that  she  would  and  decided  to 
prevent  a  disaster  to  his  plan  by  acceding  to  the  wishes 
of  his  French  colleague. 

Some  time  in  April  prior  to  the  acceptance  of  the  Treaty 
of  Peace  by  the  Premiers  of  the  Allied  Powers,  the  Presi- 
dent and  Mr.  Lloyd  George  agreed  with  M.  Clemenceau 


1 82  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

to  negotiate  the  treaties  of  protective  alliance  which  the 
French  demanded.  The  President  advised  me  of  his  de- 
cision on  the  day  before  the  Treaty  was  delivered  to  the 
German  plenipotentiaries  stating  in  substance  that  his 
promise  to  enter  into  the  alliance  formed  a  part  of  the  set- 
tlements as  fully  as  if  written  into  the  Treaty.  I  told  him 
that  personally  I  considered  an  agreement  to  negotiate  the 
treaty  of  assistance  a  mistake,  as  it  discredited  Article  10 
of  the  Covenant,  which  he  considered  all-important,  and 
as  it  would,  I  was  convinced,  be  the  cause  of  serious  oppo- 
sition in  the  United  States.  He  replied  that  he  considered 
it  necessary  to  adopt  this  policy  in  the  circumstances,  and 
that,  at  any  rate,  having  passed  his  word  with  M.  Clemen- 
ceau,  who  was  accepting  the  Treaty  because  of  his  promise, 
it  was  too  late  to  reconsider  the  matter  and  useless  to 
discuss  it. 

Subsequently  the  President  instructed  me  to  have  a 
treaty  drafted  in  accordance  with  a  memorandum  which 
he  sent  me.  This  was  done  by  Dr.  James  Brown  Scott  and 
the  draft  was  approved  and  prepared  for  signature.  On  the 
morning  of  June  28,  the  same  day  on  which  the  Treaty  of 
Versailles  was  signed,  the  protective  treaty  with  France 
was  signed  at  the  President's  residence  in  the  Place  des 
Etats  Unis  by  M.  Clemenceau  and  M.  Pichon  for  the 
French  Republic  and  by  President  Wilson  and  myself  for 
the  United  States,  Mr.  Lloyd  George  and  Mr.  Balfour 
signing  at  the  same  time  a  similar  treaty  for  Great  Britain. 
Though  disagreeing  with  the  policy  of  the  President  in 


[Facsimile] 


WOODROW       \V  I  L  3  0  H 
President  Of  the  United  States  of  /jnerica 
To  all  to  whom  these  presents  shall  come,  Greetings: 


Know  ye,  That  reposing  full  faith  and  confidence  in 
the   intetjrity  and  ability  of  Hobert  Lansing,  Secretary  of  State  of  the 
United  States,   1  do  hereby  invest  him  with  full  and  all  manner  of  power 
azti.  authority,   for  and  in  the  name  of  the  United  States,   to  meat  and  con- 
fer with  uny  person  or  persons  invested  with  liste  power  and  authority  on 
the  part  of  France  and  with  him  or   them  to  negotiate,  conclude  and  sign 
a  Treaty  of  assistance  to  Franc*  in  the  event  of  unprovoked  aggression 
by  Germany,    the  same   to'  be  submitted  to    the  President  of  the  United  States 
for  transmission  by  him  to  the  Senate  thereof  to  receive   the  advice  and 
consent  of  that  body  to   its  ratification. 

IE  'A'lKHSS  MIEKEOF  I  have  hereto  set  my  hand  and 

caused  the  Seal  of  the  United  states  to  be  affixed,   this  twntyseventh 
day  of  June,   in  the  year  Of  our  Lord,   one  thousand  nine  hundred  and  nine- 
teen and  of   the  Independence  of  the  United  States  of  America  the  143rd. 


fly  the  jrT£$, ideal 


"j  of  .jUite. 


THE  PROPOSED  TREATY  WITH  FRANCE    183 

regard  to  this  special  treaty  it  would  have  been  futile  for 
me  to  have  refused  to  accept  the  full  powers  issued  to  me 
on  June  27  or  to  have  declined  to  follow  the  directions  to 
act  as  a  plenipotentiary  in  signing  the  document.  Such  a 
course  would  not  have  prevented  Mr.  Wilson  from  enter- 
ing into  the  defensive  alliance  with  France  and  Great  Brit- 
ain and  might  have  actually  delayed  the  peace.  Feeling 
strongly  the  supreme  necessity  of  ending  the  existing  state 
of  war  as  soon  as  possible  I  did  not  consider  that  I  would 
be  justified  in  refusing  to  act  as  the  formal  agent  of  the 
President  or  in  disobeying  his  instructions  as  such  agent. 
In  view  of  the  long  delay  in  ratification  of  the  Treaty  of 
the  Peace,  I  have  since  doubted  whether  I  acted  wisely. 
But  at  the  time  I  was  convinced  that  the  right  course  was 
the  one  which  I  followed. 

In  spite  of  the  fact  that  my  judgment  was  contrary  to 
the  President's  as  to  the  wisdom  of  negotiating  this  treaty 
because  I  considered  the  policy  of  doing  so  bad  from  the 
standpoint  of  national  interests  and  of  doubtful  expediency 
in  view  of  the  almost  certain  rejection  of  it  by  the  United 
States  Senate  and  of  its  probable  effect  on  any  plan  for 
general  disarmament,  I  was  not  entirely  satisfied  because 
I  could  not  disregard  the  fact  that  an  argument  could  be 
made  in  its  favor  which  was  not  without  force. 

The  United  States  entered  the  war  to  check  the  progress 
of  the  autocratic  imperialism  of  Germany.  That  purpose 
became  generally  recognized  before  the  victory  was  won. 
In  making  peace  it  was  deemed,  therefore,  a  matter  of  first 


1 84  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

importance  to  make  impossible  a  revival  of  the  aggressive 
spirit  and  ambitious  designs  of  Germany.  The  prevailing 
bitterness  against  France  because  of  the  territorial  cessions 
and  the  reparations  demanded  by  the  victor  would  natur- 
ally cause  the  German  people  to  seek  future  opportunity 
to  be  revenged.  With  a  population  almost,  if  not  quite, 
double  that  of  the  French  Republic,  Germany  would  be 
a  constant  menace  to  the  nation  which  had  suffered  so  ter- 
ribly in  the  past  by  reason  of  the  imperialistic  spirit  prev- 
alent in  the  German  Empire.  The  fear  of  that  menace 
strongly  influenced  the  French  policies  during  the  negotia- 
tions at  Paris.  In  fact  it  was  hard  to  avoid  the  feeling  that 
this  fear  dominated  the  conduct  of  the  French  delegates 
and  the  attitude  of  their  Government.  They  demanded 
much,  and  recognizing  the  probable  effect  of  their  demands 
on  the  German  people  sought  to  obtain  special  protection 
in  case  their  vanquished  enemy  attempted  in  the  future 
to  dispossess  them  by  force  of  the  land  which  he  had  been 
compelled  to  surrender  or  attempted  to  make  them  re- 
store the  indemnity  paid. 

Whether  France  could  have  avoided  the  danger  of  Ger- 
man attack  in  the  future  by  lessening  her  demands,  how- 
ever just  they  might  be,  is  neither  here  nor  there.  It  makes 
little  practical  difference  how  that  question  is  answered. 
The  important  fact  is  that  the  settlements  in  favor  of 
France  under  the  Treaty  were  of  a  nature  which  made  the 
continuance  of  peace  between  the  two  nations  doubtful 
if  Germany  possessed  the  ability  to  regain  her  military 


THE  PROPOSED  TREATY  WITH  FRANCE    185 

strength  and  if  nothing  was  done  to  prevent  her  from  using 
it.  In  these  circumstances  a  special  protective  treaty 
seemed  a  practical  way  to  check  the  conversion  of  the 
revengeful  spirit  of  the  Germans  into  another  war  of 
invasion. 

However  valid  this  argument  in  favor  of  the  two  treaties 
of  assistance,  and  though  my  personal  sympathy  for 
France  inclined  me  to  satisfy  her  wishes,  my  judgment,  as 
an  American  Commissioner,  was  that  American  interests 
and  the  traditional  policies  of  the  United  States  were 
against  this  alliance.  Possibly  the  President  recognized  the 
force  of  the  argument  in  favor  of  the  treaty  and  valued  it 
so  highly  that  he  considered  it  decisive.  Knowing,  how- 
ever, his  general  attitude  toward  French  demands  and  his 
confidence  in  the  effectiveness  of  the  guaranty  in  the 
Covenant,  I  believe  that  the  controlling  reason  for  promis- 
ing the  alliance  and  negotiating  the  treaty  was  his  convic- 
tion that  it  was  necessary  to  make  this  concession  to  the 
French  in  order  to  secure  their  support  for  the  Covenant 
and  to  check  the  disposition  in  certain  quarters  to  make 
the  League  of  Nations  essentially  a  military  coalition  un- 
der a  general  international  staff  organized  and  controlled 
by  the  French. 

There  were  those  who  favored  the  mutual  guaranty  in 
the  Covenant,  but  who  strongly  opposed  the  separate 
treaty  with  France.  Their  objection  was  that,  in  view  of 
the  general  guaranty,  the  treaty  of  assistance  was  super- 
fluous, or,  if  it  were  considered  necessary,  then  it  dis- 


1 86  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

credited  the  Covenant's  guaranty.  The  argument  was 
logical  and  difficult  to  controvert.  It  was  the  one  taken  by 
delegates  of  the  smaller  nations  who  relied  on  the  general 
guaranty  to  protect  their  countries  from  future  aggres- 
sions on  the  part  of  their  powerful  neighbors.  If  the  guar- 
anty of  the  Covenant  was  sufficient  protection  for  them, 
they  declared  that  it  ought  to  be  sufficient  for  France.  If 
France  doubted  its  sufficiency,  how  could  they  be  content 
with  it? 

Since  my  own  judgment  was  against  any  form  of  guar- 
anty imposing  upon  the  United  States  either  a  legal  or  a 
moral  obligation  to  employ  coercive  measures  under  cer- 
tain conditions  arising  in  international  affairs,  I  could  not 
conscientiously  support  the  idea  of  the  French  treaty. 
This  further  departure  from  America's  historic  policy 
caused  me  to  accept  President  Wilson's  "guidance  and 
direction  .  .  .  with  increasing  reluctance,"  as  he  aptly  ex- 
pressed it  in  his  letter  of  February  n,  1920.  We  did  not 
agree,  we  could  not  agree,  since  our  points  of  view  were  so 
much  at  variance. 

Yet,  in  spite  of  the  divergence  of  our  views  as  to  the 
negotiations  which  constantly  increased  and  became  more 
and  more  pronounced  during  the  six  months  at  Paris,  our 
personal  relations  continued  unchanged;  at  least  there  was 
no  outward  evidence  of  the  actual  breach  which  existed. 
As  there  never  had  been  the  personal  intimacy  between  the 
President  and  myself,  such  as  existed  in  the  case  of  Colonel 
House  and  a  few  others  of  his  advisers,  and  as  our  inter- 


THE  PROPOSED  TREATY  WITH  FRANCE    187 

course  had  always  been  more  or  less  formal  in  character, 
it  was  easier  to  continue  the  official  relations  that  had  pre- 
viously prevailed.  I  presume  that  Mr.  Wilson  felt,  as  I 
did,  that  it  would  create  an  embarrassing  situation  in  the 
negotiations  if  there  was  an  open  rupture  between  us  or 
if  my  commission  was  withdrawn  or  surrendered  and  I 
returned  to  the  United  States  before  the  Treaty  of  Peace 
was  signed.  The  eifect,  too,  upon  the  situation  in  the  Sen- 
ate would  be  to  strengthen  the  opposition  to  the  Presi- 
dent's purposes  and  furnish  his  personal,  as  well  as  his 
political,  enemies  with  new  grounds  for  attacking  him. 

I  think,  however,  that  our  reasons  for  avoiding  a  public 
break  in  our  official  relations  were  different.  The  Presi- 
dent undoubtedly  believed  that  such  an  event  would  jeop- 
ardize the  acceptance  of  the  Covenant  by  the  United 
States  Senate  in  view  of  the  hostility  to  it  which  had  al- 
ready developed  and  which  was  supplemented  by  the  bit- 
ter animosity  to  him  personally  which  was  undisguised. 
On  my  part,  the  chief  reason  for  leaving  the  situation 
undisturbed  was  that  I  was  fully  convinced  that  my  with- 
drawal from  the  American  Commission  would  seriously 
delay  the  restoration  of  peace,  possibly  in  the  signature  of 
the  Treaty  at  Paris  and  certainly  in  its  ratification  at 
Washington.  Considering  that  the  time  had  passed  to 
make  an  attempt  to  change  Mr.  Wilson's  views  on  any 
fundamental  principle,  and  believing  it  a  duty  to  place  no 
obstacle  in  the  way  of  the  signature  and  ratification  of  the 
Treaty  of  Peace  with  Germany,  I  felt  that  there  was  no 


1 88  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

course  for  me  as  a  representative  of  the  United  States 
other  than  to  obey  the  President's  orders  however  strong 
my  personal  inclination  might  be  to  refuse  to  follow  a  line 
of  action  which  seemed  to  me  wrong  in  principle  and  un- 
wise in  policy. 

In  view  of  the  subsequent  contest  between  the  Presi- 
dent and  the  opposition  Senators  over  the  Treaty  of  Ver- 
sailles, resulting  in  its  non-ratification  and  the  consequent 
delay  in  the  restoration  of  a  state  of  peace  between  the 
United  States  and  Germany,  my  failure  at  Paris  to  decline 
to  follow  the  President  may  be  open  to  criticism,  if  not  to 
censure.  But  it  can  hardly  be  considered  just  to  pass 
judgment  on  my  conduct  by  what  occurred  after  the  sig- 
nature of  the  Treaty  unless  what  would  occur  was  a 
foregone  conclusion,  and  at  that  time  it  was  not  even 
suggested  that  the  Treaty  would  fail  of  ratification.  The 
decision  had  to  be  made  under  the  conditions  and  expecta- 
tions which  then  prevailed.  Unquestionably  there  was  on 
June  28,  1919,  a  common  belief  that  the  President  would 
compose  his  differences  with  a  sufficient  number  of  the 
Republican  Senators  to  obtain  the  necessary  consent  of 
two  thirds  of  the  Senate  to  the  ratification  of  the  Treaty, 
and  that  the  delay  in  senatorial  action  would  be  brief.  I 
personally  believed  that  that  would  be  the  result,  although 
Mr.  Wilson's  experience  in  Washington  in  February  and 
the  rigid  attitude,  which  he  then  assumed,  might  have 
been  a  warning  as  to  the  future.  Seeing  the  situation  as  I 
did,  no  man  would  have  been  willing  to  imperil  immediate 


THE  PROPOSED  TREATY  WITH  FRANCE    189 

ratification  by  resigning  as  Commissioner  on  the  ground 
that  he  was  opposed  to  the  President's  policies.  A  return 
to  peace  was  at  stake,  and  peace  was  the  supreme  need  of 
the  world,  the  universal  appeal  of  all  peoples.  I  could  not 
conscientiously  assume  the  responsibility  of  placing  any 
obstacle  in  the  way  of  a  return  to  peace  at  the  earliest 
possible  moment.  It  would  have  been  to  do  the  very  thing 
which  I  condemned  in  the  President  when  he  prevented 
an  early  signing  of  the  peace  by  insisting  on  the  acceptance 
of  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations  as  a  condition 
precedent.  Whatever  the  consequence  of  my  action  would 
have  been,  whether  it  resulted  in  delay  or  in  defeat  of  rati- 
fication, I  should  have  felt  guilty  of  having  prevented  an 
immediate  peace  which  from  the  first  seemed  to  me  vitally 
important  to  all  nations.  Personal  feelings  and  even  per- 
sonal beliefs  were  insufficient  to  excuse  such  action. 


CHAPTER  XVI 
LACK  OF  AN  AMERICAN  PROGRAMME 

HAVING  reviewed  the  radical  differences  between  the 
President  and  myself  in  regard  to  the  League  of  Nations 
and  the  inclusion  of  the  Covenant  in  the  Treaty  of  Peace 
with  Germany,  it  is  necessary  to  revert  to  the  early  days 
of  the  negotiations  at  Paris  in  order  to  explain  the  diver- 
gence of  our  views  as  to  the  necessity  of  a  definite  pro- 
gramme for  the  American  Commission  to  direct  it  in  its 
work  and  to  guide  its  members  in  their  intercourse  with 
the  delegates  of  other  countries. 

If  the  President  had  a  programme,  other  than  the  gen- 
eral principles  and  the  few  territorial  settlements  included 
in  his  Fourteen  Points,  and  the  generalities  contained  in 
his  "  subsequent  addresses,"  he  did  not  show  a  copy  of  the 
programme  to  the  Commissioners  or  advise  them  of  its 
contents.  The  natural  conclusion  was  that  he  had  never 
worked  out  in  detail  the  application  of  his  announced  prin- 
ciples or  put  into  concrete  form  the  specific  settlements 
which  he  had  declared  ought  to  be  in  the  terms  of  peace. 
The  definition  of  the  principles,  the  interpretation  of  the 
policies,  and  the  detailing  of  the  provisions  regarding 
territorial  settlements  were  not  apparently  attempted  by 
Mr.  Wilson.  They  were  in  large  measure  left  uncertain  by 
the  phrases  in  which  they  were  delivered.  Without  author- 
itative explanation,  interpretation,  or  application  to  actual 


LACK  OF  AN  AMERICAN  PROGRAMME    191 

facts  they  formed  incomplete  and  inadequate  instructions 
to  Commissioners  who  were  authorized  "to  negotiate 
peace." 

An  examination  of  the  familiar  Fourteen  Points  uttered 
by  the  President  in  his  address  of  January  8,  1918,  will 
indicate  the  character  of  the  declarations,  which  may  be, 
by  reason  of  their  thought  and  expression,  termed  "Wil- 
sonian  "  (Appendix  IV,  p.  314).  The  first  five  Points  are 
announcements  of  principle  which  should  govern  the  peace 
negotiations.  The  succeeding  eight  Points  refer  to  terri- 
torial adjustments,  but  make  no  attempt  to  define  actual 
boundaries,  so  essential  in  conducting  negotiations  regard- 
ing territory.  The  Fourteenth  Point  relates  to  the  forma- 
tion of  "  a  general  association  of  the  nations  for  the  purpose 
of  affording  mutual  guarantees  of  political  independence 
and  territorial  integrity  to  great  and  small  nations  alike." 

It  is  hardly  worth  while  to  say  that  the  Fourteen  Points 
and  the  four  principles  declared  in  the  address  of  February 
1 1, 1918  (Appendix  V,  p.  3 17),  do  not  constitute  a  sufficient 
programme  for  negotiators.  Manifestly  they  are  too  in- 
definite in  specific  application.  They  were  never  intended 
for  that  purpose  when  they  were  proclaimed.  They  might 
have  formed  a  general  basis  for  the  preparation  of  instruc- 
tions for  peace  commissioners,  but  they  omitted  too  many 
of  the  essentials  to  be  considered  actual  instructions,  while 
the  lack  of  definite  terms  to  be  included  in  a  treaty  further 
deprived  them  of  that  character.  Such  important  and  prac- 
tical subjects  as  reparations,  financial  arrangements,  the 


192  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

use  and  control  of  waterways,  and  other  questions  of  a  like 
nature,  are  not  even  mentioned.  As  a  general  statement 
of  the  bases  of  peace  the  Fourteen  Points  and  subsequent 
declarations  probably  served  a  useful  purpose,  though 
some  critics  would  deny  it,  but  as  a  working  programme  for 
the  negotiation  of  a  treaty  they  were  inadequate,  if  not 
wholly  useless. 

Believing  in  the  autumn  of  1918  that  the  end  of  the  war 
was  approaching  and  assuming  that  the  American  pleni- 
potentiaries to  the  Peace  Conference  would  have  to  be  fur- 
nished with  detailed  written  instructions  as  to  the  terms 
of  the  treaty  to  be  signed,  I  prepared  on  September  21, 
1918,  a  memorandum  of  my  views  as  to  the  territorial 
settlements  which  would  form,  not  instructions,  but  a 
guide  in  the  drafting  of  instructions  for  the  American  Com- 
missioners. At  the  time  I  had  no  intimation  that  the 
President  purposed  to  be  present  in  person  at  the  peace 
table  and  had  not  even  thought  of  such  a  possibility.  The 
memorandum,  which  follows,  was  written  with  the  sole 
purpose  of  being  ready  to  draft  definite  instructions  which 
could  be  submitted  to  the  President  when  the  time  came 
to  prepare  for  the  negotiation  of  the  peace.  The  memo- 
randum follows: 

"The  present  Russian  situation,  which  is  unspeakably 
horrible  and  which  seems  beyond  present  hope  of  better- 
ment, presents  new  problems  to  be  solved  at  the  peace  table. 

"The  Pan-Germans  now  have  in  shattered  and  impotent 
Russia  the  opportunity  to  develop  an  alternative  or  sup- 


LACK  OF  AN  AMERICAN  PROGRAMME    193 

piemen tal  scheme  to  their  ' Mi ttel-Europa'  project.  Ger- 
man domination  over  Southern  Russia  would  offer  as 
advantageous,  if  not  a  more  advantageous,  route  to  the 
Persian  Gulf  than  through  the  turbulent  Balkans  and  un- 
reliable Turkey.  If  both  routes,  north  and  south  of  the 
Black  Sea,  could  be  controlled,  the  Pan-Germans  would 
have  gained  more  than  they  dreamed  of  obtaining.  I  be- 
lieve, however,  that  Bulgaria  fears  the  Germans  and  will 
be  disposed  to  resist  German  domination  possibly  to  the 
extent  of  making  a  separate  peace  with  the  Allies.  Never- 
theless, if  the  Germans  could  obtain  the  route  north  of 
the  Black  Sea,  they  would  with  reason  consider  the  war 
a  successful  venture  because  it  would  give  them  the  op- 
portunity to  rebuild  the  imperial  power  and  to  carry  out 
the  Prussian  ambition  of  world-mastery. 

"The  treaty  of  peace  must  not  leave  Germany  in  pos- 
session directly  or  indirectly  of  either  of  these  routes  to 
the  Orient.  There  must  be  territorial  barriers  erected  to 
prevent  that  Empire  from  ever  being  able  by  political  or 
economic  penetration  to  become  dominant  in  those  regions. 

"With  this  in  view  I  would  state  the  essentials  for  a 
stable  peace  as  follows,  though  I  do  so  in  the  most  ten- 
tative way  because  conditions  may  change  materially. 
These  'essentials'  relate  to  territory  and  waters,  and  do 
not  deal  with  military  protection. 

"First.  The  complete  abrogation  or  denouncement  of 
the  Brest-Litovsk  Treaty  and  all  treaties  relating  in  any 
way  to  Russian  territory  or  commerce;  and  also  the  same 
action  as  to  the  Treaty  of  Bucharest.  This  applies  to  all 
treaties  made  by  the  German  Empire  or  Germany's  allies. 

"Second.  The  Baltic  Provinces  of  Lithuania,  Latvia, 
and  Esthonia  should  be  autonomous  states  of  a  Russian 
Confederation. 

"  Third.  Finland  raises  a  different  question  and  it  should 


194  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

be  carefully  considered  whether  it  should  not  be  an  in- 
dependent state. 

"Fourth.  An  independent  Poland,  composed  of  Polish 
provinces  of  Russia,  Prussia,  and  Austria,  and  in  posses- 
sion of  the  port  of  Danzig. 

"Fifth.  An  independent  state,  either  single  or  federal 
composed  of  Bohemia,  Slovakia,  and  Moravia  (and  pos- 
sibly a  portion  of  Silesia)  and  possessing  an  international 
right  of  way  by  land  or  water  to  a  free  port. 

"Sixth.  The  Ukraine  to  be  a  state  of  the  Russian  Con- 
federation, to  which  should  be  annexed  that  portion  of  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Empire  in  which  the  Ruthenians  pre- 
dominate. 

"Seventh.  Roumania,  in  addition  to  her  former  terri- 
tory, should  ultimately  be  given  sovereignty  over  Bessa- 
rabia, Transylvania,  and  the  upper  portion  of  the  Dob- 
rudja,  leaving  the  central  mouth  of  the  Danube  as  the 
boundary  of  Bulgaria,  or  else  the  northern  half.  (As  to  the 
boundary  there  is  doubt.) 

"Eighth.  The  territories  in  which  the  Jugo-Slavs  pre- 
dominate, namely  Croatia,  Slavonia,  Dalmatia,  Bosnia, 
and  Herzegovina,  should  be  united  with  Serbia  and  Monte- 
negro forming  a  single  or  a  federal  state.  The  sovereignty 
over  Trieste  or  some  other  port  should  be  later  settled  in 
drawing  a  boundary  line  between  the  new  state  and  Italy. 
My  present  view  is  that  there  should  be  a  good  Jugo-Slav 
port. 

"Ninth.  Hungary  should  be  separated  from  Austria  and 
possess  rights  of  free  navigation  of  the  Danube. 

"  Tenth.  Restoration  to  Italy  of  all  the  Italian  provinces 
of  Austria.  Italy's  territory  to  extend  along  the  northern 
Adriatic  shore  to  the  Jugo-Slav  boundary.  Certain  ports 
on  the  eastern  side  of  the  Adriatic  should  be  considered 
as  possible  naval  bases  of  Italy.  (This  last  is  doubtful.) 


LACK  OF  AN  AMERICAN  PROGRAMME    195 

"Eleventh.  Reduction  of  Austria  to  the  ancient  bounda- 
ries and  title  of  the  Archduchy  of  Austria.  Incorporation 
of  Archduchy  in  the  Imperial  German  Confederation. 
Austrian  outlet  to  the  sea  would  be  like  that  of  Baden  and 
Saxony  through  German  ports  on  the  North  Sea  and  the 
Baltic. 

"  Twelfth.  The  boundaries  of  Bulgaria,  Serbia,  and 
Greece  to  follow  in  general  those  established  after  the 
First  Balkan  War,  though  Bulgaria  should  surrender  to 
Greece  more  of  the  ^Egean  coast  and  obtain  the  southern 
half  only  of  the  Dobrudja  (or  else  as  far  as  the  Danube) 
and  the  Turkish  territory  up  to  the  district  surrounding 
Constantinople,  to  be  subsequently  decided  upon. 

"  Thirteenth.  Albania  to  be  under  Italian  or  Serbian  sov- 
ereignty or  incorporated  in  the  Jugo-Slav  Confederation. 

"Fourteenth.  Greece  to  obtain  more  of  the  ^Egean  litoral 
at  the  expense  of  Bulgaria,  the  Greek-inhabited  islands 
adjacent  to  Asia  Minor  and  possibly  certain  ports  and 
adjoining  territory  in  Asia  Minor. 

"Fifteenth.  The  Ottoman  Empire  to  be  reduced  to 
Anatolia  and  have  no  possessions  in  Europe.  (This  re- 
quires consideration.) 

"Sixteenth.  Constantinople  to  be  erected  into  an  inter- 
national protectorate  surrounded  by  a  land  zone  to  allow 
for  expansion  of  population.  The  form  of  government  to 
be  determined  upon  by  an  international  commission  or  by 
one  Government  acting  as  the  mandatory  of  the  Powers. 
The  commission  or  mandatory  to  have  the  regulation  and 
control  of  the  navigation  of  the  Dardanelles  and  Bosphorus 
as  international  waterways. 

"Seventeenth.  Armenia  and  Syria  to  be  erected  into 
protectorates  of  such  Government  or  Governments  as 
seems  expedient  from  a  domestic  as  well  as  an  international 
point  of  view;  the  guaranty  being  that  both  countries  will 


196  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

be  given  self-government  as  soon  as  possible  and  that  an 
'Open-Door'  policy  as  to  commerce  and  industrial  de- 
velopment will  be  rigidly  observed. 

"Eighteenth.  Palestine  to  be  an  autonomous  state  under 
a  general  international  protectorate  or  under  the  protector- 
ate of  a  Power  designated  to  act  as  the  mandatory  of  the 
Powers. 

"Nineteenth.  Arabia  to  receive  careful  consideration  as 
to  the  full  or  partial  sovereignty  of  the  state  or  states 
established. 

"  Twentieth.  Great  Britain  to  have  the  sovereignty  of 
Egypt,  or  a  full  protectorate  over  it. 

"  Twenty-first.  Persia  to  be  freed  from  all  treaties  es- 
tablishing spheres  of  influence.  Rigid  application  of  the 
'Open-Door'  policy  in  regard  to  commercial  and  industrial 
development. 

"  Twenty-second.  All  Alsace-Lorraine  to  be  restored  to 
France  without  conditions. 

"  Twenty-third.  Belgium  to  be  restored  to  full  sover- 
eignty. 

"  Twenty-fourth.  A  consideration  of  the  union  of  Lux- 
emburg to  Belgium.  (This  is  open  to  question.) 

"  Twenty-fifth.  The  Kiel  Canal  to  be  internationalized 
and  an  international  zone  twenty  miles  from  the  Canal  on 
either  side  to  be  erected  which  should  be,  with  the  Canal, 
under  the  control  and  regulation  of  Denmark  as  the  man- 
datory of  the  Powers.  (This  last  is  doubtful.) 

"  Twenty-sixth.  All  land  north  of  the  Kiel  Canal  Zone  to 
be  ceded  to  Denmark. 

"  Twenty-seventh.  The  fortifications  of  the  Kiel  Canal 
and  of  Heligoland  to  be  dismantled.  Heligoland  to  be 
ceded  to  Denmark. 

"  Twenty-eighth.  The  sovereignty  of  the  archipelago  of 
Spitzbergen  to  be  granted  to  Norway. 


LACK  OF  AN  AMERICAN  PROGRAMME    197 

"  Twenty-ninth.  The  disposition  of  the  colonial  posses- 
sions formerly  belonging  to  Germany  to  be  determined  by 
an  international  commission  having  in  mind  the  interests 
of  the  inhabitants  and  the  possibility  of  employing  these 
colonies  as  a  means  of  indemnification  for  wrongs  done. 
The  'Open-Door'  policy  should  be  guaranteed. 

"While  the  foregoing  definitive  statement  as  to  terri- 
tory contains  my  views  at  the  present  time  (September  21, 
1918),  I  feel  that  no  proposition  should  be  considered  un- 
alterable, as  further  study  and  conditions  which  have  not 
been  disclosed  may  materially  change  some  of  them. 

"Three  things  must  constantly  be  kept  in  mind,  the 
natural  stability  of  race,  language,  and  nationality,  the 
necessity  of  every  nation  having  an  outlet  to  the  sea  so 
that  it  may  maintain  its  own  merchant  marine,  and  the 
imperative  need  of  rendering  Germany  impotent  as  a  mili- 
tary power." 

Later  I  realized  that  another  factor  should  be  given  as 
important  a  place  in  the  terms  of  peace  as  any  of  the  three, 
namely,  the  economic  interdependence  of  adjoining  areas 
and  the  mutual  industrial  benefit  to  their  inhabitants  by 
close  political  affiliation.  This  factor  in  the  territorial  set- 
tlements made  more  and  more  impression  upon  me  as  it 
was  disclosed  by  a  detailed  study  of  the  numerous  prob- 
lems which  the  Peace  Conference  had  to  solve. 

I  made  other  memoranda  on  various  subjects  relating  to 
the  general  peace  for  the  purpose  of  crystallizing  my  ideas, 
so  that  I  could  lay  them  in  concrete  form  before  the  Presi- 
dent when  the  time  came  to  draft  instructions  for  the 
American  plenipotentiaries  charged  with  the  negotiation 


198  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

of  the  Treaty  of  Peace.  When  the  President  reached  the 
decision  to  attend  the  Conference  and  to  direct  in  person 
the  negotiations,  it  became  evident  that,  in  place  of  the 
instructions  customarily  issued  to  negotiators,  a  more 
practical  and  proper  form  of  defining  the  objects  to  be 
sought  by  the  United  States  would  be  an  outline  of  a  treaty 
setting  forth  in  detail  the  features  of  the  peace,  or  else  a 
memorandum  containing  definite  declarations  of  policy  in 
regard  to  the  numerous  problems  presented.  Unless  there 
was  some  framework  of  this  sort  on  which  to  build,  it 
would  manifestly  be  very  embarrassing  for  the  American 
Commissioners  in  their  intercourse  with  their  foreign  col- 
leagues, as  they  would  be  unable  to  discuss  authoritatively 
or  even  informally  the  questions  at  issue  or  express  opin- 
ions upon  them  without  the  danger  of  unwittingly  oppos- 
ing the  President's  wishes  or  of  contradicting  the  views 
which  might  be  expressed  by  some  other  of  their  associates 
on  the  American  Commission.  A  definite  plan  seemed 
essential  if  the  Americans  were  to  take  any  part  in  the 
personal  exchanges  of  views  which  are  so  usual  during  the 
progress  of  negotiations. 

Prior  to  the  departure  of  the  American  delegation  from 
the  United  States  and  for  two  weeks  after  their  arrival  in 
Paris,  it  was  expected  that  the  President  would  submit  to 
the  Commissioners  for  their  guidance  a  projet  of  a  treaty 
or  a  very  complete  programme  as  to  policies.  Nothing, 
however,  was  done,  and  in  the  conferences  which  took  place 
between  the  President  and  his  American  associates  he  con- 


LACK  OF  AN  AMERICAN  PROGRAMME    199 

fined  his  remarks  almost  exclusively  to  the  League  of  Na- 
tions and  to  his  plan  for  its  organization.  It  was  evident 
—  at  least  that  was  the  natural  inference  —  that  Presi- 
dent Wilson  was  without  a  programme  of  any  sort  or  even 
of  a  list  of  subjects  suitable  as  an  outline  for  the  prepara- 
tion of  a  programme.  How  he  purposed  to  conduct  the 
negotiations  no  one  seemed  to  know.  It  was  all  very  un- 
certain and  unsatisfactory. 

In  the  circumstances,  which  seemed  to  be  due  to  the 
President's  failure  to  appreciate  the  necessity  for  a  definite 
programme,  I  felt  that  something  ought  to  be  done,  as  the 
probable  result  would  be  that  the  terms  of  the  Treaty, 
other  than  the  provisions  regarding  a  League  of  Nations, 
would  be  drafted  by  foreign  delegates  and  not  by  the  Presi- 
dent. 

Impressed  by  the  unsatisfactory  state  of  affairs  and  de- 
sirous of  remedying  it  if  possible,  I  asked  Dr.  James  Brown 
Scott  and  Mr.  David  Hunter  Miller,  the  legal  advisers  of 
the  American  Commission,  to  prepare  a  skeleton  treaty 
covering  the  subjects  to  be  dealt  with  in  the  negotiations 
which  could  be  used  in  working  out  a  complete  programme. 
After  several  conferences  with  these  advisers  concerning 
the  subjects  to  be  included  and  their  arrangement  in  the 
Treaty,  the  work  was  sufficiently  advanced  to  lay  before 
the  Commissioners.  Copies  were,  therefore,  furnished  to 
them  with  the  request  that  they  give  the  document  con- 
sideration in  order  that  they  might  make  criticisms  and 
suggest  changes.  I  had  not  sent  a  copy  to  the  President, 


200  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

intending  to  await  the  views  of  my  colleagues  before  doing 
so,  but  during  the  conference  of  January  10,  to  which  I 
have  been  compelled  reluctantly  to  refer  in  discussing  the 
Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations,  I  mentioned  the  fact 
that  our  legal  advisers  had  been  for  some  time  at  work  on 
a  "skeleton  treaty"  and  had  made  a  tentative  draft.  The 
President  at  once  showed  his  displeasure  and  resented  the 
action  taken,  evidently  considering  the  request  that  a 
draft  be  prepared  to  be  a  usurpation  of  his  authority  to 
direct  the  activities  of  the  Commission.  It  was  this  inci- 
dent which  called  forth  his  remark,  to  which  reference  was 
made  in  Chapter  VIII,  that  he  did  not  propose  to  have 
lawyers  drafting  the  Treaty. 

In  view  of  Mr.  Wilson's  attitude  it  was  useless  for  Dr. 
Scott  and  Mr.  Miller  to  proceed  with  their  outline  of  a 
treaty  or  for  the  Commissioners  to  give  consideration  to 
the  tentative  draft  already  made.  It  was  a  disagreeable 
situation.  If  the  President  had  had  anything,  however 
crude  and  imperfect  it  might  have  been,  to  submit  in  place 
of  the  Scott-Miller  draft,  it  would  have  been  a  different 
matter  and  removed  to  an  extent  the  grounds  for  com- 
plaint at  his  attitude.  But  he  offered  nothing  at  all  as  a 
substitute.  It  is  fair  to  assume  that  he  had  no  programme 
prepared  and  was  unwilling  to  have  any  one  else  make  a 
tentative  one  for  his  consideration.  It  left  the  American 
Commission  without  a  chart  marking  out  the  course 
which  they  were  to  pursue  in  the  negotiations  and  appar- 
ently without  a  pilot  who  knew  the  channel. 


LACK  OF  AN  AMERICAN  PROGRAMME    201 

Six  days  after  the  enforced  abandonment  of  the  plan  to 
prepare  a  skeleton  treaty  as  a  foundation  for  a  definite 
and  detailed  programme,  I  made  the  following  note  which 
expresses  my  views  on  the  situation  at  that  time: 

"January  16,  1919 

"No  plan  of  work  has  been  prepared.  Unless  something 
is  done  we  will  be  here  for  many  weeks,  possibly  for 
months.  After  the  President's  remarks  the  other  day 
about  a  draft-treaty  no  one  except  the  President  would 
think  of  preparing  a  plan.  He  must  do  it  himself,  and  he 
is  not  doing  it.  He  has  not  even  given  us  a  list  of  subjects 
to  be  considered  and  of  course  has  made  no  division  of  our 
labors. 

"If  the  President  does  not  take  up  this  matter  of  organi- 
zation and  systematically  apportion  the  subjects  between 
us,  we  may  possibly  have  no  peace  before  June.  This 
would  be  preposterous  because  with  proper  order  and  divi- 
sion of  questions  we  ought  to  have  a  treaty  signed  by 
April  first. 

"I  feel  as  if  we,  the  Commissioners,  were  like  a  lot  of 
skilled  workmen  who  are  ordered  to  build  a  house.  We 
have  the  materials  and  tools,  but  there  are  no  plans  and 
specifications  and  no  master-workman  in  charge  of  the 
construction.  We  putter  around  in  an  aimless  sort  of  way 
and  get  nowhere. 

"With  all  his  natural  capacity  the  President  seems  to 
lack  the  faculty  of  employing  team-work  and  of  adopting  a 
system  to  utilize  the  brains  of  other  men.  It  is  a  decided 
defect  in  an  executive.  He  would  not  make  a  good  head  of 
a  governmental  department.  The  result  is,  so  far  as  our 
Commission  is  concerned,  a  state  of  confusion  and  uncer- 
tainty with  a  definite  loss  and  delay  through  effort  being 
undirected.  " 


202  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

On  several  occasions  I  spoke  to  the  President  about  a 
programme  for  the  work  of  the  Commission  and  its  corps 
of  experts,  but  he  seemed  indisposed  co  consider  the  sub- 
ject and  gave  the  impression  that  he  intended  to  call  on 
the  experts  for  his  own  information  which  would  be  all 
that  was  necessary.  I  knew  that  Colonel  House,  through 
Dr.  Mezes,  the  head  of  the  organization,  was  directing  the 
preparation  of  certain  data,  but  whether  he  was  doing  so 
under  the  President's  directions  I  did  not  know,  though  I 
presumed  such  was  the  case.  Whatever  data  were  fur- 
nished did  not,  however,  pass  through  the  hands  of  the 
other  Commissioners  who  met  every  morning  in  my  office 
to  exchange  information  and  discuss  matters  pertaining  to 
the  negotiations  and  to  direct  the  routine  work  of  the 
Commission. 

It  is  difficult,  even  with  the  entire  record  of  the  proceed- 
ings at  Paris  before  one,  to  find  a  satisfactory  explanation 
for  the  President's  objection  to  having  a  definite  pro- 
gramme other  than  the  general  declarations  contained  in 
the  Fourteen  Points  and  his  "subsequent  addresses."  It 
may  be  that  he  was  unwilling  to  bind  himself  to  a  fixed 
programme,  since  it  would  restrict  him,  to  an  extent,  in 
his  freedom  of  action  and  prevent  him  from  assuming  any 
position  which  seemed  to  him  expedient  at  the  time  when  a 
question  arose  during  the  negotiations.  It  may  be  that  he 
did  not  wish  to  commit  himself  in  any  way  to  the  contents 
of  a  treaty  until  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations 
had  been  accepted.  It  may  be  that  he  preferred  not  to  let 


LACK  OF  AN  AMERICAN  PROGRAMME    203 

the  American  Commissioners  know  his  views,  as  they 
would  then  be  in  a  position  to  take  an  active  part  in  the 
informal  discussions  which  he  apparently  wished  to  handle 
alone.  None  of  these  explanations  is  at  all  satisfactory, 
and  yet  any  one  of  them  may  be  the  true  one. 

Whatever  was  the  chief  reason  for  the  President's  failure 
to  furnish  a  working  plan  to  the  American  Commissioners, 
he  knowingly  adopted  the  policy  and  clung  to  it  with  the 
tenacity  of  purpose  which  has  been  one  of  the  qualities  of 
mind  that  account  for  his  great  successes  and  for  his  great 
failures.  I  use  the  adverb  "knowingly"  because  it  had 
been  made  clear  to  him  that,  in  the  judgment  of  others, 
the  Commissioners  ought  to  have  the  guidance  furnished 
by  a  draft-treaty  or  by  a  definite  statement  of  policies  no 
matter  how  tentative  or  subject  to  change  the  draft  or 
statement  might  be. 

On  the  day  that  the  President  left  Paris  to  return  to  the 
United  States  (February  14,  1919)  I  asked  him  if  he  had 
any  instructions  for  the  Commissioners  during  his  absence 
concerning  the  settlements  which  should  be  included  in 
the  preliminary  treaty  of  peace,  as  it  was  understood  that 
the  Council  of  Ten  would  continue  its  sessions  for  the  con- 
sideration of  the  subjects  requiring  investigation  and  de- 
cision. The  President  replied  that  he  had  no  instructions, 
that  the  decisions  could  wait  until  he  returned,  though  the 
hearings  could  proceed  and  reports  could  be  made  during 
his  absence.  Astonished  as  I  was  at  this  wish  to  delay 
these  matters,  I  suggested  to  him  the  subjects  which  I 


204  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

thought  ought  to  go  into  the  Treaty.  He  answered  that  he 
did  not  care  to  discuss  them  at  that  time,  which,  as  he  was 
about  to  depart  from  Paris,  meant  that  everything  must 
rest  until  he  had  returned  from  his  visit  to  Washington. 

Since  I  was  the  head  of  the  American  Commission  when 
the  President  was  absent  and  became  the  spokesman  for 
the  United  States  on  the  Council  of  Ten,  this  refusal  to 
disclose  his  views  even  in  a  general  way  placed  me  in  a 
very  awkward  position.  Without  instructions  and  without 
knowledge  of  the  President's  wishes  or  purposes  the  con- 
duct of  the  negotiations  was  difficult  and  progress  toward 
actual  settlements  practically  impossible.  As  a  matter  of 
fact  the  Council  did  accomplish  a  great  amount  of  work, 
while  the  President  was  away,  in  the  collection  of  data  and 
preparing  questions  for  final  settlement.  But  so  far  as  de- 
ciding questions  was  concerned,  which  ought  to  have  been 
the  principal  duty  of  the  Council  of  Ten,  it  simply 
"marked  time,"  as  I  had  no  power  to  decide  or  even  to 
express  an  authoritative  opinion  on  any  subject.  It 
showed  very  clearly  that  the  President  intended  to  do 
everything  himself  and  to  allow  no  one  to  act  for  him  un- 
less it  was  upon  some  highly  technical  matter.  All  actual 
decisions  in  regard  to  the  terms  of  peace  which  involved 
policy  were  thus  forced  to  await  his  time  and  pleasure. 

Even  after  Mr.  Wilson  returned  to  Paris  and  resumed 
his  place  as  head  of  the  American  delegation  he  was  ap- 
parently without  a  programme.  On  March  20,  six  days 
after  his  return,  I  made  a  note  that  "the  President,  so  far 


LACK  OF  AN  AMERICAN  PROGRAMME    205 

as  I  can  judge,  has  yet  no  definite  programme,"  and  that  I 
was  unable  to  "find  that  he  has  talked  over  a  plan  of  a 
treaty  even  with  Colonel  House."  It  is  needless  to  quote 
the  thoughts,  which  I  recorded  at  the  time,  in  regard  to  the 
method  in  which  the  President  was  handling  a  great  in- 
ternational negotiation,  a  method  as  unusual  as  it  was 
unwise.  I  referred  to  Colonel  House's  lack  of  information 
concerning  the  President's  purposes  because  he  was  then 
and  had  been  from  the  beginning  on  more  intimate  terms 
with  the  President  than  any  other  American.  If  he  did  not 
know  the  President's  mind,  it  was  safe  to  assume  that  no 
one  knew  it. 

I  had,  as  has  been  stated,  expressed  to  Mr.  Wilson  my 
views  as  to  what  the  procedure  should  be  and  had  ob- 
tained no  action.  With  the  responsibility  resting  on  him 
for  the  conduct  and  success  of  the  negotiations  and  with 
his  constitutional  authority  to  exercise  his  own  judgment 
in  regard  to  every  matter  pertaining  to  the  treaty,  there 
was  nothing  further  to  be  done  in  relieving  the  situation  of 
the  American  Commissioners  from  embarrassment  or  in 
inducing  the  President  to  adopt  a  better  course  than  the 
haphazard  one  that  he  was  pursuing. 

It  is  apparent  that  we  differed  radically  as  to  the  neces- 
sity for  a  clearly  defined  programme  and  equally  so  as  to 
the  advantages  to  be  gained  by  having  a  draft-treaty 
made  or  a  full  statement  prepared  embodying  the  provi- 
sions to  be  sought  by  the  United  States  in  the  negotia- 
tions. I  did  not  attempt  to  hide  my  disapproval  of  the 


206  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

vagueness  and  uncertainty  of  the  President's  method,  and 
there  is  no  doubt  in  my  own  mind  that  Mr.  Wilson  was 
fully  cognizant  of  my  opinion.  How  far  this  lack  of  system 
in  the  work  of  the  Commission  and  the  failure  to  provide 
a  plan  for  a  treaty  affected  the  results  written  into  the 
Treaty  of  Versailles  is  speculative,  but  my  belief  is  that 
they  impaired  in  many  particulars  the  character  of  the 
settlements  by  frequent  abandonment  of  principle  for  the 
sake  of  expediency. 

The  want  of  a  programme  or  even  of  an  unwritten  plan 
as  to  the  negotiations  was  further  evidenced  by  the  fact 
that  the  President,  certainly  as  late  as  March  19,  had  not 
made  up  his  mind  whether  the  treaty  which  was  being 
negotiated  should  be  preliminary  or  final.  He  had  up  to 
that  time  the  peculiar  idea  that  a  preliminary  treaty  was 
in  the  nature  of  a  modus  vivendi  which  could  be  entered 
into  independently  by  the  Executive  and  which  would 
restore  peace  without  going  through  the  formalities  of 
senatorial  consent  to  ratification. 

The  purpose  of  Mr.  Wilson,  so  far  as  one  could  judge, 
was  to  include  in  a  preliminary  treaty  of  the  sort  that  he 
intended  to  negotiate,  the  entire  Covenant  of  the  League 
of  Nations  and  other  principal  settlements,  binding  the 
signatories  to  repeat  these  provisions  in  the  final  and 
definitive  treaty  when  that  was  later  negotiated.  By  this 
method  peace  would  be  at  once  restored,  the  United 
States  and  other  nations  associated  with  it  in  the  war 
would  be  obligated  to  renew  diplomatic  and  consular  rela- 


LACK  OF  AN  AMERICAN  PROGRAMME    207 

tions  with  Germany,  and  commercial  intercourse  would 
follow  as  a  matter  of  course.  All  this  was  to  be  done  with- 
out going  through  the  American  constitutional  process  of 
obtaining  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate  to  the 
Covenant  and  to  the  principal  settlements.  The  intent 
seemed  to  be  to  respond  to  the  popular  demand  for  an 
immediate  peace  and  at  the  same  time  to  checkmate  the 
opponents  of  the  Covenant  in  the  Senate  by  having  the 
League  of  Nations  organized  and  functioning  before  the 
definitive  treaty  was  laid  before  that  body. 

When  the  President  advanced  this  extraordinary  theory 
of  the  nature  of  a  preliminary  treaty  during  a  conversa- 
tion, of  which  I  made  a  full  memorandum,  I  told  him  that 
it  was  entirely  wrong,  that  by  whatever  name  the  docu- 
ment was  called,  whether  it  was  "armistice,"  "agree- 
ment," "protocol,"  or  "modus"  it  would  be  a  treaty  and 
would  have  to  be  sent  by  him  to  the  Senate  for  its  ap- 
proval. I  said,  "  If  we  change  the  status  from  war  to  peace, 
it  has  to  be  by  a  ratified  treaty.  There  is  no  other  way  save 
by  a  joint  resolution  of  Congress."  At  this  statement  the 
President  was  evidently  much  perturbed.  He  did  not  ac- 
cept it  as  conclusive,  for  he  asked  me  to  obtain  the  opinion 
of  others  on  the  subject.  He  was  evidently  loath  to  aban- 
don the  plan  that  he  had  presumably  worked  out  as  a 
means  of  preventing  the  Senate  from  rejecting  or  modify- 
ing the  Covenant  before  it  came  into  actual  operation.  It 
seems  almost  needless  to  say  that  all  the  legal  experts, 
among  them  Thomas  W.  Gregory,  the  retiring  Attorney- 


208  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

General  of  the  United  States,  who  chanced  to  be  in  Paris 
at  the  time,  agreed  with  my  opinion,  and  upon  being  so 
informed  the  President  abandoned  his  purpose. 

It  is  probable  that  the  conviction,  which  was  forced 
upon  Mr.  Wilson,  that  he  could  not  independently  of  the 
Senate  put  into  operation  a  preliminary  treaty,  determined 
him  to  abandon  that  type  of  treaty  and  to  proceed  with  the 
negotiation  of  a  definitive  one.  At  least  I  had  by  March  30 
reached  the  conclusion  that  there  would  be  no  preliminary 
treaty  as  is  disclosed  by  the  following  memorandum  writ- 
ten on  that  day: 

"  I  am  sure  now  that  there  will  be  no  preliminary  treaty 
of  peace,  but  that  the  treaty  will  be  complete  and  defini- 
tive. This  is  a  serious  mistake.  Time  should  be  given  for 
passions  to  cool.  The  operations  of  a  preliminary  treaty 
should  be  tested  and  studied.  It  would  hasten  a  restora- 
tion of  peace.  Certainly  this  is  the  wise  course  as  to  terri- 
torial settlements  and  the  financial  and  economic  burdens 
to  be  imposed  upon  Germany.  The  same  comment  applies 
to  the  organization  of  a  League  of  Nations.  Unfortunately 
the  President  insists  on  a  full-blown  Covenant  and  not  a 
declaration  of  principles.  This  has  much  to  do  with  pre- 
venting a  preliminary  treaty,  since  he  wishes  to  make  the 
League  an  agent  for  enforcement  of  definite  terms. 

"When  the  President  departed  for  the  United  States  in 
February,  I  assumed  and  I  am  certain  that  he  had  in  mind 
that  there  would  be  a  preliminary  treaty.  With  that  in 
view  I  drafted  at  the  time  a  memorandum  setting  forth 
what  the  preliminary  treaty  of  peace  should  contain. 
Here  are  the  subjects  I  then  set  down: 

"i.  Restoration  of  Peace  and  official  relations. 


LACK  OF  AN  AMERICAN  PROGRAMME    209 

"2.  Restoration  of  commercial  and  financial  relations 
subject  to  conditions. 

"3.  Renunciation  by  Germany  of  all  territory  and  terri- 
torial rights  outside  of  Europe. 

"4.  Minimum  territory  of  Germany  in  Europe,  the 
boundaries  to  be  fixed  in  the  Definitive  Treaty. 

"5.  Maximum  military  and  naval  establishments  and 
production  of  arms  and  munitions. 

"6.  Maximum  amount  of  money  and  property  to  be 
surrendered  by  Germany  with  time  limits  for  payment  and 
delivery. 

"  7.  German  property  and  territory  to  be  held  as  secu- 
rity by  the  Allies  until  the  Definitive  Treaty  is  ratified. 

"8.  Declaration  as  to  the  organization  of  a  League  of 
Nations. 

"The  President's  obsession  as  to  a  League  of  Nations 
blinds  him  to  everything  else.  An  immediate  peace  is 
nothing  to  him  compared  to  the  adoption  of  the  Covenant. 
The  whole  world  wants  peace.  The  President  wants  his 
League.  I  think  that  the  world  will  have  to  wait." 

The  eight  subjects,  above  stated,  were  the  ones  which  I 
called  to  the  President's  attention  at  the  time  he  was  leav- 
ing Paris  for  the  United  States  and  which  he  said  he  did 
not  care  to  discuss. 

The  views  that  are  expressed  in  the  memorandum  of 
March  30  are  those  that  I  have  continued  to  hold.  The 
President  was  anxious  to  have  the  Treaty,  even  though  pre- 
liminary in  character,  contain  detailed  rather  than  general 
provisions,  especially  as  to  the  League  of  Nations.  With 
that  view  I  entirely  disagreed,  as  detailed  terms  of  settle- 
ment and  the  articles  of  the  Covenant  as  proposed  would 


210  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

cause  discussion  and  unquestionably  delay  the  peace.  To 
restore  the  peaceful  intercourse  between  the  belligerents, 
to  open  the  long-closed  channels  of  commerce,  and  to  give 
to  the  war-stricken  peoples  of  Europe  opportunity  to  re- 
sume their  normal  industrial  life  seemed  to  me  the  first  and 
greatest  task  to  be  accomplished.  It  was  in  my  judgment 
superior  to  every  other  object  of  the  Paris  negotiations. 
Compared  with  it  the  creation  of  a  League  of  Nations 
was  insignificant  and  could  well  be  postponed.  President 
Wilson  thought  otherwise.  We  were  very  far  apart  in 
this  matter  as  he  well  knew,  and  he  rightly  assumed  that 
I  followed  his  instructions  with  reluctance,  and,  he  might 
have  added,  with  grave  concern. 

As  a  matter  of  interest  in  this  connection  and  as  a  pos- 
sible source  from  which  the  President  may  have  acquired 
knowledge  of  my  views  as  to  the  conduct  of  the  negotia- 
tions, I  would  call  attention  again  to  the  conference  which 
I  had  with  Colonel  House  on  December  17,  1918,  and  to 
which  I  have  referred  in  connection  with  the  subject  of 
international  arbitration.  During  that  conference  I  said 
to  the  Colonel  "that  I  thought  that  there  ought  to  be  a 
preliminary  treaty  of  peace  negotiated  without  delay,  and 
that  all  the  details  as  to  a  League  of  Nations,  boundaries, 
and  indemnities  should  wait  for  the  time  being.  The 
Colonel  replied  that  he  was  not  so  sure  about  delaying  the 
creation  of  a  League,  as  he  was  afraid  that  it  never  could 
be  put  through  unless  it  was  done  at  once.  I  told  him  that 
possibly  he  was  right,  but  that  I  was  opposed  to  anything 


LACK  OF  AN  AMERICAN  PROGRAMME    211 

which  delayed  the  peace."  This  quotation  is  from  my 
memorandum  made  at  the  time  of  our  conversation.  I 
think  that  the  same  reason  for  insisting  on  negotiating  the 
Covenant  largely  influenced  the  course  of  the  President. 
My  impression  at  the  time  was  that  the  Colonel  favored  a 
preliminary  treaty  provided  that  there  was  included  in  it 
the  full  plan  for  a  League  of  Nations,  which  to  me  seemed 
to  be  impracticable. 

There  can  be  little  doubt  that,  if  there  had  been  a  set- 
tled programme  prepared  or  a  tentative  treaty  drafted, 
there  would  have  been  a  preliminary  treaty  which  might 
and  probably  would  have  postponed  the  negotiations  as  to 
a  League.  Possibly  the  President  realized  that  this  danger 
of  excluding  the  Covenant  existed  and  for  that  reason  was 
unwilling  to  make  a  definite  programme  or  to  let  a  draft- 
treaty  be  drawn.  At  least  it  may  have  added  another  rea- 
son for  his  proceeding  without  advising  the  Commission- 
ers of  his  purposes. 

As  I  review  the  entire  negotiations  and  the  incidents 
which  took  place  at  Paris,  President  Wilson's  inherent 
dislike  to  depart  in  the  least  from  an  announced  course, 
a  characteristic  already  referred  to,  seems  to  me  to  have 
been  the  most  potent  influence  in  determining  his  method 
of  work  during  the  Peace  Conference.  He  seemed  to  think 
that,  having  marked  out  a  definite  plan  of  action,  any 
deviation  from  it  would  show  intellectual  weakness  or  vac- 
illation of  purpose.  Even  when  there  could  be  no  doubt  that 
in  view  of  changed  conditions  it  was  wise  to  change  a  pol- 


212  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

icy,  which  he  had  openly  adopted  or  approved,  he  clung  to 
it  with  peculiar  tenacity  refusing  or  merely  failing  to  mod- 
ify it.  Mr.  Wilson's  mind  once  made  up  seemed  to  become 
inflexible.  It  appeared  to  grow  impervious  to  arguments 
and  even  to  facts.  It  lacked  the  elasticity  and  receptivity 
which  have  always  been  characteristic  of  sound  judgment 
and  right  thinking.  He  might  break,  but  he  would  not 
bend.  This  rigidity  of  mind  accounts  in  large  measure  for 
the  deplorable,  and,  as  it  seemed  to  me,  needless,  conflict 
between  the  President  and  the  Senate  over  the  Treaty  of 
Versailles.  It  accounts  for  other  incidents  in  his  career 
which  have  materially  weakened  his  influence  and  cast 
doubts  on  his  wisdom.  It  also  accounts,  in  my  opinion,  for 
the  President's  failure  to  prepare  or  to  adopt  a  programme 
at  Paris  or  to  commit  himself  to  a  draft  of  a  treaty  as  a 
basis  for  the  negotiations,  which  failure,  I  am  convinced, 
not  only  prevented  the  signature  of  a  short  preliminary 
treaty  of  peace,  but  lost  Mr.  Wilson  the  leadership  in  the 
proceedings,  as  the  statesmen  of  the  other  Great  Powers 
outlined  the  Treaty  negotiated  and  suggested  the  majority 
of  the  articles  which  were  written  into  it.  It  would  have 
made  a  vast  difference  if  the  President  had  known  defi- 
nitely what  he  sought,  but  he  apparently  did  not.  He  dealt 
in  generalities  leaving,  but  not  committing,  to  others  their 
definition  and  application.  He  was  always  in  the  position 
of  being  able  to  repudiate  the  interpretation  which  others 
might  place  upon  his  declarations  of  principle. 


CHAPTER  XVII 
SECRET  DIPLOMACY 

ANOTHER  matter,  concerning  which  the  President  and 
I  disagreed,  was  the  secrecy  with  which  the  negotiations 
were  carried  on  between  him  and  the  principal  European 
statesmen,  incidental  to  which  was  the  willingness,  if  not 
the  desire,  to  prevent  the  proceedings  and  decisions  from 
becoming  known  even  to  the  delegates  of  the  smaller  na- 
tions which  were  represented  at  the  Peace  Conference. 

Confidential  personal  interviews  were  to  a  certain  extent 
unavoidable  and  necessary,  but  to  conduct  the  entire  nego- 
tiation through  a  small  group  sitting  behind  closed  doors 
and  to  shroud  their  proceedings  with  mystery  and  uncer- 
tainty made  a  very  unfortunate  impression  on  those  who 
were  not  members  of  the  secret  councils. 

At  the  first  there  was  no  Council  of  the  Heads  of  States 
(the  so-called  Council  of  Four);  in  fact  it  was  not  recog- 
nized as  an  organized  body  until  the  latter  part  of  March, 
1919.  Prior  to  that  time  the  directing  body  of  the  Confer- 
ence was  the  self-constituted  Council  of  Ten  composed  of 
the  President  and  the  British,  French,  and  Italian  Pre- 
miers with  their  Secretaries  or  Ministers  of  Foreign  Af- 
fairs, and  two  Japanese  delegates  of  ambassadorial  rank. 
This  Council  had  a  membership  identical  with  that  of  the 
Supreme  War  Council,  which  controlled  the  armistices, 


214  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

their  enforcement,  and  other  military  matters.  It  as- 
sumed authority  over  the  negotiations  and  proceedings  of 
the  Conference,  though  it  was  never  authorized  so  to  do  by 
the  body  of  delegates.  The  Council  of  Four,  when  later 
formed,  was  equally  without  a  mandate  from  the  Confer- 
ence. They  assumed  the  authority  and  exercised  it  as  a 
matter  of  right. 

From  the  time  of  his  arrival  in  Paris  President  Wilson 
held  almost  daily  conversations  with  the  leading  foreign 
statesmen.  It  would  be  of  little  value  to  speculate  on  what 
took  place  at  these  interviews,  since  the  President  seldom 
told  the  American  Commission  of  the  meetings  or  dis- 
closed to  them,  unless  possibly  to  Colonel  House,  the  sub- 
jects which  were  discussed.  My  conviction  is,  from  the 
little  information  which  the  President  volunteered,  that 
these  consultations  were  —  certainly  at  first  —  devoted 
to  inducing  the  European  leaders  to  give  their  support  to 
his  plan  for  a  League  of  Nations,  and  that,  as  other  mat- 
ters relating  to  the  terms  of  peace  were  in  a  measure  in- 
volved because  of  their  possible  relation  to  the  functions  of 
the  League,  they  too  became  more  and  more  subjects  of 
discussion. 

The  introduction  of  this  personal  and  clandestine 
method  of  negotiation  was  probably  due  to  the  President's 
belief  that  he  could  in  this  way  exercise  more  effectively  his 
personal  influence  in  favor  of  the  acceptance  of  a  League. 
It  is  not  unlikely  that  this  belief  was  in  a  measure  justified. 
In  Colonel  House  he  found  one  to  aid  him  in  this  course  of 


SECRET  DIPLOMACY  215 

procedure,  as  the  Colonel's  intimate  association  with  the 
principal  statesmen  of  the  Allied  Powers  during  previous 
visits  to  Europe  as  the  President's  personal  envoy  was  an 
asset  which  he  could  utilize  as  an  intermediary  between 
the  President  and  those  with  whom  he  wished  to  confer. 
Mr.  Wilson  relied  upon  Colonel  House  for  his  knowledge  of 
the  views  and  temperaments  of  the  men  with  whom  he  had 
to  deal.  It  was  not  strange  that  he  should  adopt  a  method 
which  the  Colonel  had  found  successful  in  the  past  and 
that  he  should  seek  the  latter's  aid  and  advice  in  connec- 
tion with  the  secret  conferences  which  usually  took  place 
at  the  residence  of  the  President. 

Mr.  Wilson  pursued  this  method  of  handling  the  sub- 
jects of  negotiation  the  more  readily  because  he  was  by 
nature  and  by  inclination  secretive.  He  had  always  shown 
a  preference  for  a  private  interview  with  an  individual.  In 
his  conduct  of  the  executive  affairs  of  the  Government  at 
Washington  he  avoided  as  far  as  possible  general  confer- 
ences. He  talked  a  good  deal  about "  taking  common  coun- 
sel," but  showed  no  disposition  to  put  it  into  practice.  He 
followed  the  same  course  in  the  matter  of  foreign  affairs. 
At  Paris  this  characteristic,  which  had  often  been  the  sub- 
ject of  remark  in  Washington,  was  more  pronounced,  or 
at  least  more  noticeable.  He  was  not  disposed  to  discuss 
matters  with  the  American  Commission  as  a  whole  or  even 
to  announce  to  them  his  decisions  unless  something  arose 
which  compelled  him  to  do  so.  He  easily  fell  into  the  prac- 
tice of  seeing  men  separately  and  of  keeping  secret  the 


216  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

knowledge  acquired  as  well  as  the  effect  of  this  knowledge 
on  his  views  and  purposes.  To  him  this  was  the  normal 
and  most  satisfactory  method  of  doing  business. 

From  the  time  that  the  President  arrived  in  Paris  up  to 
the  time  that  the  Commission  on  the  League  of  Nations 
made  its  report  —  that  is,  from  December  14,  1918,  to 
February  14,  1919  —  the  negotiations  regarding  the 
League  were  conducted  with  great  secrecy.  Colonel 
House,  the  President's  collaborator  in  drafting  the  Cove- 
nant, if  he  was  not,  as  many  believed,  the  real  author,  was 
the  only  American  with  whom  Mr.  Wilson  freely  conferred 
and  to  whom  he  confided  the  progress  that  he  was  making 
in  his  interviews  with  the  foreign  statesmen,  at  many  of 
which  interviews  the  Colonel  was  present.  It  is  true  that 
the  President  held  an  occasional  conference  with  all  the 
American  Commissioners,  but  these  conferences  were 
casual  and  perfunctory  in  nature  and  were  very  evidently 
not  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  the  opinions  and  counsel 
of  the  Commissioners.  There  was  none  of  the  frankness 
that  should  have  existed  between  the  Chief  Executive  and 
his  chosen  agents  and  advisers.  The  impression  made  was 
that  he  summoned  the  conferences  to  satisfy  the  amour 
propre  of  the  Commissioners  rather  than  out  of  any  per- 
sonal wish  to  do  so. 

The  consequence  was  that  the  American  Commission- 
ers, other  than  Colonel  House,  were  kept  in  almost  com- 
plete ignorance  of  the  preliminary  negotiations  and  were 
left  to  gather  such  information  as  they  were  able  from  the 


SECRET  DIPLOMACY  217 

delegates  of  other  Powers,  who,  naturally  assuming  that 
the  Americans  possessed  the  full  confidence  of  the  Presi- 
dent, spoke  with  much  freedom.  As  Mr.  Wilson  never  held 
a  conference  with  the  American  Commission  from  the  first 
meeting  of  the  Commission  on  the  League  of  Nations  until 
its  report  was  printed,  his  American  colleagues  did  not 
know,  except  indirectly,  of  the  questions  at  issue  or  of  the 
progress  that  was  being  made.  The  fact  is  that,  as  the 
Commission  on  the  League  met  in  Colonel  House's  office 
at  the  Hotel  Crillon,  his  office  force  knew  far  more  about 
the  proceedings  than  did  the  three  American  Commission- 
ers who  were  not  present.  As  the  House  organization  made 
no  effort  to  hide  the  fact  that  they  had  inside  information, 
the  representatives  of  the  press  as  a  consequence  fre- 
quented the  office  of  the  Colonel  in  search  of  the  latest 
news  concerning  the  Commission  on  the  League  of  Nations. 
But,  in  addition  to  the  embarrassment  caused  the  Ameri- 
can Commissioners  and  the  unenviable  position  in  which 
they  were  placed  by  the  secrecy  with  which  the  President 
surrounded  his  intercourse  with  the  foreign  statesmen  and 
the  proceedings  of  the  Commission  on  the  League  of  Na- 
tions, his  secret  negotiations  caused  the  majority  of  the 
delegates  to  the  Conference  and  the  public  at  large  to  lose 
in  a  large  measure  their  confidence  in  the  actuality  of  his 
devotion  to  "open  diplomacy,"  which  he  had  so  uncon- 
ditionally proclaimed  in  the  first  of  his  Fourteen  Points. 
If  the  policy  of  secrecy  had  ceased  with  the  discussions 
preliminary  to  the  organization  of  the  Conference,  or  even 


218  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

with  those  preceding  the  meetings  of  the  Commission  on 
the  League  of  Nations,  criticism  and  complaint  would 
doubtless  have  ceased,  but  as  the  negotiations  progressed 
the  secrecy  of  the  conferences  of  the  leaders  increased 
rather  than  decreased,  culminating  at  last  in  the  organiza- 
tion of  the  Council  of  Four,  the  most  powerful  and  most 
seclusive  of  the  councils  which  directed  the  proceedings  at 
Paris.  Behind  closed  doors  these  four  individuals,  who 
controlled  the  policies  of  the  United  States,  Great  Britain, 
France,  and  Italy,  passed  final  judgment  on  the  mass  of 
articles  which  entered  into  the  Treaties  of  Peace,  but  kept 
their  decisions  secret  except  from  the  committee  which  was 
drafting  the  articles. 

The  organization  of  the  Council  of  Four  and  the  mystery 
which  enveloped  its  deliberations  emphasized  as  nothing 
else  could  have  done  the  secretiveness  with  which  adjust- 
ments were  being  made  and  compromises  were  being  ef- 
fected. It  directed  attention  also  to  the  fact  that  the  Four 
Great  Powers  had  taken  supreme  control  of  settling  the 
terms  of  peace,  that  they  were  primates  among  the  as- 
sembled nations  and  that  they  intended  to  have  their 
authority  acknowledged.  This  extraordinary  secrecy  and 
arrogation  of  power  by  the  Council  of  Four  excited  aston- 
ishment and  complaint  throughout  the  body  of  delegates 
to  the  Conference,  and  caused  widespread  criticism  in  the 
press  and  among  the  people  of  many  countries. 

A  week  after  the  Council  of  Ten  was  divided  into  the 
Council  of  the  Heads  of  States,  the  official  title  of  the 


SECRET  DIPLOMACY  219 

Council  of  Four,  and  the  Council  of  Foreign  Ministers, 
the  official  title  of  the  Council  of  Five  (popularly  nick- 
named "The  Big  Four"  and  "The  Little  Five"),  I  made 
the  following  note  on  the  subject  of  secret  negotiations: 

"After  the  experience  of  the  last  three  months  [January- 
March,  1919]  I  am  convinced  that  the  method  of  personal 
interviews  and  private  conclaves  is  a  failure.  It  has  given 
every  opportunity  for  intrigue,  plotting,  bargaining,  and 
combining.  The  President,  as  I  now  see  it,  should  have  in- 
sisted on  everything  being  brought  before  the  Plenary 
Conference.  He  would  then  have  had  the  confidence  and 
support  of  all  the  smaller  nations  because  they  would  have 
looked  up  to  him  as  their  champion  and  guide.  They 
would  have  followed  him. 

"The  result  of  the  present  method  has  been  to  destroy 
their  faith  and  arouse  their  resentment.  They  look  upon 
the  President  as  in  favor  of  a  world  ruled  by  Five  Great 
Powers,  an  international  despotism  of  the  strong,  in  which 
the  little  nations  are  merely  rubber-stamps. 

"The  President  has  undoubtedly  found  himself  in  a  most 
difficult  position.  He  has  put  himself  on  a  level  with  poli- 
ticians experienced  in  intrigue,  whom  he  will  find  a  pretty 
difficult  lot.  He  will  sink  in  the  estimation  of  the  dele- 
gates who  are  not  within  the  inner  circle,  and  what  will 
be  still  more  disastrous  will  be  the  loss  of  confidence  among 
the  peoples  of  the  nations  represented  here.  A  grievous 
blunder  has  been  made." 

The  views,  which  I  expressed  in  this  note  in  regard  to 
the  unwisdom  of  the  President's  course,  were  not  new  at 
the  time  that  I  wrote  them.  Over  two  months  before  I  had 
watched  the  practice  of  secret  negotiation  with  apprehen- 


220  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

sion  as  to  what  the  effect  would  be  upon  the  President's 
influence  and  standing  with  the  delegates  to  the  Confer- 
ence. I  then  believed  that  he  was  taking  a  dangerous 
course  which  he  would  in  the  end  regret.  So  strong  was 
this  conviction  that  during  a  meeting,  which  the  President 
held  with  the  American  Commissioners  on  the  evening  of 
January  29,  I  told  him  bluntly  —  perhaps  too  bluntly 
from  the  point  of  view  of  policy  —  that  I  considered  the 
secret  interviews  which  he  was  holding  with  the  European 
statesmen,  where  no  witnesses  were  present,  were  unwise, 
that  he  was  far  more  successful  in  accomplishment  and 
less  liable  to  be  misunderstood  if  he  confined  his  negotia- 
ting to  the  Council  of  Ten,  and  that,  furthermore,  acting 
through  the  Council  he  would  be  much  less  subject  to 
public  criticism.  I  supported  these  views  with  the  state- 
ment that  the  general  secrecy,  which  was  being  practiced, 
was  making  a  very  bad  impression  everywhere,  and  for 
that  reason,  if  for  no  other,  I  was  opposed  to  it.  The  si- 
lence with  which  the  President  received  my  remarks  ap- 
peared to  me  significant  of  his  attitude  toward  this  advice, 
and  his  subsequent  continuance  of  secret  methods  with- 
out change,  unless  it  was  to  increase  the  secrecy,  proved 
that  our  judgments  were  not  in  accord  on  the  subject. 
The  only  result  of  my  representations,  it  would  seem, 
was  to  cause  Mr.  Wilson  to  realize  that  I  was  not  in  sym- 
pathy with  his  way  of  conducting  the  negotiations.  In 
the  circumstances  I  think  now  that  it  was  a  blunder  on  my 
part  to  have  stated  my  views  so  frankly. 


SECRET  DIPLOMACY  221 

Two  days  after  I  wrote  the  note,  which  is  quoted  (April 
2,  1919),  I  made  another  note  more  general  in  character, 
but  in  which  appears  the  following: 

"Everywhere  there  are  developing  bitterness  and  re- 
sentment against  a  secretiveness  which  is  interpreted  to 
mean  failure.  The  patience  of  the  people  is  worn  thread- 
bare. Their  temper  has  grown  ragged.  They  are  sick  of 
whispering  diplomats. 

"Muttered  confidences,  secret  intrigues,  and  the  tactics 
of  the  £gum-shoer'  are  discredited.  The  world  wants  none 
of  them  these  days.  It  despises  and  loathes  them.  What 
the  world  asks  are  honest  declarations  openly  proclaimed. 
The  statesman  who  seeks  to  gain  his  end  by  tortuous  and 
underground  ways  is  foolish  or  badly  advised.  The  public 
man  who  is  sly  and  secretive  rather  than  frank  and  bold, 
whose  methods  are  devious  rather  than  obvious,  pursues  a 
dangerous  path  which  leads  neither  to  glory  nor  to  success. 

"Secret  diplomacy,  the  bane  of  the  past,  is  a  menace 
from  which  man  believed  himself  to  be  rid.  He  who  res- 
urrects it  invites  condemnation.  The  whole  world  will 
rejoice  when  the  day  of  the  whisperer  is  over." 

This  note,  read  at  the  present  time,  sounds  extravagant 
in  thought  and  intemperate  in  expression.  It  was  written 
under  the  influence  of  emotions  which  had  been  deeply 
stirred  by  the  conditions  then  existing.  Time  usually 
softens  one's  judgments  and  the  passage  of  events  makes 
less  vivid  one's  impressions.  The  perspective,  however, 
grows  clearer  and  the  proportions  more  accurate  when  the 
observer  stands  at  a  distance.  While  the  language  of  the 
note  might  well  be  changed  and  made  less  florid,  the 


222  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

thought  needs  little  modification.  The  public  criticism  was 
widespread  and  outspoken,  and  from  the  expressions  used 
it  was  very  evident  that  there  prevailed  a  general  popular 
disapproval  of  the  way  the  negotiations  were  being  con- 
ducted. The  Council  of  Four  won  the  press-name  of  "The 
Olympians,"  and  much  was  said  of  "the  thick  cloud  of 
mystery"  which  hid  them  from  the  anxious  multitudes, 
and  of  the  secrecy  which  veiled  their  deliberations.  The 
newspapers  and  the  correspondents  at  Paris  openly  com- 
plained and  the  delegates  to  the  Conference  in  a  more 
guarded  way  showed  their  bitterness  at  the  overlordship 
assumed  by  the  leading  statesmen  of  the  Great  Powers  and 
the  secretive  methods  which  they  employed.  It  was,  as 
may  be  gathered  from  the  note  quoted,  a  distressing  and 
depressing  time. 

As  concrete  examples  of  the  evils  of  secret  negotiations 
the  "Fiume  Affair"  and  the  "Shantung  Settlement"  are 
the  best  known  because  of  the  storm  of  criticism  and  pro- 
test which  they  caused.  As  the  Shantung  Settlement  was 
one  of  the  chief  matters  of  difference  between  the  Presi- 
dent and  myself,  it  will  be  treated  later.  The  case  of  Fiume 
is  different.  As  to  the  merits  of  the  question  I  was  very 
much  in  accord  with  the  President,  but  to  the  bungling 
way  in  which  it  was  handled  I  was  strongly  opposed  believ- 
ing that  secret  interviews,  at  which  false  hopes  were  en- 
couraged, were  at  the  bottom  of  all  the  trouble  which  later 
developed.  But  for  this  secrecy  I  firmly  believe  that  there 
would  have  been  no  "Fiume  Affair." 


SECRET  DIPLOMACY  223 

The  discussion  of  the  Italian  claims  to  territory  along 
the  northern  boundary  of  the  Kingdom  and  about  the 
head  of  the  Adriatic  Sea  began  as  soon  as  the  American 
Commission  was  installed  at  Paris,  about  the  middle  of 
December,  1918.  The  endeavor  of  the  Italian  emissaries 
was  to  induce  the  Americans,  particularly  the  President, 
to  recognize  the  boundary  laid  down  in  the  Pact  of  London. 
That  agreement,  which  Italy  had  required  Great  Britain 
and  France  to  accept  in  April,  1915,  before  she  consented 
to  declare  war  against  the  Austro-Hungarian  Empire, 
committed  the  Entente  Powers  to  the  recognition  of  Italy's 
right  to  certain  territorial  acquisitions  at  the  expense  of 
Austria-Hungary  in  the  event  of  the  defeat  of  the  Central 
Empires.  By  the  boundary  line  agreed  upon  in  the  Pact, 
Italy  would  obtain  certain  important  Islands  and  ports  on 
the  Dalmatian  coast  in  addition  to  the  Austrian  Tyrol  and 
the  Italian  provinces  of  the  Dual  Monarchy  at  the  head  of 
the  Adriatic. 

When  this  agreement  was  signed,  the  dissolution  of 
Austria-Hungary  was  not  in  contemplation,  or  at  least,  if 
it  was  considered,  the  possibility  of  its  accomplishment 
seemed  very  remote.  It  was  assumed  that  the  Dalmatian 
territory  to  be  acquired  under  the  treaty  to  be  negotiated 
in  accordance  with  the  terms  of  the  Pact  would,  with  the 
return  of  the  Italian  provinces,  give  to  Italy  naval  control 
over  the  Adriatic  Sea  and  secure  the  harborless  eastern 
coast  of  the  Italian  peninsula  against  future  hostile  attack 
by  the  Austro-Hungarian  Empire.  The  boundary  laid 


224  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

down  in  the  agreement  was  essentially  strategic  and  based 
primarily  on  considerations  of  Italian  national  safety.  As 
long  as  the  Empire  existed  as  a  Great  Power  the  boundary 
of  the  Pact  of  London,  so  far  as  it  related  to  the  Adriatic 
littoral  and  islands,  was  not  unreasonable  or  the  territorial 
demands  excessive. 

But  the  close  of  active  warfare  in  the  autumn  of  1918, 
when  the  armistice  went  into  effect,  found  conditions 
wholly  different  from  those  upon  which  these  territorial 
demands  had  been  predicated.  The  Austro-Hungarian 
Empire  had  fallen  to  pieces  beyond  the  hope  of  becoming 
again  one  of  the  Great  Powers.  The  various  nationalities, 
which  had  long  been  restless  and  unhappy  under  the  rule 
of  the  Hapsburgs,  threw  off  the  imperial  yoke,  proclaimed 
their  independence,  and  sought  the  recognition  and  pro- 
tection of  the  Allies.  The  Poles  of  the  Empire  joined  their 
brethren  of  the  Polish  provinces  of  Russia  and  Prussia  in 
the  resurrection  of  their  ancient  nation;  Bohemia,  Mo- 
ravia, and  Slovakia  united  in  forming  the  new  state  of 
Czecho-Slovakia;  the  southern  Slavs  of  Croatia,  Slavonia, 
Bosnia,  Herzegovina,  and  Dalmatia  announced  their  union 
with  their  kindred  of  the  Kingdom  of  Serbia;  and  Hun- 
gary declared  the  severance  of  her  political  union  with 
Austria.  In  a  word  the  Dual  Empire  ceased  to  exist.  It 
was  no  longer  a  menace  to  the  national  safety  of  Italy. 
This  was  the  state  of  affairs  when  the  delegates  to  the 
Peace  Conference  began  to  assemble  at  Paris. 

The  Italian  statesmen  realized  that  these  new  conditions 


SECRET  DIPLOMACY  225 

might  raise  serious  questions  as  to  certain  territorial  ces- 
sions which  would  come  to  Italy  under  the  terms  of  the 
Pact  of  London,  because  their  strategic  necessity  had  dis- 
appeared with  the  dissolution  of  Austria-Hungary.  While 
they  had  every  reason  to  assume  that  Great  Britain  and 
France  would  live  up  to  their  agreement,  it  was  hardly  to 
be  expected  that  under  the  changed  conditions  and  in  the 
circumstances  attending  the  negotiation  and  signature  of 
the  Pact,  the  British  and  French  statesmen  would  be  dis- 
posed to  protest  against  modifications  of  the  proposed 
boundary  if  the  United  States  and  other  nations,  not  par- 
ties to  the  agreement,  should  insist  upon  changes  as  a  mat- 
ter of  justice  to  the  new  state  of  the  Serbs,  Croats,  and 
Slovenes.  It  apparently  was  considered  expedient,  by  the 
Italian  representatives,  in  view  of  the  situation  which  had 
developed,  to  increase  rather  than  to  reduce  their  claims 
along  the  Dalmatian  coast  in  order  that  they  might  have 
something  which  could  be  surrendered  in  a  compromise 
without  giving  up  the  boundaries  laid  down  in  the  Pact 
of  London. 

It  is  probable,  too,  that  these  additional  claims  were  ad- 
vanced by  Italy  in  order  to  offset  in  a  measure  the  claims 
of  the  Jugo-Slavs,  who  through  the  Serbian  delegates  at 
Paris  were  making  territorial  demands  which  the  Italians 
declared  to  be  extravagant  and  which,  if  granted,  would 
materially  reduce  the  proposed  cessions  to  Italy  under  the 
Pact  of  London.  Furthermore,  the  Italian  Government 
appeared  to  be  by  no  means  pleased  with  the  idea  of  a 


226  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

Jugo-Slav  state  so  strong  that  it  might  become  a  commer- 
cial, if  not  a  naval,  rival  of  Italy  in  the  Adriatic.  The 
Italian  delegates  in  private  interviews  showed  great  bitter- 
ness toward  the  Slavs,  who,  they  declared,  had,  as  Austrian 
subjects,  waged  war  against  Italy  and  taken  part  in  the 
cruel  and  wanton  acts  attendant  upon  the  invasion  of  the 
northern  Italian  provinces.  They  asserted  that  it  was 
unjust  to  permit  these  people,  by  merely  changing  their 
allegiance  after  defeat,  to  escape  punishment  for  the  out- 
rages which  they  had  committed  against  Italians  and  ac- 
tually to  profit  by  being  vanquished.  This  antipathy  to 
the  Slavs  of  the  former  Empire  was  in  a  measure  trans- 
ferred to  the  Serbs,  who  were  naturally  sympathetic  with 
their  kinsmen  and  who  were  also  ambitious  to  build  up 
a  strong  Slav  state  with  a  large  territory  and  with  com- 
mercial facilities  on  the  Adriatic  coast  which  would  be 
ample  to  meet  the  trade  needs  of  the  interior. 

While  there  may  have  been  a  certain  fear  for  the  na- 
tional safety  of  Italy  in  having  as  a  neighbor  a  Slav  state 
with  a  large  and  virile  population,  extensive  resources,  and 
opportunity  to  become  a  naval  power  in  the  Mediterra- 
nean, the  real  cause  of  apprehension  seemed  to  be  that  the 
new  nation  would  become  a  commercial  rival  of  Italy  in  the 
Adriatic  and  prevent  her  from  securing  the  exclusive  con- 
trol of  the  trade  which  her  people  coveted  and  which  the 
complete  victory  over  Austria-Hungary  appeared  to  assure 
to  them. 

The  two  principal  ports  having  extensive  facilities  for 


SECRET  DIPLOMACY  227 

shipping  and  rail-transportation  to  and  from  the  Danu- 
bian  provinces  of  the  Dual  Empire  were  Trieste  and  Fiume. 
The  other  Dalmatian  ports  were  small  and  without  possi- 
bilities of  extensive  development,  while  the  precipitous 
mountain  barrier  between  the  coast  and  the  interior  which 
rose  almost  from  the  water-line  rendered  railway  con- 
struction from  an  engineering  standpoint  impracticable  if 
not  impossible.  It  was  apparent  that,  if  Italy  could  obtain 
both  the  port  of  Trieste  and  the  port  of  Fiume,  the  two 
available  outlets  for  foreign  trade  to  the  territories  lying 
north  and  east  of  the  Adriatic  Sea,  she  would  have  a  sub- 
stantial monopoly  of  the  sea-borne  commerce  of  the  Dal- 
matian coast  and  its  hinterland.  It  was  equally  apparent 
that  Italian  possession  of  the  two  ports  would  place  the 
new  Slav  state  at  a  great  disadvantage  commercially,  as 
the  principal  volume  of  its  exports  and  imports  would  have 
to  pass  through  a  port  in  the  hands  of  a  trade  rival  which 
could,  in  case  of  controversy  or  in  order  to  check  competi- 
tion, be  closed  to  Slav  ships  and  goods  on  this  or  that  pre- 
text, even  if  the  new  state  found  it  practicable  to  maintain 
a  merchant  marine  under  an  agreement  granting  it  the  use 
of  the  port. 

In  view  of  the  new  conditions  which  had  thus  arisen 
through  the  dissolution  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Empire 
and  the  union  of  the  Southern  Slavs,  the  Italian  delegates 
at  Paris  began  a  vigorous  campaign  to  obtain  sovereignty, 
or  at  least  administrative  control,  over  Fiume  and  the 
adjacent  coasts  and  islands,  it  having  been  generally  con- 


228  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

ceded  that  Trieste  should  be  ceded  to  Italy.  The  Italian 
demand  for  Flume  had  become  real  instead  of  artificial. 
This  campaign  was  conducted  by  means  of  personal  inter- 
views with  the  representatives  of  the  principal  Powers,  and 
particularly  with  those  of  the  United  States  because  it  was 
apparently  felt  that  the  chief  opposition  to  the  demand 
would  come  from  that  quarter,  since  the  President  was 
known  to  favor  the  general  proposition  that  every  nation 
should  have  free  access  to  the  sea  and,  if  possible,  a  seaport 
under  its  own  sovereignty. 

The  Italian  delegates  were  undoubtedly  encouraged  by 
some  Americans  to  believe  that,  while  the  President  had 
not  actually  declared  in  favor  of  Italian  control  of  Fiume, 
he  was  sympathetic  to  the  idea  and  would  ultimately 
assent  to  it  just  as  he  had  in  the  case  of  the  cession  to  Italy 
of  the  Tyrol  with  its  Austrian  population.  Convinced  by 
these  assurances  of  success  the  Italian  leaders  began  a  na- 
tion-wide propaganda  at  home  for  the  purpose  of  arousing 
a  strong  public  sentiment  for  the  acquisition  of  the  port. 
This  propaganda  was  begun,  it  would  seem,  for  two  rea- 
sons, first,  the  political  advantage  to  be  gained  when  it  was 
announced  that  Signer  Orlando  and  his  colleagues  at  Paris 
had  succeeded  in  having  their  demand  recognized,  and, 
second,  the  possibility  of  influencing  the  President  to  a 
speedy  decision  by  exhibiting  the  intensity  and  unity  of 
the  Italian  national  spirit  in  demanding  the  annexation  of 
the  little  city,  the  major  part  of  the  population  of  which 
was  asserted  to  be  of  Italian  blood. 


SECRET  DIPLOMACY  229 

The  idea,  which  was  industriously  circulated  throughout 
Italy,  that  Fiume  was  an  Italian  city,  aroused  the  feelings 
of  the  people  more  than  any  political  Or  economic  argu- 
ment could  have  done.  The  fact  that  the  suburbs,  which 
were  really  as  much  a  part  of  the  municipality  as  the  area 
within  the  city  proper,  were  inhabited  largely  by  Jugo- 
Slavs  was  ignored,  ridiculed,  or  denied.  That  the  Jugo- 
Slavs  undoubtedly  exceeded  in  numbers  the  Italians  in  the 
community  when  it  was  treated  as  a  whole  made  no  differ- 
ence to  the  propagandists  who  asserted  that  Fiume  was 
Italian.  They  clamored  for  its  annexation  on  the  ground 
of  "self-determination,"  though  refusing  to  accept  that 
principle  as  applicable  to  the  inhabitants  of  the  Austrian 
Tyrol  and  failing  to  raise  any  question  in  regard  to  it  in  the 
case  of  the  port  of  Danzig.  The  Italian  orators  and  press 
were  not  disturbed  by  the  inconsistency  of  their  positions, 
and  the  Italian  statesmen  at  Paris,  when  their  attention 
was  called  to  it,  replied  that  the  cases  were  not  the  same, 
an  assertion  which  it  would  have  been  difficult  to  establish 
with  facts  or  support  with  convincing  arguments. 

While  the  propaganda  went  forward  in  Italy  with  in- 
creasing energy,  additional  assurances,  I  was  informed  by 
one  of  the  Italian  group,  were  given  to  Signor  Orlando  and 
Baron  Sonnino  that  President  Wilson  was  almost  on  the 
point  of  conceding  the  justice  of  the  Italian  claim  to 
Fiume.  It  was  not  until  the  latter  part  of  March,  1919, 
that  these  statesmen  began  to  suspect  that  they  had  been 
misinformed  and  that  the  influence  of  their  American 


230 

friends  was  not  as  powerful  with  Mr.  Wilson  as  they  had 
been  led  to  believe.  It  was  an  unpleasant  awakening. 
They  were  placed  in  a  difficult  position.  Too  late  to  calm 
the  inflamed  temper  of  the  Italian  people  the  Italian  lead- 
ers at  Paris  had  no  alternative  but  to  press  their  demands 
with  greater  vigor  since  the  failure  to  obtain  Fiume  meant 
almost  inevitable  disaster  to  the  Orlando  Ministry. 

Following  conversations  with  Baron  Sonnino  and  some 
others  connected  with  the  Italian  delegation,  I  drew  the 
conclusion  that  they  would  go  so  far  as  to  refuse  to  make 
peace  with  Germany  unless  the  Adriatic  Question  was 
first  settled  to  their  satisfaction.  In  a  memorandum  dated 
March  29,  I  wrote:  "This  will  cause  a  dangerous  crisis," 
and  in  commenting  on  the  probable  future  of  the  subject 
I  stated: 

"My  fear  is  that  the  President  will  continue  to  rely  upon 
private  interviews  and  his  powers  of  persuasion  to  induce 
the  Italians  to  abandon  their  extravagant  claim.  I  am  sure 
that  he  will  not  be  able  to  do  it.  On  the  contrary,  his  con- 
versations will  strengthen  rather  than  weaken  Italian  de- 
termination. He  ought  to  tell  them  now  that  he  will  not 
consent  to  have  Fiume  given  to  Italy.  It  would  cause 
anger  and  bitterness,  but  nothing  to  compare  with  the  re- 
sentment which  will  be  aroused  if  the  uncertainty  is  per- 
mitted to  go  on  much  longer.  I  shall  tell  the  President  my 
opinion  at  the  first  opportunity.  [I  did  this  a  few  days 
later.] 

"The  future  is  darkened  by  the  Adriatic  situation  and 
I  look  to  an  explosion  before  the  matter  is  settled.  It  is 
a  good  thing  that  the  President  visited  Italy  when  he  did 


SECRET  DIPLOMACY  231 

and  when  blessings  rather  than  curses  greeted  him.  Secret 
diplomacy  is  reaping  a  new  harvest  of  execrations  and  con- 
demnations. Will  the  practice  ever  cease?" 

During  the  first  three  weeks  of  April  the  efforts  to  shake 
the  determination  of  the  President  to  support  the  Jugo- 
Slav  claims  to  Fiume  and  the  adjacent  territory  were  re- 
doubled, but  without  avail.  Every  form  of  compromise  as 
to  boundary  and  port  privileges,  which  did  not  deprive 
Italy  of  the  sovereignty,  was  proposed,  but  found  to  be 
unacceptable.  The  Italians,  held  by  the  pressure  of  the 
aroused  national  spirit,  and  the  President,  firm  in  the  con- 
viction that  the  Italian  claim  to  the  port  was  unjust,  re- 
mained obdurate.  Attempts  were  made  by  both  sides  to 
reach  some  common  ground  for  an  agreement,  but  none 
was  found.  As  the  time  approached  to  submit  the  Treaty 
to  the  German  plenipotentiaries,  who  were  expected  to  ar- 
rive at  Paris  on  April  26,  the  Italian  delegates  let  it  be 
known  that  they  would  absent  themselves  from  the  meet- 
ing at  which  the  document  was  to  be  presented  unless  a 
satisfactory  understanding  in  regard  to  Fiume  was  ob- 
tained before  the  meeting.  I  doubt  whether  this  threat 
was  with  the  approval  and  upon  the  advice  of  the  Ameri- 
can friends  of  the  Italians  who  had  been  industrious  in  at- 
tempting to  persuade  the  President  to  accept  a  compro- 
mise. An  American  familiar  with  Mr.  Wilson's  disposition 
would  have  realized  that  to  try  to  coerce  him  in  that  man- 
ner would  be  folly,  as  in  all  probability  it  would  have  just 
the  contrary  effect  to  the  one  desired. 


232  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

The  Italian  delegates  did  not  apparently  read  the  Presi- 
dent's temper  aright.  They  made  a  mistake.  Their  threat 
of  withdrawal  from  the  Conference  resulted  far  differently 
from  their  expectation  and  hope.  When  Mr.  Wilson 
learned  of  the  Italian  threat  he  met  it  with  a  public  an- 
nouncement of  his  position  in  regard  to  the  controversy, 
which  was  intended  as  an  appeal  to  the  people  of  Italy  to 
abandon  the  claim  to  Fiume  and  to  reject  their  Govern- 
ment's policy  of  insisting  on  an  unjust  settlement.  This 
declaration  was  given  to  the  press  late  in  the  afternoon  of 
April  23,  and  a  French  newspaper  containing  it  was  handed, 
it  was  said,  to  Signor  Orlando  at  the  President's  residence 
where  the  Council  of  Four  were  assembled.  He  immedi- 
ately withdrew,  issued  a  counter-statement,  and  the  fol- 
lowing day  left  Paris  for  Rome  more  on  account  of  his 
indignation  at  the  course  taken  by  the  President  than  be- 
cause of  the  threat  which  he  had  made.  Baron  Sonnino 
also  departed  the  next  day. 

It  is  not  my  purpose  to  pursue  further  the  course  of 
events  following  the  crisis  which  was  precipitated  by  the 
President's  published  statement  and  the  resulting  depar- 
ture of  the  principal  Italian  delegates.  The  effect  on  the 
Italian  people  is  common  knowledge.  A  tempest  of  popu- 
lar fury  against  the  President  swept  over  Italy  from  end  to 
end.  From  being  the  most  revered  of  all  men  by  the  Ital- 
ians, he  became  the  most  detested.  As  no  words  of  praise 
and  admiration  were  too  extravagant  to  be  spoken  of  him 
when  he  visited  Rome  in  January,  so  no  words  of  insult  or 


SECRET  DIPLOMACY  233 

execration  were  too  gross  to  characterize  him  after  his  pub- 
lic announcement  regarding  the  Adriatic  Question.  There 
was  never  a  more  complete  reversal  of  public  sentiment 
toward  an  individual. 

The  reason  for  reciting  the  facts  of  the  Fiume  dispute, 
which  was  one  of  the  most  unpleasant  incidents  that  took 
place  at  Paris  during  the  negotiations,  is  to  bring  out 
clearly  the  consequences  of  secret  diplomacy.  A  discussion 
of  the  reasons,  or  of  the  probable  reasons,  for  the  return 
of  the  Italian  statesmen  to  Paris  before  the  Treaty  was 
handed  to  the  Germans  would  add  nothing  to  the  subject 
under  consideration,  while  the  same  may  be  said  of  the 
subsequent  occupation  of  Fiume  by  Italian  nationalists 
under  the  fanatical  D'Annunzio,  without  authority  of 
their  Government,  but  with  the  enthusiastic  approval  of 
the  Italian  people. 

Five  days  after  the  Italian  Premier  and  his  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs  had  departed  from  Paris  I  had  a  long  inter- 
view with  a  well-known  Italian  diplomat,  who  was  an  inti- 
mate friend  of  both  Signor  Orlando  and  Baron  Sonnino 
and  who  had  been  very  active  in  the  secret  negotiations 
regarding  the  Italian  boundaries  which  had  been  taking 
place  at  Paris  since  the  middle  of  December.  This  diplo- 
mat was  extremely  bitter  about  the  whole  affair  and  took 
no  pains  to  hide  his  views  as  to  the  causes  of  the  critical 
situation  which  existed.  In  the  memorandum  of  our  con- 
versation, which  I  wrote  immediately  after  he  left  my 
office,  appears  the  following: 


234  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

"He  exclaimed:  'One  tells  you  one  thing  and  that  is  not 
true;  then  another  tells  you  another  thing  and  that  too  is 
not  true.  What  is  one  to  believe?  What  can  one  do?  It  is 
hopeless.  So  many  secret  meetings  with  different  persons 
are  simply  awful'  —  He  threw  up  his  hands  —  'Now  we 
have  the  result.  It  is  terrible!' 

"I  laughed  and  said,  'I  conclude  that  you  do  not  like 
secret  diplomacy/ 

( 'I  do  not;  I  do  not/  he  fervently  exclaimed.  'All  our 
trouble  comes  from  these  secret  meetings  of  four  men  [re- 
ferring to  the  Big  Four],  who  keep  no  records  and  who  tell 
different  stories  of  what  takes  place.  Secrecy  is  to  blame. 
We  have  been  unable  to  rely  on  any  one.  To  have  to  run 
around  and  see  this  man  and  that  man  is  not  the  way  to  do. 
Most  all  sympathize  with  you  when  alone  and  then  they 
desert  you  when  they  get  with  others.  This  is  the  cause  of 
much  bitterness  and  distrust.  Secret  diplomacy  is  an  utter 
failure.  It  is  too  hard  to  endure.  Some  men  know  only 
how  to  whisper.  They  are  not  to  be  trusted.  I  do  not 
like  it.' 

"  'Well/ 1  said,  'you  cannot  charge  me  with  that  way  of 
doing  business/ 

"  'I  cannot/  he  replied,  'you  tell  me  the  truth.  I  may  not 
like  it,  but  at  least  you  do  not  hold  out  false  hopes/' 

The  foregoing  conversation  no  doubt  expressed  the  real 
sentiments  of  the  members  of  the  Italian  delegation  at 
that  time.  Disgust  with  confidential  personal  interviews 
and  with  relying  upon  personal  influence  rather  than  upon 
the  merits  of  their  case  was  the  natural  reaction  following 
the  failure  to  win  by  these  means  the  President's  approval, 
of  Italy's  demands. 

The  Italian  policy  in  relation  to  Fiume  was  wrecked  on 


SECRET  DIPLOMACY  235 

the  rock  of  President  Wilson's  firm  determination  that  the 
Jugo-Slavs  should  have  a  seaport  on  the  Adriatic  sufficient 
for  their  needs  and  that  Italy  should  not  control  the  ap- 
proaches to  that  port.  With  the  wreck  of  the  Fiume  policy 
went  in  time  the  Orlando  Government  which  had  failed  to 
make  good  the  promises  which  they  had  given  to  their 
people.  Too  late  they  realized  that  secret  diplomacy  had 
failed,  and  that  they  had  made  a  mistake  in  relying  upon 
it.  It  is  no  wonder  that  the  two  leaders  of  the  Italian 
delegation  on  returning  to  Paris  and  resuming  their  duties 
in  the  Conference  refrained  from  attempting  to  arrange 
clandestinely  the  settlement  of  the  Adriatic  Question. 
The  "go-betweens,"  on  whom  they  had  previously  relied, 
were  no  longer  employed.  Secret  diplomacy  was  anath- 
ema. They  had  paid  a  heavy  price  for  the  lesson,  which 
they  had  learned. 

When  one  reviews  the  negotiations  at  Paris  from  De- 
cember, 1918,  to  June,  1919,  the  secretiveness  which  char- 
acterized them  is  very  evident.  Everybody  seemed  to  talk 
in  whispers  and  never  to  say  anything  worth  while  except 
in  confidence.  The  open  sessions  of  the  Conference  were 
arranged  beforehand.  They  were  formal  and  perfunctory. 
The  agreements  and  bargains  were  made  behind  closed 
doors.  This  secrecy  began  with  the  exchange  of  views  con- 
cerning the  League  of  Nations,  following  which  came  the 
creation  of  the  Council  of  Ten,  whose  meetings  were  in- 
tended to  be  secret.  Then  came  the  secret  sessions  of  the 
Commission  on  the  League  and  the  numerous  informal  in- 


236  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

terviews  of  the  President  with  one  or  more  of  the  Premiers 
of  the  Allied  Powers,  the  facts  concerning  which  were  not 
divulged  to  the  American  Commissioners.  Later,  on  Mr. 
Wilson's  return  from  the  United  States,  dissatisfaction 
with  and  complaint  of  the  publicity  given  to  some  of  the 
proceedings  of  the  Council  of  Ten  induced  the  formation 
of  the  Council  of  Four  with  the  result  that  the  secrecy  of  the 
negotiations  was  practically  unbroken.  If  to  this  brief  sum- 
mary of  the  increasing  secretiveness  of  the  proceedings  of 
the  controlling  bodies  of  the  Peace  Conference  are  added  the 
intrigues  and  personal  bargainings  which  were  constantly 
going  on,  the  "log-rolling"  —  to  use  a  term  familiar  to 
American  politics — which  was  practiced,  the  record  is  one 
which  invites  no  praise  and  will  find  many  who  condemn  it. 
In  view  of  the  frequent  and  emphatic  declarations  in 
favor  of  "open  diplomacy"  and  the  popular  interpretation 
placed  upon  the  phrase  "Open  covenants  openly  arrived 
at,"  the  effect  of  the  secretive  methods  employed  by  the 
leading  negotiators  at  Paris  was  to  destroy  public  confi- 
dence in  the  sincerity  of  these  statesmen  and  to  subject 
them  to  the  charge  of  pursuing  a  policy  which  they  had 
themselves  condemned  and  repudiated.  Naturally  Presi- 
dent Wilson,  who  had  been  especially  earnest  in  his  de- 
nunciation of  secret  negotiations,  suffered  more  than  his 
foreign  colleagues,  whose  real  support  of  "open  diplo- 
macy" had  always  been  doubted,  though  all  of  them  in  a 
measure  fell  in  public  estimation  as  a  consequence  of  the 
way  in  which  the  negotiations  were  conducted. 


SECRET  DIPLOMACY  237 

The  criticism  and  condemnation,  expressed  with  varying 
degrees  of  intensity,  resulted  from  the  disappointed  hopes 
of  the  peoples  of  the  world,  who  had  looked  forward  con- 
fidently to  the  Peace  Conference  at  Paris  as  the  first  great 
and  decisive  change  to  a  new  diplomacy  which  would  cast 
aside  the  cloak  of  mystery  that  had  been  in  the  past  the 
recognized  livery  of  diplomatic  negotiations.  The  record 
of  the  Paris  proceedings  in  this  particular  is  a  sorry  one. 
It  is  the  record  of  the  abandonment  of  principle,  of  the 
failure  to  follow  precepts  unconditionally  proclaimed,  of 
the  repudiation  by  act,  if  not  by  word,  of  a  new  and  better 
type  of  international  intercourse. 

It  is  not  my  purpose  or  desire  to  fix  the  blame  for  this 
perpetuation  of  old  and  discredited  practices  on  any  one 
individual.  To  do  so  would  be  unjust,  since  more  than  one 
preferred  the  old  way  and  should  share  the  responsibility 
for  its  continuance.  But,  as  the  secrecy  became  more  and 
more  impenetrable  and  as  the  President  gave  silent  acqui- 
escence or  at  least  failed  to  show  displeasure  with  the 
practice,  I  realized  that  in  this  matter,  as  in  others,  our 
judgments  were  at  variance  and  our  views  irreconcilable. 
As  my  opposition  to  the  method  of  conducting  the  pro- 
ceedings was  evident,  I  cannot  but  assume  that  this  de- 
cided difference  was  one  that  materially  affected  the  rela- 
tions between  Mr.  Wilson  and  myself  and  that  he  looked 
upon  me  as  an  unfavorable  critic  of  his  course  in  permit- 
ting to  go  unprotested  the  secrecy  which  characterized  the 
negotiations. 


238  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

The  attention  of  the  delegates  to  the  Peace  Conference 
who  represented  the  smaller  nations  was  early  directed  to 
their  being  denied  knowledge  of  the  terms  of  the  Treaty 
which  were  being  formulated  by  the  principal  members  of 
the  delegations  of  the  Five  Great  Powers.  There  is  no 
doubt  that  at  the  first  their  mental  attitude  was  one  of 
confidence  that  the  policy  of  secrecy  would  not  be  contin- 
ued beyond  the  informal  meetings  preliminary  to  and 
necessary  for  arranging  the  organization  and  procedure  of 
the  Conference;  but,  as  the  days  lengthened  into  weeks 
and  the  weeks  into  months,  and  as  the  information  con- 
cerning the  actual  negotiations,  which  reached  them,  be- 
came more  and  more  meager,  they  could  no  longer  close 
their  eyes  to  the  fact  that  their  national  rights  and  aspira- 
tions were  to  be  recognized  or  denied  by  the  leaders  of  the 
Great  Powers  without  the  consent  and  even  without  the 
full  knowledge  of  the  delegates  of  the  nations  vitally  inter- 
ested. 

Except  in  the  case  of  a  few  of  these  delegates,  who  had 
been  able  to  establish  intimate  personal  relations  with 
some  of  the  "Big  Four,"  the  secretiveness  of  the  discus- 
sions and  decisions  regarding  the  Treaty  settlements 
aroused  amazement  and  indignation.  It  was  evident  that 
it  was  to  be  a  "dictated  peace"  and  not  a  "negotiated 
peace,"  a  peace  dictated  by  the  Great  Powers  not  only  to 
the  enemy,  but  also  to  their  fellow  belligerents.  Some  of 
the  delegates  spoke  openly  in  criticism  of  the  furtive  meth- 
ods that  were  being  employed,  but  the  majority  held  their 


SECRET  DIPLOMACY  239 

peace.  It  can  hardly  be  doubted,  however,  that  the  body 
of  delegates  were  practically  unanimous  in  disapproving 
the  secrecy  of  the  proceedings,  and  this  disapproval  was 
to  be  found  even  among  the  delegations  of  the  Great 
Powers.  It  was  accepted  by  the  lesser  nations  because  it 
seemed  impolitic  and  useless  to  oppose  the  united  will  of 
the  controlling  oligarchy.  It  was  natural  that  the  delegates 
of  the  less  influential  states  should  feel  that  their  countries 
would  suffer  in  the  terms  of  peace  if  they  openly  denounced 
the  treatment  accorded  them  as  violative  of  the  dignity 
of  representatives  of  independent  sovereignties.  In  any 
event  no  formal  protest  was  entered  against  their  being 
deprived  of  a  knowledge  to  which  they  were  entitled,  a 
deprivation  which  placed  them  and  their  countries  in  a 
subordinate,  and,  to  an  extent,  a  humiliating,  position. 

The  climax  of  this  policy  of  secrecy  toward  the  body  of 
delegates  came  on  the  eve  of  the  delivery  of  the  Treaty  of 
Peace  to  the  German  representatives  who  were  awaiting 
that  event  at  Versailles.  By  a  decision  of  the  Council  of 
the  Heads  of  States,  reached  three  weeks  before  the  time, 
only  a  digest  or  summary  of  the  Treaty  was  laid  before  the 
plenary  session  of  the  Conference  on  the  Preliminaries  of 
Peace  on  the  day  preceding  the  delivery  of  the  full  text 
of  the  Treaty  to  the  Germans.  The  delegates  of  the  smaller 
belligerent  nations  were  not  permitted  to  examine  the 
actual  text  of  the  document  before  it  was  seen  by  their 
defeated  adversaries.  Nations,  which  had  fought  val- 
iantly and  suffered  agonies  during  the  war,  were  treated 


240  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

with  no  more  consideration  than  their  enemies  so  far  as 
knowledge  of  the  exact  terms  of  peace  were  concerned. 
The  arguments,  which  could  be  urged  on  the  ground  of 
the  practical  necessity  of  a  small  group  dealing  with  the 
questions  and  determining  the  settlements,  seem  insuffi- 
cient to  justify  the  application  of  the  rule  of  secrecy  to 
the  delegates  who  sat  in  the  Conference  on  the  Prelim- 
inaries of  Peace.  It  is  not  too  severe  to  say  that  it  out- 
raged the  equal  rights  of  independent  and  sovereign 
states  and  under  less  critical  conditions  would  have  been 
resented  as  an  insult  by  the  plenipotentiaries  of  the  lesser 
nations.  Even  within  the  delegations  of  the  Great  Powers 
there  were  indignant  murmurings  against  this  indefensible 
and  unheard-of  treatment  of  allies.  No  man,  whose  mind 
was  not  warped  by  prejudice  or  dominated  by  political 
expediency,  could  give  it  his  approval  or  become  its 
apologist.  Secrecy,  and  intrigues  which  were  only  possi- 
ble through  secrecy,  stained  nearly  all  the  negotiations 
at  Paris,  but  in  this  final  act  of  withholding  knowledge 
of  the  actual  text  of  the  Treaty  from  the  delegates  of 
most  of  the  nations  represented  in  the  Conference  the 
spirit  of  secretiveness  seems  to  have  gone  mad. 

The  psychological  effects  of  secrecy  on  those  who  are 
kept  in  ignorance  are  not  difficult  to  analyze.  They  follow 
normal  processes  and  may  be  thus  stated :  Secrecy  breeds 
suspicion;  suspicion,  doubt;  doubt,  distrust;  and  distrust 
produces  lack  of  frankness,  which  is  closely  akin  to  secrecy. 
The  result  is  a  vicious  circle,  of  which  deceit  and  intrigue 


SECRET  DIPLOMACY  241 

are  the  very  essence.  Secrecy  and  its  natural  consequences 
have  given  to  diplomacy  a  popular  reputation  for  trickery, 
for  double-dealing,  and  in  a  more  or  less  degree  for  unscru- 
pulous and  dishonest  methods  of  obtaining  desired  ends,  a 
reputation  that  has  found  expression  in  the  ironic  defini- 
tion of  a  diplomat  as  "  an  honest  man  sent  to  lie  abroad 
for  the  good  of  his  country." 

The  time  had  arrived  when  the  bad  name  which  diplo- 
macy had  so  long  borne  could  and  should  have  been  re- 
moved. "Open  covenants  openly  arrived  at"  appealed  to 
the  popular  feeling  of  antipathy  toward  secret  diplomacy, 
of  which  the  Great  War  was  generally  believed  to  be  the 
product.  The  Paris  Conference  appeared  to  offer  an  in- 
viting opportunity  to  turn  the  page  and  to  begin  a  new 
and  better  chapter  in  the  annals  of  international  inter- 
course. To  do  this  required  a  fixed  purpose  to  abandon  the 
old  methods,  to  insist  on  openness  and  candor,  to  refuse  to 
be  drawn  into  whispered  agreements.  The  choice  between 
the  old  and  the  new  ways  had  to  be  definite  and  final.  It 
had  to  be  made  at  the  very  beginning  of  the  negotiations. 
It  was  made.  Secrecy  was  adopted.  Thus  diplomacy,  in 
spite  of  the  announced  intention  to  reform  its  practices, 
has  retained  the  evil  taint  which  makes  it  out  of  harmony 
with  the  spirit  of  good  faith  and  of  open  dealing  which  is 
characteristic  of  the  best  thought  of  the  present  epoch. 
There  is  little  to  show  that  diplomacy  has  been  raised  to  a 
higher  plane  or  has  won  a  better  reputation  in  the  world  at 
large  than  it  possessed  before  the  nations  assembled  at 


242  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

Paris  to  make  peace.  This  failure  to  lift  the  necessary 
agency  of  international  relations  out  of  the  rut  worn  deep 
by  centuries  of  practice  is  one  of  the  deplorable  conse- 
quences of  the  peace  negotiations.  So  much  might  have 
been  done;  nothing  was  done. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

THE  SHANTUNG  SETTLEMENT 

THE  Shantung  Settlement  was  not  so  evidently  chargeable 
to  secret  negotiations  as  the  crisis  over  the  disposition  of 
Fiume,  but  the  decision  was  finally  reached  through  that 
method.  The  controversy  between  Japan  and  China  as 
to  which  country  should  become  the  possessor  of  the  former 
German  property  and  rights  in  the  Shantung  Peninsula 
was  not  decided  until  almost  the  last  moment  before  the 
Treaty  with  Germany  was  completed.  Under  pressure 
of  the  necessity  of  making  the  document  ready  for  deliv- 
ery to  the  German  delegates,  President  Wilson,  M.  Cle- 
menceau,  and  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  composing  the  Council  of 
the  Heads  of  States  in  the  absence  of  Signor  Orlando  in 
Rome,  issued  an  order  directing  the  Drafting  Committee 
of  the  Conference  to  prepare  articles  for  the  Treaty  em- 
bodying the  decision  that  the  Council  had  made.  This  de- 
cision, which  was  favorable  to  the  Japanese  claims,  was 
the  result  of  a  confidential  arrangement  with  the  Japanese 
delegates  by  which,  in  the  event  of  their  claims  being 
granted,  they  withdrew  their  threat  to  decline  to  sign  the 
Treaty  of  Peace,  agreed  not  to  insist  on  a  proposed 
amendment  to  the  Covenant  declaring  for  racial  equality, 
and  orally  promised  to  restore  to  China  in  the  near  future 
certain  rights  of  sovereignty  over  the  territory,  which 


244  TOE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

promise  failed  of  confirmation  in  writing  or  by  formal 
public  declaration. 

It  is  fair  to  presume  that,  if  the  conflicting  claims  of 
Japan  and  China  to  the  alleged  rights  of  Germany  in 
Chinese  territory  had  been  settled  upon  the  merits  through 
the  medium  of  an  impartial  commission  named  by  the 
Conference,  the  Treaty  provisions  relating  to  the  disposi- 
tion of  those  rights  would  have  been  very  different  from 
those  which  "The  Three"  ordered  to  be  drafted.  Before 
a  commission  of  the  Conference  no  persuasive  reasons  for 
conceding  the  Japanese  claims  could  have  been  urged  on 
the  basis  of  an  agreement  on  the  part  of  Japan  to  adhere  to 
the  League  of  Nations  or  to  abandon  the  attempt  to  have 
included  in  the  Covenant  a  declaration  of  equality  between 
races.  It  was  only  through  secret  interviews  and  secret 
agreements  that  the  threat  of  the  Japanese  delegates 
could  be  successfully  made.  An  adjustment  on  such  a 
basis  had  nothing  to  do  with  the  justice  of  the  case  or  with 
the  legal  rights  and  principles  involved.  The  threat  was 
intended  to  coerce  the  arbiters  of  the  treaty  terms  by  men- 
acing the  success  of  the  plan  to  establish  a  League  of  Na- 
tions —  to  use  an  ugly  word,  it  was  a  species  of  "black- 
mail" not  unknown  to  international  relations  in  the  past. 
It  was  made  possible  because  the  sessions  of  the  Council 
of  the  Heads  of  States  and  the  conversations  concerning 
Shantung  were  secret. 

It  was  a  calamity  for  the  Republic  of  China  and  unfor- 
tunate for  the  presumed  justice  written  into  the  Treaty 


THE  SHANTUNG  SETTLEMENT          245 

that  President  Wilson  was  convinced  that  the  Japanese 
delegates  would  decline  to  accept  the  Covenant  of  the 
League  of  Nations  if  the  claims  of  Japan  to  the  German 
rights  were  denied.  It  was  equally  unfortunate  that  the 
President  felt  that  without  Japan's  adherence  to  the  Cov- 
enant the  formation  of  the  League  would  be  endangered  if 
not  actually  prevented.  And  it  was  especially  unfortunate 
that  the  President  considered  the  formation  of  the  League 
in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  Covenant  to  be 
superior  to  every  other  consideration  and  that  to  accom- 
plish this  object  almost  any  sacrifice  would  be  justifiable. 
It  is  my  impression  that  the  departure  of  Signer  Orlando 
and  Baron  Sonnino  from  Paris  and  the  uncertainty  of  their 
return  to  give  formal  assent  to  the  Treaty  with  Germany, 
an  uncertainty  which  existed  at  the  time  of  the  decision 
of  the  Shantung  Question,  had  much  to  do  with  the  anxi- 
ety of  the  President  as  to  Japan's  attitude.  He  doubtless 
felt  that  to  have  two  of  the  Five  Great  Powers  decline  at 
the  last  moment  to  accept  the  Treaty  containing  the  Cove- 
nant would  jeopardize  the  plan  for  a  League  and  would 
greatly  encourage  his  opponents  in  the  United  States.  His 
line  of  reasoning  was  logical,  but  in  my  judgment  was 
based  on  the  false  premise  that  the  Japanese  would  carry 
out  their  threat  to  refuse  to  accept  the  Treaty  and  enter 
the  League  of  Nations  unless  they  obtained  a  cession  of 
the  German  rights.  I  did  not  believe  at  the  time,  and  I  do 
not  believe  now,  that  Japan  would  have  made  good  her 
threat.  The  superior  international  position,  which  she 


246  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

held  as  one  of  the  Five  Great  Powers  in  the  Conference, 
and  which  she  would  hold  in  the  League  of  Nations  as  one 
of  the  Principal  Powers  in  the  constitution  of  the  Execu- 
tive Council,  would  never  have  been  abandoned  by  the 
Tokio  Government.  The  Japanese  delegates  would  not 
have  run  the  risk  of  losing  this  position  by  adopting  the 
course  pursued  by  the  Italians. 

The  cases  were  different.  No  matter  what  action  was 
taken  by  Italy  she  would  have  continued  to  be  a  Great 
Power  in  any  organization  of  the  world  based  on  a  classi- 
fication of  the  nations.  If  she  did  not  enter  the  League 
under  the  German  Treaty,  she  certainly  would  later  and 
would  undoubtedly  hold  an  influential  position  in  the  or- 
ganization whether  her  delegates  signed  the  Covenant  or 
accepted  it  in  another  treaty  or  by  adherence.  It  was  not 
so  with  Japan.  There  were  reasons  to  believe  that,  if  she 
failed  to  become  one  of  the  Principal  Powers  at  the  outset, 
another  opportunity  might  never  be  given  her  to  obtain  so 
high  a  place  in  the  concert  of  the  nations.  The  seats  that 
her  delegates  had  in  the  Council  of  Ten  had  caused  criti- 
cism and  dissatisfaction  in  certain  quarters,  and  the  elim- 
ination of  a  Japanese  from  the  Council  of  the  Heads  of 
States  showed  that  the  Japanese  position  as  an  equal  of  the 
other  Great  Powers  was  by  no  means  secure.  These  in- 
dications of  Japan's  place  in  the  international  oligarchy 
must  have  been  evident  to  her  plenipotentiaries  at  Paris, 
who  in  all  probability  reported  the  situation  to  Tokio. 
From  the  point  of  view  of  policy  the  execution  of  the  threat 


THE  SHANTUNG  SETTLEMENT          247 

of  withdrawal  presented  dangers  to  Japan's  prestige  which 
the  diplomats  who  represented  her  would  never  have  in- 
curred if  they  were  as  cautious  and  shrewd  as  they  ap- 
peared to  be.  The  President  did  not  hold  this  opinion.  We 
differed  radically  in  our  judgment  as  to  the  sincerity  of  the 
Japanese  threat.  He  showed  that  he  believed  it  would  be 
carried  out.  I  believed  that  it  would  not  be. 

It  has  not  come  to  my  knowledge  what  the  attitude  of 
the  British  and  French  statesmen  was  concerning  the  dis- 
position of  the  Shantung  rights,  although  I  have  read  the 
views  of  certain  authors  on  the  subject,  but  I  do  know  that 
the  actual  decision  lay  with  the  President.  If  he  had  de- 
clined to  recognize  the  Japanese  claims,  they  would  never 
have  been  granted  nor  would  the  grant  have  been  written 
into  the  Treaty.  Everything  goes  to  show  that  he  realized 
this  responsibility  and  that  the  cession  to  Japan  was  not 
made  through  error  or  misconception  of  the  rights  of  the 
parties,  but  was  done  deliberately  and  with  a  full  apprecia- 
tion that  China  was  being  denied  that  which  in  other  cir- 
cumstances would  have  been  awarded  to  her.  If  it  had 
not  been  for  reasons  wholly  independent  and  outside  of  the 
question  in  dispute,  the  President  would  not  have  decided 
as  he  did. 

It  is  not  my  purpose  to  enter  into  the  details  of  the  ori- 
gin of  the  German  lease  of  Kiao-Chau  (the  port  of  Tsing- 
tau)  and  of  the  economic  concessions  in  the  Province  of 
Shantung  acquired  by  Germany.  Suffice  it  to  say  that, 
taking  advantage  of  a  situation  caused  by  the  murder  of 


248  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

some  missionary  priests  in  the  province,  the  German  Gov- 
ernment in  1898  forced  the  Chinese  Government  to  make 
treaties  granting  for  the  period  of  ninety-nine  years  the 
lease  and  concessions,  by  which  the  sovereign  authority 
over  this  "Holy  Land"  of  China  was  to  all  intents  ceded 
to  Germany,  which  at  once  improved  the  harbor,  fortified 
the  leased  area,  and  began  railway  construction  and  the 
exploitation  of  the  Shantung  Peninsula. 

The  outbreak  of  the  World  War  found  Germany  in  pos- 
session of  the  leased  area  and  in  substantial  control  of  the 
territory  under  the  concession.  On  August  15,  1914,  the 
Japanese  Government  presented  an  ultimatum  to  the  Ger- 
man Government,  in  which  the  latter  was  required  "to 
deliver  on  a  date  not  later  than  September  15  to  the  Im- 
perial Japanese  authorities,  without  condition  or  compen- 
sation, the  entire  leased  territory  of  Kiao-Chau  with  a  view 
to  the  eventual  restoration  of  the  same  to  China." 

On  the  German  failure  to  comply  with  these  demands 
the  Japanese  Government  landed  troops  and,  in  company 
with  a  small  British  contingent,  took  possession  of  the 
leased  port  and  occupied  the  territory  traversed  by  the 
German  railway,  even  to  the  extent  of  establishing  a  civil 
government  in  addition  to  garrisoning  the  line  with  Jap- 
anese troops.  Apparently  the  actual  occupation  of  this 
Chinese  territory  induced  a  change  in  the  policy  of  the 
Imperial  Government  at  Tokio,  for  in  December,  1914, 
Baron  Kato,  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  declared  that 
the  restoration  of  Tsingtau  to  China  "  is  to  be  settled  in 


THE  SHANTUNG  SETTLEMENT          249 

the  future"  and  that  the  Japanese  Government  had  made 
no  promises  to  do  so. 

This  statement,  which  seemed  in  contradiction  of  the 
ultimatum  to  Germany,  was  made  in  the  Japanese  Diet.  It 
was  followed  up  in  January,  1915,  by  the  famous  "Twenty- 
one  Demands  "  made  upon  the  Government  at  Peking.  It 
is  needless  to  go  into  these  demands  further  than  to  quote 
the  first  to  which  China  was  to  subscribe. 

"The  Chinese  Government  agrees  that  when  the  Jap- 
anese Government  hereafter  approaches  the  German  Gov- 
ernment for  the  transfer  of  all  rights  and  privileges  of 
whatsoever  nature  enjoyed  by  Germany  in  the  Province 
of  Shantung,  whether  secured  by  treaty  or  in  any  other 
manner,  China  shall  give  her  full  assent  thereto." 

The  important  point  to  be  noted  in  this  demand  is  that 
Japan  did  not  consider  that  the  occupation  of  Kiao-Chau 
and  the  seizure  of  the  German  concessions  transferred  title 
to  her,  but  looked  forward  to  a  future  transfer  by  treaty. 

The  "Twenty-one  Demands"  were  urged  with  persist- 
ency by  the  Japanese  Government  and  finally  took  the 
form  of  an  ultimatum  as  to  all  but  Group  V  of  the  "De- 
mands." The  Peking  Government  was  in  no  political  or 
military  condition  to  resist,  and,  in  order  to  avoid  an  open 
rupture  with  their  aggressive  neighbor,  entered  into  a 
treaty  granting  the  Japanese  demands. 

China,  following  the  action  which  the  United  States  had 
taken  on  February  3,  1917,  severed  diplomatic  relations 
with  Germany  on  March  14,  and  five  months  later  de- 


250  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

clared  war  against  her  announcing  at  the  same  time  that 
the  treaties,  conventions,  and  agreements  between  the  two 
countries  were  by  the  declaration  abrogated.  As  to  whether 
a  state  of  war  does  in  fact  abrogate  a  treaty  of  the  charac- 
ter of  the  Sino-German  Treaty  of  1898  some  question  may 
be  raised  under  the  accepted  rules  of  international  law, 
on  the  ground  that  it  was  a  cession  of  sovereign  rights  and 
constituted  an  international  servitude  in  favor  of  Germany 
over  the  territory  affected  by  it.  But  in  this  particular 
case  the  indefensible  duress  employed  by  the  German 
Government  to  compel  China  to  enter  into  the  treaty  in- 
troduces another  factor  into  the  problem  and  excepts  it 
from  any  general  rule  that  treaties  of  that  nature  are 
merely  suspended  and  not  abrogated  by  war  between  the 
parties.  It  would  seem  as  if  no  valid  argument  could  be 
made  in  favor  of  suspension  because  the  effect  of  the  rule 
would  be  to  revive  and  perpetuate  an  inequitable  and  un- 
justifiable act.  Morally  and  legally  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment was  right  in  denouncing  the  treaty  and  agreements 
with  Germany  and  in  treating  the  territorial  rights  ac- 
quired by  coercion  as  extinguished. 

It  would  appear,  therefore,  that,  as  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment recognized  that  the  rights  in  the  Province  of  Shan- 
tung had  not  passed  to  Japan  by  the  forcible  occupation 
of  Kiao-Chau  and  the  German  concessions,  those  rights 
ceased  to  exist  when  China  declared  war  against  Germany, 
and  that  China  was,  therefore,  entitled  to  resume  full  sov- 
ereignty over  the  area  where  such  rights  previously  existed. 


THE  SHANTUNG  SETTLEMENT          251 

It  is  true  that  subsequently,  on  September  24,  1918, 
the  Chinese  and  Japanese  Governments  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Tokio  entered  into  agreements  affecting  the  Jap- 
anese occupation  of  the  Kiao-Chau-Tsinan  Railway  and 
the  adjoining  territory,  but  the  governmental  situation 
at  Peking  was  too  precarious  to  refuse  any  demands  made 
by  the  Japanese  Government.  In  fact  the  action  of  the 
Japanese  Government  was  very  similar  to  that  of  the 
German  Government  in  1898.  An  examination  of  these 
notes  discloses  the  fact  that  the  Japanese  were  in  posses- 
sion of  the  denounced  German  rights,  but  nothing  in  the 
notes  indicates  that  they  were  there  as  a  matter  of  legal 
right,  or  that  the  Chinese  Government  conceded  their  right 
of  occupation. 

This  was  the  state  of  affairs  when  the  Peace  Conference 
assembled  at  Paris.  Germany  had  by  force  compelled 
China  in  1898  to  cede  to  her  certain  rights  in  the  Province 
of  Shantung.  Japan  had  seized  these  rights  by  force  in 
1914  and  had  by  threats  forced  China  in  1915  to  agree 
to  accept  her  disposition  of  them  when  they  were  legally 
transferred  by  treaty  at  the  end  of  the  war.  China  in  1917 
had,  on  entering  the  war  against  Germany,  denounced  all 
treaties  and  agreements  with  Germany,  so  that  the  ceded 
rights  no  longer  existed  and  could  not  legally  be  trans- 
ferred by  Germany  to  Japan  by  the  Treaty  of  Peace,  since 
the  title  was  in  China.  In  fact  any  transfer  or  disposition 
of  the  rights  in  Shantung  formerly  belonging  to  Germany 
was  a  transfer  or  disposition  of  rights  belonging  wholly  to 


252  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

China  and  would  deprive  that  country  of  a  portion  of  its 
full  sovereignty  over  the  territory  affected. 

While  this  view  of  the  extinguishment  of  the  German 
rights  in  Shantung  was  manifestly  the  just  one  and  its 
adoption  would  make  for  the  preservation  of  permanent 
peace  in  the  Far  East,  the  Governments  of  the  Allied  Pow- 
ers had,  early  in  1917,  and  prior  to  the  severance  of  diplo- 
matic relations  between  China  and  Germany,  acceded  to 
the  request  of  Japan  to  support,  "on  the  occasion  of  the 
Peace  Conference,"  her  claims  in  regard  to  these  rights 
which  then  existed.  The  representatives  of  Great  Britain, 
France,  and  Italy  at  Paris  were  thus  restricted,  or  at  least 
embarrassed,  by  the  promises  which  their  Governments 
had  made  at  a  time  when  they  were  in  no  position  to  refuse 
Japan's  request.  They  might  have  stood  on  the  legal 
ground  that  the  Treaty  of  1898  having  been  abrogated  by 
China  no  German  rights  in  Shantung  were  in  being  at  the 
time  of  the  Peace  Conference,  but  they  apparently  were 
unwilling  to  take  that  position.  Possibly  they  assumed  that 
the  ground  was  one  which  they  could  not  take  in  view  of 
the  undertakings  of  their  Governments;  or  possibly  they 
preferred  to  let  the  United  States  bear  the  brunt  of  Japa- 
nese resentment  for  interfering  with  the  ambitious  schemes 
of  the  Japanese  Government  in  regard  to  China.  There 
can  be  little  doubt  that  political,  and  possibly  commer- 
cial, interests  influenced  the  attitude  of  the  European 
Powers  in  regard  to  the  Shantung  Question. 

President  Wilson  and  the  American  Commissioners, 


THE  SHANTUNG  SETTLEMENT          253 

unhampered  by  previous  commitments,  were  strongly 
opposed  to  acceding  to  the  demands  of  the  Japanese  Gov- 
ernment. The  subject  had  been  frequently  considered 
during  the  early  days  of  the  negotiations  and  there  seemed 
to  be  no  divergence  of  views  as  to  the  justice  of  the  Chinese 
claim  of  right  to  the  resumption  of  full  sovereignty  over 
the  territory  affected  by  the  lease  and  the  concessions  to 
Germany.  These  views  were  further  strengthened  by  the 
presentation  of  the  question  before  the  Council  of  Ten. 
On  January  27  the  Japanese  argued  their  case  before  the 
Council,  the  Chinese  delegates  being  present;  and  on  the 
28th  Dr.  V.  K.  Wellington  Koo  spoke  on  behalf  of  China. 
In  a  note  on  the  meeting  I  recorded  that  "he  simply  over- 
whelmed the  Japanese  with  his  argument."  I  believe  that 
that  opinion  was  common  to  all  those  who  heard  the  two 
presentations.  In  fact  it  made  such  an  impression  on  the 
Japanese  themselves,  that  one  of  the  delegates  called  upon 
me  the  following  day  and  attempted  to  offset  the  effect  by 
declaring  that  the  United  States,  since  it  had  not  promised 
to  support  Japan's  contention,  would  be  blamed  if  Kiao- 
Chau  was  returned  directly  to  China.  He  added  that  there 
was  intense  feeling  in  Japan  in  regard  to  the  matter.  It 
was  an  indirect  threat  of  what  would  happen  to  the 
friendly  relations  between  the  two  countries  if  Japan's 
claim  was  denied. 

The  sessions  of  the  Commission  on  the  League  of  Na- 
tions and  the  absence  of  President  Wilson  from  Paris  inter- 
rupted further  consideration  of  the  Shantung  Question 


254  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

until  the  latter  part  of  March,  when  the  Council  of  Four 
came  into  being.  As  the  subject  had  been  fully  debated  in 
January  before  the  Council  of  Ten,  final  decision  lay  with 
the  Council  of  Four.  What  discussions  took  place  in  the  lat- 
ter council  I  do  not  know  on  account  of  the  secrecy  which 
was  observed  as  to  their  deliberations.  But  I  presume  that 
the  President  stood  firmly  for  the  Chinese  rights,  as  the 
matter  remained  undecided  until  the  latter  part  of  April. 

On  the  2 ist  of  April  Baron  Makino  and  Viscount  Chinda 
called  upon  me  in  regard  to  the  question,  and  I  frankly 
told  them  that  they  ought  to  prove  the  justice  of  the  Japa- 
nese claim,  that  they  had  not  done  it  and  that  I  doubted 
their  ability  to  do  so.  I  found,  too,  that  the  President  had 
proposed  that  the  Five  Powers  act  as  trustees  of  the  former 
German  rights  in  Shantung,  but  that  the  Japanese  dele- 
gates had  declared  that  they  could  not  consent  to  the 
proposition,  which  was  in  the  nature  of  a  compromise  in- 
tended to  bridge  over  the  existing  situation  that,  on  ac- 
count of  the  near  approach  of  the  completion  of  the  Treaty, 
was  becoming  more  and  more  acute. 

On  April  26  the  President,  at  a  conference  with  the 
American  Commissioners,  showed  deep  concern  over  the 
existing  state  of  the  controversy,  and  asked  me  to  see  the 
Japanese  delegates  again  and  endeavor  to  dissuade  them 
from  insisting  on  their  demands  and  to  induce  them  to  con- 
sider the  international  trusteeship  proposed.  The  evening 
of  the  same  day  the  two  Japanese  came  by  request  to  my 
office  and  conferred  with  Professor  E.  T.  Williams,  the 


THE  SHANTUNG  SETTLEMENT          255 

Commission's  principal  adviser  on  Far  Eastern  affairs, 
and  with  me.  After  an  hour's  conversation  Viscount 
Chinda  made  it  very  clear  that  Japan  intended  to  insist 
on  her  "pound  of  flesh."  It  was  apparent  both  to  Mr. 
Williams  and  to  me  that  nothing  could  be  done  to  obtain 
even  a  compromise,  though  it  was  on  the  face  favorable  to 
Japan,  since  it  recognized  the  existence  of  the  German 
rights,  which  China  claimed  were  annulled. 

On  April  28  I  gave  a  full  report  of  the  interview  to  Mr. 
White  and  General  Bliss  at  our  regular  morning  meeting. 
Later  in  the  morning  the  President  telephoned  me  and 
I  informed  him  of  the  fixed  determination  of  the  Japanese 
to  insist  upon  their  claims.  What  occurred  between  the 
time  of  my  conversation  with  the  President  and  the  ple- 
nary session  of  the  Conference  on  the  Preliminaries  of  Peace 
in  the  afternoon,  at  which  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of 
Nations  was  adopted,  I  do  not  actually  know,  but  the  pre- 
sumption is  that  the  Japanese  were  promised  a  satisfactory 
settlement  in  regard  to  Shantung,  since  they  announced 
that  they  would  not  press  an  amendment  on  "  racial  equal- 
ity" at  the  session,  an  amendment  upon  which  they  had 
indicated  they  intended  to  insist. 

After  the  meeting  of  the  Conference  I  made  the  follow- 
ing memorandum  of  the  situation : 

"At  the  Plenary  Session  of  the  Peace  Conference  this 
afternoon  Baron  Makino  spoke  of  his  proposed  amend- 
ment to  the  Covenant  declaring  '  racial  equality/  but  said 
he  would  not  press  it. 


256  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

"I  concluded  from  what  the  President  said  to  me  that 
he  was  disposed  to  accede  to  Japan's  claims  in  regard  to 
Kiao-Chau  and  Shantung.  He  also  showed  me  a  letter 
from  — —  to  Makino  saying  he  was  sorry  their  claims 
had  not  been  finally  settled  before  the  Session. 

"From  all  this  I  am  forced  to  the  conclusion  that  a 
bargain  has  been  struck  by  which  the  Japanese  agree  to 
sign  the  Covenant  in  exchange  for  admission  of  their 
claims.  If  so,  it  is  an  iniquitous  agreement. 

"Apparently  the  President  is  going  to  do  this  to  avoid 
Japan's  declining  to  enter  the  League  of  Nations.  It  is  a 
surrender  of  the  principle  of  self-determination,  a  transfer 
of  millions  of  Chinese  from  one  foreign  master  to  another. 
This  is  another  of  those  secret  arrangements  which  have 
riddled  the  'Fourteen  Points'  and  are  wrecking  a  just 
peace. 

"In  my  opinion  it  would  be  better  to  let  Japan  stay  out 
of  the  League  than  to  abandon  China  and  surrender  our 
prestige  in  the  Far  East  for  'a  mess  of  pottage'  —  and 
a  mess  it  is.  I  fear  that  it  is  too  late  to  do  anything  to 
save  the  situation." 

Mr.  White,  General  Bliss,  and  I,  at  our  meeting  that 
morning  before  the  plenary  session,  and  later  when  we 
conferred  as  to  what  had  taken  place  at  the  session,  were 
unanimous  in  our  opinions  that  China's  rights  should  be 
sustained  even  if  Japan  withdrew  from  the  Peace  Confer- 
ence. We  were  all  indignant  at  the  idea  of  submitting  to 
the  Japanese  demands  and  agreed  that  the  President 
should  be  told  of  our  attitude,  because  we  were  unwilling 
to  have  it  appear  that  we  in  any  way  approved  of  acced- 
ing to  Japan's  claims  or  even  of  compromising  them. 


*•  *#*?•   ..  — 

,j^     "*^r~ 


THE  DAILY  CONFERENCE   OF  THE  AMERICAN   PEACE   COMMISSION 


THE  SHANTUNG  SETTLEMENT          257 

General  Bliss  volunteered  to  write  the  President  a  letter 
on  the  subject,  a  course  which  Mr.  White  and  I  heartily 
endorsed. 

The  next  morning  the  General  read  the  following  letter 
to  us  and  with  our  entire  approval  sent  it  to  Mr.  Wilson : 

"Hotel  de  Crillon,  Paris 

"April  29,  1919 
"Mv  DEAR  MR.  PRESIDENT: 

"Last  Saturday  morning  you  told  the  American  Delega- 
tion that  you  desired  suggestions,  although  not  at  that 
moment,  in  regard  to  the  pending  matter  of  certain  con- 
flicting claims  between  Japan  and  China  centering  about 
the  alleged  German  rights.  My  principal  interest  in  the 
matter  is  with  sole  reference  to  the  question  of  the  moral 
right  or  wrong  involved.  From  this  point  of  view  I  dis- 
cussed the  matter  this  morning  with  Mr.  Lansing  and  Mr. 
White.  They  concurred  with  me  and  requested  me  to 
draft  a  hasty  note  to  you  on  the  subject. 

"Since  your  conference  with  us  last  Saturday,  I  have 
asked  myself  three  or  four  Socratic  questions  the  answers 
to  which  make  me,  personally,  quite  sure  on  which  side 
the  moral  right  lies. 

"First.  Japan  bases  certain  of  her  claims  on  the  right 
acquired  by  conquest.  I  asked  myself  the  following  ques- 
tions: Suppose  Japan  had  not  succeeded  in  her  efforts  to 
force  the  capitulation  of  the  Germans  at  Tsing-Tsau; 
suppose  that  the  armistice  of  November  nth  had  found 
her  still  fighting  the  Germans  at  that  place,  just  as  the 
armistice  found  the  English  still  fighting  the  Germans  in 
South-East  Africa.  We  would  then  oblige  Germany  to 
dispose  of  her  claims  in  China  by  a  clause  in  the  Treaty  of 
Peace.  Would  it  occur  to  any  one  that,  as  a  matter  of 
right,  we  should  force  Germany  to  cede  her  claims  to  Japan 


258  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

rather  than  to  China?  It  seems  to  me  that  it  would  occur 
to  every  American  that  we  would  then  have  the  opportu- 
nity that  we  have  long  desired  to  force  Germany  to  cor- 
rect, in  favor  of  China,  the  great  wrong  which  she  began 
to  do  to  the  latter  in  1898.  What  moral  right  has  Japan 
acquired  by  her  conquest  of  Shantung  assisted  by  the 
British?  If  Great  Britain  and  Japan  secured  no  moral 
right  to  sovereignty  over  various  savages  inhabiting  is- 
lands in  the  Pacific  Ocean,  but,  on  the  other  hand,  we 
held  that  these  peoples  shall  be  governed  by  mandates 
under  the  League  of  Nations,  what  moral  right  has  Japan 
acquired  to  the  suzerainty  (which  she  would  undoubt- 
edly eventually  have)  over  30,000,000  Chinese  in  the  sa- 
cred province  of  Shantung? 

"  Second.  Japan  must  base  her  claims  either  on  the  Con- 
vention with  China  or  on  the  right  of  conquest,  or  on  both. 
Let  us  consider  her  moral  right  under  either  of  these  points. 
"a)  If  the  United  States  has  not  before  this  recognized 
the  validity  of  the  rights  claimed  by  Japan  under 
her  Convention  with  China,  what  has  happened 
since  the  Armistice  that  would  justify  us  in  recog- 
nizing their  validity  now? 

"&)  If  Germany  had  possessed  territory,  in  full  sover- 
eignty, on  the  east  coast  of  Asia,  a  right  to  this  ter- 
ritory, under  international  law,  could  have  been 
obtained  by  conquest.  But  Germany  possessed  no 
such  territory.  What  then  was  left  for  Japan  to 
acquire  by  conquest?  Apparently  nothing  but  a 
lease  extorted  under  compulsion  from  China  by 
Germany.  I  understand  that  international  lawyers 
hold  that  such  a  lease,  or  the  rights  acquired,  justly 
or  unjustly,  under  it,  cannot  be  acquired  by  con- 
quest. 
"  Third.  Suppose  Germany  says  to  us,  'We  will  cede  our 


TOE  SHANTUNG  SETTLEMENT          259 

lease  and  all  rights  under  it,  but  we  will  cede  them  back  to 
China/  Will  we  recognize  the  justice  of  Japan's  claims  to 
such  an  extent  that  we  will  threaten  Germany  with  further 
war  unless  she  cedes  these  rights  to  Japan  rather  than  to 
China  ? 

"Again,  suppose  that  Germany,  in  her  hopelessness  of 
resistance  to  our  demands,  should  sign  without  question  a 
clause  ceding  these  rights  to  Japan,  even  though  we  know 
that  this  is  so  wrong  that  we  would  not  fight  in  order  to 
compel  Germany  to  do  it,  what  moral  justification  would 
we  have  in  making  Germany  do  this  ? 

"Fourth.  Stripped  of  all  words  that  befog  the  issue, 
would  we  not,  under  the  guise  of  making  a  treaty  with 
Germany,  really  be  making  a  treaty  with  Japan  by  which 
we  compel  one  of  our  Allies  (China)  to  cede  against  her 
will  these  things  to  Japan  ?  Would  not  this  action  be  really 
more  unjustifiable  than  the  one  which  you  have  refused  to 
be  a  party  to  on  the  Dalmatian  Coast?  Because,  in  the 
latter  case,  the  territory  in  dispute  did  not  belong  to  one  of 
the  Allies,  but  to  one  of  the  Central  Powers;  the  question 
in  Dalmatia  is  as  to  which  of  two  friendly  powers  we  shall 
give  territory  taken  from  an  enemy  power;  in  China  the 
question  is,  shall  we  take  certain  claimed  rights  from  one 
friendly  power  in  order  to  give  them  to  another  friendly 
power. 

"It  would  seem  to  be  advisable  to  call  particular  atten- 
tion to  what  the  Japanese  mean  when  they  say  that  they 
will  return  Kiao-chow  to  China.  They  do  not  offer  to  re- 
turn the  railway,  the  mines  or  the  port,  i.e.,  Tsingtau. 
The  leased  territory  included  a  portion  of  land  on  the 
north-east  side  of  the  entrance  of  the  Bay  and  another  on 
the  south-west  and  some  islands.  It  is  a  small  territory. 
The  50  Kilometer  Zone  was  not  included.  That  was  a 
limitation  put  upon  the  movement  of  German  troops. 


2<5o  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

They  could  not  go  beyond  the  boundary  of  the  zone. 
Within  this  zone  China  enjoyed  all  rights  of  sovereignty 
and  administration. 

"Japan's  proposal  to  abandon  the  zone  is  somewhat  of 
an  impertinence,  since  she  has  violated  it  ever  since  she 
took  possession.  She  kept  troops  all  along  the  railway  line 
until  recently  and  insists  on  maintaining  in  the  future  a 
guard  at  Tsinan,  254  miles  away.  The  zone  would  restrict 
her  military  movements,  consequently  she  gives  it  up. 

"The  proposals  she  makes  are  (i)  to  open  the  whole 
bay.  It  is  from  15  to  20  miles  from  the  entrance  to  the 
northern  shore  of  the  bay.  (2)  To  have  a  Japanese  exclu- 
sive concession  at  a  place  to  be  designated  by  her,  i.e.,  she 
can  take  just  as  much  as  she  likes  of  the  territory  around 
the  bay.  It  may  be  as  large  as  the  present  leased  terri- 
tory, but  more  likely  it  will  include  only  the  best  part  of 
Tsingtau.  What  then  does  she  give  up  ?  Nothing  but  such 
parts  of  the  leased  territory  as  are  of  no  value. 

"The  operation  then  would  amount  chiefly  to  an  ex- 
change of  two  pieces  of  paper  —  one  cancelling  the  lease 
for  78  years,  the  other  granting  a  more  valuable  concession 
which  would  amount  to  a  permanent  title  to  the  port. 
Why  take  two  years  to  go  through  this  operation  ? 

"If  it  be  right  for  a  policeman,  who  recovers  your  purse, 
to  keep  the  contents  and  claim  that  he  has  fulfilled  his 
duty  in  returning  the  empty  purse,  then  Japan's  conduct 
may  be  tolerated. 

"If  it  be  right  for  Japan  to  annex  the  territory  of  an 
Ally,  then  it  cannot  be  wrong  for  Italy  to  retain  Fiume 
taken  from  the  enemy. 

"If  we  support  Japan's  claim,  we  abandon  the  democ- 
racy of  China  to  the  domination  of  the  Prussianized  mili- 
tarism of  Japan. 

"We  shall  be  sowing  dragons'  teeth. 


THE  SHANTUNG  SETTLEMENT          261 

"It  can't  be  right  to  do  wrong  even  to  make  peace. 
Peace  is  desirable,  but  there  are  things  dearer  than  peace, 
justice  and  freedom. 

"  Sincerely  yours 

"  THE  PRESIDENT  "  "T.  H.  BLISS 

I  have  not  discussed  certain  modifications  proposed  by 
the  Japanese  delegates,  since,  as  is  clear  from  General 
Bliss's  letter,  they  amounted  to  nothing  and  were  merely 
a  pretense  of  concession  and  without  substantial  value. 

The  day  following  the  delivery  of  this  letter  to  the  Pres- 
ident (April  30),  by  which  he  was  fully  advised  of  the  atti- 
tude of  General  Bliss,  Mr.  White,  and  myself  in  regard  to 
the  Japanese  claims,  the  Council  of  Four  reached  its  final 
decision  of  the  matter,  in  which  necessarily  Mr.  Wilson 
acquiesced.  I  learned  of  this  decision  the  same  evening. 
The  memorandum  which  I  made  the  next  morning  in 
regard  to  the  matter  is  as  follows : 

"China  has  been  abandoned  to  Japanese  rapacity.  A 
democratic  territory  has  been  given  over  to  an  autocratic 
government.  The  President  has  conceded  to  Japan  all 
that,  if  not  more  than,  she  ever  hoped  to  obtain.  This  is 
the  information  contained  in  a  memorandum  handed  by 
Ray  Stannard  Baker  under  the  President's  direction  to  the 
Chinese  delegation  last  evening,  a  copy  of  which  reached 
me  through  Mr. [of  the  Chinese  delegation]. 

"Mr.  also  said  that  Mr.  Baker  stated  that  the 

President  desired  him  to  say  that  the  President  was  very 
sorry  that  he  had  not  been  able  to  do  more  for  China  but 
that  he  had  been  compelled  to  accede  to  Japan's  demand 
'in  order  to  save  the  League  of  Nations' 


262  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

"The  memorandum  was  most  depressing.  Though  I  had 
anticipated  something  of  the  sort  three  days  ago  [see  note 
of  April  28  previously  quoted],  I  had  unconsciously  cher- 
ished a  hope  that  the  President  would  stand  to  his  guns 
and  champion  China's  cause.  He  has  failed  to  do  so.  It  is 
true  that  China  is  given  the  shell  called  'sovereignty/  but 
the  economic  control,  the  kernel,  is  turned  over  to  Japan. 

"However  logical  may  appear  the  argument  that 
China's  political  integrity  is  preserved  and  will  be  main- 
tained under  the  guaranty  of  the  League  of  Nations,  the 
fact  is  that  Japan  will  rule  over  millions  of  Chinese.  Fur- 
thermore it  is  still  a  matter  of  conjecture  how  valuable  the 
guaranty  of  the  League  will  prove  to  be.  It  has,  of  course, 
never  been  tried,  and  Japan's  representation  on  the 
Council  will  possibly  thwart  any  international  action  in 
regard  to  China. 

"Frankly  my  policy  would  have  been  to  say  to  the  Jap- 
anese, '  If  you  do  not  give  back  to  China  what  Germany 
stole  from  her,  we  don't  want  you  in  the  League  of  Na- 
tions.' If  the  Japanese  had  taken  offense  and  gone,  I 
would  have  welcomed  it,  for  we  would  have  been  well  rid 
of  a  government  with  such  imperial  designs.  But  she  would 
not  have  gone.  She  would  have  submitted.  She  has  at- 
tained a  high  place  in  world  councils.  Her  astute  states- 
men would  never  have  abandoned  her  present  exalted 
position  even  for  the  sake  of  Kiao-Chau.  The  whole  affair 
assumes  a  sordid  and  sinister  character,  in  which  the 
President,  acting  undoubtedly  with  the  best  of  motives, 
became  the  cat's-paw. 

"  I  have  no  doubt  that  the  President  fully  believed  that 
the  League  of  Nations  was  in  jeopardy  and  that  to  save  it 
he  was  compelled  to  subordinate  every  other  consideration. 
The  result  was  that  China  was  offered  up  as  a  sacrifice 
to  propitiate  the  threatening  Moloch  of  Japan.  When 


THE  SHANTUNG  SETTLEMENT          263 

you  get  down  to  facts  the  threats  were  nothing  but 
'bluff.' 

"I  do  not  think  that  anything  that  has  happened  here 
has  caused  more  severe  or  more  outspoken  criticism  than 
this  affair.  I  am  heartsick  over  it,  because  I  see  how  much 
good-will  and  regard  the  President  is  bound  to  lose.  I  can 
offer  no  adequate  explanation  to  the  critics.  There  seems 
to  be  none." 

It  is  manifest,  from  the  foregoing  recital  of  events  lead- 
ing up  to  the  decision  in  regard  to  the  Shantung  Question 
and  the  apparent  reasons  for  the  President's  agreement  to 
support  the  Japanese  claims,  that  we  radically  differed  as  to 
the  decision  which  was  embodied  in  Articles  156,  157,  and 
158  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  (see  Appendix  VI,  p.  318). 
I  do  not  think  that  we  held  different  opinions  as  to  the 
justice  of  the  Chinese  position,  though  probably  the  sound- 
ness of  the  legal  argument  in  favor  of  the  extinguishment 
of  the  German  rights  appealed  more  strongly  to  me  than  it 
did  to  Mr.  Wilson.  Our  chief  differences  were,  first,  that  it 
was  more  important  to  insure  the  acceptance  of  the  Cove- 
nant of  the  League  of  Nations  than  to  do  strict  justice  to 
China;  second,  that  the  Japanese  withdrawal  from  the 
Conference  would  prevent  the  formation  of  the  League; 
and,  third,  that  Japan  would  have  withdrawn  if  her  claims 
had  been  denied.  As  to  these  differences  our  opposite 
views  remained  unchanged  after  the  Treaty  of  Versailles 
was  signed. 

When  I  was  summoned  before  the  Senate  Committee 
on  Foreign  Relations  on  August  6,  1919,  I  told  the  Com- 


264  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

mittee  that,  in  my  opinion,  the  Japanese  signatures  would 
have  been  affixed  to  the  Treaty  containing  the  Covenant 
even  though  Shantung  had  not  been  delivered  over  to 
Japan,  and  that  the  only  reason  that  I  had  yielded  was  be- 
cause it  was  my  duty  to  follow  the  decision  of  the  President 
of  the  United  States. 

About  two  weeks  later,  August  19,  the  President  had  a 
conference  at  the  White  House  with  the  same  Committee. 
In  answer  to  questions  regarding  the  Shantung  Settle- 
ment, Mr.  Wilson  said  concerning  my  statement  that  his 
judgment  was  different  from  mine,  that  in  his  judgment 
the  signatures  could  not  have  been  obtained  if  he  had  not 
given  Shantung  to  Japan,  and  that  he  had  been  notified 
that  the  Japanese  delegates  had  been  instructed  not  to  sign 
the  Treaty  unless  the  cession  of  the  German  rights  in 
Shantung  to  Japan  was  included. 

Presumably  the  opinion  which  Mr.  Wilson  held  in  the 
summer  of  1919  he  continues  to  hold,  and  for  my  part  my 
views  and  feelings  remain  the  same  now  as  they  were 
then,  with  possibly  the  difference  that  the  indignation  and 
shame  that  I  felt  at  the  time  in  being  in  any  way  a  partici- 
pant in  robbing  China  of  her  just  rights  have  increased 
rather  than  lessened. 

So  intense  was  the  bitterness  among  the  American  Com- 
missioners over  the  flagrant  wrong  being  perpetrated  that, 
when  the  decision  of  the  Council  of  Four  was  known,  some 
of  them  considered  whether  or  not  they  ought  to  resign 
or  give  notice  that  they  would  not  sign  the  Treaty  if  the 


THE  SHANTUNG  SETTLEMENT          265 

articles  concerning  Shantung  appeared.  The  presence 
at  Versailles  of  the  German  plenipotentiaries,  the  uncer- 
tainty of  the  return  of  the  Italian  delegates  then  in  Rome, 
and  the  murmurs  of  dissatisfaction  among  the  delegates  of 
the  lesser  nations  made  the  international  situation  precari- 
ous. To  have  added  to  the  serious  conditions  and  to  have 
possibly  precipitated  a  crisis  by  openly  rebelling  against 
the  President  was  to  assume  a  responsibility  which  no 
Commissioner  was  willing  to  take.  With  the  greatest  re- 
luctance the  American  Commissioners  submitted  to  the 
decision  of  the  Council  of  Four;  and,  when  the  Chinese 
delegates  refused  to  sign  the  Treaty  after  they  had  been 
denied  the  right  to  sign  it  with  reservations  to  the  Shan- 
tung articles,  the  American  Commissioners,  who  had  so 
strongly  opposed  the  settlement,  silently  approved  their 
conduct  as  the  only  patriotic  and  statesmanlike  course  to 
take.  So  far  as  China  was  concerned  the  Shantung  Ques- 
tion remained  open,  and  the  Chinese  Government  very 
properly  refused,  after  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  was  signed, 
to  enter  into  any  negotiations  with  Japan  looking  toward 
its  settlement  upon  the  basis  of  the  treaty  provisions. 

There  was  one  exception  to  the  President's  usual  prac- 
tice which  is  especially  noticeable  in  connection  with  the 
Shantung  controversy,  and  that  was  the  greater  participa- 
tion which  he  permitted  the  members  of  the  American 
Commission  in  negotiating  with  both  the  Japanese  and 
the  Chinese.  It  is  true  he  did  not  disclose  his  intentions  to 
the  Commissioners,  but  he  did  express  a  wish  for  their  ad- 


266  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

vice  and  he  directed  me  to  confer  with  the  Japanese  and 
obtain  their  views.  Just  why  he  adopted  this  course,  for 
him  unusual,  I  do  not  know  unless  he  felt  that  so  far  as  the 
equity  of  China's  claim  was  concerned  we  were  all  in  agree- 
ment, and  if  there  was  to  be  a  departure  from  strict  justice 
he  desired  to  have  his  colleagues  suggest  a  way  to  do  so. 
It  is  possible,  too,  that  he  felt  the  question  was  in  large 
measure  a  legal  one,  and  decided  that  the  illegality  of 
transferring  the  German  rights  to  Japan  could  be  more 
successfully  presented  to  the  Japanese  delegates  by  a  law- 
yer. In  any  event,  in  this  particular  case  he  adopted  a 
course  more  in  accord  with  established  custom  and  prac- 
tice than  he  did  in  any  other  of  the  many  perplexing  and 
difficult  problems  which  he  was  called  upon  to  solve  during 
the  Paris  negotiations,  excepting  of  course  the  subjects 
submitted  to  commissions  of  the  Conference.  As  has  been 
shown,  Mr.  Wilson  did  not  follow  the  advice  of  the  three 
Commissioners  given  him  in  General  Bliss's  letter,  but 
that  does  not  detract  from  the  noteworthiness  of  the  fact 
that  in  the  case  of  Shantung  he  sought  advice  from  his 
Commissioners. 

This  ends  the  account  of  the  Shantung  Settlement  and 
the  negotiations  which  led  up  to  it.  The  consequences  were 
those  which  were  bound  to  follow  so  indefensible  a  de- 
cision as  the  one  that  was  reached.  Public  opinion  in  the 
United  States  was  almost  unanimous  in  condemning  it  and 
in  denouncing  those  responsible  for  so  evident  a  departure 
from  legal  justice  and  the  principles  of  international  mo- 


THE  SHANTUNG  SETTLEMENT         267 

rality.  No  plea  of  expediency  or  of  necessity  excused  such 
a  flagrant  denial  of  undoubted  right.  The  popular  recog- 
nition that  a  great  wrong  had  been  done  to  a  nation  weak 
because  of  political  discord  and  an  insufficient  military  es- 
tablishment, in  order  to  win  favor  with  a  nation  strong  be- 
cause of  its  military  power  and  national  unity,  had  much 
to  do  with  increasing  the  hostility  to  the  Treaty  and  pre- 
venting its  acceptance  by  the  Senate  of  the  United  States. 
The  whole  affair  furnishes  another  example  of  the  results 
of  secret  diplomacy,  for  the  arguments  which  prevailed 
with  the  President  were  those  to  which  he  listened  when  he 
sat  in  secret  council  with  M.  Clemenceau  and  Mr.  Lloyd 
George. 


CHAPTER  XIX 
THE  BULLITT  AFFAIR 

THE  foregoing  chapters  have  related  to  subjects  which 
were  known  to  President  Wilson  to  be  matters  of  differ- 
ence between  us  while  we  were  together  in  Paris  and  which 
are  presumably  referred  to  in  his  letter  of  February  n, 
1920,  extracts  from  which  are  quoted  in  the  opening  chap- 
ter. The  narration  might  be  concluded  with  our  difference 
of  opinion  as  to  the  Shantung  Settlement,  but  in  view  of 
subsequent  information  which  the  President  received  I  am 
convinced  that  he  felt  that  my  objections  to  his  decisions 
in  regard  to  the  terms  of  the  peace  with  Germany  extended 
further  than  he  knew  at  the  time,  and  that  he  resented 
the  fact  that  my  mind  did  not  go  along  with  his  as  to  these 
decisions.  This  undoubtedly  added  to  the  reasons  for  his 
letter  and  possibly  influenced  him  to  write  as  he  did  in 
February,  1920,  even  more  than  our  known  divergence  of 
judgment  during  the  negotiations. 

I  do  not  feel,  therefore,  that  the  story  is  complete  with- 
out at  least  a  brief  reference  to  my  views  concerning  the 
Treaty  of  Versailles  at  the  time  of  its  delivery  to  the 
German  delegates,  which  were  imperfectly  disclosed  in  a 
statement  made  by  William  C.  Bullitt  on  September  12, 
1919,  at  a  public  hearing  before  the  Senate  Committee  on 
Foreign  Relations.  As  to  the  conduct  of  Mr.  Bullitt,  who 


THE  BULLITT  AFFAIR  269 

had  held  a  responsible  position  with  the  American  Com- 
mission at  Paris,  in  voluntarily  repeating  a  conversation 
which  was  from  its  nature  highly  confidential,  I  make  no 
comment. 

The  portion  of  the  statement,  which  I  have  no  doubt 
deeply  incensed  the  President  because  it  was  published 
while  he  was  in  the  West  making  his  appeals  to  the  peo- 
ple in  behalf  of  the  Treaty  and  especially  of  the  League 
of  Nations,  is  as  follows: 

"Mr.  Lansing  said  that  he,  too,  considered  many  parts 
of  the  Treaty  thoroughly  bad,  particularly  those  dealing 
with  Shantung  and  the  League  of  Nations.  He  said:  *I 
consider  that  the  League  of  Nations  at  present  is  entirely 
useless.  The  Great  Powers  have  simply  gone  ahead  and 
arranged  the  world  to  suit  themselves.  England  and 
France  have  gotten  out  of  the  Treaty  everything  that  they 
wanted,  and  the  League  of  Nations  can  do  nothing  to  alter 
any  of  the  unjust  clauses  of  the  Treaty  except  by  unani- 
mous consent  of  the  members  of  the  League,  and  the  Great 
Powers  will  never  give  their  consent  to  changes  in  the  in- 
terests of  weaker  peoples/ 

"We  then  talked  about  the  possibility  of  ratification  by 
the  Senate.  Mr.  Lansing  said : '  I  believe  that  if  the  Senate 
could  only  understand  what  this  Treaty  means,  and  if  the 
American  people  could  really  understand,  it  would  un- 
questionably be  defeated,  but  I  wonder  if  they  will  ever 
understand  what  it  lets  them  in  for."  (Senate  Doc.  106, 
66th  Congress,  1st  Session,  p.  1276.) 

It  does  not  seem  an  unwarranted  conjecture  that  the 
President  believed  that  this  statement,  which  was  asserted 
by  Mr.  Bullitt  to  be  from  a  memorandum  made  at  the 


270  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

time,  indicated  that  I  had  been  unfaithful  to  him.  He  may 
even  have  concluded  that  I  had  been  working  against  the 
League  of  Nations  with  the  intention  of  bringing  about 
the  rejection  of  the  Covenant  by  the  Senate.  If  he  did  be- 
lieve this,  I  cannot  feel  that  it  was  other  than  natural  in 
the  circumstances,  especially  if  I  did  not  at  once  publicly 
deny  the  truth  of  the  Bullitt  statement.  That  I  could  not 
do  because  there  was  sufficient  truth  in  it  to  compel  me 
to  show  how,  by  slight  variations  and  by  omissions  in  the 
conversation,  my  words  were  misunderstood  or  misinter- 
preted. 

In  view  of  the  fact  that  I  found  it  impossible  to  make  an 
absolute  denial,  I  telegraphed  the  President  stating  the 
facts  and  offering  to  make  them  public  if  he  considered  it 
wise  to  do  so.  The  important  part  of  the  telegram,  which 
was  dated  September  16,  1919,  is  as  follows: 

"On  May  iyth  Bullitt  resigned  by  letter  giving  his  rea- 
sons, with  which  you  are  familiar.  I  replied  by  letter  on 
the  1 8th  without  any  comment  on  his  reasons.  Bullitt  on 
the  I9th  asked  to  see  me  to  say  good-bye  and  I  saw  him. 
He  elaborated  on  the  reasons  for  his  resignation  and  said 
that  he  could  not  conscientiously  give  countenance  to  a 
treaty  which  was  based  on  injustice.  I  told  him  that  I 
would  say  nothing  against  his  resigning  since  he  put  it  on 
conscientious  grounds,  and  that  I  recognized  that  certain 
features  of  the  Treaty  were  bad,  as  I  presumed  most  every 
one  did,  but  that  was  probably  unavoidable  in  view  of  con- 
flicting claims  and  that  nothing  ought  to  be  done  to  pre- 
vent the  speedy  restoration  of  peace  by  signing  the  Treaty. 
Bullitt  then  discussed  the  numerous  European  commis- 


THE  BULLITT  AFFAIR  271 

sions  provided  for  by  the  Treaty  on  which  the  United 
States  was  to  be  represented.  I  told  him  that  I  was  dis- 
turbed by  this  fact  because  I  was  afraid  the  Senate  and 
possibly  the  people,  if  they  understood  this,  would  refuse 
ratification,  and  that  anything  which  was  an  obstacle  to 
ratification  was  unfortunate  because  we  ought  to  have 
peace  as  soon  as  possible." 

It  is  very  easy  to  see  how  by  making  a  record  of  one  side 
of  this  conversation  without  reference  to  the  other  side  and 
by  an  omission  here  and  there,  possibly  unintentionally, 
the  sense  was  altered.  Thus  Mr.  Bullitt,  by  repeating  only 
a  part  of  my  words  and  by  omitting  the  context,  entirely 
changed  the  meaning  of  what  was  said.  My  attitude  was, 
and  I  intended  to  show  it  at  the  time,  that  the  Treaty 
should  be  signed  and  ratified  at  the  earliest  possible  mo- 
ment because  the  restoration  of  peace  was  paramount  and 
that  any  provision  in  the  Treaty  which  might  delay  the 
peace,  by  making  uncertain  senatorial  consent  to  ratifica- 
tion, was  to  be  deplored. 

Having  submitted  to  the  President  the  question  of  mak- 
ing a  public  explanation  of  my  interview  with  Mr.  Bullitt 
which  would  in  a  measure  at  least  correct  the  impression 
caused  by  his  statement,  I  could  not  do  so  until  I  received 
the  President's  approval.  That  was  never  received.  The 
telegram,  which  was  sent  to  Mr.  Wilson,  through  the  De- 
partment of  State,  was  never  answered.  It  was  not  even 
acknowledged.  The  consequence  was  that  the  version  of 
the  conversation  given  by  Mr.  Bullitt  was  the  only  one 
that  up  to  the  present  time  has  been  published. 


272  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

The  almost  unavoidable  conclusion  from  the  Presi- 
dent's silence  is  that  he  considered  my  explanation  was  in- 
sufficient to  destroy  or  even  to  weaken  materially  the  effect 
of  Mr.  Bullitt' s  account  of  what  had  taken  place,  and  that 
the  public  would  believe  in  spite  of  it  that  I  was  opposed 
to  the  Treaty  and  hostile  to  the  League  of  Nations.  I  am 
not  disposed  to  blame  the  President  for  holding  this  opin- 
ion considering  what  had  taken  place  at  Paris.  From  his 
point  of  view  a  statement,  such  as  I  was  willing  to  make, 
would  in  no  way  help  the  situation.  I  would  still  be  on 
record  as  opposed  to  certain  provisions  of  the  Treaty,  pro- 
visions which  he  was  so  earnestly  defending  in  his  ad- 
dresses. While  Mr.  Bullitt  had  given  an  incomplete  report 
of  our  conversation,  there  was  sufficient  truth  in  it  to 
make  anything  but  a  flat  denial  seem  of  little  value  to  the 
President;  and,  as  I  could  not  make  such  a  denial,  his  point 
of  view  seemed  to  be  that  the  damage  was  done  and  could 
not  be  undone.  I  am  inclined  to  think  that  he  was  right. 

My  views  concerning  the  Treaty  at  the  time  of  the  con- 
versation with  Mr.  Bullitt  are  expressed  in  a  memorandum 
of  May  8,  1919,  which  is  as  follows: 

"The  terms  of  peace  were  yesterday  delivered  to  the 
German  plenipotentiaries,  and  for  the  first  time  in  these 
days  of  feverish  rush  of  preparation  there  is  time  to  consider 
the  Treaty  as  a  complete  document. 

"The  impression  made  by  it  is  one  of  disappointment,  of 
regret,  and  of  depression.  The  terms  of  peace  appear  im- 
measurably harsh  and  humiliating,  while  many  of  them 
seem  to  me  impossible  of  performance. 


THE  BULLITT  AFFAIR  273 

"The  League  of  Nations  created  by  the  Treaty  is  relied 
upon  to  preserve  the  artificial  structure  which  has  been 
erected  by  compromise  of  the  conflicting  interests  of  the 
Great  Powers  and  to  prevent  the  germination  of  the 
seeds  of  war  which  are  sown  in  so  many  articles  and  which 
under  normal  conditions  would  soon  bear  fruit.  The 
League  might  as  well  attempt  to  prevent  the  growth  of 
plant  life  in  a  tropical  jungle.  Wars  will  come  sooner  or 
later. 

"  It  must  be  admitted  in  honesty  that  the  League  is  an 
instrument  of  the  mighty  to  check  the  normal  growth  of 
national  power  and  national  aspirations  among  those  who 
have  been  rendered  impotent  by  defeat.  Examine  the 
Treaty  and  you  will  find  peoples  delivered  against  their 
wills  into  the  hands  of  those  whom  they  hate,  while  their 
economic  resources  are  torn  from  them  and  given  to  others. 
Resentment  and  bitterness,  if  not  desperation,  are  bound 
to  be  the  consequences  of  such  provisions.  It  may  be  years 
before  these  oppressed  peoples  are  able  to  throw  off  the 
yoke,  but  as  sure  as  day  follows  night  the  time  will  come 
when  they  will  make  the  effort. 

"This  war  was  fought  by  the  United  States  to  destroy 
forever  the  conditions  which  produced  it.  Those  condi- 
tions have  not  been  destroyed.  They  have  been  sup- 
planted by  other  conditions  equally  productive  of  hatred, 
jealousy,  and  suspicion.  In  place  of  the  Triple  Alliance 
and  the  Entente  has  arisen  the  Quintuple  Alliance  which 
is  to  rule  the  world.  The  victors  in  this  war  intend  to  im- 
pose their  combined  will  upon  the  vanquished  and  to  sub- 
ordinate all  interests  to  their  own. 

"It  is  true  that  to  please  the  aroused  public  opinion  of 
mankind  and  to  respond  to  the  idealism  of  the  moralist 
they  have  surrounded  the  new  alliance  with  a  halo  and 
called  it  'The  League  of  Nations,'  but  whatever  it  may  be 


274  TOE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

called  or  however  it  may  be  disguised  it  is  an  alliance  of  the 
Five  Great  Military  Powers. 

"It  is  useless  to  close  our  eyes  to  the  fact  that  the  power 
to  compel  obedience  by  the  exercise  of  the  united  strength 
of  'The  Five'  is  the  fundamental  principle  of  the  League. 
Justice  is  secondary.  Might  is  primary. 

"The  League  as  now  constituted  will  be  the  prey  of 
greed  and  intrigue;  and  the  law  of  unanimity  in  the  Coun- 
cil, which  may  offer  a  restraint,  will  be  broken  or  render  the 
organization  powerless.  It  is  called  upon  to  stamp  as  just 
what  is  unjust. 

"We  have  a  treaty  of  peace,  but  it  will  not  bring  per- 
manent peace  because  it  is  founded  on  the  shifting  sands 
of  self-interest." 

In  the  views  thus  expressed  I  was  not  alone.  A  few  days 
after  they  were  written  I  was  in  London  where  I  discussed 
the  Treaty  with  several  of  the  leading  British  statesmen. 
I  noted  their  opinions  thus:  "The  consensus  was  that  the 
Treaty  was  unwise  and  unworkable,  that  it  was  conceived 
in  intrigue  and  fashioned  in  cupidity,  and  that  it  would 
produce  rather  than  prevent  wars."  One  of  these  leaders 
of  political  thought  in  Great  Britain  said  that  "the  only 
apparent  purpose  of  the  League  of  Nations  seems  to  be  to 
perpetuate  the  series  of  unjust  provisions  which  were  being 
imposed." 

The  day  following  my  return  from  London,  which  was 
on  May  17,  I  received  Mr.  Bullitt's  letter  of  resignation 
and  also  letters  from  five  of  our  principal  experts  protest- 
ing against  the  terms  of  peace  and  stating  that  they  con- 
sidered them  to  be  an  abandonment  of  the  principles  for 


THE  BULLITT  AFFAIR  275 

which  Americans  had  fought.  One  of  the  officials,  whose 
relations  with  the  President  were  of  a  most  intimate  na- 
ture, said  that  he  was  in  a  quandary  about  resigning;  that 
he  did  not  think  that  the  conditions  in  the  Treaty  would 
make  for  peace  because  they  were  too  oppressive;  that  the 
obnoxious  things  in  the  Treaty  were  due  to  secret  diplo- 
macy; and  that  the  President  should  have  stuck  rigidly  to 
his  principles,  which  he  had  not.  This  official  was  evi- 
dently deeply  incensed,  but  in  the  end  he  did  not  resign, 
nor  did  the  five  experts  who  sent  letters,  because  they 
were  told  that  it  would  seriously  cripple  the  American 
Commission  in  the  preparation  of  the  Austrian  Treaty  if 
they  did  not  continue  to  serve.  Another  and  more  promi- 
nent adviser  of  the  President  felt  very  bitterly  over  the 
terms  of  peace.  In  speaking  of  his  disapproval  of  them  he 
told  me  that  he  had  found  the  same  feeling  among  the 
British  in  Paris,  who  were  disposed  to  blame  the  President 
since  "  they  had  counted  upon  him  to  stand  firmly  by  his 
principles  and  face  down  the  intriguers." 

It  is  needless  to  cite  other  instances  indicating  the  gen- 
eral state  of  mind  among  the  Americans  and  British  at 
Paris  to  show  the  views  that  were  being  exchanged  and 
the  frank  comments  that  were  being  made  at  the  time  of 
my  interview  with  Mr.  Bullitt.  In  truth  I  said  less  to  him 
in  criticism  of  the  Treaty  than  I  did  to  some  others,  but 
they  have  seen  fit  to  respect  the  confidential  nature  of  our 
conversations. 

It  is  not  pertinent  to  the  present  subject  to  recite  the 


276  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

events  between  the  delivery  of  the  Treaty  to'  the  Germans 
on  May  7  and  its  signature  on  June  28.  In  spite  of  the  dis- 
satisfaction, which  even  went  so  far  that  some  of  the  dele- 
gates of  the  Great  Powers  threatened  to  decline  to  sign 
the  Treaty  unless  certain  of  its  terms  were  modified,  the 
supreme  necessity  of  restoring  peace  as  soon  as  possible 
overcame  all  obstacles.  It  was  the  appreciation  of  this 
supreme  necessity  which  caused  many  Americans  to  urge 
consent  to  ratification  when  the  Treaty  was  laid  before 
the  Senate. 

My  own  position  was  paradoxical.  I  was  opposed  to  the 
Treaty,  but  signed  it  and  favored  its  ratification.  The  ex- 
planation is  this:  Convinced  after  conversations  with  the 
President  in  July  and  August,  1919,  that  he  would  not 
consent  to  any  effective  reservations,  the  politic  course 
seemed  to  be  to  endeavor  to  secure  ratification  without 
reservations.  It  appeared  to  be  the  only  possible  way  of 
obtaining  that  for  which  all  the  world  longed  and  which  in 
the  months  succeeding  the  signature  appeared  absolutely 
essential  to  prevent  the  widespread  disaster  resulting 
from  political  and  economic  chaos  which  seemed  to 
threaten  many  nations  if  not  civilization  itself.  Even  if 
the  Treaty  was  bad  in  certain  provisions,  so  long  as  the 
President  remained  inflexible  and  insistent,  its  ratification 
without  change  seemed  a  duty  to  humanity.  At  least  that 
was  my  conviction  in  the  summer  and  autumn  of  1919,  and 
I  am  not  yet  satisfied  that  it  was  erroneous.  My  views 
after  January,  1920,  are  not  pertinent  to  the  subject  under 


THE  BULLITT  AFFAIR  277 

consideration.  The  consequences  of  the  failure  to  ratify 
promptly  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  are  still  uncertain.  They 
may  be  more  serious  or  they  may  be  less  serious  than  they 
appeared  in  1919.  Time  alone  will  disclose  the  truth  and 
fix  the  responsibility  for  what  occurred  after  the  Treaty  of 
Versailles  was  laid  before  the  Senate  of  the  United  States. 


CONCLUSION 

THE  narration  of  my  relations  to  the  peace  negotiations 
as  one  of  the  American  Commissioners  to  the  Paris  Con- 
ference, which  has  been  confined  within  the  limits  laid 
down  in  the  opening  chapter  of  this  volume,  concludes 
with  the  recital  of  the  views  which  I  held  concerning  the 
terms  of  the  Treaty  of  Peace  with  Germany  and  which 
were  brought  to  the  attention  of  Mr.  Wilson  through  the 
press  reports  of  William  C.  Bullitt's  statement  to  the 
Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  on  September  12, 
1919. 

The  endeavor  has  been  to  present,  as  fully  as  possible 
in  the  circumstances,  a  review  of  my  association  with 
President  Wilson  in  connection  with  the  negotiations  at 
Paris  setting  forth  our  differences  of  opinion  and  diver- 
gence of  judgment  upon  the  subjects  coming  before  the 
Peace  Conference,  the  conduct  of  the  proceedings,  and  the 
terms  of  peace  imposed  upon  Germany  by  the  Treaty  of 
Versailles. 

It  is  evident  from  this  review  that,  from  a  time  prior  to 
Mr.  Wilson's  departure  from  the  United  States  on  Decem- 
ber 4,  1918,  to  attend  the  Peace  Conference  up  to  the  de- 
livery of  the  text  of  the  Treaty  to  the  German  plenipoten- 
tiaries on  May  7,  1919,  there  were  many  subjects  of  dis- 
agreement between  the  President  and  myself;  that  he  was 


CONCLUSION  279 

disposed  to  reject  or  ignore  the  advice  and  suggestions 
which  I  volunteered;  and  that  in  consequence  of  my  con- 
victions I  followed  his  guidance  and  obeyed  his  instruc- 
tions unwillingly. 

While  there  were  other  matters  of  friction  between  us 
they  were  of  a  personal  nature  and  of  minor  importance. 
Though  they  may  have  contributed  to  the  formality  of 
our  relations  they  played  no  real  part  in  the  increasing 
difficulty  of  the  situation.  The  matters  narrated  were, 
in  my  opinion,  the  principal  causes  for  the  letters  written 
by  President  Wilson  in  February,  1920;  at  least  they  seem 
sufficient  to  explain  the  origin  of  the  correspondence,  while 
the  causes  specifically  stated  by  him  —  my  calling  to- 
gether of  the  heads  of  the  executive  departments  for  con- 
sultation during  his  illness  and  my  attempts  to  anticipate 
his  judgment  —  are  insufficient. 

The  reasons  given  in  the  President's  letter  of  Febru- 
ary n,  the  essential  portions  of  which  have  been  quoted, 
for  stating  that  my  resignation  as  Secretary  of  State  would 
be  acceptable  to  him,  are  the  embarrassment  caused  him 
by  my  "reluctance  and  divergence  of  judgment"  and  the 
implication  that  my  mind  did  not  "willingly  go  along" 
with  his.  As  neither  of  these  reasons  applies  to  the  calling 
of  Cabinet  meetings  or  to  the  anticipation  of  his  judgment 
in  regard  to  foreign  affairs,  the  unavoidable  conclusion  is 
that  these  grounds  of  complaint  were  not  the  real  causes 
leading  up  to  the  severance  of  our  official  association. 

The  real  causes  —  which  are  the  only  ones  worthy  of 


280  THE  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 

consideration  —  are  to  be  found  in  the  record  of  the  rela- 
tions between  President  Wilson  and  myself  in  connection 
with  the  peace  negotiations.  Upon  that  record  must  rest 
the  justification  or  the  refutation  of  Mr.  Wilson's  implied 
charge  that  I  was  not  entirely  loyal  to  him  as  President 
and  that  I  failed  to  perform  my  full  duty  to  my  country 
as  Secretary  of  State  and  as  a  Commissioner  to  Negotiate 
Peace  by  opposing  the  way  in  which  he  exercised  his  con- 
stitutional authority  to  conduct  the  foreign  aifairs  of  the 
United  States. 


THE  END 


APPENDIX  I 

THE  PRESIDENT'S  ORIGINAL  DRAFT  OF  THE  COVE- 
NANT OF  THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS,  LAID  BEFORE 
THE  AMERICAN  COMMISSION  ON  JANUARY  IO,  1919 

PREAMBLE 

IN  order  to  secure  peace,  security,  and  orderly  government 
by  the  prescription  of  open,  just,  and  honorable  relations 
between  nations,  by  the  firm  establishment  of  the  under- 
standings of  international  law  as  the  actual  rule  of  con- 
duct among  governments,  and  by  the  maintenance  of 
justice  and  a  scrupulous  respect  for  all  treaty  obligations 
in  the  dealings  of  organized  peoples  with  one  another,  the 
Powers  signatory  to  this  covenant  and  agreement  jointly 
and  severally  adopt  this  constitution  of  the  League  of 
Nations. 

ARTICLE  I 

THE  action  of  the  Signatory  Powers  under  the  terms  of  this 
agreement  shall  be  effected  through  the  instrumentality 
of  a  Body  of  Delegates  which  shall  consist  of  the  ambas- 
sadors and  ministers  of  the  contracting  Powers  accred- 
ited to  H.  and  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  of  H.  The 
meetings  of  the  Body  of  Delegates  shall  be  held  at  the  seat 
of  government  of  H.  and  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 
of  H.  shall  be  the  presiding  officer  of  the  Body. 

Whenever  the  Delegates  deem  it  necessary  or  advisable, 
they  may  meet  temporarily  at  the  seat  of  government  of 
B.  or  of  S.,  in  which  case  the  Ambassador  or  Minister  to 
H.  of  the  country  in  which  the  meeting  is  held  shall  be  the 
presiding  officer  pro  tern-pore. 


282  APPENDIX 

It  shall  be  the  privilege  of  any  of  the  contracting  Powers 
to  assist  its  representative  in  the  Body  of  Delegates  by  any 
method  of  conference,  counsel,  or  advice  that  may  seem 
best  to  it,  and  also  to  substitute  upon  occasion  a  special 
representative  for  its  regular  diplomatic  representative 

accredited  to  H. 

/ 

ARTICLE  II 

THE  Body  of  Delegates  shall  regulate  their  own  procedure 
and  shall  have  power  to  appoint  such  committees  as  they 
may  deem  necessary  to  inquire  into  and  report  upon  any 
matters  that  lie  within  the  field  of  their  action. 

It  shall  be  the  right  of  the  Body  of  Delegates,  upon  the 
initiative  of  any  member,  to  discuss,  either  publicly  or 
privately  as  it  may  deem  best,  any  matter  lying  within  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  League  of  Nations  as  defined  in  this 
Covenant,  or  any  matter  likely  to  affect  the  peace  of  the 
world;  but  all  actions  of  the  Body  of  Delegates  taken  in 
the  exercise  of  the  functions  and  powers  granted  to  them 
under  this  Covenant  shall  be  first  formulated  and  agreed 
upon  by  an  Executive  Council,  which  shall  act  either  by 
reference  or  upon  its  own  initiative  and  which  shall  consist 
of  the  representatives  of  the  Great  Powers  together  with 
representatives  drawn  in  annual  rotation  from  two  panels, 
one  of  which  shall  be  made  up  of  the  representatives  of  the 
States  ranking  next  after  the  Great  Powers  and  the  other 
of  the  representatives  of  the  minor  States  (a  classification 
which  the  Body  of  Delegates  shall  itself  establish  and 
may  from  time  to  time  alter),  such  a  number  being  drawn 
from  these  panels  as  will  be  but  one  less  than  the  repre- 
sentatives of  the  Great  Powers ;  and  three  or  more  nega- 
tive votes  in  the  Council  shall  operate  as  a  veto  upon  any 
action  or  resolution  proposed. 

All  resolutions  passed  or  actions  taken  by  the  Body  of 


APPENDIX  283 

Delegates  upon  the  recommendation  of  the  Executive 
Council,  except  those  adopted  in  execution  of  any  direct 
powers  herein  granted  to  the  Body  of  Delegates  them- 
selves, shall  have  the  effect  of  recommendations  to  the 
several  governments  of  the  League. 

The  Executive  Council  shall  appoint  a  permanent  Secre- 
tariat and  staff  and  may  appoint  joint  committees  chosen 
from  the  Body  of  Delegates  or  consisting  of  specially  qual- 
ified persons  outside  of  that  Body,  for  the  study  and  sys- 
tematic consideration  of  the  international  questions  with 
which  the  Council  may  have  to  deal,  or  of  questions  likely 
to  lead  to  international  complications  or  disputes.  It  shall 
also  take  the  necessary  steps  to  establish  and  maintain 
proper  liaison  both  with  the  foreign  offices  of  the  signatory 
powers  and  with  any  governments  or  agencies  which  may 
be  acting  as  mandatories  of  the  League  of  Nations  in  any 
part  of  the  world. 

ARTICLE  III 

THE  Contracting  Powers  unite  in  guaranteeing  to  each 
other  political  independence  and  territorial  integrity;  but 
it  is  understood  between  them  that  such  territorial  read- 
justments, if  any,  as  may  in  the  future  become  necessary 
by  reason  of  changes  in  present  racial  conditions  and  as- 
pirations or  present  social  and  political  relationships,  pur- 
suant to  the  principle  of  self-determination,  and  also  such 
territorial  readjustments  as  may  in  the  judgment  of  three 
fourths  of  the  Delegates  be  demanded  by  the  welfare  and 
manifest  interest  of  the  peoples  concerned,  may  be  effected 
if  agreeable  to  those  peoples;  and  that  territorial  changes 
may  in  equity  involve  material  compensation.  The  Con- 
tracting Powers  accept  without  reservation  the  principle 
that  the  peace  of  the  world  is  superior  in  importance  to 
every  question  of  political  jurisdiction  or  boundary. 


284  APPENDIX 

ARTICLE  IV 

THE  Contracting  Powers  recognize  the  principle  that  the 
establishment  and  maintenance  of  peace  will  require  the 
reduction  of  national  armaments  to  the  lowest  point  con- 
sistent with  domestic  safety  and  the  enforcement  by  com- 
mon action  of  international  obligations ;  and  the  Delegates 
are  directed  to  formulate  at  once  plans  by  which  such  a  re- 
duction may  be  brought  about.  The  plan  so  formulated 
shall  be  binding  when,  and  only  when,  unanimously  ap- 
proved by  the  Governments  signatory  to  this  Covenant. 

As  the  basis  for  such  a  reduction  of  armaments,  all  the 
Powers  subscribing  to  the  Treaty  of  Peace  of  which  this 
Covenant  constitutes  a  part  hereby  agree  to  abolish  con- 
scription and  all  other  forms  of  compulsory  military  serv- 
ice, and  also  agree  that  their  future  forces  of  defence  and 
of  international  action  shall  consist  of  militia  or  volunteers, 
whose  numbers  and  methods  of  training  shall  be  fixed, 
after  expert  inquiry,  by  the  agreements  with  regard  to 
the  reduction  of  armaments  referred  to  in  the  last  pre- 
ceding paragraph. 

The  Body  of  Delegates  shall  also  determine  for  the  con- 
sideration and  action  of  the  several  governments  what 
direct  military  equipment  and  armament  is  fair  and  rea- 
sonable in  proportion  to  the  scale  of  forces  laid  down  in 
the  programme  of  disarmament;  and  these  limits,  when 
adopted,  shall  not  be  exceeded  without  the  permission  of 
the  Body  of  Delegates. 

The  Contracting  Powers  further  agree  that  munitions 
and  implements  of  war  shall  not  be  manufactured  by  pri- 
vate enterprise  or  for  private  profit,  and  that  there  shall  be 
full  and  frank  publicity  as  to  all  national  armaments  and 
military  or  naval  programmes. 


APPENDIX  285 

ARTICLE  V 

THE  Contracting  Powers  jointly  and  severally  agree  that, 
should  disputes  or  difficulties  arise  between  or  among  them 
which  cannot  be  satisfactorily  settled  or  adjusted  by  the 
ordinary  processes  of  diplomacy,  they  will  in  no  case  resort 
to  armed  force  without  previously  submitting  the  ques- 
tions and  matters  involved  either  to  arbitration  or  to  in- 
quiry by  the  Executive  Council  of  the  Body  of  Delegates 
or  until  there  has  been  an  award  by  the  arbitrators  or  a 
decision  by  the  Executive  Council ;  and  that  they  will  not 
even  then  resort  to  armed  force  as  against  a  member  of  the 
League  of  Nations  who  complies  with  the  award  of  the 
arbitrators  or  the  decision  of  the  Executive  Council. 

The  Powers  signatory  to  this  Covenant  undertake  and 
agree  that  whenever  any  dispute  or  difficulty  shall  arise 
between  or  among  them  with  regard  to  any  questions  of 
the  law  of  nations,  with  regard  to  the  interpretation  of  a 
treaty,  as  to  any  fact  which  would,  if  established,  consti- 
tute a  breach  of  international  obligation,  or  as  to  any 
alleged  damage  and  the  nature  and  measure  of  the  repa- 
ration to  be  made  therefor,  if  such  dispute  or  difficulty 
cannot  be  satisfactorily  settled  by  the  ordinary  processes 
of  negotiation,  to  submit  the  whole  subject-matter  to  ar- 
bitration and  to  carry  out  in  full  good  faith  any  award 
or  decision  that  may  be  rendered. 

In  case  of  arbitration,  the  matter  or  matters  at  issue 
shall  be  referred  to  three  arbitrators,  one  of  the  three  to  be 
selected  by  each  of  the  parties  to  the  dispute,  when  there 
are  but  two  such  parties,  and  the  third  by  the  two  thus 
selected.  When  there  are  more  than  two  parties  to  the 
dispute,  one  arbitrator  shall  be  named  by  each  of  the 
several  parties,  and  the  arbitrators  thus  named  shall  add 
to  their  number  others  of  their  own  choice,  the  number 


286  APPENDIX 

thus  added  to  be  limited  to  the  number  which  will  suffice  to 
give  a  deciding  voice  to  the  arbitrators  thus  added  in  case 
of  a  tie  vote  among  the  arbitrators  chosen  by  the  contend- 
ing parties.  In  case  the  arbitrators  chosen  by  the  contend- 
ing parties  cannot  agree  upon  an  additional  arbitrator  or 
arbitrators,  the  additional  arbitrator  or  arbitrators  shall 
be  chosen  by  the  Body  of  Delegates. 

On  the  appeal  of  a  party  to  the  dispute  the  decision  of 
the  arbitrators  may  be  set  aside  by  a  vote  of  three-fourths 
of  the  Delegates,  in  case  the  decision  of  the  arbitrators  was 
unanimous,  or  by  a  vote  of  two-thirds  of  the  Delegates  in 
case  the  decision  of  the  arbitrators  was  not  unanimous,  but 
unless  thus  set  aside  shall  be  finally  binding  and  conclusive. 

When  any  decision  of  arbitrators  shall  have  been  thus 
set  aside,  the  dispute  shall  again  be  submitted  to  arbitra- 
tors chosen  as  heretofore  provided,  none  of  whom  shall, 
however,  have  previously  acted  as  arbitrators  in  the  dis- 
pute in  question,  and  the  decision  of  the  arbitrators  ren- 
dered in  this  second  arbitration  shall  be  finally  binding 
and  conclusive  without  right  of  appeal. 

If  for  any  reason  it  should  prove  impracticable  to  refer 
any  matter  in  dispute  to  arbitration,  the  parties  to  the 
dispute  shall  apply  to  the  Executive  Council  to  take  the 
matter  under  consideration  for  such  mediatory  action  or 
recommendation  as  it  may  deem  wise  in  the  circumstances. 
The  Council  shall  immediately  accept  the  reference  and 
give  notice  to  the  other  party  or  parties,  and  shall  make 
the  necessary  arrangements  for  a  full  hearing,  investiga- 
tion, and  consideration.  It  shall  ascertain  all  the  facts  in- 
volved in  the  dispute  and  shall  make  such  recommenda- 
tions as  it  may  deem  wise  and  practicable  based  on  the 
merits  of  the  controversy  and  calculated  to  secure  a 
just  and  lasting  settlement.  Other  members  of  the  League 
shall  place  at  the  disposal  of  the  Executive  Council  any 


APPENDIX  287 

and  all  information  that  may  be  in  their  possession  which 
in  any  way  bears  upon  the  facts  or  merits  of  the  contro- 
versy; and  the  Executive  Council  shall  do  everything  in  its 
power  by  way  of  mediation  or  conciliation  to  bring  about 
a  peaceful  settlement.  The  decisions  of  the  Executive 
Council  shall  be  addressed  to  the  disputants,  and  shall  not 
have  the  force  of  a  binding  verdict.  Should  the  Executive 
Council  fail  to  arrive  at  any  conclusion,  it  shall  be  the  priv- 
ilege of  the  members  of  the  Executive  Council  to  publish 
their  several  conclusions  or  recommendations;  and  such 
publications  shall  not  be  regarded  as  an  unfriendly  act  by 
either  or  any  of  the  disputants. 

ARTICLE  VI 

SHOULD  any  contracting  Power  break  or  disregard  its 
covenants  under  ARTICLE  V,  it  shall  thereby  ipso  facto 
commit  an  act  of  war  with  all  the  members  of  the  League, 
which  shall  immediately  subject  it  to  a  complete  economic 
and  financial  boycott,  including  the  severance  of  all  trade 
or  financial  relations,  the  prohibition  of  all  intercourse  be- 
tween their  subjects  and  the  subjects  of  the  covenant- 
breaking  State,  and  the  prevention,  so  far  as  possible,  of 
all  financial,  commercial,  or  personal  intercourse  between 
the  subjects  of  the  covenant-breaking  State  and  the  sub- 
jects of  any  other  State,  whether  a  member  of  the  League 
of  Nations  or  not. 

It  shall  be  the  privilege  and  duty  of  the  Executive  Coun- 
cil of  the  Body  of  Delegates  in  such  a  case  to  recommend 
what  effective  military  or  naval  force  the  members  of  the 
League  of  Nations  shall  severally  contribute,  and  to  ad- 
vise, if  it  should  think  best,  that  the  smaller  members  of 
the  League  be  excused  from  making  any  contribution  to 
the  armed  forces  to  be  used  against  the  covenant-break- 
ing State. 


288  APPENDIX 

The  covenant-breaking  State  shall,  after  the  restoration 
of  peace,  be  subject  to  perpetual  disarmament  and  to  the 
regulations  with  regard  to  a  peace  establishment  provided 
for  new  States  under  the  terms  of  SUPPLEMENTARY  AR- 
TICLE IV. 

ARTICLE  VII 

IF  any  Power  shall  declare  war  or  begin  hostilities,  or  take 
any  hostile  step  short  of  war,  against  another  Power  be- 
fore submitting  the  dispute  involved  to  arbitrators  or  con- 
sideration by  the  Executive  Council  as  herein  provided,  or 
shall  declare  war  or  begin  hostilities,  or  take  any  hostile 
step  short  of  war,  in  regard  to  any  dispute  which  has  been 
decided  adversely  to  it  by  arbitrators  chosen  and  empow- 
ered as  herein  provided,  the  Contracting  Powers  hereby 
bind  themselves  not  only  to  cease  all  commerce  and  inter- 
course with  that  Power  but  also  to  unite  in  blockading 
and  closing  the  frontiers  of  that  Power  to  commerce  or 
intercourse  with  any  part  of  the  world  and  to  use  any  force 
that  may  be  necessary  to  accomplish  that  object. 

ARTICLE  VIII 

ANY  war  or  threat  of  war,  whether  immediately  affecting 
any  of  the  Contracting  Powers  or  not,  is  hereby  declared 
a  matter  of  concern  to  the  League  of  Nations  and  to  all  the 
Powers  signatory  hereto,  and  those  Powers  hereby  re- 
serve the  right  to  take  any  action  that  may  be  deemed  wise 
and  effectual  to  safeguard  the  peace  of  nations. 

It  is  hereby  also  declared  and  agreed  to  be  the  friendly 
right  of  each  of  the  nations  signatory  or  adherent  to  this 
Covenant  to  draw  the  attention  of  the  Body  of  Delegates 
to  any  circumstances  anywhere  which  threaten  to  disturb 
international  peace  or  the  good  understanding  between 
nations  upon  which  peace  depends. 


APPENDIX  289 

The  Delegates  shall  meet  in  the  interest  of  peace  when- 
ever war  is  rumored  or  threatened,  and  also  whenever  the 
Delegate  of  any  Power  shall  inform  the  Delegates  that  a 
meeting  and  conference  in  the  interest  of  peace  is  advisable- 

The  Delegates  may  also  meet  at  such  other  times  and 
upon  such  other  occasions  as  they  shall  from  time  to  time 
deem  best  and  determine. 

ARTICLE  IX 

IN  the  event  of  a  dispute  arising  between  one  of  the  Con- 
tracting Powers  and  a  Power  not  a  party  to  this  Covenant, 
the  Contracting  Power  involved  hereby  binds  itself  to 
endeavour  to  obtain  the  submission  of  the  dispute  to  judi- 
cial decision  or  to  arbitration.  If  the  other  Power  will  not 
agree  to  submit  the  dispute  to  judicial  decision  or  to  ar- 
bitration, the  Contracting  Power  shall  bring  the  matter  to 
the  attention  of  the  Body  of  Delegates.  The  Delegates 
shall  in  such  a  case,  in  the  name  of  the  League  of  Nations, 
invite  the  Power  not  a  party  to  this  Covenant  to  become 
ad  hoc  a  party  and  to  submit  its  case  to  judicial  decision 
or  to  arbitration,  and  if  that  Power  consents  it  is  hereby 
agreed  that  the  provisions  hereinbefore  contained  and  ap- 
plicable to  the  submission  of  disputes  to  arbitration  or 
discussion  shall  be  in  all  respects  applicable  to  the  dispute 
both  in  favour  of  and  against  such  Power  as  if  it  were  a 
party  to  this  Covenant. 

In  case  the  Power  not  a  party  to  this  Covenant  shall  not 
accept  the  invitation  of  the  Delegates  to  become  ad  hoc  a 
party,  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  Executive  Council  im- 
mediately to  institute  an  inquiry  into  the  circumstances 
and  merits  of  the  dispute  involved  and  to  recommend  such 
joint  action  by  the  Contracting  Powers  as  may  seem  best 
and  most  effectual  in  the  circumstances  disclosed. 


290 


APPENDIX 


ARTICLE  X 

IF  hostilities  should  be  begun  or  any  hostile  action  taken 
against  the  Contracting  Power  by  the  Power  not  a  party 
to  this  Covenant  before  a  decision  of  the  dispute  by  arbi- 
trators or  before  investigation,  report  and  recommenda- 
tion by  the  Executive  Council  in  regard  to  the  dispute,  or 
contrary  to  such  recommendation,  the  Contracting  Powers 
shall  thereupon  cease  all  commerce  and  communication 
with  that  Power  and  shall  also  unite  in  blockading  and 
closing  the  frontiers  of  that  Power  to  all  commerce  or  inter- 
course with  any  part  of  the  world,  employing  jointly  any 
force  that  may  be  necessary  to  accomplish  that  object. 
The  Contracting  Powers  shall  also  unite  in  coming  to  the 
assistance  of  the  Contracting  Power  against  which  hostile 
action  has  been  taken,  combining  their  armed  forces  in 
its  behalf. 

ARTICLE  XI 

IN  case  of  a  dispute  between  states  not  parties  to  this 
Covenant,  any  Contracting  Power  may  bring  the  matter 
to  the  attention  of  the  Delegates,  who  shall  thereupon 
tender  the  good  offices  of  the  League  of  Nations  with  a 
view  to  the  peaceable  settlement  of  the  dispute. 

If  one  of  the  states,  a  party  to  the  dispute,  shall  offer  and 
agree  to  submit  its  interests  and  causes  of  action  wholly 
to  the  control  and  decision  of  the  League  of  Nations,  that 
state  shall  ad  hoc  be  deemed  a  Contracting  Power.  If 
no  one  of  the  states,  parties  to  the  dispute,  shall  so  offer 
and  agree,  the  Delegates  shall,  through  the  Executive 
Council,  of  their  own  motion  take  such  action  and  make 
such  recommendation  to  their  governments  as  will  pre- 
vent hostilities  and  result  in  the  settlement  of  the  dispute. 


APPENDIX  291 

ARTICLE  XII 

ANY  Power  not  a  party  to  this  Covenant,  whose  govern- 
ment is  based  upon  the  principle  of  popular  self-govern- 
ment, may  apply  to  the  Body  of  Delegates  for  leave  to 
become  a  party.  If  the  Delegates  shall  regard  the  granting 
thereof  as  likely  to  promote  the  peace,  order,  and  security 
of  the  World,  they  may  act  favourably  on  the  application, 
and  their  favourable  action  shall  operate  to  constitute  the 
Power  so  applying  in  all  respects  a  full  signatory  party  to 
this  Covenant.  This  action  shall  require  the  affirmative 
vote  of  two-thirds  of  the  Delegates. 

ARTICLE  XIII 

THE  Contracting  Powers  severally  agree  that  the  present 
Covenant  and  Convention  is  accepted  as  abrogating  all 
treaty  obligations  inter  se  which  are  inconsistent  with  the 
terms  hereof,  and  solemnly  engage  that  they  will  not  enter 
into  any  engagements  inconsistent  with  the  terms  hereof. 
In  case  any  of  the  Powers  signatory  hereto  or  subse- 
quently admitted  to  the  League  of  Nations  shall,  before 
becoming  a  party  to  this  Covenant,  have  undertaken  any 
treaty  obligations  which  are  inconsistent  with  the  terms  of 
this  Covenant,  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  such  Power  to  take 
immediate  steps  to  procure  its  release  from  such  obliga- 
tions. 

SUPPLEMENTARY  AGREEMENTS 

I 

IN  respect  of  the  peoples  and  territories  which  formerly 
belonged  to  Austria-Hungary,  and  to  Turkey,  and  in  re- 
spect of  the  colonies  formerly  under  the  dominion  of  the 
German  Empire,  the  League  of  Nations  shall  be  regarded 
as  the  residuary  trustee  with  sovereign  right  of  ultimate 


292  APPENDIX 

disposal  or  of  continued  administration  in  accordance  with 
certain  fundamental  principles  hereinafter  set  forth;  and 
this  reversion  and  control  shall  exclude  all  rights  or  priv- 
ileges of  annexation  on  the  part  of  any  Power. 

These  principles  are,  that  there  shall  in  no  case  be  any 
annexation  of  any  of  these  territories  by  any  State  either 
within  the  League  or  outside  of  it,  and  that  in  the  future 
government  of  these  peoples  and  territories  the  rule  of 
self-determination,  or  the  consent  of  the  governed  to  their 
form  of  government,  shall  be  fairly  and  reasonably  applied, 
and  all  policies  of  administration  or  economic  develop- 
ment be  based  primarily  upon  the  well-considered  interests 
of  the  people  themselves. 

II 

ANY  authority,  control,  or  administration  which  may  be 
necessary  in  respect  of  these  peoples  or  territories  other 
than  their  own  self-determined  and  self-organized  auton- 
omy shall  be  the  exclusive  function  of  and  shall  be  vested 
in  the  League  of  Nations  and  exercised  or  undertaken  by 
or  on  behalf  of  it. 

It  shall  be  lawful  for  the  League  of  Nations  to  delegate 
its  authority,  control,  or  administration  of  any  such  people 
or  territory  to  some  single  State  or  organized  agency  which 
it  may  designate  and  appoint  as  its  agent  or  mandatory; 
but  whenever  or  wherever  possible  or  feasible  the  agent  or 
mandatory  so  appointed  shall  be  nominated  or  approved 
by  the  autonomous  people  or  territory. 

Ill 

THE  degree  of  authority,  control,  or  administration  to  be 
exercised  by  the  mandatary  State  or  agency  shall  in  each 
case  be  explicitly  defined  by  the  League  in  a  special  Act  or 
Charter  which  shall  reserve  to  the  League  complete  power 


APPENDIX  293 

of  supervision  and  of  intimate  control,  and  which  shall  also 
reserve  to  the  people  of  any  such  territory  or  govern- 
mental unit  the  right  to  appeal  to  the  League  for  the  re- 
dress or  correction  of  any  breach  of  the  mandate  by  the 
mandatary  State  or  agency  or  for  the  substitution  of  some 
other  State  or  agency,  as  mandatary. 

The  mandatary  State  or  agency  shall  in  all  cases  be 
bound  and  required  to  maintain  the  policy  of  the  open 
door,  or  equal  opportunity  for  all  the  signatories  to  this 
Covenant,  in  respect  of  the  use  and  development  of  the 
economic  resources  of  such  people  or  territory. 

The  mandatary  State  or  agency  shall  in  no  case  form  or 
maintain  any  military  or  naval  force  in  excess  of  definite 
standards  laid  down  by  the  League  itself  for  the  purposes 
of  internal  police. 

IV 

No  new  State  arising  or  created  from  the  old  Empires  of 
Austria-Hungary,  or  Turkey  shall  be  recognized  by  the 
League  or  admitted  into  its  membership  except  on  condi- 
tion that  its  military  and  naval  forces  and  armaments  shall 
conform  to  standards  prescribed  by  the  League  in  respect 
of  it  from  time  to  time. 

As  successor  to  the  Empires,  the  League  of  Nations  is 
empowered,  directly  and  without  right  of  delegation,  to 
watch  over  the  relations  inter  se  of  all  new  independent 
States  arising  or  created  out  of  the  Empires,  and  shall 
assume  and  fulfill  the  duty  of  conciliating  and  composing 
differences  between  them  with  a  view  to  the  maintenance 
of  settled  order  and  the  general  peace. 

V 

THE  Powers  signatory  or  adherent  to  this  Covenant  agree 
that  they  will  themselves  seek  to  establish  and  maintain 


294  APPENDIX 

fair  hours  and  humane  conditions  of  labour  for  all  those 
within  their  several  jurisdictions  who  are  engaged  in  man- 
ual labour  and  that  they  will  exert  their  influence  in  favour 
of  the  adoption  and  maintenance  of  a  similar  policy  and 
like  safeguards  wherever  their  industrial  and  commercial 
relations  extend. 

VI 

THE  League  of  Nations  shall  require  all  new  States  to  bind 
themselves  as  a  condition  precedent  to  their  recognition 
as  independent  or  autonomous  States,  to  accord  to  all 
racial  or  national  minorities  within  their  several  jurisdic- 
tions exactly  the  same  treatment  and  security,  both  in  law 
and  in  fact,  that  is  accorded  the  racial  or  national  majority 
of  their  people. 


APPENDIX  II 

LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 
(Plan  of  Lord  Robert  Cecil  0 

I 
ORGANIZATION 

THE  general  treaty  setting  up  the  league  of  nations  will 
explicitly  provide  for  regular  conferences  between  the 
responsible  representatives  of  the  contracting  powers. 

These  conferences  would  review  the  general  conditions 
of  international  relations  and  would  naturally  pay  special 
attention  to  any  difficulty  which  might  seem  to  threaten 
the  peace  of  the  world.  They  would  also  receive  and  as 
occasion  demanded  discuss  reports  as  to  the  work  of  any 
international  administrative  or  investigating  bodies  work- 
ing under  the  League. 

These  conferences  would  constitute  the  pivot  of  the 
league.  They  would  be  meetings  of  statesmen  responsible 
to  their  own  sovereign  parliaments,  and  any  decisions 
taken  would  therefore,  as  in  the  case  of  the  various  allied 
conferences  during  the  war,  have  to  be  unanimous. 

The  following  form  of  organization  is  suggested : 

I.  The  conference.  Annual  meeting  of  prime  ministers 
and  foreign  secretaries  of  British  Empire,  United  States, 
France,  Italy,  Japan,  and  any  other  States  recognized  by 
them  as  great  powers.  Quadrennial  meeting  of  represent- 
atives of  all  States  included  in  the  league.  There  should 
also  be  provision  for  the  summoning  of  special  conferences 

1  Reprinted  from  Senate  Doc.  No.  106,  66th  Congress,  1st  Session, 
p.  1163. 


296  APPENDIX 

on  the  demand  of  any  one  of  the  great  powers  or,  if  there 
were  danger  of  an  outbreak  of  war,  of  any  member  of  the 
league.  (The  composition  of  the  league  will  be  deter- 
mined at  the  peace  conference.  Definitely  untrustworthy 
and  hostile  States,  e.g.,  Russia,  should  the  Bolshevist 
government  remain  in  power,  should  be  excluded. 
Otherwise  it  is  desirable  not  to  be  too  rigid  in  scrutinizing 
qualifications,  since  the  small  powers  will  in  any  case  not 
exercise  any  considerable  influence.) 

2.  For  the  conduct  of  its  work  the  interstate  conference 
will  require  a  permanent  secretariat.   The  general  secre- 
tary should  be  appointed  by  the  great  powers,  if  possible 
choosing  a  national  of  some  other  country. 

3.  International  bodies.   The  secretariat  would  be  the 
responsible  channel  of  communication  between  the  inter- 
state conference  and  all  international  bodies  functioning 
under  treaties  guaranteed  by  the  league.  These  would  fall 
into  three  classes: 

(a)  Judicial;  i.e.,  the  existing  Hague  organization  with 
any  additions  or  modifications  made  by  the  league. 

(b)  International  administrative  bodies.    Such  as  the 
suggested  transit  commission.   To  these  would  be  added 
bodies  already  formed  under  existing  treaties  (which  are 
very  numerous  and  deal  with  very  important  interests, 
e.g.,  postal  union,  international  labor  office,  etc.). 

(c)  International  commissions  of  enquiry:  e.g.,  commis- 
sion on  industrial  conditions  (labor  legislation),  African 
commission,  armaments  commission. 

4.  In  addition  to  the  above  arrangements  guaranteed 
by  or  arising  out  of  the  general  treaty,  there  would  prob- 
ably be  a  periodical  congress  of  delegates  of  the  parlia- 
ments of  the  States  belonging  to  the  league,  as  a  develop- 
ment out  of  the  existing  Interparliamentary  Union.    A 
regular  staple  of  discussion  for  this  body  would  be  afforded 


APPENDIX  297 

by  the  reports  of  the  interstate  conference  and  of  the 
different  international  bodies.  The  congress  would  thus 
cover  the  ground  that  is  at  present  occupied  by  the  period- 
ical Hague  Conference  and  also  the  ground  claimed  by  the 
Socialist  International. 

For  the  efficient  conduct  of  all  these  activities  it  is  essen- 
tial that  there  should  be  a  permanent  central  meeting-place, 
where  the  officials  and  officers  of  the  league  would  enjoy 
the  privileges  of  extra-territoriality.  Geneva  is  suggested 
as  the  most  suitable  place. 

II 

PREVENTION  OF  WAR 

THE  covenants  for  the  prevention  of  war  which  would  be 
embodied  in  the  general  treaty  would  be  as  follows : 

(1)  The  members  of  the  league  would  bind  themselves 
not  to  go  to  war  until  they  had  submitted  the  questions  at 
issue  to  an  international  conference  or  an  arbitral  court, 
and  until  the  conference  or  court  had  issued  a  report  or 
handed  down  an  award. 

(2)  The  members  of  the  league  would  bind  themselves 
not  to  go  to  war  with  any  member  of  the  league  complying 
with  the  award  of  a  court  or  with  the  report  of  a  confer- 
ence.  For  the  purpose  of  this  clause,  the  report  of  the  con- 
ference must  be  unanimous,  excluding  the  litigants. 

(3)  The  members  of  the  league  would  undertake  to  re- 
gard themselves,  as  ipso  facto,  at  war  with  any  one  of 
them  acting  contrary  to  the  above  covenants,  and  to  take, 
jointly  and  severally,  appropriate  military,  economic  and 
other  measure  against  the  recalcitrant  State. 

(4)  The  members  of  the  league  would  bind  themselves 
to  take  similar  action,  in  the  sense  of  the  above  clause, 
against  any  State  not  being  a  member  of  the  league  which 
is  involved  in  a  dispute  with  a  member  of  the  league. 


298  APPENDIX 

(This  is  a  stronger  provision  than  that  proposed  in  the 
Phillimore  Report.) 

The  above  covenants  mark  an  advance  upon  the  prac- 
tice of  international  relations  previous  to  the  war  in  two 
respects:  (i)  In  insuring  a  necessary  period  of  delay  before 
war  can  break  out  (except  between  two  States  which  are 
neither  of  them  members  of  the  league);  (2)  In  securing 
public  discussion  and  probably  a  public  report  upon  mat- 
ters in  dispute. 

It  should  be  observed  that  even  in  cases  where  the  con- 
ference report  is  not  unanimous,  and  therefore  in  no  sense 
binding,  a  majority  report  may  be  issued  and  that  this 
would  be  likely  to  carry  weight  with  the  public  opinion  of 
the  States  in  the  league. 


APPENDIX  III 

THE  COVENANT  OF  THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS  IN 
THE  TREATY  OF  VERSAILLES 

ARTICLE  I 

THE  original  Members  of  the  League  of  Nations  shall  be 
those  of  the  Signatories  which  are  named  in  the  Annex  to 
this  Covenant  and  also  such  of  those  other  States  named 
in  the  Annex  as  shall  accede  without  reservation  to  this 
Covenant.  Such  accession  shall  be  effected  by  a  Declara- 
tion deposited  with  the  Secretariat  within  two  months  of 
the  coming  into  force  of  the  Covenant.  Notice  thereof 
shall  be  sent  to  all  other  Members  of  the  League. 

Any  fully  self-governing  State,  Dominion,  or  Colony  not 
named  in  the  Annex  may  become  a  Member  of  the  League 
if  its  admission  is  agreed  to  by  two  thirds  of  the  Assembly, 
provided  that  it  shall  give  effective  guarantees  of  its  sin- 
cere intention  to  observe  its  international  obligations,  and 
shall  accept  such  regulations  as  may  be  prescribed  by  the 
League  in  regard  to  its  military,  naval  and  air  forces  and 
armaments. 

Any  Member  of  the  League  may,  after  two  years'  notice 
of  its  intention  so  to  do,  withdraw  from  the  League,  pro- 
vided that  all  its  international  obligations  and  all  its  obli- 
gations under  this  Covenant  shall  have  been  fulfilled  at 
the  time  of  its  withdrawal. 

ARTICLE  2 

THE  action  of  the  League  under  this  Covenant  shall  be 
effected  through  the  instrumentality  of  an  Assembly  and 
of  a  Council,  with  a  permanent  Secretariat. 


300  APPEXDLX 

ARTICLE  3 

THE  Assembly  shall  consist  of  Representatives  of  the 
Members  of  the  League. 

The  Assembly  shall  meet  at  stated  intervals  and  from 
time  to  time  as  occasion  may  require  at  the  Seat  of  the 
League  or  at  such  other  place  as  may  be  decided  upon. 

The  Assembly  may  deal  at  its  meetings  with  any  matter 
within  the  sphere  of  action  of  the  League  or  affecting  the 
peace  of  the  world. 

At  meetings  of  the  Assembly  each  Member  of  the 
League  shall  have  one  vote,  and  may  have  not  more  than 
three  Representatives. 

ARTICLE  4 

THE  Council  shall  consist  of  Representatives  of  the  Princi- 
pal Allied  and  Associated  Powers,  together  with  Repre- 
sentatives of  four  other  Members  of  the  League.  These 
four  Members  of  the  League  shall  be  selected  by  the  As- 
sembly from  time  to  time  in  its  discretion.  Until  the  ap- 
pointment of  the  Representatives  of  the  four  Members  of 
the  League  first  selected  by  the  Assembly,  Representa- 
tives of  Belgium,  Brazil,  Spain,  and  Greece  shall  be  mem- 
bers of  the  Council. 

With  the  approval  of  the  majority  of  the  Assembly,  the 
Council  may  name  additional  Members  of  the  League 
whose  Representatives  shall  always  be  members  of  the 
Council;  the  Council  with  like  approval  may  increase  the 
number  of  Members  of  the  League  to  be  selected  by  the 
Assembly  for  representation  on  the  Council. 

The  Council  shall  meet  from  time  to  time  as  occasion 
may  require,  and  at  least  once  a  year,  at  the  Seat  of  the 
League,  or  at  such  other  place  as  may  be  decided  upon. 

The  Council  may  deal  at  its  meetings  with  any  matter 


APPENDIX  301 

within  the  sphere  of  action  of  the  League  or  affecting  the 
peace  of  the  world. 

Any  Member  of  the  League  not  represented  on  the 
Council  shall  be  invited  to  send  a  Representative  to  sit  as  a 
member  at  any  meeting  of  the  Council  during  the  consid- 
eration of  matters  specially  affecting  the  interests  of  that 
Member  of  the  League. 

At  meetings  of  the  Council,  each  Member  of  the  League 
represented  on  the  Council  shall  have  one  vote,  and  may 
have  not  more  than  one  Representative. 

ARTICLE  5 

EXCEPT  where  otherwise  expressly  provided  in  this  Cove- 
nant or  by  the  terms  of  the  present  Treaty,  decisions  at 
any  meeting  of  the  Assembly  or  of  the  Council  shall  re- 
quire the  agreement  of  all  the  Members  of  the  League 
represented  at  the  meeting. 

All  matters  of  procedure  at  meetings  of  the  Assembly  or 
of  the  Council,  including  the  appointment  of  Committees 
to  investigate  particular  matters,  shall  be  regulated  by  the 
Assembly  or  by  the  Council  and  may  be  decided  by  a  ma- 
jority of  the  Members  of  the  League  represented  at  the 
meeting. 

The  first  meeting  of  the  Assembly  and  the  first  meeting 
of  the  Council  shall  be  summoned  by  the  President  of  the 
United  States  of  America. 

ARTICLE  6 

THE  permanent  Secretariat  shall  be  established  at  the 
Seat  of  the  League.  The  Secretariat  shall  comprise  a  Secre- 
tary General  and  such  secretaries  and  staff  as  may  be  re- 
quired. 

The  first  Secretary  General  shall  be  the  person  named  in 
the  Annex;  thereafter  the  Secretary  General  shall  be  ap- 


302  APPENDIX 

pointed  by  the  Council  with  the  approval  of  the  majority 
of  the  Assembly. 

The  secretaries  and  staff  of  the  Secretariat  shall  be  ap- 
pointed by  the  Secretary  General  with  the  approval  of  the 
Council. 

The  Secretary  General  shall  act  in  that  capacity  at  all 
meetings  of  the  Assembly  and  of  the  Council. 

The  expenses  of  the  Secretariat  shall  be  borne  by  the 
Members  of  the  League  in  accordance  with  the  apportion- 
ment of  the  expenses  of  the  International  Bureau  of  the 
Universal  Postal  Union. 

ARTICLE  7 
THE  Seat  of  the  League  is  established  at  Geneva. 

The  Council  may  at  any  time  decide  that  the  Seat  of  the 
League  shall  be  established  elsewhere. 

All  positions  under  or  in  connection  with  the  League, 
including  the  Secretariat,  shall  be  open  equally  to  men 
and  women. 

Representatives  of  the  Members  of  the  League  and  offi- 
cials of  the  League  when  engaged  on  the  business  of  the 
League  shall  enjoy  diplomatic  privileges  and  immunities. 

The  buildings  and  other  property  occupied  by  the 
League  or  its  officials  or  by  Representatives  attending  its 
meetings  shall  be  inviolable. 

ARTICLE  8 

THE  Members  of  the  League  recognize  that  the  mainte- 
nance of  peace  requires  the  reduction  of  national  arma- 
ments to  the  lowest  point  consistent  with  national  safety 
and  the  enforcement  by  common  action  of  international 
obligations. 

The  Council,  taking  account  of  the  geographical  situa- 
tion and  circumstances  of  each  State,  shall  formulate  plans 


APPENDIX  303 

for  such  reduction  for  the  consideration  and  action  of  the 
several  Governments. 

Such  plans  shall  be  subject  to  reconsideration  and  re- 
vision at  least  every  ten  years. 

After  these  plans  shall  have  been  adopted  by  the  several 
Governments,  the  limits  of  armaments  therein  fixed  shall 
not  be  exceeded  without  the  concurrence  of  the  Council. 

The  Members  of  the  League  agree  that  the  manufacture 
by  private  enterprise  of  munitions  and  implements  of  war 
is  open  to  grave  objections.  The  Council  shall  advise  how 
the  evil  effects  attendant  upon  such  manufacture  can  be 
prevented,  due  regard  being  had  to  the  necessities  of  those 
Members  of  the  League  which  are  not  able  to  manufacture 
the  munitions  and  implements  of  war  necessary  for  their 
safety. 

The  Members  of  the  League  undertake  to  interchange 
full  and  frank  information  as  to  the  scale  of  their  arma- 
ments, their  military,  naval  and  air  programmes  and  the 
condition  of  such  of  their  industries  as  are  adaptable  to 
warlike  purposes. 

ARTICLE  9 

A  PERMANENT  Commission  shall  be  constituted  to  advise 
the  Council  on  the  execution  of  the  provisions  of  Articles 
i  and  8  and  on  military,  naval  and  air  questions  generally. 

ARTICLE  10 

THE  Members  of  the  League  undertake  to  respect  and 
preserve  as  against  external  aggression  the  territorial  in- 
tegrity and  existing  political  independence  of  all  Members 
of  the  League.  In  case  of  any  such  aggression  or  in  case  of 
any  threat  or  danger  of  such  aggression  the  Council  shall 
advise  upon  the  means  by  which  this  obligation  shall  be 
fulfilled. 


304  APPENDIX 

ARTICLE  n 

ANY  war  or  threat  of  war,  whether  immediately  affecting 
any  of  the  Members  of  the  League  or  not,  is  hereby  de- 
clared a  matter  of  concern  to  the  whole  League,  and  the 
League  shall  take  any  action  that  may  be  deemed  wise  and 
effectual  to  safeguard  the  peace  of  nations.  In  case  any 
such  emergency  should  arise  the  Secretary  General  shall 
on  the  request  of  any  Member  of  the  League  forthwith 
summon  a  meeting  of  the  Council. 

It  is  also  declared  to  be  the  friendly  right  of  each  Mem- 
ber of  the  League  to  bring  to  the  attention  of  the  Assembly 
or  of  the  Council  any  circumstance  whatever  affecting  in- 
ternational relations  which  threatens  to  disturb  interna- 
tional peace  or  the  good  understanding  between  nations 
upon  which  peace  depends. 

ARTICLE  12 

THE  Members  of  the  League  agree  that  if  there  should 
arise  between  them  any  dispute  likely  to  lead  to  a  rupture, 
they  will  submit  the  matter  either  to  arbitration  or  to  in- 
quiry by  the  Council,  and  they  agree  in  no  case  to  resort 
to  war  until  three  months  after  the  award  by  the  arbitra- 
tors or  the  report  by  the  Council. 

In  any  case  under  this  Article  the  award  of  the  arbitra- 
tors shall  be  made  within  a  reasonable  time,  and  the  report 
of  the  Council  shall  be  made  within  six  months  after  the 
submission  of  the  dispute. 

ARTICLE  13 

THE  Members  of  the  League  agree  that  whenever  any  dis- 
pute shall  arise  between  them  which  they  recognize  to  be 
suitable  for  submission  to  arbitration  and  which  cannot  be 
satisfactorily  settled  by  diplomacy,  they  will  submit  the 
whole  subject-matter  to  arbitration. 


APPENDIX  305 

Disputes  as  to  the  interpretation  of  a  treaty,  as  to  any 
question  of  international  law,  as  to  the  existence  of  any 
fact  which  if  established  would  constitute  a  breach  of  any 
international  obligation,  or  as  to  the  extent  and  nature  of 
the  reparation  to  be  made  for  any  such  breach,  are  de- 
clared to  be  among  those  which  are  generally  suitable  for 
submission  to  arbitration. 

For  the  consideration  of  any  such  dispute  the  court  of 
arbitration  to  which  the  case  is  referred  shall  be  the  Court 
agreed  on  by  the  parties  to  the  dispute  or  stipulated  in 
any  convention  existing  between  them. 

The  Members  of  the  League  agree  that  they  will  carry 
out  in  full  good  faith  any  award  that  may  be  rendered,  and 
that  they  will  not  resort  to  war  against  a  Member  of  the 
League  which  complies  therewith.  In  the  event  of  any 
failure  to  carry  out  such  an  award,  the  Council  shall  pro- 
pose what  steps  should  be  taken  to  give  effect  thereto. 

ARTICLE  14 

THE  Council  shall  formulate  and  submit  to  the  Members 
of  the  League  for  adoption  plans  for  the  establishment  of 
a  Permanent  Court  of  International  Justice.  The  Court 
shall  be  competent  to  hear  and  determine  any  dispute  of 
an  international  character  which  the  parties  thereto  sub- 
mit to  it.  The  Court  may  also  give  an  advisory  opinion 
upon  any  dispute  or  question  referred  to  it  by  the  Council 
or  by  the  Assembly. 

ARTICLE  15 

IF  there  should  arise  between  Members  of  the  League  any 
dispute  likely  to  lead  to  a  rupture,  which  is  not  submitted 
to  arbitration  in  accordance  with  Article  13,  the  Members 
of  the  League  agree  that  they  will  submit  the  matter  to  the 
Council.  Any  party  to  the  dispute  may  effect  such  sub- 


3o6  APPENDIX 

mission  by  giving  notice  of  the  existence  of  the  dispute  to  the 
Secretary  General,  who  will  make  all  necessary  arrange- 
ments for  a  full  investigation  and  consideration  thereof. 

For  this  purpose  the  parties  to  the  dispute  will  com- 
municate to  the  Secretary  General,  as  promptly  as  possi- 
ble, statements  of  their  case  with  all  the  relevant  facts  and 
papers,  and  the  Council  may  forthwith  direct  the  publica- 
tion thereof. 

The  Council  shall  endeavour  to  effect  a  settlement  of  the 
dispute,  and  if  such  efforts  are  successful,  a  statement  shall 
be  made  public  giving  such  facts  and  explanations  regard- 
ing the  dispute  and  the  terms  of  settlement  thereof  as  the 
Council  may  deem  appropriate. 

If  the  dispute  is  not  thus  settled,  the  Council  either 
unanimously  or  by  a  majority  vote  shall  make  and  publish 
a  report  containing  a  statement  of  the  facts  of  the  dispute 
and  the  recommendations  which  are  deemed  just  and 
proper  in  regard  thereto. 

Any  Member  of  the  League  represented  on  the  Council 
may  make  public  a  statement  of  the  facts  of  the  dispute 
and  of  its  conclusions  regarding  the  same. 

If  a  report  by  the  Council  is  unanimously  agreed  to  by 
the  members  thereof  other  than  the  Representatives  of  one 
or  more  of  the  parties  to  the  dispute,  the  Members  of  the 
League  agree  that  they  will  not  go  to  war  with  any  party 
to  the  dispute  which  complies  with  the  recommendations 
of  the  report. 

If  the  Council  fails  to  reach  a  report  which  is  unani- 
mously agreed  to  by  the  members  thereof,  other  than  the 
Representatives  of  one  or  more  of  the  parties  to  the  dis- 
pute, the  Members  of  the  League  reserve  to  themselves  the 
right  to  take  such  action  as  they  shall  consider  necessary 
for  the  maintenance  of  right  and  justice. 

If  the  dispute  between  the  parties  is  claimed  by  one  of 


APPENDIX  307 

them,  and  is  found  by  the  Council,  to  arise  out  of  a  matter 
which  by  international  law  is  solely  within  the  domestic 
jurisdiction  of  that  party,  the  Council  shall  so  report,  and 
shall  make  no  recommendation  as  to  its  settlement. 

The  Council  may  in  any  case  under  this  Article  refer  the 
dispute  to  the  Assembly.  The  dispute  shall  be  so  referred 
at  the  request  of  either  party  to  the  dispute,  provided  that 
such  request  be  made  within  fourteen  days  after  the  sub- 
mission of  the  dispute  to  the  Council. 

In  any  case  referred  to  the  Assembly,  all  the  provisions 
of  this  Article  and  of  Article  12  relating  to  the  action  and 
powers  of  the  Council  shall  apply  to  the  action  and  powers 
of  the  Assembly,  provided  that  a  report  made  by  the 
Assembly,  if  concurred  in  by  the  Representatives  of  those 
Members  of  the  League  represented  on  the  Council  and  of 
a  majority  of  the  other  Members  of  the  League,  exclusive 
in  each  case  of  the  Representatives  of  the  parties  to  the  dis- 
pute, shall  have  the  same  force  as  a  report  by  the  Council 
concurred  in  by  all  the  members  thereof  other  than  the  Rep- 
resentatives of  one  or  more  of  the  parties  to  the  dispute. 

ARTICLE  16 

SHOULD  any  Member  of  the  League  resort  to  war  in  disre- 
gard of  its  covenants  under  Articles  12,  13  or  15,  it  shall 
ipso  facto  be  deemed  to  have  committed  an  act  of  war 
against  all  other  Members  of  the  League,  which  hereby 
undertake  immediately  to  subject  it  to  the  severance  of  all 
trade  or  financial  relations,  the  prohibition  of  all  inter- 
course between  their  nationals  and  the  nationals  of  the 
covenant-breaking  State,  and  the  prevention  of  all  finan- 
cial, commercial  or  personal  intercourse  between  the  na- 
tionals of  the  covenant-breaking  State  and  the  nationals  of 
any  other  State,  whether  a  Member  of  the  League  or  not. 
It  -shall  be  the  duty  of  the  Council  in  such  case  to  recom- 


3o8  APPENDIX 

mend  to  the  several  Governments  concerned  what  effec- 
tive military,  naval  or  air  force  the  Members  of  the 
League  shall  severally  contribute  to  the  armed  forces  to 
be  used  to  protect  the  covenants  of  the  League. 

The  Members  of  the  League  agree,  further,  that  they 
will  mutually  support  one  another  in  the  financial  and 
economic  measures  which  are  taken  under  this  Article, 
in  order  to  minimise  the  loss  and  inconvenience  resulting 
from  the  above  measures,  and  that  they  will  mutually  sup- 
port one  another  in  resisting  any  special  measures  aimed 
at  one  of  their  number  by  the  covenant-breaking  State, 
and  that  they  will  take  the  necessary  steps  to  afford  pas- 
sage through  their  territory  to  the  forces  of  any  of  the 
Members  of  the  League  which  are  cooperating  to  protect 
the  covenants  of  the  League. 

Any  Member  of  the  League  which  has  violated  any 
covenant  of  the  League  may  be  declared  to  be  no  longer  a 
Member  of  the  League  by  a  vote  of  the  Council  concurred 
in  by  the  Representatives  of  all  the  other  Members  of  the 
League  represented  thereon. 

ARTICLE  17 

IN  the  event  of  a  dispute  between  a  Member  of  the  League 
and  a  State  which  is  not  a  Member  of  the  League,  or  be- 
tween States  not  Members  of  the  League,  the  State  or 
States  not  Members  of  the  League  shall  be  invited  to 
accept  the  obligations  of  membership  in  the  League  for 
the  purposes  of  such  dispute,  upon  such  conditions  as  the 
Council  may  deem  just.  If  such  invitation  is  accepted, 
the  provisions  of  Articles  12  to  16  inclusive  shall  be  applied 
with  such  modifications  as  may  be  deemed  necessary  by 
the  Council. 

Upon  such  invitation  being  given  the  Council  shall  im- 
mediately institute  an  inquiry  into  the  circumstances  of 


APPENDIX  309 

the  dispute  and  recommend  such  action  as  may  seem  best 
and  most  effectual  in  the  circumstances. 

If  a  State  so  invited  shall  refuse  to  accept  the  obliga- 
tions of  membership  in  the  League  for  the  purposes  of  such 
dispute,  and  shall  resort  to  war  against  a  Member  of  the 
League,  the  provisions  of  Article  16  shall  be  applicable  as 
against  the  State  taking  such  action. 

If  both  parties  to  the  dispute  when  so  invited  refuse  to 
accept  the  obligations  of  membership  in  the  League  for  the 
purposes  of  such  dispute,  the  Council  may  take  such  meas- 
ures and  make  such  recommendations  as  will  prevent  hos- 
tilities and  will  result  in  the  settlement  of  the  dispute. 

ARTICLE  18 

EVERY  treaty  or  international  engagement  entered  into 
hereafter  by  any  Member  of  the  League  shall  be  forthwith 
registered  with  the  Secretariat  and  shall  as  soon  as  pos- 
sible be  published  by  it.  No  such  treaty  or  international 
engagement  shall  be  binding  until  so  registered. 

ARTICLE  19 

THE  Assembly  may  from  time  to  time  advise  the  reconsid- 
eration by  Members  of  the  League  of  treaties  which  have 
become  inapplicable  and  the  consideration  of  international 
conditions  whose  continuance  might  endanger  the  peace 
of  the  world. 

ARTICLE  20 

THE  Members  of  the  League  severally  agree  that  this 
Covenant  is  accepted  as  abrogating  all  obligations  or  un- 
derstandings inter  se  which  are  inconsistent  with  the  terms 
thereof,  and  solemnly  undertake  that  they  will  not  here- 
after enter  into  any  engagements  inconsistent  with  the 
terms  thereof. 


310  APPENDIX 

In  case  any  Member  of  the  League  shall,  before  becom- 
ing a  Member  of  the  League,  have  undertaken  any  obliga- 
tions inconsistent  with  the  terms  of  this  Covenant,  it  shall 
be  the  duty  of  such  Member  to  take  immediate  steps  to 
procure  its  release  from  such  obligations. 

ARTICLE  21 

NOTHING  in  this  Covenant  shall  be  deemed  to  affect  the 
validity  of  international  engagements,  such  as  treaties  of 
arbitration  or  regional  understandings  like  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  for  securing  the  maintenance  of  peace. 

ARTICLE  22 

To  those  colonies  and  territories  which  as  a  consequence  of 
the  late  war  have  ceased  to  be  under  the  sovereignty  of  the 
States  which  formerly  governed  them  and  which  are  in- 
habited by  peoples  not  yet  able  to  stand  by  themselves 
under  the  strenuous  conditions  of  the  modern  world,  there 
should  be  applied  the  principle  that  the  well-being  and 
development  of  such  peoples  form  a  sacred  trust  of  civili- 
sation and  that  securities  for  the  performance  of  this  trust 
should  be  embodied  in  this  Covenant. 

The  best  method  of  giving  practical  effect  to  this  princi- 
ple is  that  the  tutelage  of  such  peoples  should  be  entrusted 
to  advanced  nations  who  by  reason  of  their  resources, 
their  experience  or  their  geographical  position  can  best 
undertake  this  responsibility,  and  who  are  willing  to  accept 
it,  and  that  this  tutelage  should  be  exercised  by  them  as 
Mandatories  on  behalf  of  the  League. 

The  character  of  the  mandate  must  differ  according  to 
the  stage  of  the  development  of  the  people,  the  geographi- 
cal situation  of  the  territory,  its  economic  conditions  and 
other  similar  circumstances. 

Certain  communities  formerly  belonging  to  the  Turkish 


APPENDIX  311 

Empire  have  reached  a  stage  of  development  where  their 
existence  as  independent  nations  can  be  provisionally  recog- 
nised subject  to  the  rendering  of  administrative  advice  and 
assistance  by  a  Mandatory  until  such  time  as  they  are  able 
to  stand  alone.  The  wishes  of  these  communities  must  be  a 
principal  consideration  in  the  selection  of  the  Mandatory. 

Other  peoples,  especially  those  of  Central  Africa,  are  at 
such  a  stage  that  the  Mandatory  must  be  responsible  for 
the  administration  of  the  territory  under  conditions  which 
will  guarantee  freedom  of  conscience  and  religion,  subject 
only  to  the  maintenance  of  public  order  and  morals,  the 
prohibition  of  abuses  such  as  the  slave  trade,  the  arms 
traffic  and  the  liquor  traffic,  and  the  prevention  of  the 
establishment  of  fortifications  or  military  and  naval  bases 
and  of  military  training  of  the  natives  for  other  than  police 
purposes  and  the  defense  of  territory,  and  will  also  secure 
equal  opportunities  for  the  trade  and  commerce  of  other 
Members  of  the  League. 

There  are  territories,  such  as  South-West  Africa  and 
certain  of  the  South  Pacific  Islands,  which,  owing  to  the 
sparseness  of  their  population,  or  their  small  size,  or  their 
remoteness  from  the  centres  of  civilisation,  or  their  geo- 
graphical contiguity  to  the  territory  of  the  Mandatory, 
and  other  circumstances,  can  be  best  administered  under 
the  laws  of  the  Mandatory  as  integral  portions  of  its  terri- 
tory, subject  to  the  safeguards  above  mentioned  in  the 
interests  of  the  indigenous  population. 

In  every  case  of  mandate,  the  Mandatory  shall  render 
to  the  Council  an  annual  report  in  reference  to  the  terri- 
tory committed  to  its  charge. 

The  degree  of  authority,  control,  or  administration  to 
be  exercised  by  the  Mandatory  shall,  if  not  previously 
agreed  upon  by  the  Members  of  the  League,  be  explicitly 
defined  in  each  case  by  the  Council. 


312  APPENDIX 

A  permanent  Commission  shall  be  constituted  to  receive 
and  examine  the  annual  reports  of  the  Mandatories  and  to 
advise  the  Council  on  all  matters  relating  to  the  observ- 
ance of  the  mandates. 

ARTICLE  23 

SUBJECT  to  and  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  inter- 
national conventions  existing  or  hereafter  to  be  agreed 
upon,  the  Members  of  the  League: 

(a)  will  endeavour  to  secure  and  maintain  fair  and  hu- 
mane conditions  of  labour  for  men,  women,  and  chil- 
dren, both  in  their  own  countries  and  in  all  countries 
to  which  their  commercial  and  industrial  relations 
extend,  and  for  that  purpose  will  establish  and  main- 
tain the  necessary  international  organisations ; 

(b)  undertake  to  secure  just  treatment  of  the  native 
inhabitants  of  territories  under  their  control; 

(c)  will  entrust  the  League  with  the  general  supervision 
over  the  execution  of  agreements  with  regard  to  the 
traffic  in  women  and  children,  and  the  traffic  in 
opium  and  other  dangerous  drugs; 

(d)  will  entrust  the  League  with  the  general  supervision 
of  the  trade  in  arms  and  ammunition  with  the  coun- 
tries in  which  the  control  of  this  traffic  is  necessary 
in  the  common  interest; 

(e)  will  make  provision  to  secure  and  maintain  freedom 
of  communications  and  of  transit  and  equitable 
treatment  for  the  commerce  of  all  Members  of  the 
League.    In  this  connection,  the  special  necessities 
of  the  regions  devastated  during  the  war  of  1914- 
1918  shall  be  borne  in  mind; 

(/)  will  endeavour  to  take  steps  in  matters  of  interna- 
tional concern  for  the  prevention  and  control  of 
disease. 


APPENDIX  313 

ARTICLE  24 

THERE  shall  be  placed  under  the  direction  of  the  League 
all  international  bureaux  already  established  by  general 
treaties  if  the  parties  to  such  treaties  consent.  All  such 
international  bureaux  and  all  commissions  for  the  regula- 
tion of  matters  of  international  interest  hereafter  consti- 
tuted shall  be  placed  under  the  direction  of  the  League. 

In  all  matters  of  international  interest  which  are  regu- 
lated by  general  conventions  but  which  are  not  placed 
under  the  control  of  international  bureaux  or  commissions, 
the  Secretariat  of  the  League  shall,  subject  to  the  consent 
of  the  Council  and  if  desired  by  the  parties,  collect  and  dis- 
tribute all  relevant  information  and  shall  render  any  other 
assistance  which  may  be  necessary  or  desirable. 

The  Council  may  include  as  part  of  the  expenses  of  the 
Secretariat  the  expenses  of  any  bureau  or  commission 
which  is  placed  under  the  direction  of  the  League. 

ARTICLE  25 

THE  Members  of  the  League  agree  to  encourage  and  pro- 
mote the  establishment  and  co-operation  of  duly  authorised 
voluntary  national  Red  Cross  organisations  having  as  pur- 
poses the  improvement  of  health,  the  prevention  of  disease 
and  the  mitigation  of  suffering  throughout  the  world. 

ARTICLE  26 

AMENDMENTS  to  this  Covenant  will  take  effect  when  rati- 
fied by  the  Members  of  the  League  whose  Representatives 
compose  the  Council  and  by  a  majority  of  the  Members  of 
the  League  whose  Representatives  compose  the  Assembly. 
No  such  amendment  shall  bind  any  Member  of  the 
League  which  signifies  its  dissent  therefrom,  but  in  that 
case  it  shall  cease  to  be  a  Member  of  the  League. 


APPENDIX  IV 
THE  FOURTEEN  POINTS  * 

THE  program  of  the  world's  peace,  therefore,  is  our  pro- 
gram; and  that  program,  the  only  possible  program,  as 
we  see  it,  is  this: 

I.  Open  covenants  of  peace,  openly  arrived  at,  after 
which  there  shall  be  no  private  international  understand- 
ings of  any  kind   but  diplomacy  shall   proceed  always 
frankly  and  in  the  public  view. 

II.  Absolute  freedom  of  navigation  upon  the  seas,  out- 
side territorial  waters,  alike  in  peace  and  in  war,  except  as 
the  seas  may  be  closed  in  whole  or  in  part  by  international 
action  for  the  enforcement  of  international  covenants. 

III.  The  removal,  so  far  as  possible,  of  all  economic 
barriers  and  the  establishment  of  an  equality  of  trade  con- 
ditions among  all  the  nations  consenting  to  the  peace  and 
associating  themselves  for  its  maintenance. 

IV.  Adequate  guarantees  given  and  taken  that  national 
armaments  will  be  reduced  to  the  lowest  point  consistent 
with  domestic  safety. 

V.  A  free,  open-minded,  and  absolutely  impartial  ad- 
justment of  all  colonial  claims,  based  upon  a  strict  ob- 
servance of  the  principle  that  in  determining  all  such 
questions  of  sovereignty  the  interests  of  the  populations 
concerned  must  have  equal  weight  with  the  equitable 
claims  of  the  government  whose  title  is  to  be  determined. 

VI.  The  evacuation  of  all  Russian  territory  and  such  a 
settlement  of  all  questions  affecting  Russia  as  will  secure 

1  From  the  address  of  President  Wilson  delivered  at  a  Joint  Session 
of  Congress  on  January  8,  1918. 


APPENDIX  315 

the'  best  and  freest  cooperation  of  the  other  nations  of  the 
world  in  obtaining  for  her  an  unhampered  and  unembar- 
rassed opportunity  for  the  independent  determination  of 
her  own  political  development  and  national  policy  and 
assure  her  of  a  sincere  welcome  into  the  society  of  free  na- 
tions under  institutions  of  her  own  choosing;  and,  more 
than  a  welcome,  assistance  also  of  every  kind  that  she 
may  need  and  may  herself  desire.  The  treatment  accorded 
Russia  by  her  sister  nations  in  the  months  to  come  will  be 
the  acid  test  of  their  good-will,  of  their  comprehension  of 
her  needs  as  distinguished  from  their  own  interests,  and 
of  their  intelligent  and  unselfish  sympathy. 

VII.  Belgium,  the  whole  world  will  agree,  must  be  evac- 
uated and  restored,  without  any  attempt  to  limit  the  sov- 
ereignty which  she  enjoys  in  common  with  all  other  free 
nations.  No  other  single  act  will  serve  as  this  will  serve  to 
restore  confidence  among  the  nations  in  the  laws  which 
they  have  themselves  set  and  determined  for  the  govern- 
ment of  their  relations  with  one  another.    Without  this 
healing  act  the  whole  structure  and  validity  of  interna- 
tional law  is  forever  impaired. 

VIII.  All  French  territory  should  be  freed  and  the  in- 
vaded portions  restored,  and  the  wrong  done  to  France  by 
Prussia  in  1871  in  the  matter  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  which 
has  unsettled  the  peace  of  the  world  for  nearly  fifty  years, 
should  be  righted,  in  order  that  peace  may  once  more  be 
made  secure  in  the  interest  of  all. 

IX.  A  readjustment  of  the  frontiers  of  Italy  should  be 
effected  along  clearly  recognizable  lines  of  nationality. 

X.  The  peoples  of  Austria-Hungary,  whose  place  among 
the  nations  we  wish  to  see  safeguarded  and  assured,  should 
be  accorded  the  freest  opportunity  of  autonomous  devel- 
opment. 

XI.  Rumania,  Serbia,  and  Montenegro  should  be  evac- 


316  APPENDIX 

uated;  occupied  territories  restored;  Serbia  accorded  free 
and  secure  access  to  the  sea;  and  the  relations  of  the  sev- 
eral Balkan  states  to  one  another  determined  by  friendly 
counsel  along  historically  established  lines  of  allegiance 
and  nationality;  and  international  guarantees  of  the  polit- 
ical and  economic  independence  and  territorial  integrity 
of  the  several  Balkan  states  should  be  entered  into. 

XII.  The  Turkish  portions   of  the  present  Ottoman 
Empire  should  be  assured  a  secure  sovereignty,  but  the 
other  nationalities  which  are  now  under  Turkish  rule 
should  be  assured  an  undoubted  security  of  life  and  an 
absolutely  unmolested  opportunity  of  autonomous  devel- 
opment,  and   the  Dardanelles    should   be   permanently 
opened  as  a  free  passage  to  the  ships  and  commerce  of  all 
nations  under  international  guarantees. 

XIII.  An  independent  Polish  state  should  be  erected 
which  should  include  the  territories  inhabited  by  indis- 
putably Polish  populations,  which  should  be  assured  a  free 
and  secure  access  to  the  sea,  and  whose  political  and  eco- 
nomic independence  and  territorial  integrity  should  be 
guaranteed  by  international  covenant. 

XIV.  A  general  association  of  nations  must  be  formed 
under  specific  covenants  for  the  purpose  of  affording 
mutual  guarantees  of  political  independence  and  terri- 
torial integrity  to  great  and  small  states  alike. 


APPENDIX  V 

PRINCIPLES  DECLARED  BY  PRESIDENT  WILSON  IN 
HIS  ADDRESS  OF  FEBRUARY  1 1,  1918 

THE  principles  to  be  applied  are  these: 

First,  that  each  part  of  the  final  settlement  must  be 
based  upon  the  essential  justice  of  that  particular  case  and 
upon  such  adjustments  as  are  most  likely  to  bring  a  peace 
that  will  be  permanent; 

Second,  that  peoples  and  provinces  are  not  to  be  bartered 
about  from  sovereignty  to  sovereignty  as  if  they  were  mere 
chattels  and  pawns  in  a  game,  even  the  great  game,  now 
forever  discredited,  of  the  balance  of  power;  but  that 

Third,  every  territorial  settlement  involved  in  this  war 
must  be  made  in  the  interest  and  for  the  benefit  of  the 
populations  concerned,  and  not  as  a  part  of  any  mere  ad- 
justment or  compromise  of  claims  amongst  rival  states; 
and 

Fourth,  that  all  well  defined  national  aspirations  shall 
be  accorded  the  utmost  satisfaction  that  can  be  accorded 
them  without  introducing  new  or  perpetuating  old  ele- 
ments of  discord  and  antagonism  that  would  be  likely  in 
time  to  break  the  peace  of  Europe  and  consequently  of  the 
world. 


APPENDIX  VI 

THE  ARTICLES  OF  THE  TREATY  OF  VERSAILLES 
RELATING  TO  SHANTUNG 

ARTICLE  156 

GERMANY  renounces,  in  favour  of  Japan,  all  her  rights, 
title  and  privileges  —  particularly  those  concerning  the 
territory  of  Kiaochow,  railways,  mines,  and  submarine 
cables  —  which  she  acquired  in  virtue  of  the  Treaty  con- 
cluded by  her  with  China  on  March  6,  1898,  and  of  all 
other  arrangements  relative  to  the  Province  of  Shantung. 

All  German  rights  in  the  Tsingtao-Tsinanfu  Railway, 
including  its  branch  lines,  together  with  its  subsidiary 
property  of  all  kinds,  stations,  shops,  fixed  and  rolling 
stock,  mines,  plant  and  material  for  the  exploitation  of 
the  mines,  are  and  remain  acquired  by  Japan,  together 
with  all  rights  and  privileges  attaching  thereto. 

The  German  State  submarine  cables  from  Tsingtao  to 
Shanghai  and  from  Tsingtao  to  Chefoo,  with  all  the  rights, 
privileges  and  properties  attaching  thereto,  are  similarly 
acquired  by  Japan,  free  and  clear  of  all  charges  and  en- 
cumbrances. 

ARTICLE  157 

THE  movable  and  immovable  property  owned  by  the  Ger- 
man State  in  the  territory  of  Kiaochow,  as  well  as  all  the 
rights  which  Germany  might  claim  in  consequence  of  the 
works  or  improvements  made  or  of  the  expenses  incurred 
by  her,  directly  or  indirectly,  in  connection  with  this  terri- 
tory, are  and  remain  acquired  by  Japan,  free  and  clear  of 
all  charges  and  encumbrances. 


APPENDIX  319 

ARTICLE  158 

GERMANY  shall  hand  over  to  Japan  within  three  months 
from  the  coming  into  force  of  the  present  Treaty  the  ar- 
chives, registers,  plans,  title-deeds  and  documents  of  every 
kind,  wherever  they  may  be,  relating  to  the  administra- 
tion, whether  civil,  military,  financial,  judicial  or  other, 
of  the  territory  of  Kiaochow. 

Within  the  same  period  Germany  shall  give  particulars 
to  Japan  of  all  treaties,  arrangements  or  agreements  re- 
lating to  the  rights,  title  or  privileges  referred  to  in  the 
two  preceding  Articles. 


INDEX 


Abrogation  of  treaties  contrary  to  the 
League,  in  Wilson's  original  draft,  291 ; 
in  Treaty,  309,  310. 

Affirmative  guaranty  of  territory  and  in- 
dependence, plan,  33;  Wilson  adopts, 
34,  35;  in  Fourteen  Points,  35,  36,  316; 
Lansing's  opposition,  37,  44,  85;  con- 
stitutional and  political  arguments 
against,  48-50,  167-169;  Lansing's 
"  self-denying  covenant"  as  substitute, 
52-54;  in  Wilson's  original  draft  and 
in  Treaty,  54-56,  93.  283>  3°3!  as  con- 
tinuing balance  of  power,  78;  Wilson 
adheres  to,  86,  124;  not  in  Cecil  plan, 
91;  in  Lansing's  resolution  of  princi- 
ples, 116;  other  substitute,  123,  124; 
as  reason  for  rejection  of  Treaty  by 
Senate,  125;  retained  in  reported  Cove- 
nant, 135;  and  dominance  of  Great 
Powers,  166.  See  also  Equality  of  na- 
tions; League;  Self-denying  covenant. 

Albania,  disposition,  195. 

Alliances.  See  French  alliance. 

Alsace-Lorraine,  to  be  restored  to  France, 

196,  3i5- 
Amendment  of  League,  provision  for, 

3*3- 

American  Bar  Association,  Lansing's  ad- 
dress, 70. 

American  Commission,  members,  15, 48; 
ignored  in  League  negotiations,  37,41, 
42, 46, 87, 105-108,  137, 143,  217; con- 
ference of  January  10,  106-108;  igno- 
rant of  preliminary  negotiations,  214, 
216,  217;  question  of  resignation  over 
Shantung  settlement,  264,  265;  shares 
in  Shantung  negotiations,  265,  266. 
See  also  Bliss;  House;  Lansing;  White; 
Wilson. 

American  Peace  Society,  30. 

American  programme,  lack  of  definite, 
as  subject  of  disagreement,  8;  Four- 
teen Points  announced,  1 7 ;  not  worked 
out,  190;  insufficiency  of  Fourteen 
Points,  191;  Lansing's  memorandum 
on  territorial  settlements,  192-197; 
effect  of  President's  attendance  at 
Conference,  198;  embarrassment  to 
delegates  of  lack,  198,  199;  projet 
of  treaty  prepared  for  Lansing,  199; 


President  resents  it,  200;  no  system  or 
team-work  in  American  Commission, 
201,  202,  204,  303;  reason  for  Presi- 
dent's attitude,  202,  203,  211,  212;  no 
instructions  during  President's  ab- 
sence, 203,  208,  209;  results  of  lack, 
206 ;  and  Preliminary  Treaty,  211,212; 
influence  of  lack  on  Wilson's  leader- 
ship, 212;  text  of  Fourteen  Points, 
314-316. 

Annunzio,  Gabriele  d',  at  Fiume,  233. 

Arabia,  disposition,  196.  See  also  Near 
East. 

Arbitral  Tribunal,  in  Lansing's  plan,  63- 
65. 

Arbitration,  as  form  of  peace  promotion, 
33;  in  Lansing's  plan,  63-65;  in  Wil- 
son's original  draft,  285,  286,  289,  290; 
in  Cecil  plan,  297;  in  Treaty,  304,  305, 
308,  309.  See  also  Diplomatic  adjust- 
ment; Judicial  settlement. 

Armenia,  mandate  for,  159;  protectorate, 
195.  See  also  Near  East. 

Armistice,  American  conference  on,  15. 

Article  X.  See  Affirmative  guaranty. 

Assembly  (Body  of  Delegates),  in  Wil- 
son's original  draft,  281,  282;  analo- 
gous body  in  Cecil  plan,  295;  in 
Treaty,  300. 

Auchincloss,  Gordon,  and  drafting  of 
League,  122,  123, 131. 

Austria,  Archduchy  and  union  with  Ger- 
many, outlet  to  sea,  99,  195. 

Austria-Hungary,  dissolution,  194,  224; 
Fourteen  Points  on  subject  people, 

3iS-. 
Azerbaidjan,  Wilson  and,  99. 

Baker,  Ray  Stannard,  and  Shantung, 
261. 

Balance  of  power,  Clemenceau  advo- 
cates, 77;  Wilson  denounces,  77;  and 
Cecil  plan,  89;  League  and,  165.  See 
also  Affirmative  guaranty;  Equality 
of  nations. 

Balfour,  Arthur,  signs  French  alliance, 
182. 

Balkans,  Fourteen  Points  on,  315.  See 
also  states  by  names. 

Belgium,   and  Anglo-Franco-American 


322 


INDEX 


alliance,  179;   full   sovereignty,  196, 

3i5- 

Bessarabia,  disposition,  194. 

Bliss,  Tasker  H.,  American  delegate,  48; 
opposes  affirmative  guaranty,  124; 
and  Covenant  as  reported,  137;  and 
proposed  French  alliance,  179;  and 
Shantung,  letter  to  President,  255- 
261.  See  also  American  Commission; 
American  programme. 

Body  of  Delegates.  See  Assembly. 

Boers,  and  self-determination,  97. 

Bohemia,  disposition,  194. 

Bolshevism,  peace  as  check  to  spread, 
no. 

Bosnia,  disposition,  194. 

Boundaries,  principles  in  drawing,  102. 

Bowman,  Isaiah,  Commission  of  In- 
quiry, 18. 

Brest-Litovsk  Treaty,  to  be  abrogated, 

193- 
Bucharest    Treaty,    to    be    abrogated, 

193- 

Buffer  state  on  the  Rhine,  179,  180. 

Bulgaria,  boundaries,  195. 

Bullitt,  William  C.,  on  revision  of  Cov- 
enant, 123;  testimony  on  Lansing  inter- 
view, 268,  269;  Lansing's  telegram  to 
President  on  testimony,  270;  no  reply 
received,  271;  and  Wilson's  western 
speeches,  272. 

Canada,  Papineau  Rebellion  and  self- 
determination,  103. 

Carnegie  Endowment  for  International 
Peace,  30. 

Cecil,  Lord  Robert,  plan  for  League,  88, 
89;  Wilson  opposes  it,  89-92;  text  of 
plan,  295-298. 

Central  Powers,  Wilson  and  need  of 
defeat,  17;  hope  in  Wilson's  attitude, 
20;  peace  or  Bolshevism,  no.  See 
also  Mandates,  and  states  by  name. 

China.   See  Shantung. 

Chinda,  Viscount,  and  Shantung,  254, 
255- 

Civil  War,  and  self-determination,  100, 
101. 

Clemenceau,  Georges,  Supreme  War 
Council,  14;  advocates  balance  of 
power,  77;  and  Cecil  plan.  89;  and 
Franco-American  alliance,  180.  See 
also  Council  of  Four. 

Codification  of  international  law,  in 
Lansing's  plan,  64,  65. 

Colonies,   disposition  of,  in  Lansing's 


plan,  187;  Fourteen  Points  on,  314. 
See  also  Mandates. 

Commerce.  See  Non-intercourse;  Open 
Door. 

Commission  of  Inquiry,  work,  17.  18. 

Commission  on  the  League  of  Nations, 
appointed,  117;  and  Wilson's  return 
to  United  States,  117, 118;  meets,  Wil- 
son's draft  as  groundwork,  1:9;  meet- 
ings and  report,  Wilson's  address,  134; 
character  of  report  and  work,  134, 
137,  172;  secrecy,  136,  235;  Wilson's 
domination,  138. 

Constantinople,  disposition,  195. 

Constitutional  objections,  to  affirmative 
guaranty,  50-52,  167;  and  to  Cecil 
plan,  91. 

Council  of  Foreign  Ministers,  estab- 
lished, nickname,  219. 

Council  of  Four,  self-constituted,  214; 
secrecy,  218,  236;  "Olympians,"  222; 
gives  only  digest  of  Treaty  to  other 
delegates,  239,  240;  Shantung  bar- 
gain, 243,  254,  255,  261,  267.  See  also 
Secret  diplomacy. 

Council  of  Ten,  and  Lansing's  substitute 
resolution  on  League,  115;  during  Wil- 
son's absence,  204;  self-constituted 
organization,  213,  214;  and  Supreme 
War  Council,  213;  divided,  218;  and 
secrecy,  235. 

Council  of  the  Heads  of  States.  See 
Council  of  Four. 

Council  (Executive  Council)  of  the 
League,  in  Wilson's  original  draft, 
282,  283;  analogous  body  in  Cecil 
plan,  295;  in  Treaty,  300,  301. 

Covenant.  See  League  of  Nations. 

Croatia,  disposition,  194. 

Czecho-Slovakia,  erection,  194,  224. 

Dalmatia,  in  Pact  of  London,  223. 

Danzig,  for  Poland,  194. 

Dardanelles,  Fourteen  Points  on,  316. 

Declaration  of  war,  affirmative  guaranty 
and  power  over,  49,  50,  167. 

Denmark,  Schleswig-Holstein,  196; 
Heligoland,  196. 

Diplomacy.  See  Secret  diplomacy. 

Diplomatic  adjustment,  as  basis  of  Cov- 
enant, 46;  exalted,  67-70,  82,  169; 
Lansing  on  judicial  settlement  and, 
70-73;  in  Wilson's  original  draft,  285- 
287;  in  Treaty,  305-307.  See  also 
Judicial  settlement. 

Disarmament,  not  touched  in  Lansing's 


INDEX 


323 


plan,  75;   in  Lansing's  resolution  of 
principles,  117;  in  Wilson's  original 
draft,  284;  in  Treaty,  302,  303. 
Dobrudja,  disposition,  194,  195. 

East  Indians,  and  self-determination,  97. 

Economic  influence  on  boundary  lines, 
103. 

Economic  interdependence,  importance 
in  peace  negotiations,  197. 

Economic  pressure.  See  Non-inter- 
course. 

Egypt,  and  self-determination,  97;  dis- 
position, 196. 

Election  of  1918,  as  rebuke  to  Wilson, 
32. 

Entangling  alliances.  See  Isolation. 

Equality  of  nations,  sacrifice  in  Wilson's 
draft  of  League,  44,  45,  67,  81,  85,  90; 
in  Lansing's  form  for  League,  58,  59; 
ignored  in  Cecil  plan,  88,  89;  primacy 
of  Great  Powers  retained  in  reported 
Covenant,  135,  138;  violation  by 
Treaty,  164-167,  273,  274;  and  secret 
diplomacy  at  Conference,  219,  238- 
240. 

Esthonia,  Wilson  and,  99;  autonomy, 

iQ3- 

Ethnic  influence  on  boundary  lines,  103. 
See  also  Racial  minorities;  Self-de- 
termination. 

Finland,  question  of  independence,  193. 

Fiume  affair,  Lansing's  attitude,  222; 
Pact  of  London  in  light  of  dissolu- 
tion of  Austria-Hungary,  223-225; 
resulting  increase  in  Italian  claims  as 
basis  for  compromise,  225;  attitude 
of  Italy  toward  Jugo-Slavia,  225,  226; 
commercial  importance  of  Fiume  to 
Jugo-Slavia,  226;  campaign  of  Italian 
delegates  for  Fiume,  227,  228;  Italian 
public  sentiment,  228;  character  of 
population,  self-determination  ques- 
tion, 229;  efforts  to  get  Wilson's  ap- 
proval, 229-231;  threat  to  retire  from 
Conference,  231;  Wilson's  statement 
against  Italian  claim,  232;  withdrawal 
of  delegation,  232;  Italian  resentment 
against  Wilson,  232;  as  lesson  on 
secret  diplomacy,  233-235;  delegation 
returns,  235;  and  Shantung,  259,  260. 

Fourteen  Points,  announced,  17;  af- 
firmative guaranty  in,  35,  38;  insuf- 
ficient as  programme,  191;  text,  314- 
316. 


France,  Alsace-Lorraine,  196,  315;  res- 
toration, 315.  See  also  Clemenceau; 
French  alliance;  Great  Powers. 

Freedom  of  the  seas,  in  Fourteen  Points, 
314- 

French  alliance,  as  subject  of  disagree- 
ment, 8;  provisions  of  treaty,  178;  re- 
lation to  League,  179,  185;  and  re- 
moval of  certain  French  demands 
from  Treaty  of  Peace,  179,  180;  and 
French  adherence  to  League,  179-181, 
185;  Lansing's  opposition,  182,  183, 
185,  186;  drafted,  signed,  182;  Lan- 
sing and  signing,  183;  arguments  for, 
183-185. 

Geographic  influence  on  boundary  lines, 
103. 

Georgia,  Wilson  and,  99. 

Germany,  buffer  state  on  the  Rhine, 
179,  1 80;  and,  Russian  route  to  the 
East,  192,  193;  Lansing's  memoran- 
dum on  territorial  settlements,  194, 
196,  197;  military  impotence,  197. 
See  also  Central  Powers;  French  al- 
liance; Mandates. 

Ginn  Peace  Foundation,  30. 

Great  Britain,  and  clause  on  self-de- 
termination, 95;  Egypt,  196.  See  also 
French  alliance;  Great  Powers;  Lloyd 
George. 

Great  Powers,  and  mandates,  156-160. 
See  also  Balance  of  power;  Council  of 
Four;  Equality  of  nations. 

Greece,  territory,  194. 

Gregory,  Thomas  W.,  and  Wilson's 
modus  vivendi  idea,  207. 

Guaranty.  See  Affirmative;  Self-deny- 
ing. 

Hague  Conventions,  and  international 
peace,  30. 

Hague  Tribunal,  and  Lansing's  plan,  65, 
73;  Wilson's  contempt,  130;  recogni- 
tion in  Cecil  plan,  296. 

Hands  Off,  as  basis  of  Lansing's  plan,  75. 

Health,  promotion  in  Treaty,  312. 

Heligoland,  dismantlement,  disposition, 
196. 

Herzegovina,  disposition,  194. 

Historic  influence  on  boundary  lines, 
103. 

Hostilities.    See  Prevention  of  war. 

House,  Edward  M.,  joins  Supreme  War 
Council,  14;  conference  on  armistice 
terms,  15;  selection  as  peace  negotia- 


324 


INDEX 


tor,  15;  and  President  as  delegate,  15, 
25,  26;  Commission  of  Inquiry,  18; 
and  drafting  of  League,  36,  42,  122, 
216;  and  international  court,  73,  131, 
132;  and  "self-denying  covenant," 
79,  124;  and  balance  of  power,  78; 
of  Commission  on  the  League  of  Na- 
tions, 117;  and  mandates,  153,  160; 
and  data,  202;  ignorant  of  Wilson's 
programme,  205;  and  Preliminary 
Treaty  with  detailed  Covenant,  210, 
21 1 ;  and  private  consultations,  214. 
See  also  American  Commission. 
Hungary,  separation  from  Austria,  194, 
224. 

Immoral  traffic,  prevention  in  Treaty ,  3 1 2. 

Immunities  of  League  representatives, 
302. 

Indemnities,  and  mandates,  156,  157. 

India,  German  routes  to,  192,  193. 

International  commissions,  in  Cecil 
plan,  296;  in  Treaty,  313. 

International  court.  See  Judicial  set- 
tlement. 

International  enforcement.  See  Affirm- 
ative guaranty. 

International  military  force,  in  Wilson's 
original  draft,  287;  in  Treaty,  308. 

International  military  staff,  proposal, 
179,  185. 

Interparliamentary  Congress,  in  Cecil 
plan,  206. 

Inviolability  of  League  property,  302. 

Irish,  and  self-determination,  97. 

Isolation,  policy,  and  affirmative  guar- 
anty, 39,  168;  and  mandates,  149;  and 
French  alliance,  180,  185,  186. 

Italy,  and  Cecil  plan,  89;  territory,  194, 
315.  See  also  Fiume;  Great  Powers. 

Japan,  and  Cecil  plan,  89;  in  Council  of 
Ten,  213.  See  also  Great  Powers; 
Shantung. 

Judicial  settlement  of  international  dis- 
putes, Lansing's  plan,  62-64;  subor- 
dinated in  Wilson's  draft,  67,  74,  82, 
169;  Lansing  on  diplomatic  adjust- 
ment and,  70-73;  Lansing  urges  as  nu- 
cleus of  League,  73;  in  Lansing's  reso- 
lution of  principles,  116,117;  Lansing's 
appeal  for,  in  Covenant,  126-130;  ar- 
bitrators of  litigant  nations,  127;  dif- 
ficulties in  procedure,  127,  128;  cost, 
128;  elimination  from  Covenant  of  ap- 
peal from  arbitral  awards,  how  effected, 


129,  131-133,  169;  Lansing's  appeal 
ignored,  130,  131;  in  Cecil  plan,  296. 
See  also  Arbitration;  Diplomatic  ad- 
justment. 

Jugo-Slavia,  and  Anglo-Franco-Ameri- 
can alliance,  180;  port,  194;  erected, 
194,  224.  See  also  Fiume. 

Kato,  Baron,  and  Shantung,  248. 
Kiao-Chau.  See  Shantung. 
Kiel  Canal,  internationalization,  196. 
Koo,  V.  K.  Wellington,  argument  on 
Shantung,  253. 

Labor  article,  in  Wilson's  original  draft, 
293;  in  Treaty,  312. 

Lansing,  Robert,  resignation  asked  and 
given,  3;  divergence  of  judgment  from 
President,  3,  4;  reasons  for  retaining 
office,  3,  137,  162,  187-189,  264,  265; 
reasons  for  narrative,  4;  imputation 
of  faithlessness,  5,  24,  106,  163,  270; 
personal  narrative,  6;  subjects  of  dis- 
agreement, 8,  9,  278-280;  attitude 
toward  duty  as  negotiator,  7,  8,  10; 
policy  as  to  advice  to  President,  10; 
President's  attitude  towards  opinions, 
n,  23,  59,  60,  62,  79,  87,  105-108, 130, 
131;  method  of  treatment  of  subject, 
12,  26,  27;  conference  on  armistice 
terms,  15;  selected  as  a  negotiator,  15; 
opposition  to  President  being  a  dele- 
gate, 15,  21-23,  255  President's  atti- 
tude toward  this  opposition,  23;  and 
Commission  of  Inquiry,  18;  arrival  in 
Paris,  48;  and  balance  of  power,  78, 
79;  and  paramount  need  of  speedy 
peace,  110-113,  209,  210;  opposition 
to  mandates,  150-154,  1 60;  opposition 
to  French  alliance  treaty,  179,  180, 
182,  183,  185,  186;  signs  it,  182, 
183;  personal  relations  with  President, 
186;  memorandum  on  American  pro- 
gramme (1918),  192-197;  has  pro  jet 
of  treaty  prepared,  Wilson  resents  it, 
199-201;  on  lack  of  organization  in 
American  Commission,  201;  and  lack 
of  programme,  205,  206;  and  Ameri- 
can Commission  during  President's  ab- 
sence, 203,  204,  208,  209;  on  Wilson's 
modus  vivendi  idea,  207;  opposition 
to  secret  diplomacy,  effect  on  Wilson, 
219-221;  and  Fiume,  222,  230;  and 
Shantung,  254-256,  261-263;  Bullitt 
affair,  269-272;  views  on  Treaty  when 
presented  to  Germans,  272-274;  and 


INDEX 


325 


ratification  of  Treaty,  276.  See  also 
American  Commission;  League;  Wil- 
son. 

Latvia,  Wilson  and,  99;  autonomy,  193. 

League  of  Nations,  principles  as  subject 
of  disagreement,  8;  as  object  of  peace 
negotiations,  18;  as  reason  for  Presi- 
dent's participation  in  Conference, 
28;  Wilson's  belief  in  necessity,  28, 31; 
American  support  of  idea,  earlier 
plans  and  associations,  29-33;  diver- 
gence of  opinion  on  form,  33 ;  political 
and  juridical  forms  of  organization, 
34;  Wilson's  belief  in  international 
force  and  affirmative  guaranty,  34, 
35;  affirmative  guaranty  in  Fourteen 
Points,  35,  36,  316;  Phillimore's  re- 
port, 36;  preparation  of  Wilson's 
original  draft,  House  as  author,  36,  37, 
42,  122,  216;  Lansing  not  consulted, 
reason,  37,  41,  42,  46;  Lansing's  op- 
position to  affirmative  guaranty,  37, 
44,  48-50,  78,  85,  167-169;  Lansing 
and  non-intercourse  peace  plan,  40; 
draft  impracticable,  43;  and  equality 
of  nations,  44,  45,  67,  81,  85,  88-90, 
i35»  138,  164-167,  273,  274;  Lansing's 
"self-denying  covenant,"  44,  52-54, 
86;  Lansing  accepts  guaranty  as  mat- 
ter of  expediency,  45,  49;  diplomatic 
adjustment  as  basis  of  Wilson's  draft, 
46;  guaranty  in  first  draft,  later  draft, 
and  Treaty,  54-56,  93,  94;  Lansing's 
substitute,  56-59,  62-67,  74-76;  his 
communications  not  acknowledged, 
59,  60,  62,  79,  87;  incorporation  of  de- 
tailed Covenant  in  Treaty,  61;  ir- 
reconcilable differences  between  Wil- 
son's and  Lansing's  plans,  67-70,  85; 
Lansing  on  diplomatic  adjustment 
versus  judicial  settlement,  70-73; 
Lansing  urges  international  court  as 
nucleus,  73;  three  doctrines  of  Lan- 
sing's plan,  75;  Lansing's  first  view  of 
Wilson's  draft,  79;  his  opinion  of  its 
form,  81;  of  its  principles,  81;  Wilson 
considers  affirmative  guaranty  essen- 
tial, effect  on  Treaty,  87,  124,  125; 
American  Commission  ignored  on 
matters  concerning,  87,  105-108,  143, 
217;  Cecil  plan,  88,  89;  Wilson's  op- 
position to  it,  89-92;  question  of  self- 
determination,  94-105;  Lansing's  pro- 
posed resolution  of  principles  in 
Treaty  and  later  detailing,  109,  no, 
170-172;  detailed  Covenant  or  speedy 


peace,  109-112,  173-177,  209-211; 
Wilson  utilizes  desire  for  peace  to 
force  acceptance  of  League,  112,  119, 
140,  173-177;  Lansing  proposes  reso- 
lution to  Wilson,  113,  114;  and  to 
Council  of  Ten,  115;  drafted  resolu- 
tion of  principles,  115-117;  Commis- 
sion on  the  League  of  Nations  ap- 
pointed, American  members,  117; 
resolution  and  Wilson's  return  to 
United  States,  117-119;  Wilson's 
draft  before  Commission,  119;  Wilson 
pigeonholes  resolution,  119-121;  re- 
vision of  Wilson's  draft,  122;  Lan- 
sing's appeal  for  international  court, 
126-130;  it  is  ignored,  130,  131;  elimi- 
nation of  appeal  from  arbitral  awards, 
how  effected,  129,  131-133,  169;  re- 
port of  Commission,  Wilson's  ad- 
dress, 134;  character  of  report  and 
work  of  Commission,  main  principles 
unaltered,  134,  135,  137,  172;  Wilson 
and  American  opposition  (Feb.),  135, 
139-143;  American  Commission  and 
report,  136,  137;  amendments  to 
placate  American  opinion,  142,  143; 
reaction  in  Europe  due  to  American 
opposition,  143,  144;  change  in  char- 
acter and  addition  of  functions  to  pre- 
serve it,  145,  148,  154,  156;  summary 
of  Lansing's  objections,  164-177;  and 
French  alliance,  179-181,  185;  in  a 
preliminary  treaty  as  a  modus  vi- 
vendi,  206-208;  as  subject  of  Wilson's 
private  consultations,  214;  secrecy  in 
negotiations,  216,  235;  and  Shantung 
bargain,  245-247,  261;  Bullitt's  report 
of  Lansing's  attitude,  269-272;  and 
carrying  out  of  the  Treaty,  273,  274; 
as  merely  a  name  for  the  Quintuple  Al- 
liance, 273,  274;  text  of  Wilson's  origi- 
nal draft,  281-294;  of  Cecil  plan,  295- 
298;  in  Treaty,  299-313.  See  also 
Mandates. 

League  to  Enforce  Peace,  30;  Wilson's 
address,  34,  35. 

Lithuania,  Wilson  and,  99;  autonomy, 

193- 

Lloyd  George,  David,  Supreme  War 
Council,  14;  and  French  alliance,  181, 
182.  See  also  Council  of  Four. 

Log-rolling  at  Conference,  236. 

London,  Pact  of,  223. 

Makino,  Baron,  and  Shantung,  254,  255. 
Mandates,  in  Smuts  plan,  Wilson  adopts 


326 


INDEX 


it,  82;  Lansing's  criticism,  83-85,  160; 
retained  in  reported  Covenant,  135; 
political  difficulties,  149;  Wilson's 
attitude,  150;  legal  difficulties,  150- 
154;  usefulness  questioned,  155, 156;  as 
means  of  justifying  the  League,  156; 
and  indemnities,  156,  157;  altruistic, 
to  be  share  of  United  States,  157- 
160;  in  Wilson's  original  draft,  291; 
in  Treaty,  310-312. 

Meeting-place  of  League,  in  Wilson's 
original  draft,  281;  in  Cecil  plan,  297; 
in  Treaty,  302. 

Membership  in  League,  in  Wilson's 
original  draft,  291;  in  Treaty,  299; 
withdrawal,  299,  313. 

Mezes,  Sidney  E.,  Commission  of  In- 
quiry, 18;  and  data,  202. 

Miller,  David  Hunter,  and  drafting  of 
Covenant,  122,  123,  131;  and  projet 
of  a  treaty,  199,  200. 

Modus  vivendi,  Wilson  and  a  preliminary 
treaty  as,  206-208. 

Monroe  Doctrine,  and  affirmative  cove- 
nant, 40,  49,  168;  preservation  in 
Treaty,  310. 

Montenegro,  in  Jugo-Slavia,  194;  Four- 
teen Points  on,  315. 

Moravia,  disposition,  194. 

Munitions,  regulation  of  manufacture 
and  trade,  in  Wilson's  original  draft, 
284;  in  Treaty,  303,  312. 

National  safety,  dominance  of  principle, 
102. 

Near  East,  United  States  and  mandates, 
149,  158;  Lansing's  memorandum  on 
territorial  settlements,  195-196;  man- 
dates in  Wilson's  original  draft,  291; 
mandates  in  Treaty,  310,  311;  Four- 
teen Points  on,  316.  [covenant. 

Negative  guaranty.     See  Self-denying 

Non-intercourse,  as  form  of  peace  pro- 
motion, 33,  40;  constitutionality,  51, 
52;  in  Wilson's  original  draft,  287, 
288,  290;  in  Treaty,  307. 

Norway,  Spitzbergen,  196. 

Open  Door,  in  Lansing's  plan,  66,  75, 
117;  in  Near  East,  196,  311,  312;  in 
former  German  colonies,  197;  prin- 
ciple in  Wilson's  original  draft,  293; 
and  in  Treaty,  311,  312;  in  Fourteen 
Points,  314. 

Outlet  to  the  sea  for  each  nation,  197. 

Orlando,  Vittorio  Emmanuele,  228-235. 


Palestine,  autonomy,  196.  See  also  Near 
East. 

Pan-America,  proposed  mutual  guar- 
anty treaty,  35,  39. 

Papineau  Rebellion,  and  self-determi- 
nation. 103. 

Peace,  Treaty  of,  inclusion  of  detailed 
Covenant  as  subject  of  disagreement, 
8;  expected  preliminary  treaty,  76, 
109;  speedy  restoration  of  peace  ver- 
sus detailed  Covenant,  110-112,  173- 
177,  209-211;  Wilson  employs  desire 
for,  to  force  acceptance  of  League,  re- 
sulting delay,  112,  119,  140,  173-177; 
delay  on  League  causes  definitive 
rather  than  preliminary  treaty,  174; 
subjects  for  a  preliminary  treaty,  208, 
209;  influence  of  lack  of  American  pro- 
gramme, 206,  211,  212;  Wilson's  de- 
cision for  a  definitive  treaty,  208;  Lan- 
sing's views  of  finished  treaty,  272- 
274;  British  opinion,  274;  protests  of 
experts  and  officials  of  American  Com- 
mission, 274,  275;  Lansing  and  rati- 
fication, 276.  See  also  League. 

Persia,  disposition,  196. 

Phillimore,  Lord,  report  on  League  of 
Nations,  36. 

Poland,  and  Anglo-Franco-American  al- 
liance, 180;  independence,  194,  224, 
316;  Danzig,  194. 

Postponement  of  hostilities,  as  form  of 
peace  promotion,  33;  in  Wilson's  origi- 
nal draft,  285;  in  Cecil  plan,  297;  in 
Treaty,  304. 

President  as  delegate,  as  subject  of  dis- 
agreement, 8;  Lansing's  opposition, 
15,  21-24;  origin  of  Wilson's  intention, 
16;  influence  of  belligerency  on  plan, 
19;  influence  of  presence  on  domina- 
tion of  situation,  20,  22;  personal  rea- 
sons for  attending,  20,  21;  decision  to 
go  to  Paris,  22;  decision  to  be  a  dele- 
gate, 25;  attitude  of  House,  26;  League 
as  reason  for  decision,  28. 

Prevention  of  war,  in  Wilson's  original 
draft,  288-290;  in  Cecil  plan,  297;  in 
Treaty,  304.  See  also  Arbitration; 
League. 

Publication  of  treaties,  in  Lansing's  plan, 
65,  66,  117;  in  Treaty,  309. 

Publicity,  as  basis  of  Lansing's  plan,  75. 
See  also  Secret  diplomacy. 

Quintuple  Alliance,  League  of  Nations 
as  name  for,  273,  274. 


INDEX 


327 


Racial  equality,  issue  in  Shantung  bar- 
gain, 243,  255. 

Racial  minorities,  protection,  in  Wilson's 
original  draft,  294. 

Ratification  of  Treaty,  Lansing's  atti- 
tude, 276. 

Red  Cross,  promotion  in  Treaty,  313. 

Rhenish  Republic,  as  buffer  state,  179, 
180. 

Roumania,  Bucharest  Treaty  to  be  ab- 
rogated, 193;  territory,  194;  Fourteen 
Points  on,  315. 

Russia,  Wilson's  policy,  99,  100; .  and 
route  for  Germany  to  the  East,  192, 
193;  Lansing's  notes  on  territorial 
settlement,  193,  194;  Fourteen  Points 
on,  314. 

Ruthenians,  and  Ukraine,  194. 

Schleswig-Holstein,  disposition,  196. 

Scott,  James  Brown,  drafts  French 
alliance  treaty,  182;  and  projet  of  a 
treaty,  199,  200. 

Secret  diplomacy,  as  subject  of  disagree- 
ment, 8;  in  negotiation  of  League, 
136,  216,  235;  as  evil  at  Conference, 
213;  Lansing's  opposition,  its  effect 
on  Wilson,  213,  219,  221, 237;  Wilson's 
consultations,  214-216;  and  Wilson's 
"open  diplomacy,"  217;  in  Council 
of  Four,  218,  236;  public  resentment, 
221,  222,  237;  Fiume  affair  as  lesson 
on,  233-235;  perfunctory  open  plenary 
sessions  of  Conference,  235;  Council 
of  Ten,  235;  effect  on  Wilson's  pres- 
tige, 236;  responsibility,  237;  effect 
on  delegates  of  smaller  nations,  238, 
239;  climax,  text  of  Treaty  withheld 
from  delegates,  239,  240;  psychologi- 
cal effect,  240;  great  opportunity  for 
reform  missed,  241;  and  Shantung, 
243,  244,  267;  Fourteen  Points  on, 
314.  See  also  Publicity. 

Secretariat  of  the  League,  in  Wilson's 
original  draft,  283;  in  Cecil  plan,  296; 
in  Treaty,  301,  302. 

"Self-denying  covenant"  for  guaranty 
of  territory  and  independence,  Lan- 
sing's advocacy,  44,  52;  House  and, 
79;  Wilson  rejects,  86;  suggested  by 
others  to  Wilson,  123. 

Self-determination,  in  Wilson's  draft  of 
Covenant,  93,  283,  292;  why  omitted 
from  treaty,  94;  in  theory  and  in  prac- 
tice, 96-98,  102-105;  Wilson  aban- 
dons, 98-100;  violation  in  the  treaties, 


98,  99,  273;  and  Civil  War,  100,  101; 
and  Fiume,  220;  colonial,  in  Fourteen 
Points,  314;  Wilson's  statement  (Feb. 
1918),  317.  A 

Senate  of  United  States,  and  affirmative 
guaranty,  125;  opposition  and  Wil- 
son's threat,  141;  plan  to  check  op- 
position by  a  modus  vivendi,  207. 

Separation  of  powers,  Wilson's  attitude, 
70. 

Serbia,  Jugo-Slavia,  194;  territory,  195; 
Fourteen  Points  on,  315,  316. 

Serbs,  Croats,  and  Slovenes.  See  Jugo- 
slavia. 

Shantung  Settlement,  as  subject  of  dis- 
agreement, 9;  and  secret  diplomacy, 
243,  244,  267;  bargain,  243,  255,  261; 
injustice,  blackmail,  244;  influence  of 
Japanese  bluff  not  to  agree  to  the 
League,  245-247,  261-264;  German 
control,  247;  Japanese  occupation, 
moral  effect,  248,  257,  258;  Chinese 
agreement  to  Japanese  demands,  re- 
sulting legal  and  moral  status,  249, 
258,  259;  status  after  China's  declara- 
tion of  war  on  Germany,  249-252; 
attitude  of  Allied  delegates,  252;  at- 
titude of  American  Commission,  letter 
to  Wilson,  252,  254-265;  argument 
before  Council  of  Ten,  253;  Japanese 
threat  to  American  Commission,  253; 
before  Council  of  Four,  254;  value 
of  Japanese  promises  questioned, 
243,  259-262;  and  Fiume,  259,  260; 
question  of  resignation  of  American 
Commission  over,  264,  265;  China 
refuses  to  sign  Treaty,  265;  Wilson 
permits  American  Commission  to 
share  in  negotiations,  265,  266;  Ameri- 
can public  opinion,  266,  267;  text  of 
Treaty  articles  on,  318,  319. 

Silesia,  and  Czecho-Slovakia,  194. 

Slavonia,  disposition,  194. 

Slovakia,  disposition,  194. 

Small  nations.   See  Equality. 

Smuts,  General,  and  disarmament,  75; 
plan  for  mandates,  82,  155. 

Society  for  the  Judicial  Settlement  of 
International  Disputes,  30. 

Sonnino,  Baron  Sidney.  See  Fiume. 

Sovereignty,  question  in  system  of  man- 
dates, 151,  291. 

Spitzbergen,  disposition,  196. 

Strategic  influence  on  boundary  lines,  103 . 

Straus,  Oscar  S.,  favors  League  as  re- 
ported, 136. 


328 


INDEX 


Supreme  War  Council,  American  mem- 
bers added,  14;  and  Cecil  plan,  88; 
and  Council  of  Ten,  213. 

Syria,  protectorate,  195.  See  also  Near 
East. 

Taft,  William  H.,  supports  League  as 
reported,  136. 

Transylvania,  disposition,  194. 

Treaty  of  Peace.  See  Peace. 

Treaty-making  power,  President's  re- 
sponsibility, 6;  duties  of  negotiators, 
7,  8;  and  affirmative  guaranty,  50-52, 
91,  167. 

Trieste,  disposition,  194,  228;  impor- 
tance, 227. 

Turkey,  dismemberment  and  mandates, 
Z57)  JQSj  3i°>  3".  3l6-  See  also  Near 
East. 

Ukraine,   Wilson   and,   99;   autonomy, 

and  Ruthenians,  194. 
Unanimity,  requirement  in  League,  295, 

301. 

Violation  of  the  League,  action  concern- 
ing, in  Wilson's  original  draft,  287, 
288;  in  Cecil  plan,  297;  in  Treaty, 
307- 

War.  See  Arbitration;  League  of  Na- 
tions; Prevention. 

White,  Henry,  arrival  in  Paris,  48;  op- 
poses affirmative  guaranty,  124;  and 
Covenant  as  reported,  137;  and  later 
amendments,  143;  and  proposed 
French  alliance,  179;  and  Shantung 
question,  255-257.  See  also  American 
programme;  American  Commission. 

Wickersham,  George  W.,  supports 
League  as  reported,  136. 

Williams,  E.  T.,  and  Shantung  question, 

254- 

Wilson,  Woodrow,  responsibility  for  for- 
eign relations,  6,  108;  duties  of  nego- 


tiators to,  7,  8,  10;  and  opposition, 
10-12,  41,  140,  231;  presumption  of 
self-assurance,  n;  conference  on  armi- 
stice terms,  15;  disregard  of  precedent, 
1 6;  and  need  of  defeat  of  enemy,  17; 
and  Commission  of  Inquiry,  17;  open- 
mindedness,  24;  and  advice  on  per- 
sonal conduct,  24;  positiveness  and 
indecision,  26;  and  election  of  1918, 
32;  prejudice  against  legal  attitude, 
41,  42,  107,  108,  200;  prefers  written 
advice,  47;  arrives  in  Paris,  48;  re- 
ception abroad,  48,  60,  62,  232;  on 
equality  of  nations,  59;  and  separa- 
tion of  powers,  70;  denounces  balance 
of  power,  77;  and  self-determination, 
95, 98-100;  conference  of  Jan.  10,  106- 
108;  contempt  for  Hague  Tribunal, 
130;  fidelity  to  convictions,  131,  163, 
21 1 ;  return  to  United  States,  135;  re- 
turn to  Paris,  141;  and  mandates,  150, 
151, 154, 159-161;  and  French  alliance, 
179-182,  185;  and  open  rupture  with 
Lansing,  187;  and  team-work,  201; 
decides  for  a  definitive  treaty  only, 
208;  rigidity  of  mind,  212;  secretive 
nature,  215;  and  Fiume,  228-232,  235; 
Italian  resentment,  232;  and  Shan- 
tung, 245, 247, 254, 255,  261-266;  and 
Bullitt  affair,  268-272;  Treaty  as 
abandonment  of  his  principles,  275; 
Fourteen  Points,  314-316;  principles 
of  peace  (Feb.  1918),  317.  See  also 
American  programme;  Commission 
on  the  League;  Council  of  Four;  Lan- 
sing; League;  Peace;  President  as  dele- 
gate; Secret  diplomacy. 

Withdrawal  from  League,  provision  in 
Treaty,  299;  through  failure  to  ap- 
prove amendments,  313. 

World  Peace  Foundation,  30. 

Zionism,  and  self-determination,  97. 
Zone  system  in  mutual  guaranty  plan, 
38. 


A     000667210     9 


